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Jurisdictional Statement 
This court has jurisdiction under section 78A-3-102(3)G) of the Utah Code. 
Introduction 
In 1964, Congress passed the Urban Mass Transportation Act, which 
allowed the federal government to provide federal funds to local public transit 
districts to enable those public transit districts to take over then-failing private 
transit systems. Pub. L. 88-365, 78 Stat. 302 (1964) (now codified at 49 U.S.C. 
§§ 5301 to -5340). Because federal labor laws concerning collective bargaining 
applied only to private employees -e.g., the employees of private transit 
systems-Congress required states, as a condition of receiving federal funds, to 
enact legislation to preserve "existing collective bargaining agreements," and 
continue "collective bargaining rights" to protect" individual employees against 
a worsening of their positions related to employment." 49 U.S.C. § 5333(b)(2). 
In 1969, Utah enacted the Utah Public Transit District Act to satisfy the 
Urban Mass Transportation Act's precondition for receiving federal funding to 
create a public transit district, such as UTA. 1969 Utah Laws ch. 12 § 30 (now 
codified at Utah Code§ 17B-2a-813(1)). To satisfy the precondition, the Utah 
Public Transit District Act allows the "employees" of a public transit system to 
join labor organizations and bargain collectively. Utah Code § 17B-2a-813(2)(a). 
The issue here is whether the term "employee" in the Utah Public Transit 
District Act includes supervisors, even though the term "employee" under 
1 
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federal labor laws in 1964 did not. Put differently, the issue is whether the Utah 
Public Transit District Act provided more collective bargaining rights - i.e., to 
supervisors - than the Urban Mass Transportation Act required, even though the 
Utah Public Transit District Act expressly states that it was establishing only 
those "rights, benefits, and other employee protective conditions and remedies of 
Section 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, ... as determined by 
the Secretary of Labor." Id. § 17B-2a-813(1). 
Because the Utah Public Transit District Act used the term "employee" as 
it was used in the Urban Mass Transportation Act, UT A supervisors do not have 
collective bargaining rights. The district court erred in ruling otherwise, even 
while recognizing the result as anomalous because UT A supervisors "may very 
well be the only supervisors in the United States with the right to organize and 
collectively bargain." [R.287 at n.2.] This court should reverse on the ground that 
the Utah Public Transit District Act does not provide collective bargaining rights 
to supervisors because federal law did not require Utah to create such rights. 
The result is no different if, as the district court ruled, the term "employee" 
in the Utah Public Transit District Act has the same meaning as it does in the 
Utah Labor Relations Act ("ULRA"). Utah enacted the ULRA in 1937. 1937 Utah 
Laws ch. 55 §§ 1-18 (current version at Utah Code§§ 34-20-1 to -14). The relevant 
language is copied almost verbatim from the National Labor Relations Act 
("NLRA"). Utah Code § 34-20-2(4). 
2 
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The NLRA was enacted in 1935 through legislation known as the "Wagner 
Act." Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (Supp. 1 
(1935)). It guaranteed private sector employees, but not public employees, the 
right to organize into unions and engage in collective bargaining. 29 U.S.C. 
§ 152(2) (Supp. 1 (1935)). 
In 1947, after a series of inconsistent decisions by the National Labor 
Relations Board ("NLRB") and the courts, Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley 
Amendments to clarify and amend the NLRA. Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 
(amendments originally codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 - 167 (Supp. 1 (1947)). 
Relevant here, Congress clarified that supervisors were never employees for 
purposes of collective bargaining. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2), (3) (Supp. 1 (1947)). 
Utah did not amend its ULRA definition of" employee" or" employer," 
but instead kept the original language that Congress clarified had never included 
supervisors. In fact, the ULRA today is nearly identical to its 1937 version. 
Compare Utah Code§ 34-20-2, with 1937 Utah Laws ch. 55 § 2. 
The district court here nonetheless interpreted the term "employees" to 
include supervisors under the ULRA, and, therefore, under the Utah Public 
Transit District Act. But if the Taft-Hartley Amendments clarified that supervisors 
were never included in the definition of "employees" under the NLRA, then 
Utah did not need to amend the ULRA to clarify that issue because its definition 
was copied from the same federal law clarified to exclude supervisors. 
3 
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For these reasons, whether the term" employee" in the Utah Public Transit 
District Act has the same definition as was required by the Urban Mass 
Transportation Act or has the same definition as that term has in the ULRA, the 
result is the same: UTA supervisors cannot bargain collectively. 
Issue: Whether the term "employee" used in section 17B-2a-813 of the 
Utah Code, Utah Public Transit District Act, includes supervisors and thereby 
allows supervisors to bargain collectively with UT A. 
Standard of Review: This court reviews a district court's interpretation of 
a statute for correctness. State v. Robertson, 2017 UT 27, ~ 14, - P.3d - . 
Preservation: This issue is preserved. [R.277,284,287,290,1008.] 
Determinative Provisions 
The following determinative provisions are attached at Addenda D-J: 
Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964: 49 U.S.C. § 1609 (1964) 
Urban Mass Transportation Act: 49 U.S.C. § 5333 (2017) 
Utah Public Transit District Act of 1969: 1969 Utah Laws ch. 12 §§ 30, 31 
Utah Public Transit District Act: Utah Code § 17B-2a-813 (2017) 
National Labor Relations Act: 29 U.S.C. §§ 152, 157 (1964) 
National Labor Relations Act: 29 U.S.C. §§ 152, 157 (2017) 
Utah Labor Relations Act: Utah Code §§ 34-20-2, -7, -8 (2017) 
4 
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Statement of the Case 
1. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
This case stems from a labor dispute between Teamsters Local 222 and 
UTA. The Teamsters sought to organize and represent UT A's rail operations 
supervisors for purposes of collective bargaining. UT A declined to recognize the 
union, asserting that rail operations supervisors are not "employees" for 
collective bargaining under the Utah Public Transit District Act. 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Teamsters. 
Because the Utah Public Transit District Act does not define the term 
"employees," the district court looked to Utah's labor statutes. The court ruled 
that UTA' s rail operations supervisors are "employees" as that term is used in 
Utah's labor statutes, and, accordingly, could organize and collectively bargain. 
The district court ordered a secret ballot election of the rail operations 
supervisors to determine whether they wanted to unionize. The rail operations 
supervisors voted not to unionize. Following the election, the district court 
entered Final Judgment. 
UTA moved for a new trial, asking the court to amend its decision 
regarding the interpretation of the terms "employer" and "employee" to make 
clear that rail operations supervisors are not employees under the Utah Public 
Transit District Act. The court denied UTA' s motion. UTA appealed. 
5 
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2. Statement of Facts 
Teamsters is a labor organization representing employees in industries 
that affect commerce. [R.1.] UTA is a public transit district organized under 
section 17B-2a-801 of the Utah Code. [R.2.] The plaintiffs work for UTA as rail 
operations supervisors in the TRAX division. [R.2.] 
In 2013, UT A employed approximately 38 to 41 rail operations supervisors. 
[R.4.] In 2014, UTA reclassified its rail operations supervisors from salaried 
workers to hourly workers. [R.4.] One or more of the rail operations supervisors 
contacted Teamsters, requesting assistance in organizing and bargaining 
collectively. [R.4.] Teamsters obtained authorization cards from 23 rail operations 
supervisors-a majority. [R.4.] 
Teamsters sent a letter to UTA informing it of organizing efforts among the 
rail operations supervisors. [R.4.] UTA responded that it "recognize[d] that its 
employees have the right to self-organize and form, join, or assist labor 
organizations pursuant to" section 17B-2a-813(1) of the Utah Public Transit 
District Act. [R.9.] Teamsters requested recognition for union representation for 
rail operations supervisors at TRAX and offered to hire a neutral third party to 
conduct a card check to verify that the 23 authorization cards were from rail 
operations supervisors on UTA's payroll. [R.11.] 
UTA rejected Teamsters' request for recognition. [R.13.] UTA indicated, 
first, that it did "not agree that the Rail Operations Supervisors at TRAX are an 
appropriate bargaining unit for representation," and second, that it rejected the 
6 
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card check as a sufficient procedure showing the desire for representation by a 
majority of the unit. [R.13.] UTA indicated that it would require that Teamsters 
file a petition for an election. [R.13.] 
The rail operations supervisors brought this action seeking declaratory 
judgment that they are an appropriate bargaining unit under section 17B-2a-
813(2) of the Utah Code. [R.2.] Simultaneously, Teamsters sought declaratory 
judgment that it was the exclusive bargaining representative for the bargaining 
unit of rail operations supervisors at TRAX. [R.2.] Teamsters and the rail 
operations supervisors asked the district court to II compel[] UTA to bargain with 
Teamsters Local 222 regarding the wages, salaries, hours, working conditions, 
and welfare, pension, and retirement of the bargaining unit." [R.3.] 
Teamsters moved for summary judgment. [R.156-70;277-94.] The district 
court granted the motion, ruling that UTA's rail operations supervisors are 
11 
employees" with the right to organize and collectively bargain. [R.278, attached 
at Add. C.] Teamsters asked the court to authorize a card check, rather than a 
secret ballot election. [R.168-70.] The district court granted that request, stating 
that a secret ballot election was preferable but essentially was too difficult now 
that the Utah Labor Relations Board no longer exists. [R.290-94.] 
The card check failed to produce the requisite number of cards, meaning 
that the rail operations supervisors had voted not to unionize. [R.301-02.] 
Teamsters filed a rule 60(b) motion, claiming several errors in the card check. 
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[R.304-12.] At that point, the district court "reconsider[ ed] its early ruling to use a 
'card check' method" because it had "major concerns with ... the overall efficacy 
of the 'card check' method." [R.436.] The district court determined that "[a] 
secret-ballot election is better designed to ascertain the true beliefs of the affected 
employees." [R.436;440-42.] 
The court granted Teamsters' rule 60(b) motion in part, but ordered a 
secret ballot election to rectify any deficiencies in the card check. [R.434-42.] The 
court ordered the parties to II meet and confer" regarding rules for the election. 
[R.442.] The court issued an Order Directing Election, setting forth rules for the 
election. [R.651-55.] 
Teamsters held the secret ballot election. [R.671-84.] The rail operations 
supervisors again voted not to unionize. [R.697-99.] As a result, Teamsters did 
not have a majority representation of the rail operations supervisors, and the rail 
operations supervisors were not certified as a collective bargaining unit. [R.699.] 
Having received the results of the election, the district court entered its final 
judgment. [R.697-99, attached at Add. B.] 
UT A moved for a new trial on the question of whether rail operations 
supervisors were II employees," the issue decided on summary judgment. [R.707-
72.] The district court denied UT A's motion for new trial. [R.1008-16, attached at 
Add. A.] UTA appealed. [R.1018-19.] Even though the election failed, the court's 
ruling, if it stands, allows UT A supervisors to attempt to unionize in the future. 
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Summary of the Argument 
The district court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Teamsters on the ground that UTA' s rail operations supervisors are "employees" 
for purposes of collective bargaining under the Utah Public Transit District Act. 
Since it was enacted in 1969, the Utah Public Transit District Act has 
required that "[t]he rights, benefits, and other employee protective conditions 
and remedies" of federal law apply to UTA. 1969 Utah Laws ch. 12 § 30 (now 
codified at Utah Code§ 17B-2a-813(1)). UTA's employees have the right to self-
organize; "form, join, or assist labor organizations"; and "bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own choosing." Utah Code§ 17B-2a-813(2)(a). In 
exchange, UTA must "recognize and bargain exclusively with any labor 
organization representing a majority" of their employees. Id.§ 17B-2a-813(2)(c)(i). 
The Utah Public Transit District Act does not define the term "employees," 
but it refers to the federal Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964. Id. § 17B-2a-
813(1). That Act does not define "employees" but preserves then-existing rights 
under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). 49 U.S.C. § 1609(c) (1964) 
( current version at 49 U.S. C. § 5333(b)). The NLRA, in turn, defines "employees" 
for collective bargaining purposes and expressly excludes "supervisors" from the 
definition of" employees." 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012); id. (1964). By extension, the 
Utah Public Transit District Act does not extend collective bargaining rights to 
"supervisors." This court can reverse on this ground alone. 
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The result is the same under the definition of "employees" in the Utah 
Labor Relations Act ("ULRA"), which the district court misinterpreted. The 
context of the ULRA reveals that "supervisors" were not entitled to collective 
bargaining protections. It was enacted in 1937, copied from the NLRA, which 
was enacted in 1935. However, in 1947, following a controversial decision of the 
U.S. Supreme Court, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Amendments, which 
amended the NLRA to clarify that" supervisors" were not II employees." Pub. L. 
No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (amendments originally codified at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 152(2), (3) (Supp. 1 (1947)). The House and Senate Reports make clear that 
Congress always intended the term "employee" to exclude supervisors. 
The Utah Legislature did not amend the ULRA. It did not need to. Had the 
Taft-Hartley Amendments changed the meaning of the term "employee" from 
the one Congress gave it originally, then the failure of Utah to amend the ULRA 
would support the district court's interpretation. The fact that the Taft-Hartley 
Amendments were clarifying reveals that Utah's definition excluded supervisors 
in 1937 and thereafter. Utah case law and statutes from the period confirm that 
Utah never treated "supervisors" as "employees," but as II employers." 
Under both interpretations, supervisors are not "employees" with 
collective bargaining rights under the Utah Public Transit Act. This court should 
reverse and remand for a factual determination of whether UTA' s rail operations 
supervisors are II supervisors" for purposes of collective bargaining. 
10 
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Argument 
Under the Utah Public Transit District Act, supervisors are not afforded 
collective bargaining rights. This is because the Utah Public Transit District Act 
afforded only those collective-bargaining rights required by the Urban Mass 
Transportation Act. And the Urban Mass Transportation Act required states to 
afford only those rights then-protected by the National Labor Relations Act 
("NLRA"), which did not extend collective bargaining rights to supervisors. 
The result is no different if the scope of the rights afforded by the Utah 
Public Transit District Act mirrors the scope of the rights in the Utah Labor 
Relations Act ("ULRA"). The ULRA was patterned on the NLRA in the 1930s, 
and in 1947 Congress clarified that the NLRA never afforded collective 
bargaining rights to supervisors. The ULRA also never afforded such rights. 
1. The Utah Public Transit District Act Does Not Provide Supervisors the 
Right to Bargain Collectively Because It Provides Only Those Rights 
Required Under Federal Law in 1964, and Federal Law Did Not Provide 
Supervisors the Right to Bargain Collectively in 1964 
In 1964, Congress passed the Urban Mass Transportation Act to help 
communities improve their mass transit operations. Pub. L. 88-365, 78 Stat. 302 
(1964) (originally codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601 -1611 (1964); current version at 49 
U.S.C. §§ 5301 - 5340); see Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Div. 1285, Amalgamated 
Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15, 17 (1982). 
At the time, many mass transit operations were private, which meant that 
transit employees' bargaining rights were protected under the NLRA, which 
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protected private, but not public, workers. Jackson Transit, 457 U.S. at 17. 
Congress understood that after the enactment of the Urban Mass Transportation 
Act many transit workers would become public employees, which meant they 
would no longer be afforded the protections of the NLRA. Id. 
While Congress wanted to improve transportation infrastructure, it also 
wanted to ensure that transit employees would be protected as they had been 
under the NLRA. Id. For that reason, Congress conditioned the receipt of federal 
funds to improve public transit systems upon whether states enacted legislation 
to preserve "existing collective bargaining agreements," to continue "collective 
bargaining rights," and to protect "individual employees against a worsening of 
their positions related to employment." 49 U.S.C. § 1609(c) (1964) (current 
version at 49 U.S.C. § 5333(b)(2)(A)-(C)) (attached at Add. D, E).1 
In 1969, to satisfy the condition for receiving federal funds, the Utah 
Legislature enacted the Utah Public Transit District Act. 1969 Utah Laws ch. 12 
§§ 1-59 (current version at Utah Code§§ 17B-2a-801 to -826). The Utah Public 
Transit District Act confirms that the legislature protected only those rights that 
the Urban Mass Transportation Act required Utah to protect: "The rights, 
benefits, and other employee protective conditions and remedies of Section 13(c) 
1 The relevant section of the Urban Mass Transportation Act is substantially 
the same as it was in 1964. Compare 49 U.S.C. § 1609(c) (1964), with 49 U.S.C. 
§ 5333(b) (2012 & Supp. 2016). For convenience, this brief cites the current version 
unless noted. 
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of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, as amended (49 U.S.C. 1609(c)), as 
determined by the Secretary of Labor, shall apply to the establishment and 
operation by the district of a public transit service or system." 1969 Utah Laws 
ch. 12 §§ 30, 31 (current version at§ 17B-2a-813(1)) (attached at Add. F, G).2 
The Utah Public Transit District Act explains the rights and responsibilities 
of UTA and its employees. UTA is required to 11recognize and bargain 
exclusively with any labor organization representing a majority of the district's 
employees in an appropriate unit." Utah Code§ 17B-2a-813(2)(c)(i). In turn, 
"[e]mployees of a public transit system established and operated by a public 
transit district have the right to: (i) self-organization; (ii) form, join, or assist labor 
organizations; and (iii) bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing." Id. § 17B-2a-813(2)(a). 
When UTA's rail operations supervisors attempted to organize, UTA 
refused to recognize them as "employees," asserting that "supervisors" are not 
"employees" allowed to bargain collectively under the NLRA and therefore are 
not II employees" allowed to bargain collectively under the Utah Public Transit 
District Act. The district court disagreed. As described below, the district court 
erred. 
2 The relevant sections of the Utah Public Transit District Act are substantially 
the same today as they were in 1969. Compare 1969 Utah Laws ch. 12 §§ 30, 31, 
with Utah Code § 17B-2a-813 (2017). For convenience, this brief cites the current 
version unless noted. 
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1.1 The Court's Objective in Interpreting a Stahtte Is to Give Effect to 
the Legislature's Intent 
This court's objective in interpreting a statute "is to give effect to the 
legislature's intent." Carranza v. United States, 2011 UT 80, ,I 8, 267 P.3d 912 
(internal quotation marks omitted). To discern legislative intent, the court looks 
first to the plain meaning of the language the legislature used. Olsen v. Eagle 
Mountain City, 2011 UT 10, ,I 9, 248 P.3d 465. And in determining the plain 
meaning, the court looks to how the language is used in context, not in isolation. 
Id. ,I,r 9, 12. The relevant context includes both "the structure and language of the 
statutory scheme." Id. ,r 12. 
When interpreting Utah statutes modeled on federal statutes, "[t]his Court 
has previously adopted federal interpretations for sections of the Utah Code 
which are identical to or copied after federal acts." W. Coating, Inc. v. Gibbons & 
Reed Co., 788 P.2d 503, 505-06 (Utah 1990); see also Kell v. State, 2012 UT 25, ,r,r 27-
28, 285 P.3d 1133 (looking to federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act to interpret Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act); Summit Water Distrib. Co. v. 
Summit Cnty., 2005 UT 73, ,r,r 21-24, 123 P.3d 437 (looking to federal Antitrust 
Act to interpret Utah Antitrust Act). 
This is because "[w]hen the legislature 'borrows terms of art in which are 
accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it 
presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each 
borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken."' Maxfield v. 
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Herbert, 2012 UT 44, ,r 31,284 P.3d 647 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 
U.S. 246, 263 (1952)). "In other words, when a word or phrase is 'transplanted 
from another legal source, whether the common law or other legislation, it brings 
the old soil with it."' Id. (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading 
of Statutes, 47 Colurn. L. Rev. 527, 537 (1947)). 
Based on these principles and for the reasons described below, this court 
should hold that when the Utah Legislature used the phrase "rights, benefits, 
and other employee protective conditions and remedies" in the Utah Public 
Transit District Act, it referred to those same rights, benefits, and employee 
protective conditions and remedies required by the Urban Mass Transportation 
Act, which, in turn, are those rights, benefits, and employee protective conditions 
and remedies afforded under the NLRA in 1964. Because the NLRA in 1964 
expressly excluded "supervisors" as "employees" for purposes of collective 
bargaining, the Utah Public Transit District Act did not extend collective 
bargaining rights to supervisors. UT A's rail operations supervisors therefore do 
not have rights to collectively bargain under the Utah Public Transit District Act. 
1.2 The Utah Public Transit District Act Protected Only Those Rights 
Recognized by the NLRA in 1964 
The Utah Public Transit District Act states that, "[t]he rights, benefits, and 
other employee protective conditions and remedies of Section 13(c) of the Urban 
Mass Transportation Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 5333(b), as determined by the 
Secretary of Labor, apply to a public transit district's establishment and 
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operation of a public transit service or system." Utah Code§ 17B-2a-813(1) 
( emphasis added). The Urban Mass Transportation Act states that it is "a 
condition of financial assistance" that "the interests of employees affected by the 
assistance shall be protected under arrangements the Secretary of Labor 
concludes are fair and equitable," including "the preservation of rights, 
privileges, and benefits ... under existing collective bargaining agreements or 
otherwise," "the continuation of collective bargaining rights,"" and "the 
protection of individual employees against a worsening of their positions related 
to employment." 49 U.S.C. § 5333(b)(l), (2)(A)-(C) (emphasis added). 
Case law makes clear that the purpose of the Urban Mass Transportation 
Act was to require only the continuation of those employees' then-existing 
collective bargaining rights. The purpose was to entice "a state or local 
government [to] make arrangements to preserve transit workers' existing 
collective-bargaining rights." Jackson Transit, 457 U.S. at 16 (emphasis added). 
As one court explained, "Congress meant to require the continuation of 
collective bargaining rights." Amalgamated Transit Union Int'l v. Donovan, 767 F.2d 
939,947 (D.C. Cir.1985) (emphasis added). The Urban Mass Transportation Act 
"was designed to preserve the status quo such that, where workers enjoyed 
collective bargaining rights prior to a state's acquisition of a transit system with 
federal money, those workers were to be assured of a continuance of collective 
bargaining. Maintaining the status quo usually meant substantially preserving 
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collective bargaining rights that had been established by federal labor policy." Id. 
at 948 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Because the Urban Mass Transportation Act required states to preserve 
"existing collective bargaining rights," and because the Utah Public Transit 
District Act intended to afford the "rights, benefits, and other employee 
protective conditions and remedies" of the Urban Mass Transportation Act, the 
dispositive issue here is whether supervisors had "existing" rights to bargain 
collectively in 1964 when Congress enacted the Urban Mass Transportation Act. 
Supervisors did not have that right. 
1.3 Supervisors Did Not Have the Right to Bargain Collectively Under 
the NLRA in 1964 
Under federal law, collective bargaining rights are - and were, in 1964-
governed by the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 - 169 (2012).3 The NLRA regulates the 
collective bargaining rights and responsibilities of employers and employees 
who "affect[] commerce." Id. § 160(a); see NLRB v. Carteret Towing Co., 307 F.2d 
835,387 (4th Cir. 1962) ("Congress intended to have the National Labor Relations 
Act extend to all employers who engage in commerce."). 
Given the breadth of the term "commerce," the NLRA reaches nearly all 
American workers except public employees. And the rights afforded by the 
3 The relevant sections of the NLRA are substantially the same, and retain the 
same numbering, today as in 1964. Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 - 169 (2012), with 29 
U.S.C. §§ 151 -168 (1964). For convenience, this brief cites the current version 
unless noted. 
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NLRA, as applied to public transit employees via the Urban Mass Transportation 
Act, govern here. E.g. Burke v. Utah Transit Auth., 462 F.3d 1253, 1259-60 (10th Cir. 
2006) (turning to decisions of the NLRB to determine whether bus and light rail 
employees could be consolidated in one II appropriate bargaining unit" under the 
Urban Mass Transportation Act and Utah Public Transit District Act). The ULRA 
protects those few Utah private workers who do not engage in commerce and 
therefore are not protected by the NLRA, and the Utah Public Transit District Act 
protects certain public employees. 
Under the NLRA, 11 [ e ]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to 
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities 
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 29 
U.S.C. § 157. 
Critically, both in 1964 and today, 11 [t]he term' employee' ... shall not 
include ... any individual employed as a supervisor." Id. § 152(3). The full 
provision states: 
The term II employee" shall include any employee, and shall 
not be limited to the employees of a particular 
employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states 
otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work 
has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, 
any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor 
practice, and who has not obtained any other regular 
and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not 
include any individual employed as an agricultural 
laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or 
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person at his home, or any individual employed by his 
parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of 
an independent contractor, or any individual employed as 
a supervisor, or any individual employed by an 
employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended 
from time to time, or by any other person who is not an 
employer as herein defined. 
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (emphases added) (1964 version attached at Add. H; current 
version attached at Add. I).4 
That same section defines "supervisors" as including "any individual 
having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay 
off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or 
responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to 
recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such 
authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of 
independent judgment." Id.§ 152(11). 
When the Urban Mass Transportation Act required states to protect "the 
interest of employees," it did not require states to create new collective 
bargaining rights for supervisors. Thus, the Utah Public Transit District Act does 
not extend to supervisors the right to bargain collectively. This court should 
reverse and remand for a factual determination of whether UTA' s rail operations 
supervisors are supervisors under the definition provided by under the NLRA, 
and, therefore, under the Utah Public Transit District Act. 
4 The history of this provision will be discussed extensively below. 
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2. The Result Is the Same if the Utah Public Transit District Act Adopted 
the Definition of the ULRA 
The district court did not rely on the Urban Mass Transportation Act or the 
NLRA. Instead, the district court turned to the ULRA for guidance as to the 
meaning of the word "employees." [R.288-90. ]5 But under the ULRA, the result is 
the same. Utah Code§§ 34-20-1 to -14 (2017) (attached at Add. J.) 
The rights and roles of II employees" and II employers" in collective 
bargaining are delineated in sections 34-20-7 and 34-20-8. Section 34-20-2 defines 
both" employee" and II employer" for purposes of that chapter. Section 34-20-
2(4)(a) states that 11 '[e]mployee' includes any employee unless this chapter 
explicitly states otherwise." The term expressly excludes II an individual 
employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of a family or 
person at his home, or an individual employed by his parent or spouse." Id.§ 34-
20-2(4)(b). An '"[e]mployer' includes a person acting in the interest of an 
employer, directly or indirectly." Id. § 34-20-2(5). 
The district court asked whether supervisors are "employees" or 
11 employers" for purposes of Utah's collective bargaining laws. Although UT A's 
"rail operations supervisors" are the only supervisors at issue here, the district 
court's ruling would extend to all supervisors, including upper management. 
5 The district court turned first to dictionary definitions. [R.289.] UTA does 
not argue that a dictionary definition of II employee" would necessarily exclude 
"supervisors." The U.S. Supreme Court has said as much. NLRB v. Ky. River 
Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 711 (2001). 
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NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 281 (1974) ( discussing 
NLRA' s potential application to vice presidents). 
In what follows, UTA explains the history of state and federal labor law, 
both of which lead to the conclusion that Utah never intended to ascribe 
collective bargaining rights to supervisors. Although the district court correctly 
recited the historical events, it failed to recognize their meaning. UT A then turns 
to the principles of statutory construction that the district court misapplied. 
2.1 Utah Never Considered Supervisors to Be Employees Under Labor 
Laws 
This court's "role in interpreting [a] statute is to give its words the 
meaning they would have had in the minds of the general public at the time of 
enactment." State v. Bagnes, 2014 UT 4, ,r 16, 322 P.3d 719. Courts should consider 
"the surrounding circumstances existing at the time of [the statute's] passage" to 
determine a term's meaning. Chapman v. Handley, 24 P. 673, 674 (Utah 1890). 
As described below, when Utah adopted its collective bargaining laws in 
1937, it did not intend "supervisors" to be included in the term "employees." 
This is confirmed by the fact that in 1947 Congress clarified that supervisors were 
never employees. It is also confirmed by contemporaneous Utah law and the 
context of the terms "employee" and "employer" in the ULRA. 
To understand these points, it is important to understand the evolution of 
Utah and federal labor law, from ratification of the Utah Constitution through 
1947, when Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Amendments. 
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2.1.1 The Early Years of Utah Labor Law 
The Utah Constitution states that "[t]he Legislature shall prohibit ... [t]he 
political and commercial control of employees." Utah Const. art. XVI, § 3. Shortly 
after statehood, Utah enacted labor laws. One such law stated that labor unions 
were not unlawful for working men or women: "It shall not be unlawful for 
working men and women to organize themselves into, or carry on, labor unions 
for the purpose of lessening the hours of labor, increasing the wages, bettering 
the conditions of the members of such organization; or carrying out their 
legitimate purposes as freely as they could do if acting singly." Utah Comp. 
Laws § 3651 (1917) (attached at Add. K). 
At the time, Utah law distinguished two types of workers: "vice-
principals" and II fellow servants." Id. §§ 3682, 3683. "Vice-principals" included 
"[a]ll persons engaged in the service of any person, firm, or corporation, ... who 
are intrusted by such person, firm, or corporation as employer with the authority 
of superintendence, control, or command of other persons in the employ or 
service of such employer, or with the authority to direct any other employe[e] in 
the performance of any duties of such employe[e]." Id.§ 3682. In contrast, 
11 fellow servants" included 11 [ a ]II persons who are engaged in the service of such 
employer, and ... [not] intrusted by such employer with any superintendence or 
control over his fellow employe[e]s." Id.§ 3683. 
Early Utah case law discussing workers compensation held that" one 
cannot at the same time be employer and employ[ee] or master and servant." 
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Rockefeller v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 197 P. 1038, 1042 (Utah 1921). This was true 
even when a person who would be considered an employer ( or vice-principal) 
was performing a task that might be considered the task of an employee ( or 
fellow servant). Southenz Pac. Co. v. Schaer, 114 F. 466,469 (8th Cir. 1902) 
(discussing Utah law). Utah law provided that "employe[e]s who are intrusted 
by their employers with the authority to superintend other employe[e]s of the 
same master, or with the authority to direct any other employe[e] in the 
discharge of any of his duties, are vice principals of such employer." Id. 
2.1.2 The NLRA, federal Wagner Act, of 1935 
In 1935, Congress enacted the NLRA, also known as the Wagner Act. Pub. 
L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (originally codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (Supp. 1 
(1935)) (attached at Add. L).6 The NLRA created the National Labor Relations 
Board ("NLRB") and set forth its policy-i.e., to address unequal bargaining 
power between employees and employers: 
The inequality of bargaining power between employees 
who do not possess full freedom of association or actual 
liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in 
the corporate or other forms of ownership association 
substantially burdens and affects the flow of 
commerce .... Experience has proved that protection 
by law of the right of employees to organize and 
bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, 
6 For clarity, the NLRA refers to one Act over time. Because this brief will 
discuss two pieces of major legislation related to it, the brief at times refers to the 
Wagner Act when discussing the 1935 legislation (Add. L) and the Taft-Hartley 
Amendments when referring to the 1947 legislation (Add. P). Both pieces of 
legislation, however, are part of the NLRA. 
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impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of 
commerce by ... restoring equality of bargaining power 
between employers and employees. 
§ 1, 49 Stat. at 449. The NLRA defined II employee" and II employer" as follows: 
(2) The term "employer" includes any person acting in 
the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, but 
shall not include the United States, or any State or 
political subdivision thereof, or any person subject to 
the Railway Labor Act, or any labor organization ( other 
than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in 
the capacity of officer or agent of such labor 
organization. 
(3) The term "employee" shall include any employee, 
and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular 
employer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise, and 
shall include any individual whose work has ceased as 
a consequence of, or in connection with, any current 
labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, 
and who has not obtained any other regular and 
substantially equivalent employment, but shall not 
include any individual employed as an agricultural 
laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or 
person at his home, or any individual employed by his 
parent or spouse. 
§ 2, 49 Stat. at 450. 
At that time, the NLRB generally excluded supervisors and foremen from 
bargaining units. The NLRB presumed, without expressly stating, that 
supervisors did not fall within the definition of" employees." For example, in In 
re United States Stamping Co., the NLRB found that "[t]he foremen and assistant 
foremen are paid respectively on a salary and an hourly basis and ought also to 
be excluded as having supervisory authority and duties that relate them more 
directly to the management than to the workers." 1 N.L.R.B. 123, 127 (1936), 1936 
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WL 6759 ( attached at Add. M). A series of other decisions routinely excluded 
supervisors as part of the "employee" bargaining unit. E.g., In re Saxon Mills, 1 
N.L.R.B. 153, 156 (1936), 1936 WL 6762 (certifying bargaining unit exclusive of 
supervisors); In re R.C.A. Manufacturing Co., Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 159, 165 (1936), 1936 
WL 7784 (same); In re Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. of Cal., 3 N.L.R.B. 431, 439 
(1937), 1937 WL 7333 (same). 
2.1.3 The ULRA, Utah Little Wagner Act, of 1937 
In this context of state and federal law, Utah enacted the ULRA in 1937, 
often called the "Little Wagner Act." 1937 Utah Laws ch. 55 §§ 1-18 (current 
version at Utah Code§§ 34-20-1 to -14)) (attached at Add. N). Utah adopted 
verbatim the NLRA' s declaration of policy, except making appropriate changes 
such replacing "interstate" with" intrastate." Id. § 2. Utah also adopted verbatim 
the NLRA' s somewhat vague definitions of" employer" and II employee." Id. § 3; 
see Se. Furniture Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 111 P.2d 153, 153-54 (Utah 1941). 
2.1.4 The NLRB Interprets the NLRA Inconsistently Between 
1942 and 1947 
In 1942, the NLRB addressed squarely whether II a unit composed entirely 
of supervisory employees was a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective 
bargaining." See In re Md. Drydock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 733,737 (1943), 1943 WL 10134 
(explaining 1942 decision). Over the next few years, the NLRB issued a series of 
inconsistent decisions on this point. 
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At first, the NLRB recognized the right of foremen to organize bargaining 
units, later refused to approve foremen organization units, and still later 
recognized their right to bargain collectively. See Bethlehem Steel Co. v. N. Y. State 
Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 770 (1947) (describing inconsistent decisions); 
N.L.R.B. v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 277 (1974) (stating 
related decisions from this period "manifested a progressive uncertainty"). 
2.1.5 The U.S. Supreme Court Issues Packard Motor Car 
Company v. NLRB in March 1947 
In March 1947, the U.S. Supreme Court issued Packard Motor Car Co. v. 
NLRB, the case that spurred Congress to clarify its definition of "employees" in 
the NLRA. 330 U.S. 485 (1947) (attached at Add. 0). Over 1,000 foremen of the 
Packard attempted to organize. Id. at 487. Packard objected on the ground that 
the foremen were not "employees," but were "employers" because they "actD in 
the interest of an employer." Id. at 488 (citing 49 Stat. 450). The NLRB disagreed, 
holding that Packard's "foremen" were "employees" under the NLRA. Id. 
The court affirmed, 5-4, holding that the NLRB had the authority to make 
this decision. Id. at 488-89. The court did not condone the policy of allowing 
foremen to bargain collectively, but held only that the NLRA did not expressly 
preclude it. Id. at 489. The court recognized its "only function is to determine 
whether the order of the Board is authorized by the statute." Id. at 488. The court 
explained that" it is for Congress to create exceptions or qualifications at odds 
with its plain terms." Id. at 490. The court would not look into legislative history 
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to determine whether u exclusion of foremen was intended," because it 
concluded that the NLRA was not ambiguous. Id. at 492. 
The court acknow !edged Packard's argument that "unionization of 
foremen is from many points bad industrial policy," but declined to rule on the 
merits of that issue, concluding that "[h]owever we might appraise the force of 
these arguments as a policy matter, we are not authorized to base decision of a 
question of law upon them. They concern the wisdom of the legislation; they 
cannot alter the meaning of otherwise plain provisions." Id. at 493. 
The court recognized the inherent inconsistency in allowing management 
to unionize, but did not specify where it drew the line between workers who 
were "employees" within the meaning of the NLRA and workers who were 
"employers" within the meaning of the NLRA. In a footnote, it commented: "If a 
union of vice presidents, presidents or others of like relationship to a corporation 
comes here claiming rights under this Act, it will be time enough then to point 
out the obvious and relevant differences between the 1100 foremen of this 
company and corporate officers elected by the board of directors." Id. at 490 n.2. 
Four justices dissented. Justice Douglas authored a strongly worded 
dissenting opinion: "For if foremen are 'employees' within the meaning of the 
[NLRA], so are vice-presidents, managers, assistant managers, superintendents, 
assistant superintendents-indeed, all who are on the payroll of the company, 
including the president. ... But once vice-presidents, managers, superintendents, 
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foremen all are unionized, management and labor will become more of a solid 
phalanx than separate factions in warring camps." Id. at 494 (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
Justice Douglas also noted that, although the statute said that "employee" 
included "any employee," the term was "used in opposition to the term 
'employer,"' which was "defined to include' any person acting in the interest of 
an employer.' The term' employer' thus includes some employees." Id. at 495 
(internal citation omitted). He could "find no evidence that one personnel group 
may be both employers and employees within the meaning of the Act." Id. 
Speaking to legislative history, Justice Douglas wrote that there was "no 
trace of Congressional concern with the problems of supervisory personnel. The 
reports and debates are barren of any reference to them." Id. at 498. He noted that 
three other federal Acts expressly included II subordinate officials" in the 
definition of II employee," which suggested, along with the legislative history of 
the NLRA, that Congress did not intend to include supervisors as employees. Id. 
at 499; see Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 279 (discussing same). 
The Congressional response to Packard, described below, demonstrates 
that Congress agreed with Justice Douglas - not that Congress had mistakenly 
extended collective bargaining rights to supervisors and needed to fix that 
problem, but that Congress never extended collective bargaining rights to 
supervisors under the NLRA. 
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2.1.6 The Taft-Hartley Amendments Are Enacted in June 1947 
Packard issued March 10, 1947, and Congress immediately moved to clarify 
the NLRA. In April, Representative Hartley introduced a bill in the House of 
Representatives, followed by Senator Taft's bill in the Senate in May. 1947 Taft-
Hartley Passage and NLRB Structural Changes, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 
BOARD,https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/ our-history/1947-taft-hartley-
passage-and-nlrb-structural-changes (last visited August 30, 2017) [hereinafter 
1947 Taft-Hartley Passage and NLRB Structural Changes]. 
Collectively, the amendments were known as the Taft-Hartley Act. Pub. L. 
No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (amendments originally codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151- 67 
(Supp. 1 (1947)) (attached at Add. P). The Taft-Hartley Act made the following 
clarifications to the definitions of II employer" and II employee": 
(2) The term II employer" includes any person acting as 
an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not 
include the United States or any wholly owned 
Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, 
or any State or political subdivision thereof, or any 
corporation or association operating a hospital, if no 
part of the net earnings inures to the benefit of any 
private shareholder or individual, or any person subject 
to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to 
time, or any labor organization ( other than when acting 
as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of 
officer or agent of such labor organization. 
(3) The term II employee" shall include any employee, 
and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular 
employer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise, and 
shall include any individual whose work has ceased as 
a consequence of, or in connection with, any current 
labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, 
and who has not obtained any other regular and 
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substantially equivalent employment, but shall not 
include any individual employed as an agricultural 
laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or 
person at his home, or any individual employed by his 
parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of 
an independent contractor, or any individual employed as 
a supervisor, or any individual employed by an 
employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended 
from time to time, or by any other person who is not an 
employer as herein defined. 
§ 2, 61 Stat. at 137-38 (emphases added). 
Representative Hartley's House Report and Senator Taft's Senate Report 
are instructive. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently relied on them in 
generating its post-Taft-Hartley jurisprudence: "Significantly, both the House 
Report and the Senate Report voiced concern over the Board's broad reading of 
the term 'employee' to include those clearly within the managerial hierarchy." 
Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 283-284. 
As described below, each Report explains that Congress was not changing, 
but was clarifying, the definition of II employees" in the NLRA. 
2.1.6.1 Representative Hartley's House Report 
Representative Hartley's House Report outlines why it was necessary to 
clarify the NLRA. H. R. Rep. No. 80-245 (1947) (pp. 292-309 attached at Add. Q) 
[full document at R.821-83]. 
First, and most generally, Representative Hartley expressed frustration 
that the NLRB had misinterpreted the Act to be overly friendly to employers and 
not adequately friendly to employees. He wrote that the NLRB II appears to have 
assumed that when Congress said it wished to protect the rights of 'workers' it 
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mean to protect labor organizations ... , even when the labor organizations 
exploited the workers or engaged in other activities that were inconsistent with 
the interests of workers." Id. at 302. He further explained that "[t]o the Board, the 
interests of the unions, not those of the workers, seem to have been of paramount 
importance. The Board has had little regard for the rights of employees, and its 
misconception of its duties doubtless has increased industrial strife." Id. 
Second, the bill clarified that the term "employee" does not include 
supervisors. Id. at 304. Representative Hartley explained the Board's errors in 
interpreting the Act: 11 [T]he bill forbids the Board to regard as employees 
foremen and other representatives of management who act for employers in their 
dealings with employees and their unions." Id. at 299. This was necessary, he 
wrote, because II so-called independent unions of foremen are not in fact 
independent, but ... the unions of men the foremen supervise actually control 
them. The evidence further shows that management must have in the plants 
agents who are entirely loyal, just as representatives of the workers must be 
undivided in their loyalty to the workers." Id. 
Finally, the bill amended the definition of" employer," changing the 
phrase II any person acting in the interest of an employer" to "any person acting 
as an agent of an employer." Id. at 302 (emphasis in original). Representative 
Hartley explained that, under the old language, "the Board frequently 'imputed' 
to employers anything that anyone connected with an employer, no matter how 
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remotely, said or did, notwithstanding that the employer had not authorized 
what was said or done, and in many cases even had prohibited it. By such 
rulings, the Board often was able to punish employers for things they did not do, 
did not authorize, and had tried to prevent." Id. As a result of the new definition, 
only when a person was acting as "agent" of the employer would his actions be 
ascribed to the employer. Representative Hartley explained that the amendment 
would "make• the ordinary rules of the law of agency equally applicable to 
employers and to unions." Id. 
Crucially, Representative Hartley explained that the Board had 
misinterpreted the original Act: "When Congress passed the Labor Act, we were 
concerned, as we said in its preamble, with the welfare of 'workers' and 'wage 
earners,' not of the boss. It was to protect workers and their unions against 
foremen, not to unionize foremen, that Congress passed the act." Id. at 304. In 
short, "unionizing supervisors under the Labor Act is inconsistent with the 
purpose of the act." Id. at 305. He explained the reason that foremen should not 
have the same protections as other employees, citing the same reasons given by 
Justice Douglas. Id. at 307-08. 
In the end, Representative Hartley confirmed that: "by this bill, Congress 
makes clear once more what it tried to make clear when, in passing the act, it defined 
as an' employer,' not an' employee,' any person' acting in the interest of an 
employer."' Id. at 308 (emphasis added). 
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2.1.6.2 Senator Taft's Senate Report 
In the Senate Report, Senator Taft described the need for clarifying 
legislation as "urgent." S. Rep. No. 80-105, at 408 (1947) (pp. 407-11 attached at 
Add. R) [full document at R.885-982]. He explained the urgency as follows:" A 
recent development which probably more than any other single factor has upset 
any real balance of power in the collective-bargaining process has been the 
successful efforts of labor organizations to invoke the NLRA for covering 
supervisory personnel, traditionally regarded as part of management, into 
organizations composed of or subservient to the unions of the very men they 
were hired to supervise." Id. at 409. 
He explained that "[i]t was not until 1945, after several changes in position, 
that the National Labor Relations Board itself by divided vote finally decided 
that supervisory employees were covered by the [NLRA]. This construction was 
recently upheld by the Supreme Court in the Packard Motor Car case ( decided 
March 10, 1947.)" Id. at 409-10. Noting that the court had not upheld the policy, 
only the Board's ability to interpret the word "employee," he stated: "This 
means, as Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out in his dissenting opinion-and as 
Board counsel conceded in argument- that unless Congress amends the act in 
this respect its process can be used to unionize even vice presidents since they 
are not specifically exempted from the category of' employees.111 Id. at 410. 
Senator Taft wrote: "In recommending the adoption of this amendment, 
the committee is trying to make clear what Congress attempted to demonstrate last year 
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when it adopted the Case bill.[71 By drawing a more definite line between 
management and labor we believe the proposed language has fully met some of 
the technical criticisms to the corresponding section ref erred to in the President's 
veto of that bill. It should be noted that all that the bill does is to leave foremen in the 
same position in which they were until the Labor Board reversed the position it had 
originally taken in 1943." Id. at 411. He summarized the change by saying "[i]t 
eliminates the genuine supervisor from the coverage of the act as an employee 
and makes it clear that he should be deemed a part of management." Id. In other 
words, the clarification was necessary to avoid the absurd conclusion that vice 
presidents could have the protections of law when they collectively bargain. 
2.1.6.3 Veto and Override 
The House passed Representative Hartley's bill 308-107, and the Senate 
passed the Taft bill, 68-24. 1947 Taft-Hartley Passage and NLRB Structural Changes. 
President Truman vetoed it. 93 Cong. Rec. 7500-03 (1947). Within days, the 
House overrode the veto 331-83, and the Senate overrode the veto 68-25, which 
was six votes more than needed. Presidential Vetoes, 1789-1988, S. Pub. 102-12, at 
378-79 (1992). The bill became law Jnne 23, 1947, just three-and-a-half months 
after Packard. Id.; Pub. L. No. 80-101, 136 (1947). 
7 The Case bill was introduced in Congress in 1946 to amend the NLRA, 
including to exclude supervisors as statutory employees. See Int'l Bros. of Elec. 
Workers v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1143, 1166 n.25 (describing history of Case bill). It 
passed both houses of Congress, but was vetoed by President Truman. Id. 
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Because Congress clarified that the NLRA never defined "employees" to 
include supervisors, Utah did not amend the ULRA. Congress had clarified that 
Packard was inconsistent with what Congress intended in 1935, the language 
Utah copied in 1937. Utah did not need to amend its language because no Utah 
court had erroneously interpreted the ULRA and, as explained above, at the time 
the ULRA was enacted, the NLRB decisions had generally excluded supervisors 
as part of bargaining units. E.g. In re U.S. Stamping Co., 1 NLRB at 127. 
The district court here disagreed. The court rejected the history and 
concluded that because Packard had said the language of the NLRA was 
unambiguous, the ULRA is also unambiguous and therefore the legislative 
history was irrelevant. [R.1013-14.] In what follows, UTA explains how the 
district court erred in assuming a 1947 U.S. Supreme Court decision reflects what 
the Utah Legislature intended in 1937. 
2.2 Because the Taft-Hartley Amendment Clarified the NLRA, Its 
Definition of "Employees" Is the Same Definition in the ULRA 
The district court erred in treating the Taft-Hartley Amendments as 
legislative history, rather than subsequent legislation. [R.1012.] This is an 
important distinction, one made clear by the U.S. Supreme Court, which has 
consistently held that subsequent legislation is entitled to great weight in 
statutory construction, even where legislative history is not. 
The district court also erred when it concluded that, because current Utah 
law does not recognize clarifying amendments, federal clarifying amendments in 
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1947 also cannot be recognized. [R.1009-10.] But federal law does recognize 
clarifying amendments as retroactive, particularly when the U.S. Supreme Court 
says a word is unambiguous, as Packard did here, but Congress concludes the 
court erred and amends the legislation to make its intention more clear. Because 
under federal law clarifying amendments apply retroactively, the 1947 Taft-
Hartley Amendments retroactively apply to the NLRA-and, in turn, confirm 
that the ULRA does not provide to supervisors the right to bargain collectively. 
Finally, the district court failed to recognize that contemporary Utah law 
shows that, in 1937, Utah-like the NLRB at that time-defined "supervisors" to 
be "employers" rather than "employees." UT A addresses each error in turn. 
2.2.1 Subsequent Legislation Declaring the Intent of an Earlier 
Statute is Entitled to Great Weight in Statutory 
Construction 
First, the district court rejected the importance of the Taft-Hartley 
Amendments, stating that it had "serious concerns about whether one Congress 
can usefully or accurately describe an earlier Congress's intent in passing a 
previous statute, concerns that are shared by the United States Supreme Court." 
[R.1012.] Here, the district court confused postenactment legislative history with 
subsequent legislation. Although postenactment legislative history is of dubious 
value, it is well settled under federal law that "[s]ubsequent legislation declaring 
the intent of an earlier statute is entitled to great weight in statutory 
construction." Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81 (1969). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court expressly addressed the distinction: "subsequent 
legislation" refers to legislation that was passed by Congress to clarify previous 
legislation. Consumer Products Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 
102, 117-18 & n.13 (1980). It does not refer to "legislative history" before the 
original act was passed or to legislative commentary after-the-fact. Id. This is 
because, "[w]ith respect to subsequent legislation, ... Congress has proceeded 
formally through the legislative process. A mere statement in a conference report 
of such legislation as to what the Committee believes an earlier statute meant is 
obviously less weighty." Id. (emphasis in original). 
The district court cited two cases that illustrate the point: GTE and 
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223 (2011). Bruesewitz confirms that "[p]ost-
enactment legislative history (a contradiction in terms) is not a legitimate tool of 
statutory interpretation." 562 U.S. at 242. Justice Scalia called it a "contradiction 
in terms" referring to statements made in subsequent debates, not to subsequent 
legislation. Id. The cases cited by Brueswitz show the distinction. In United States v. 
Wrightwood Dairy Co., the court refused to rely on "[t]he opinions of some 
members of the Senate, conflicting with the explicit statements of the meaning of 
the statutory language made by the Committee reports and members of the 
Committees." 315 U.S. 110, 125 (1942). And in United States v. United Mine 
Workers of America, the court refused to rely on "remarks" made during Senate 
debates about a bill that did not pass. 330 U.S. 258, 281-82 (1947). 
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In contrast, Red Lion refers to subsequent legislation. In Red Lion, the court 
considered a statute amended by Congress to make clear that it agreed with an 
agency interpretation of a statute enacted thirty years earlier. 395 U.S. at 380. The 
court afforded the 1959 amendment "great weight in statutory construction," id. 
at 381, holding that it made clear what Congress had meant in the 1927 statute. 
Id. The cases cited in Red Lion illustrate the operative distinction. 
The first case is Federal Housing Administration v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 
84 (1958). In Darlington, the court considered a 1954 amendment to a 1947 law. 
358 U.S. at 85-86. The court said, "[s]ubsequent legislation which declares the 
intent of an earlier law is not, of course, conclusive in determining what the 
previous Congress meant. But the later law is entitled to weight when it comes to 
the problem of construction." Id. at 90. 
The second case is Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962). In Glidden, the 
court built on that principle, saying the Darlington maxim is "[e]specially ... so 
when the Congress has been stimulated by decisions of this Court to investigate 
the historical materials involved and has drawn from them a contrary 
conclusion." 370 U.S. at 541. The court also identified its source of "subsequent 
legislation which declares the intent of an earlier law": "[an] examination of the 
House and Senate Reports." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Another case also illustrates the point. In United States v. Hutcheson, the 
court relied on the House and Senate Reports and concluded that Congress 
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passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act "to restore the broad purpose which Congress 
thought it had formulated in the Clayton Act but which was frustrated, so 
Congress believed, by unduly restrictive judicial construction." 312 U.S. 219, 235-
36 (1941). Thus, the subsequent legislation demonstrated that "[t]he Norris-
LaGuardia Act reasserted the original purpose of the Clayton Act." Id. at 236.8 
The district court erred in comparing this case to GTE and Bruesewitz, 
rather than Red Lion. The Taft-Hartley Amendments were clear in their goal to 
negate a judicial interpretation and clarify what Congress meant all along. The 
House and Senate Reports make that plain. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 278-81. 
2.2.2 Whether the Taft-Hartley Amendments Are Clarifying 
and Apply Rerroactively Is Governed by Federal Law 
The district court also erred when it applied current Utah law to reject any 
import for clarifying amendments under federal law in 1947. Subsequent 
legislation, by definition, includes clarifying amendments, which serve to 
"declar[ e] the intent of an earlier statute." Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 380-81. "An 
amendment of a statute may be evidence of the legislative intent underlying the 
earlier form of the statute. Such an amendment therefore may be used to divine 
the legislative intent with regard to the original law." 82 C.J.S. Statutes§ 460 
(footnotes omitted); see also id. §§ 509-12. 
8 None of these cases consider whether the makeup of Congress had changed. 
The district court erred in doing so. [R.1013-14.] Indeed, in Red Lion, a 1959 
Congress clarified a 1927 statute. But even if the makeup of Congress were 
important, Congress overrode a presidential veto with Taft-Hartley. 
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2.2.2.1 Under Federal Law, Clarifying Amendments 
Make What Was Intended All Along 
Unmistakably Clear 
The district court incorrectly concluded that because this court does not 
recognize state clarifying amendments, federal clarifying amendments are not 
indicative of a statute's meaning. [R.1009.] UTA acknowledges state labor law, 
rather than federal labor law, controls. Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Div. 1285, 
Amalgamated Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15, 27-29 (1982). But that state law is copied 
from federal law, which makes the interpretation of federal law dispositive. 
UT A also acknowledges that in Utah, clarifying amendments are not 
controlling. Waddoups v. Noorda, 2013 UT 64, ,r 9, 321 P.3d 1108. But this is 
irrelevant. The principle is based in state law, which by statute articulates a 
general presumption against retroactivity. Gressman v. State, 2013 UT 63, ,r 12, 
323 P.3d 998 (citing Utah Code § 68-3-3). 
Under federal law, a clarifying amendment is meaningful and applies 
retroactively. United States v. Montgomery Cty., 761 F.2d 998, 1003 (4th Cir. 1985).9 
The Fourth Circuit explained the role of clarifying amendments in United States v. 
Montgomery County. The Fourth Circuit was asked whether the National Institute 
of Health ("NIH") had to pay a county-imposed "transient tax" when its 
outpatients spent two to three days in various hotels or motels. 761 F.2d at 999. 
9 See also Holt v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 627 F.3d 188, 194-95 (5th Cir. 2010); 
Dobbs v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 600 F.3d 1275, 1282 (10th Cir. 2010); 
Piamba Cortes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999); Landgraf v. 
USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 272-80 (1994). 
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The county code defined a "transient" as "a person 'who ... obtains sleeping 
accommodations' for seven days or less." Id. at 999 & 1001 n.8 (omission in 
original). The NIH asserted that it did not have to pay the tax because it was not 
a "person." Id. at 999-1000. The district court agreed with the NIH. Id. at 1000. 
Immediately thereafter, the county amended the statute to replace 
"person" with "human being," making the tax due from the outpatients 
themselves, not the NIH. Id. at 1002. On appeal, the NIH argued that the 
amendment proved that the prior language did not reach the transactions in 
question. Id. at 1003. 
The Fmuth Circuit rejected the NIH' s argument, writing: "changes in 
statutory language need not ipso facto constitute a change in meaning or effect. 
Statutes may be passed purely to make what was intended all along even more 
unmistakably clear. That is the situation here." Id. The court elaborated, as the 
district court in the instant case cited, "It is true, of course, that a statute which 
has all along unambiguously proclaimed WHITE cannot retrospectively be made 
to assert BLACK just because the legislature, at a later date, says so." Id. 
But the Fourth Circuit was unconcerned with this, saying, "[h]owever, the 
... language with which we here are confronted ... is arguably only 
ambiguous-and not persuasively so at that." Id. The Fourth Circuit relied on the 
fact that the county enacted "within months of the district court's adverse 
decision, emergency legislation to guard against what it no doubt regarded as a 
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judicial misperception by the district judge of its intent in the past, and to insure 
that, from and after the passage of the [amendment], that erroneous possibility 
could not even arguably arise." Id. 
The same is true here. Like the legislation described in Montgomery County, 
the Taft-Hartley Amendments were emergency legislation passed within months 
of an adverse judicial decision to guard against what Congress regarded as a 
judicial misperception of its intent and to insure that the erroneous possibility 
could not even arguably arise again. In other words, Congress made clear what it 
had always believed to be true -supervisors were not "employees" with 
collective bargaining rights under the NLRA. 
2.2.2.2 The Text of A Clarifying Amendment Need Not 
Declare That It Is Clarifying 
The district court erred when it ruled that even if clarifying amendments 
applied retroactively, the Taft-Hartley Amendments were not" clarifying" 
because "the 1947 statutory amendment does not itself declare that it is a 
clarifying amendmenf1 and "does not ever make an express declaration that the 
bill is intended to be categorized as a 'clarifying amendment."' [R.1011-12.] 
The district court misunderstood the test for whether an amendment is 
clarifying. A clarifying amendment itself need not say that it is clarifying; it is 
sufficient if the legislative history does so, and it is also sufficient if either the 
legislative history or the amendment clearly indicate it. 
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An amendment of a statute may be evidence of the 
legislative intent underlying the earlier form of the 
statute. Such an amendment therefore may be used to 
divine the legislative intent with regard to the original 
law. 
A statutory amendment which construes and clarifies a 
prior statute, rather than changing the law, normally 
must be accepted as a legislative declaration of the 
mearung of the original act. A court may find a 
legislative amendment to be a clarification of a 
previously existing statute where the legislative history or 
the language of the statute, as amended, clearly indicates an 
intent to clarify. When there has been doubt or 
ambiguity surrounding a statute, an amendment by the 
legislature may be interpreted as some indication of a 
legislative intent to clarify, rather than to change, 
existing law. Likewise, when a legislative amendment is 
enacted soon after a controversy arises regarding the 
mearung of an act, it is logical to regard the amendment 
as a legislative interpretation of the original act. 
82 C.J.S. Statutes§ 460 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); see id.§§ 509-12. 
The legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act expressly states that the 
intention was to clarify the NLRA: "So, by this bill, Congress makes clear once more 
what it tried to make clear when, in passing the act, it defined as an' employer,' not 
an 'employee,' any person 'acting in the interest of an employer .... "' H. R. Rep. 
No. 80-245, at 308 (1947) (emphasis added). 
Additionally, case law sets forth "[a] number of factors [that] may indicate 
whether an amendment is clarifying rather than substantive: [1] whether the 
enacting body declared that it was clarifying a prior enactment; [2] whether a 
conflict or ambiguity existed prior to the amendment; and [3] whether the 
amendment is consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the prior enactment 
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and its legislative history." Middleton v. City of Chicago, 578 F.3d 655, 663-64 (7th 
Cir. 2009); see also Piamba Cortes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1283-84 (11th 
Cir. 1999); Liquilux Gas Corp. v. Martin Gas Sales, 979 F.2d 887,890 (1st Cir. 1992); 
73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 241 (2017). 
Using that test, the Taft-Hartley Amendments "clarified" the NLRA, at 
least as far as "supervisors" were concerned. As described above, (1) the House 
and Senate made clear that they were clarifying a prior enactment; (2) Packard v. 
Motor Car Company, 330 U.S. 485,486 (1947), made clear that a conflict existed 
prior to the amendment; and (3) Justice Douglas's Packard dissent made clear that 
there was "no trace of Congressional concern with the problems of supervisory 
personnel. The reports and debates are barren of any reference to them." Packard, 
330 U.S. at 498 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 279 
( describing same). 
In this context, Utah had no need to amend the ULRA to clarify that 
"employee" did not include "supervisors." No Utah court had interpreted the 
ULRA as Packard had let stand an interpretation of the NLRA. Thus, the original 
meaning of the word "employees," clarified in the Taft-Hartley Amendments, 
remained the meaning in the ULRA. 
44 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2.3 Both the Utah Legislature and this Court Distinguished Between 
Employers and Employees in Both the Workers Compensation 
Setting and the Collective Bargaining Setting 
Utah never considered supervisors to be employees with collective 
bargaining rights. This is confirmed by contemporaneous Utah statutes and case 
law that show that Utah consistently distinguished between employees and 
supervisors, considering "supervisors" to be a subset of "employers," not 
"employees." 
2.3.1 This Court Consistently Distinguished Between 
Employees and Supervisors When Interpreting Labor 
Laws 
Like NLRB cases between the passage of the NLRA in 1935 and the 
passage of the ULRA in 1937, Utah cases from the time period reveal that the 
terms "employer" and "employee" were mutually exclusive in the collective 
bargaining context.10 
In 1939, this court reviewed a decision of the Utah Labor Relations Board 
addressing whether certain supervisors had "interfere[ d] with, restrain[ ed] or 
coerc[ ed] employees" regarding their rights to bargain in violation of the Labor 
Code. Bldg. Serv. Emp. Local No. 59 v. Newhouse Realty Co., 95 P.2d 507, 573 (Utah 
1939). The question arose because certain "supervisory employees" who had the 
right to "hire and fire" had discussed with the non-supervisory employees their 
10 As noted above, this court made clear in a workers compensation case that 
"one cannot at the same time be employer and employ[ee] or master and 
servant." Rockefeller v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 197 P. 1038, 1042 (Utah 1921). Those 
classifications are still in effect. Utah Code§§ 34-25-1, -2. 
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right to collectively bargain. Id. at 577. These supervisory employees included a 
"head housekeeper in charge of all employees from the mezzanine floor to the 
twelfth floor of the hotel, who has the power to hire and fire in her department." 
Id. at 515. The court determined that the head housekeeper's actions had not 
constituted "interference," but clearly considered her on the" employer" side of 
the divide. Id. at 515-17. Throughout that case, individuals were described in 
terms of whether they could "hire or fire" -that being the standard used to 
separate supervisors from non-supervisors in both workers compensation cases 
and collective bargaining cases. 
Although the NLRB cases in the early 1940s were inconsistent, Utah cases 
were not. In 1943, before the Taft-Hartley Amendments, this court considered 
whether the American Foundry and Machine Company had engaged in certain 
unfair labor practices when its foremen and management had threatened to fire 
anyone they found to be unionizing. Am. Foundry & Mach. Co. v. Utah Labor 
Relations Bd., 141 P.2d 390, 390-91 (Utah 1943). 
In 1949, following the passage of the Taft-Hartley Amendments, this court 
continued to treat supervisors as different from employees. For example, it 
affirmed the Board's certification of a collective bargaining unit that "include[ d] 
all production laundry workers and exclude[ d] clerical workers and supervisors 
with power to hire and fire." Hotel Utah Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 211 P.2d 200, 201 
(Utah 1949). This court wrote, "[i]n our opinion to include all workers, except 
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clerical help and supervisors is an appropriate inclusion-exclusion line." Id. at 
205. This court allowed another bargaining unit that included "[b]ellboys, 
porters, elevator operators, baggage checkroom attendants, doormen, page boys 
and valets," but excluded "front office employees, clerks, housekeeping 
department employees, culinary and banquet department employees, garage 
employees and all supervisory employees with authority to hire and fire." Hotel 
Utah Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 209 P.2d 235,236 (Utah 1949). 
In 1951, this court affirmed a collective bargaining class that included "all 
shoe repairmen and excluding ... supervisory employees with the power to hire 
or fire." Utah Labor Relations Bd. v. Broadway Shoe Repairing Co., 236 P.2d 1072, 
1073 (Utah 1951). And in 1954, this court distinguished "union men" from "non-
union employees" and "supervisory employees." Rasmussen v. U.S. Steel Co., 265 
P.2d 1002, 1002-03 (Utah 1954). 
These cases reveal that, both before and after the Taft-Hartley 
Amendments, this court consistently distinguished supervisors, foremen, 
management, and the like from lower-level "employees" for purposes of 
certifying bargaining units. This is because, just as "employees" are different 
from II employers" in the workers compensation arena, Utah, like Congress, 
considered "employees" to exclude "supervisors" for purposes of collective 
bargaining because supervisors were the "employer." 
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2.3.2 Other Sections of the Utah Code Are in Accord 
The Utah Legislature's use of the term "employee" in other sections of 
Utah's collective bargaining laws confirm this result. Nearby sections reveal that 
the words "employer" and "employee" must be read to be exclusive groups of 
people. If a supervisor is an "employer," in that he acts in the interest of the 
employer, he cannot simultaneously be an "employee." 
This is important because this court does not "interpret the 'plain meaning' 
of a statutory term in isolation. [The court's] task, instead, is to determine the 
meaning of the text given the relevant context of the statute (including, 
particularly, the structure and language of the statutory scheme)." Olsen v. Eagle 
Mountain City, 2011 UT 10, ,I 12,248 P.3d 465. In contrast, this court must "read 
the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in 
harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters. We follow 
the cardinal rule that the general purpose, intent or purport of the whole act shall 
control, and that all the parts be interpreted as subsidiary and harmonious to its 
manifest object." Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, ,I 17, 66 P.3d 529 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). "When evaluating the plain language of 
a particular statutory provision, [this court] interpret[s] it in harmony with other 
statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." Summit Water Distrib. Co. v. 
Summit Cnty., 2005 UT 73, ,I 17, 123 P.3d 437 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The doctrine of in pari materia is also instructive, as "a reflection of practical 
experience in the interpretation of statutes: a legislative body generally uses a 
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particular word with a consistent meaning in a given context." Erlenbaugh v. 
United States, 409 U.S. 239,243 (1973) (cited by Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Carlson, 
2014 UT 24, ,r 17, 332 P.3d 900). "If it is natural or reasonable to think that the 
understanding of the legislature or of persons affected by the statute would be 
influenced by another statute, then those statutes should be construed to be in 
pari materia, construed with reference to one another and harmonized if 
possible." Hansen v. Eyre, 2003 UT App 274, ,r 7, 74 P.3d 1182 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
The following examples from the Utah Code demonstrate that the word 
11 employer" and II employee" must refer to different individuals. This is 
important because it shows the legislature's intention in using the word 
11 
employee," and also because it shows that the dictionary definition of 
11 
employee" -that is, all people who work for an entity, including the CEO-
cannot be correct in this context. 
The "Declaration of policy" concerning Employment Relations and 
Collective Bargains clearly delineates differing groups of people: 
• The public policy of the state ... recognizes that 
there are three major interests involved, namely: that 
of the public, the employee, and the employer. These 
three interests are to a considerable extent 
interrelated. It is the policy of the state to protect and 
promote each of these interests with due regard to 
the situation and to the rights of the others. 
• It is the policy of the state, in order to preserve and 
promote the interests of the public, the employee, 
and the employer alike, to establish standards of fair 
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conduct in employment relations and to provide a 
convenient, expeditious and impartial tribunal by 
which these interests may have their respective 
rights and obligations adjudicated. 
Utah Code§ 34-20-1(1), (4). Two other definitions from the same section similarly 
reveal that the terms II employee" and "employer" are exclusive: 
• "Labor dispute means any controversy between an 
employer and the majority of the employer's 
employees in a collective bargaining unit .... 
• "Labor organization means an organization of any 
kind or any agency or employee representation 
committee or plan in which employees participate 
that exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of 
dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor 
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, 
or conditions of work." 
Id. § 34-20-2(10), (11). 
The same conclusion is reached by the very definition of "unfair labor 
practices," which are described in terms of the employer's relationship with the 
employees: 
• It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer, 
individually or in concert with others ... (a) [t]o 
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees ... (b) 
[t]o dominate or interfere with the formation or 
administration of any labor organization or 
contribute financial or other support to it .... 
Id.§ 34-20-8(1). In fact, the entirety of section 34-20-8 relies on a distinction 
between "employers" and "employees." Under these statutes, one person-such 
as a "supervisor" - cannot be both an employee and employer. Utah law has 
always treated "employers" and II employees" as exclusive groups. 
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Thus, like case law from the time period, other statutory uses of the word 
11 employer" and "employee" demonstrate that the two were always intended to 
be exclusive. In the context of the entire chapter, it is difficult to see how the 
legislature might have intended the word II employee" to include all supervisors, 
up to and including vice presidents.11 
2.4 The Contrary Conclusion Yields an Absurd Consequence 
It is worth outlining the absurd consequences that result if supervisors are 
employees for purposes of collective bargaining. /.(Normally, where the language 
of a statute is clear and unambiguous, our analysis ends; our duty is to give effect 
to that plain meaning. However, [a]n equally well-settled caveat to the plain 
meaning rules states that a court should not follow the literal language of a 
statute if its plain meaning works an absurd result" State ex rel. Z.C., 2007 UT 54, 
,r 11, 165 P.3d 1206 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
"The absurd results canon of statutory construction recognizes that 
although 'the plain language interpretation of a statute enjoys a robust 
11 By contrast, section 34-20-2(5) expressly excludes charitable hospitals from 
the definition of "employer." The Taft-Hartley Amendments excluded charitable 
hospitals as part of the federal definition of "employer," stating in the House 
Report that the regulation of charitable hospitals was to be left to the states 
because charitable hospitals are not engaged in commerce. H. R. Rep. No. 80-245 
at 303. Neither the House Report nor the Senate Report has any further 
discussion. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 80-245, S. Rep. No. 80-105. 
In 1951, this court held that because the statute did not exclude "hospitals" 
from the definition of" employers," it must include them. Utah Labor Relations Bd. 
v. Utah Valley Hosp., 235 P.2d 520, 525 (Utah 1951). In 1969, the Utah Legislature 
amended the Utah Code to exclude hospitals. Utah Code § 34-20-2 (1969). 
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presumption in its favor, it is also true that [a legislative body] cannot, in every 
instance, be counted on to have said what it meant or to have meant what it 
said."' Id. ,r 11 (quoting FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 638 (1982) (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting)) (alteration in original). Said differently, "the absurd consequences 
canon ... resolves an ambiguity by choosing the reading that avoids absurd 
results." Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ,r 27, 387 P.3d 1000. 
The conclusion that supervisors are "employees" yields an absurd 
consequence. Justice Douglas, Senator Taft, and Representative Hartley made 
that clear: "For if foremen are 'employees' within the meaning of the [NLRA], so 
are vice-presidents, managers, assistant managers, superintendents, assistant 
superintendents -indeed, all who are on the payroll of the company, including 
the president .... But once vice-presidents, managers, superintendents, foremen 
all are unionized, management and labor will become more of a solid phalanx 
than separate factions in warring camps." Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 
485, 494 (1947) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
2.4.1 Independent Contractors Are Expressly Excluded Under 
Federal Law, but not Under Utah Law 
The point is illustrated by how Utah treats independent contractors. The 
Wagner Act did not mention independent contractors. Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 9(c), 
49 Stat. 450 (1935). In 1944, the NLRB concluded, and the Supreme Court 
affirmed, that Hearst Publications' newsboys were "employees" who could join 
together for collective bargaining, over Hearst's argument that they were 
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"independent contractors," who could not. NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns Inc., 322 U.S. 
111, 131-32 (1944) (overruled in part by Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 
U.S. 318 (1992)). 
Representative Hartley stated that the court's conclusion was absurd. He 
stated that "[a]n 'employee,' according to all standard dictionaries, according to 
the law as the courts have stated it, and according to the understanding of almost 
everyone, with the exception of members of the National Labor Relations Board, 
means someone who works for another for hire." H.R. Rep. No. 80-245, at 309 
(1947). He stated that Congi·ess meant" employee" as that word has always been 
interpreted, "not new meanings that, 9 years later, the Labor Board might think 
up." Id. He declared that Congress should expressly clarify that independent 
contractors do not fall within the definition of "employee." Id. That amendment 
passed as well, and, as a result, independent contractors are not "employees" 
under federal law for purposes of collective bargaining. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). 
This is important because, just as the Utah Legislature did not amend its 
statute to clarify that supervisors are not" employees," it did not clarify that 
independent contractors are not employees under section 34-20-2(4). In other 
words, the Utah Code does not exclude "independent contractors" from the term 
"employees," Utah Code § 34-20-2(4), but the United States Code does, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 152(3). And under NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., the plain language of the 
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statute that was the NLRA, and continues to be the ULRA, includes 
"independent contractors" as employees. 332 U.S. at 131-32. 
If the district court's same logic regarding" supervisors" is applied to 
"independent contractors," then in Utah, "independent contractors" are 
"employees" for purposes of collective bargaining. This would contradict several 
other sections of the Utah Code that do not treat independent contractors as 
employees. E.g., Utah Code§ 35A-4-204(3) (defining "employee" to exclude 
independent contractors in Employment Security Act);§ 61-2f-303 
(distinguishing "employees" from "independent contractors" for real estate 
licensing);§ 63G-7-102(3)(c) (defining "employee" to exclude independent 
contractors in Governmental Immunity Act of Utah). Including supervisors 
under the umbrella of "employees" results in equally absurd consequences. 
This court should vacate summary judgment and remand for the court to 
resolve the fact question of whether UTA' s rail operations supervisors are 
supervisors for purposes of collective bargaining. 
3. This Court Should Instruct the District Court, If It Becomes Necessary, 
to Order a Secret Ballot Election Rather than a Card Check 
Finally, UT A requests that this court provide guidance on the issue of card 
checks versus special elections. This issue is relevant only if this court reverses 
the entry of summary judgment and the district court later finds, as a factual 
matter, that UT A's rail operations supervisors are not supervisors for purposes 
of collective bargaining. 
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The district court initially ordered a card check. [R.290-94.] But when the 
card check proved to be fraught with uncertainty, the district court ordered a 
secret ballot election. [R.436,440-42.] The parties agreed on certain elements of the 
secret ballot election, and the district court resolved the rest. [R.651-55.] After the 
election, neither party raised procedural challenges, so there should be no 
dispute that a secret ballot remains the appropriate method. 
As the district court recognized, the card check method is less reliable and 
subjects employees to threats and group pressure. (R.440-42.] A secret ballot 
mitigates those concerns. In 1949, this court explained the virtues of a secret 
ballot election in the union con text: 
The election method is a suggested means, and in our 
opinion, is the most effective way of obtaining an 
untrammeled expression of the desires of the employees. 
It is not difficult to imagine that in bemg canvassed by 
Union agents to sign an authorization card an employee 
is subjected to Union coercion or at least mental pressure 
by the agents or by other 1nembers more interested in 
the authorization .... There is little chance for undue 
influence when employees are entitled to a secret vote, 
and we commend this method to the Commission, 
particularly, where as here, the employer made a timely 
request for its use. 
Hotel Utah Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 211 P.2d 200, 202-03 (Utah 1949). Federal law 
also requires the secret ballot method, and has done so since the Taft-Hartley 
Amendments. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c).12 
12 The Wagner Act authorized the NLRB to "take a secret ballot of employees, 
or utilize any other suitable method to ascertain such representatives." Pub. L. 
No. 74-198, § 9(c), 49 Stat. 453 (1935). The ULRA authorized the Utah Labor 
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Because special elections are preferable and required by federal law, this 
court should instruct the district court that, if the process becomes necessary, it 
must order a special election rather than a card check. 
Conclusion 
The district court erred in its interpretation of the term "employees" in 
section 34-20-2 of the Utah Public Transit District Act. This court should vacate 
summary judgment and remand for the court to resolve the fact question of 
whether UTA's rail operations supervisors are supervisors for purposes of 
collective bargaining. This court should also instruct the district court that, if 
necessary, to order a secret ballot election rather than a card check. 
DATED this 31st day of August, 2017. 
ZIMMERMAN JONES BOOHER 
Isl Troy L. Booher 
Troy L. Booher 
Julie J. Nels on 
Erin B. Hull 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Board to II take a secret ballot of employees, or utilize any other suitable method 
to ascertain such representatives." 1937 Utah Laws ch. 55 § l0(c). But the Taft-
Hartley Act stated that the NLRB "shall direct an election by secret ballot." Pub. 
L. No. 80-101, § 9(c) 61 Stat. 136, 144 (1947). The ULRA was not similarly 
amended. Utah Code § 34-20-9(3). 
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riLED DISTRICT 
Third Judicial 0 ~0URT IStrict 
FEB O 9 2017 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 222 and JOHN 
AND JANE DOE NOS.1-23, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Defendant. 
RULING AND ORDER 
Case No. 140902884 
February 9, 2017 
Judge Ryan M. Harris 
Before the Court is a Motion for New Trial Pursuant to Rules 52 and 59 ("the Motion"), 
filed by Defendant Utah Transit Authority eur A"). By the Motion, UTA asks the Court to 
reconsider its ruling, delivered in a lengthy Memorandum Decision and Order on October 13, 
2015, that UT A's rail operations supervisors are "employees" as that term is used in the Public 
Transit District Act ('1the Act't Utah Code Ann.§ 17B-2a-813(2)(a), and that therefore those rail 
operations supervisors have the statutory right to organize and collectively bargain. Plaintiff 
Teamsters Local 222 ("the Unionn) opposes the Motion. The Motion is fully briefed and ready 
for decision. UT A has requested a hearing, but the Court does not believe that oral argument 
will substantially assist the Court in adjudicating the Motion, and therefore denies UTA's request 
for oral argument. 
The question that the Court decided in October 2015 was one of statutory interpretation: 
what does the term "employeei, mean as used in the Act? The Court answered that question by 
reference to dictionaries, which the Court thought unanimously provided a straightforward 
definition of the term that does not exclude supervisors. as well as by reference to other 
sections of the Utah Code. See Oct. 13, 2015 Mem. Decision and Order, at 12-13. Specifically, 
the Court looked to Utah's "Little Wagner Act," passed in 1937 and today codified at Utah Code 
Ann.§ 34-20-2(4), which contains a definition of "employee11 that does not exclude supervisors. 
Id. at 10, 13. In the course of that discussion, the Court also noted that the analogous federal 
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TEAMSTERS LOCAL 222 v. UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY Case No. 140902884 
statute (the 'Wagner Act"} was originally passed in 1935, and at that point contained the same 
expansive definition of "empioyee,n without any exclusion for supervisors. Id. at 9-10, 13. It was 
not until 1947 that the U.S. Congress amended the Wagner Act's definition of "employeen to 
include a specific exclusion for "supervisors." Id. at 10 (citing Pub. L. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136, 
enacted June 23, 1947 (now codified at 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)). In its Memorandum Decision, the 
Court noted the significance of the U.S. Congress taking pains to amend its statute to exclude 
"supervisorsn from the definition of "employeen in their labor relations code, while the Utah 
Legislature declined to make any similar change. Partly on this basis (and partly on the plain 
meaning of the term and its dictionary definition), the Court held that the term "employee" as 
used in the Act included all employees, including supervisory employees. 
UTA now asserts that this determination was legal error, and that the Court's 
interpretation of the .statute was faulty. UTA posits that the 1947 amendment to the federal 
labor relations statute was merely a "clarifyinglt amendment intended to clarify that Congress-
even back in 1935-had all along meant for the term 0 employee12 to exclude "supervisors." UTA 
argues that, because the 1947 amendment to the Wagner Act was merely a "clarifying11 
amendment, Utah's failure to likewise amend its Little Wagner Act (to exclude "supervisors") 
should not be assigned the rather high level of significance that the Court attributed to it. There 
are several problems with this argument. 
First of all, the governing question here is governed by state law, not by federal law. The 
parties agreed on that point before. See id. at 8 (noting that "both sides recognize that the 
question of whether the UTA rail operations supervisors can organize and collectively bargain is 
ultimately a question of state law, and not of federal law'). Under state law, there is no longer 
any such thing as a "clarifying" amendment. See Waddoups v. Noorda. 2013 UT 64, 1J 91 321 
P.3d 1108 (stating that the Utah Supreme Court has "repudiated11 the "exception° to retroadivity 
rules that allowed "clarifying amendments" to operate retroactively); see also Gressman v. 
State. 2013 UT 63, 1J 16, 323 P.3d 998 (stating that "we have never applied" clarifying 
2 
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amendments as "an exception" to retroactivity rules). The Utah Supreme Court has clearly 
been uncomfortable with the concept of "clarifying" amendments for many years now, ~' ~. 
Visitor Information Center Authority of Grand County v. Customer Serv. Div., 930 P.2d 1196, 
1198 (Utah 1997) ( stating that "[l]ater versions of a statute do not necessarily reveal the intent 
behind an earlier version, 11 and that many legislative changes simply "support the proposition 
that the statute previously meant something different from what it now says,,), and in the face of 
all of this case law this Court is itself uncomfortable altering what appeared to the Court, in 
October 20151 to be a fairly straightforward exercise in statutory interpretation, based on a 
principle that has recently been "repudiated' by the Utah Supreme Court. 
Second, there is a presumption that "a new legislative enactment is an amendment 
rather than a clarification of existing law." and this presumption "may be rebutted only if it is 
clear the legislature intended to interpret rather than change the law." See State v. Elmore. 228 
P.3d 760, 770 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010); see also 82 C.J.S. STATUTES§ 460 (stating that "[a] court 
may find a legislative amendment to be a clarification of a previously existing statute Where the 
legislative history or the language of the statute, as amended, clearly indicates an intent to 
clarify"}. UTA has not rebutted this presumption here. Certainly, the federal cases cited by UTA 
do not provide a basis for rebutting this presumption; indeed, these. cases agree that the 
category of "clarifying" amendments is a narrow one, to be applied only when the intent to 
"clarify" is clear. Some of UTA's cited cases, including United States v. Montgomery County. 
761 F.2d 998 (4th Cir~ 1985), merely advert to the possibility of a clarifying amendment. Id. at 
1003 (stating that "change_s in statutory language need not ipso facto constitute a change in 
meaning or effect." and that "{s]tatutes may be passed p·ure(y to mak~ what was intended all 
along even more unmistakably clear" (emphasis added}); see also Piamba Cortes v. American 
Airlines, Inc., 177 F.~d 1272, 1283 (11 th Cir. 1999) (stating that "an amendment containing new 
language may be intended to clarify existing lawi (emphasis added)). However, the Fourth 
Circuit in Montgomery County went on to note that the Clcfarifying amendment" exception was 
3 
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limited, and that "a statute which has all along unambiguously proclaimed WHITE cannot 
retrospectively be made to assert BLACK just because the legislature. at a later datei says so." 
Id. Another cited case involved a statutory amendment that expressly stated, in the statutory 
amendment itself, that it was a clarifying amendment. See Dobbs v. Anthem Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield, 600 F.3d 1275, 1282 (10th Cir. 2010) (stating that "§906{b) states that it is merely a 
'clarification' rather than a substantive change in the law'l And the other cited cases are not 
relevant to the question at hand. See Holt v. State Farm Fire & Cas.·Co .• 627 F.2d 188, 194-95 
(5th Cir. 2010) (saying nothing about clarifying amendments); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods. 511 
U~S. 244, 272-80 {1994) (same). In essence, the Court is ofthe view that the cited federal case 
law does not quite support the weight that UTA.attempts to lay upon it. 
Moreover, even if the Court were to apply UTA's cited cases to this situation,. the Court 
would still not reach the tesult UTA desires. The Coµrt, for several reasons, cannot conclude 
that the amendment to the Wagner Act was actually a "clarifyingn amendment. 
Initially. and most fundamentally, the 1947 statutory amendment does not .itself declare 
that it is a. clarifying amendment. Congress has made such a declaration on occasiQn, see, ~' 
Dobbs, 600 F.3d at 1282, and its failure to do so here must be given some weight,~. fill:., 
Fonseca v. City of Gilroy. 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 374, 391-92 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (stating that 
"particularly when there is no definitive 'clarifying' expression by the Legislature in the 
amendments themselves, we will presume that a substantial or material statutor,y change . . ~ 
bespeaks legislative intention to change, and not just clarify. the law"); see also Salt Lake 
County v. Holliday Water Co., 2010 UT 45. ,m 43-44, 234 P .3d 1105 (nqting that the text of the 
amendment contained "nothing . . . that appear[ed] to. be an attempt to clatjfy preexisting 
language_" and therefore holding that the amendment was "not a mere clarification of the law" 
but, ratheri "an affirmative addition of a new exemption to the statute0). 
Likewise, the legislative history to which UTA so hopefully points also does not ever 
make an express declaration that the bill is intended fo be categorized as a "clarifying 
4 
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amendment," with all of the legal implications such a classification carries. Instead, the author 
of the House Report (Rep. Hartley, the bill's sponsor) simply indicates his belief that, by this 
amendment, "Congress makes clear once more what it tried to make clear when, in passing the 
act, it defined as an •employer', not an 'employee,, any person 'acting in the interest of an 
employer."' See H.R. Rep. No. 245, at 308 {1947). UTA infers that statements like this, 
appearing in the House Report (and in another similar Senate Report), are sufficient to 
categorize this amendment as a "clarifying11 amendment. But UTA fails to grapple with the fact 
that neither the bill itself, nor its sponsors, ever actually made the specific categorization that 
UTA wishes they had made. 
Next, even if the cited legislative history could be interpreted as broadly as UTA urges, 
the Court has serious concerns about whether one Congress can usefully or accurately 
describe an earlier Congress's intent in passing a previous statute, concerns that are shared by 
the United States Supreme Court. See, ~. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth. LLC. 562 U.S. 223. 242 
(2011) (stating that "[p]ost-enactrnent legislative history (a contradiction in terms) is not a 
legitimate tool of statutory interpretation"); Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n ·v. GTE Sylvania, 
Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117-18 (1980) {stating that "the views of a subsequent Congress form a 
hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one"). These concerns become especially 
pointed when one considers the circumstances surrounding the passage of the Wagner Act and 
the Taft-HartJey Act. The Wagner Act was passed in 1935 by the 74th Congress, which was an 
overwhelmingly Democratic Congress made up of 70 Democratic Senators and 322 Democratic 
representatives.1 The Taft-Hartley Act was passed a full twelve years later, by the 80th 
Congress, which happened to be the first Congress in quite some time that was controlled by 
Republicans (51 Senators and 248 Representatives). Different Congresses are controlled by 
different parties over time, and take different positions on different issues. It would be one thing 
1 Although these numbers are not in the record, the Court believes it can take judicial notice of the 
partisan makeup of various Congresses. 
5 
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if a purported "clarifying0 amendment was passed by the same Congress that passed the 
original law, but it is another thing entirely to think that a different Congress more than a decade 
tater, controlled by a different party and made up of presumably many different people, would be 
able to accurately convey, in a House Report or otherwise, what a previous Congress intended. 
Some jurists {including, most famously, the late Justice Scalia) have problems with any resort to 
legislative history. See, ~. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC. Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 73 (2004) 
{Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that "I have often criticized the Court's use of legislative history 
because it lends itself to a kind of ventriloquism" in which "committee reports are used to make 
words appear to come from Congress's mouth which were spoken or written by others 
(individual Members of Congress, congressional aides, or even enterprising lobbyists)"). In this 
Court's view, that is too hard a line to take, because sometimes legislative history can add value 
to ~ statutory interpretation analysis. But in this particular case, very little value is added by the 
proffered legislative history. It is hard enough to extrapolate the intent of an entire legislative 
body from the views of one (or even a number of) legisfator(s)r even when that legislator is 
speaking about passage of an act that occurred in the very same Congress. But where the 
legislative history proffered purports to speak of legislative intent regarding events that occurred 
twelve years in the past, in a different Congress, the weight one should give to that legislative 
history would appear to be at a very low ebb. See GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. at 118 (stating that a 
piece of legislative history from a subsequent Congress is not "entitled to much weight'). 
Finally, and most convincingly here, resort to legislative history is categorically 
inappropriate, even for jurists not named Scalia. where the legislative passage to be interpreted 
is unambiguous. See U.S. v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 {1997) (stating that "there is no reason to 
resort to legislative history11 where there is a "straightforward statutory command"); see also 
LeBeau v. State, 2014 UT 39, 11 26, 337 P.3d 254 (stating that a court "may resort to other 
indications of legislative intent, including legislative history," only where the statutory language is 
ambiguous); Taylor ex rel. C.T. v. Johnson. 1999 UT 35, ,r 13. 977 P.2d 479 {stating that "it is 
6 
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elementary that we do not seek guidance from legislative history . . . when the statute is clear 
and unambiguous"). Where the passage is unambiguous. the statute is to be interpreted 
according to the plain meaning of the terms, wjthout resort to· any extrinsic evidence. including 
legislative history. In addition, as UTA's own cases teach, if the passage is unambiguous1 then 
any ame·ndment to change it is not a !&clarifying" amendment but rather, an amendment that 
substantively changes the meaning of the term. See Montgomery County. 761 F.2d at 1003 
(stating that "a statute which has all along unambiguously proclaimed WHITE cannot 
retrospectively be made to assert BLACK just because the legislature, at .a later date, says son). 
In this case, no less an authority than the United States Supreme Court has already 
declared that the passage in question was unambiguous to begin with. See Packard Motor Car 
Co. v. N.L.R.B .• 330 U.S. 491, 492 (1947) (stating that 11[t]here is ..• no ambiguity in this Act to 
be clarified by resort to legislative history"). Indeed, 0UTA does not dispute that Packard said 
that the language [in the Wagner Act] was unambiguous." See UTA Reply Br., at 3. Rather, 
UTA impliedly asserts that Congress apparently overruled the Supreme Court on the question of 
ambiguity. This argument is without merit. If the United States Supreme Court holds that a 
particular passage is unambiguous, then that is the end of the matter. A Judicial determination 
that a passage is unambiguous means, by definition, that there are not two reasonable 
interpretations of that passage. If Congress takes another view, then its original interpretation 
was, ipso facto, not reasonable. Congress may certainly disagree with. the CQurt's interpretation 
of the statute, and may even amend the statute, but none of that legislative action changes the 
fact that the passage was originally unambiguous, and it is unambiguous because the Supreme 
Court says it is. Courts, including (and especially) the Supreme Court, get to decide whether a 
passage is or is not ambiguous. UT A provides no authority for the rather novel proposition that 
Congress can overrule a court's determination as to whether a passage is unambiguous. 
Indeed, when a 11court of last resort," such as the U.S. Supreme Court; interprets or 
construes a statute, that court "is explaining its understanding of what the statute has meant 
7 
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continuously since the date when it became lpw." See State v. Aubuchon, 90.A3d 914, 921 (Vt. 
2014) (citing McClung v. Employment Dev. Depl 99 P.3d 1015, 1018 (Cal. 2004)). In su.ch an 
instance? after the court of last resort "definitively and finally interprets a statute1 the Legisl'ature 
may amend the st~tute to say something different (b]ut if it does so, it changes the law; it does 
not merely state what the law always was." Id.; see also Elmore. 228 P.3d at 769 (stating that 
"it is ultimately for the courts to construe the law, 11 and that _.once the highest court construes a 
statute, that construction operates as if it were originally written into the statute/' and that 
thereafter a legislative body may no longer constitutionally "clarify" that statute to contradict the 
judiciary's interpretation, although it can certainly amend the statute); State v. Rios, 237 P.3d 
1052J 1061 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (stating that "[e]ven if a statute is ambiguous when enacted, 
once a judicial interpretation clarifies it, the statute is no longer ambiguous and the Legislature 
may not clarify its intent1'). Thus, anything that a legislative body might have to say about the 
meaning of a statute following definitive judicial interpretation is, by constitutional definition. not 
a "clarifying" amendment. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the Wagner Act in 
Packard. That interpretation is definitive. because the U.S. Supreme Court is without question a 
"court of last resort," and because "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.'' ~ Marbury v. Madison. 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). By 
definition, then, the 1947 change to the statute cannot be considered a "clarifyingn amendment. 
In sum, this Court simply does not believe that Congress's 1947 change to the Wagner 
Act was a "clarifying" amendment. That amendment fundamentally changed the definition of a 
term-a definition that had been interpreted and solidified by no less an authority than the U.S. 
Supreme Court-to add exceptions that were not previously included. This Court is simpfy not 
persuaded that this is one of those presumably rare instances where a legislative amendment 
can be deemed merely "clarifying.~· Therefore, the fact that the Utah Legislature, for 70 years 
now, has· declined to make a similar amendment to the Little Wagner Act is a fact that the Court 
appropriately found, and continues to find, significant. 
8 
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This Court undertook a lengthy analysis in 2015, and determined that the term 
"employee11 as used in the Act did not exclude supervisors. The Court is unpersuaded, after 
reviewing UTA's latest motion and the relevant case law, that its decision was at all infirm the 
first time around. The Court's previous decision stands. UT A's Motion is DENI ED. 
This Ruling and Order is the order of the Court with regard to the Motion, and no further 
writing is necessary to effectuate this decision. 
DATED this 94"' day of February! 2017. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRJCT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE qF UTAH 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 222 and JOHN and 
JANE DOE nos. 1-23, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORJTY, 
Defendant. 
[PROPOSED] FINAL JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 140902884 
Judge Ryan M. Harris 
l. By Memorandum Decision and Order dated October 13, 2015, the Court granted 
the motion for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Teamsters Local 222 ("Teamsters") and 
ruled that Defendant Utah Transit Authority's ("UTA") TRAX Rail Operations Supervisors 
constituted an appropriate bargaining unit under Utah Code Ann.§ l 7B-2a-813(2). The Court 
subsequently issued an Order Directing Election dated August 17, 2016, in which the Court 
ordered that a secret ballot election take place on Monday and Tuesday, September 12-13, 2016, 
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at UTA's Jordan River Service Center, to determine whether the Teamsters held majority support 
within the bargaining unit. 
2. On September 14, 2016, UT A filed an Election Report prepared by CaITie Taylor, 
the Election Monitor chosen by the parties. 
3. According to the Election Report, the secret ballot election was held as directed 
by the Court, and the Election Monitor counted and tallied the ballots on September 13, 2016. 
4. The Election Monitor reported that 44 total ballots were cast, without any 
challenged ballots. 
5. There were 19 "yes" votes in favor of union representation by the Teamsters, and 
25 "no" votes against union representation by the Teamsters. Accordingly, the ·'no" votes 
prevailed. 
6. Based on the results of the secret ballot election, Plaintiff Teamsters Local 222 
does not have majority representation within the bargaining unit consisting of TRAX Rail 
Operations Supervisors at UT A. 
7. Futthermore, as stated in the Order Directing Election, Teamsters Local 222 shall 
be barred from seeking another determination of majority status until one year from the date of 
the final determination of the election results. 
ORDER OF FINAL JUDGMENT 
The Court now orders that Teamsters Local 222 is not the exclusive bargaining 
representative for the bargaining unit of TRAX Rail Operations Supervisors at UTA, and that 
Teamsters Local 222 shall be barred from seeking another determination of majority status 
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within that unit until September 13, 2017. Furthem1ore, UT A shall not be compelled to bargain 
with Teamsters Local 222. 
This is the Final Judgment of the Court in this case. 
In accordance with the Utah State District Courts E-filing Standard No. 4, and 
URCP Rule 10( e ), this Order does not bear the handwritten signature of 
the Judge, but instead displays an electronic signature at the upper 
right-hand comer of the first page of this Order. 
Approved as to Form: 
/s/ Russell T. Monahan 
(permission given via email) 
Russell T. Monahan 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
October 27, 2016 02:22 PM 
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I hereby certify that on this 17th day of October, 2016, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing [PROPOSED] FINAL JUDGMENT was electronically filed with the Clerk of the 
Court using the Utah Trial Court/ECF system which sent notification of such to the following: 
October 27, 2016 02:22 PM 
Russell T. Monahan 
COOK & MONAHAN 
323 South 600 East 
Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Isl Doris Van den Al<ker 
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FILED 01srmcr COURT 
Third Jud:c!al rnstilCt 
OCT i 3 r.o~c:-
IN THE DISTRICT. COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIA.L DIST. Rib l. '~J 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UT.MfLA!(ECOUNT(..Q~ Oy: ________ _ 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 222and JOHN 
AND JANE DOE NOS. 1-23, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
Case No. 140902884 
October 13, 2015 
Judge Ryan M. Harris 
This matter came before the Court on September 29, 2015 for oral argument on a 
Motion for Summary Judgment ethe Motion"), filed by Plaintiff Teamsters Local 222 ("the 
Union11). Prior to the hearing, the Motion was fully briefed. At the hearing! the Union was 
represented by Russell T. Monahan, and Defendant Utah Transit Authority ("UTA"} was 
represented by Scott A. Hagen and Kimberly A Child. After consideration of the memoranda 
filed by the parties, the arguments made at the September 29 hearing, and applicable statutes 
and case law, the Court enters the following Memorandum Decision and Order. 
INTRODUCTION 
In this case, the Court is called upon to determine whether "rail operations supervisors', 
in UTA's TRAX division are entitled to organize and bargain collectively with their employer. If 
this question were decided under federal (aw, as nearly all labor law issues are these days, the 
answer may well be "No/' due to the fact that, since 1947, federal labor law has not allowed 
"supervisors" the privilege of organizing and collectively bargaining.1 But due to unique 
circumstances explained more fully below, the parties agree that the question in this case is 
1 The parties to this case take different positions as to whether, as a factual matter, these "rail operations 
supervisors11 are actually "supervisors11 as that term is used in labor law. That factual question is not 
before the Court on this particular Motion for Summary Judgment, and in fact is rendered moot by the 
Court's decision herein. 
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governed not by federal law, but by state law, informed to some degree by federal labor policy. 
The parties take different positions with regard to whether, under Utah law, supervisors have the 
right to organize and collectively bargain. 
While at some level it might seem counter-intuitive that Utah, of all states, would have 
local labor laws that are, in any respect, more favorable to workers than federal law, upon 
careful review of the applicable statutes, that indeed appears to be the case. Utah's labor laws, 
some of which have been on the books since the 1930s without significant amendment at any 
time since, indicate that all "employees" of any "public transit systemn have the right to organize 
and bargain collectively. While Congress, in 1947, amended federal labor law to create an 
exception for "supervisors," Utah's similar statute has never been so amended. The Utah 
legislature is, of course, free to amend its laws to match the federal exclusion for "supervisors." 
But at no point over the past 80 years has the legislature made that change. Until it does, this 
Court is obligated to enforce the statutes as written, according to their plain language and 
ordinary meaning. 
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, under Utah law UT A1s rail operations 
supervisors, as "employees" of a 11public transit system," have the right to organize and 
collectively bargain. And for the reasons set forth herein, the Court will conduct a "card check" 
to determine whether or not a majority of those employees have selected the Union to represent 
them. Therefore, the Union's Motion is GRANTED. for the reasons discussed below. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. Prior to 1969, all transit service in the State of Utah was provided by private transit 
companies. In 1969, the Utah legislature passed the Public Transit District Act, now codified at 
Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2a-801 et seq. ("the Act"). In 1970, very soon thereafter, UTA was 
created under authority of the Act as a public transit district. UTA is, and has been since its 
inception, a local district political subdivision of the State of Utah. 
2 
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2. A few years before passage of the Act1 the federal government had made available 
federal funds for the purpose of supporting local public transit districts. In 1964, Congress 
passed the Urban Mass Transportation Act ("UMTA"). If state and local governments met the 
requirements of UMT A, they could access federal funds for the purpose of supporting local 
public mass transit. 
3. One of the crucial requirements of the federal government upon which it 
conditioned use of federal funds was that local transit districts would have to make it possible for 
employees of the local transit districts to organize and collectively bargain. Section 13(c) of 
UMTA states expressly that 'Ta]s a condition of financial assistance ... , the interests of 
employees affected by the assistance shall be protected under arrangements the Secretary of 
Labor concludes are fair and equitable." which arrangements musL at a minimum, provide for: 
• "the preservation of rights, privileges, and benefits ... under existing 
collective bargaining agreements"; 
• "the continuation of collective bargaining rights"; and 
• "the protection of individual employees against a worsening of their 
positions related to employment. 11 
See 49 U.S.C. § 5333(b). 
4. In keeping with these requirements, the Utah Act contains provisions intended to 
allow employees of any public transit district created pursuant to the Act to organize and 
collectively bargain. The Act states plainly that "[e]mployees of a public transit system 
established and operated by a public transit district have the right to: (i) self-organization; (ii) 
form, join, or assist labor organizations; and (iii) bargain collectively through representatives of 
their own choosing." See Utah Code Ann. § 178-2a-813(2)(a). Moreover. 11[e]ach public transit 
district shall • recognize and bargain exclusively with any labor organization representing a 
majority of the district's employees in an appropriate unit with respect to wages, salaries, hours, 
working conditions, and welfare, pension, and retirement provisions." Id. at§ 813(2)(c). 
3 
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5. For decades now, the rank-and-file employees of UTA (e.g., bus drivers) have 
taken advantage of these provisions, and they have organized and appointed Local 382 of the 
Amalgamated Transit Union ciLocal 382") as their representative to bargain collectively on their 
behalf. See,~. Burke v. Utah Transit Authority and Local 382. 462 F.3d 1253, 1256 {10th Cir. 
2006) {stating that q[sFnce its inception, Local 382 of the Amalgamated Transit Union has 
continuously represented the employees of Utah,s public transit system"). 
6. However, Local 382 has never represented UT A's approximately 40 "rail 
operations supervisors." 
7. In approximately January 2014, UTA ceased paying its rail operations supervisors 
on a salary basis and, instead, made them hourly employees. At least some of the rail 
operations supervisors were not pleased with this new developmentt and contacted the Union to 
inquire about whether action could be taken to organize. 
8. In February 2014, Spencer Hogue, the Secretary-Treasurer of the Union, met with 
a number of the rail operations supervisors, and at the meeting obtained a number of 
authorization cards from them. Hogue eventually obtained a number of additional authorization 
cards, and thereupon sent a letter to UT A informing them that 23 ran operations supervisors-a 
clear majority-had signed cards authorizing the Union to bargain collectively on their behalf. 
The Union asked UTA to formally recognize it as the authorized representative of UTA's rail 
operations supervisors. 
9. UTA refused, and explained its belief that UTA's rail operations supervisors were 
not protected by the Act and that UT A did not have to bargain with the rail operations 
supervisors' representatives. Moreover, UTA questioned the 11cards11 obtained by Hogue, and 
asked for a chance to verify the supervisors1 wishes through an election. 
10. After the Union and UTA could not come to agreement on these issues, the Union 
filed this lawsuit in April 2014. The Union now moves for summary judgment, asking the Court 
to determine, as a matter of law, that the rail operations supervisors are "employees" covered by 
4 
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the Act and therefore empowered to organize and collectively bargain, and asking the Court to 
declare · that a "card checkn is a sufficiently reliable method to ascertain whether the Union 
"represent[s]a majority or the rail operations supervisors. 
STANDARD 
At issue here is a motion for summary judgment, filed pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56. 
Rule 56 provides that summary judgment should only be granted where "the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law/' Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The party moving for summary 
judgment "must make an initial showing that he is entitled to judgment and that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact that would preclude summary judgment in his favor," and if he 
does so, 11the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to show that there is a genuine issue of 
material fact or a deficiency with the moving party's legal theory that would preclude summary 
judgment." See Jones & Trevor Mktg., Inc. v. Lowry. 2012 UT 39, 1(29, 284 P.3d 630. 
DISCUSSION 
I. THE RAIL OPERATIONS SUPERVISORS ARE "EMPLOYEES" AS THAT TERM IS 
USED IN THE ACT 
The Act states that "[e]mployees of a public transit system" have the right to organize 
and collectively bargain. The first question presented by the Motion is whether UTA's rail 
operations supervisors are "employeestt as that term is used in the Act. For the reasons that 
follow, the Court is persuaded that they are. 
A. 
To answer the seemingly simple question of whether UTA's rail operations supervisors 
are "employees" of UT A as that term is used in the Act, it is first helpful to look at both the law 
governing the UMTA and federally-subsidized local transit districts, as well as the historical 
development of labor and collective bargaining rights across the country. 
5 
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By the 1960s, Congress became aware of "the increasingly precarious financial 
condition of a number of private transportation companies across the country, and it feared that 
co·mmunities might be left without adequate mass transportation~n See Jackson Transit Auth. v. 
Local Div. 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union. 457 U.S. 15, 17 (1982) (citation omitted). In an 
effort to make sure that local governments had plenty of options in providing useful mass transit 
to their citizens, Congress in 1964 passed UMTA. Under UMTA, the federal government made 
federal dollars available to states for the development of local transit systems, including funds 
for the outright purchase by local governments of some of these "failing private transportation 
companies." Id. However, Congress recognized that, in many instances, these private 
transportation companies had unionized workers who had already collectively bargained for 
certain working conditions, and Congress wanted to make sure any local government takeover 
ofthese private companies would not impair the labor rights of these transit workers. 
One hurdle that Congress faced, in working through the situation, was that government 
workers, whether at the state or federal level, were not protected by federal labor laws. 
Specifically, the National Labor Relations Act, at the time, already excluded "any State or 
political subdivision thereor from the definition of "employer." See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2). 
Congress chose not to amend this definition, and chose to leave state and local governments 
exempt from federal labor laws, even if they were to purchase some of these failing private 
transportation companies. Instead, Congress looked for another way to protect the collective 
bargaining rights of employees of these struggling transit companies, one that could keep this 
exemption intact. 
In the end. Congress chose to strike Cla delicate balancen between state and federal law. 
See Amalgamated Transit Union lnt'I v. Donovan. 767 F.2d 939, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1985). By 
passing UMTA, Congress made federal funds available to the states for the development of 
focal transit systems, but (as is often the case with federal dollars) those funds came with 
strings attached. In order to qualify for federal funds, states had to demonstrate, inter alia. that 
6 
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they had in place mechanisms designed to protect public transit employees' labor rights 1 and 
the federal Secretary of Labor had to sign off on those mechanisms as "fair and equitableD 
before federal funds could issue. See 49 U.S.C. § 5333(b){1). In deciding whether to sign off 
on any given state's arrangements, the Secretary of Labor would endeavor to ascertain whether 
the employees of the public transit system would be able to enjoy "collective bargaining rights, r) 
including "at a minimumn the right Uta be represented in meaningful, good faith negotiations with 
their employer over wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment." See 
Donovan, 767 F.2d at 950. Although UMTA does not explicitly use the term ''at a minimum,n or 
speak in terms of "floors" or "ceilings,n several cases discussing this issue expressly state that 
the Secretary of Labor was to ensure that certain minimum standards are met. As noted, the 
Donovan Court used the phrase "at a minimumr, on two occasions in this context. See id. at 
949, 950. And the Tenth Circuit, more recently, was even more clear: 
[T]he purpose of Section 13(c) [of UMTA] is not to invalidate overly-protective 
terms in a Section 13(c) agreement, but rather to prevent federal funds from 
being used to destroy the collective-bargaining rights of organized workers. 
[Citation omitted.] To that end, § 13(c) establishes "minimal standards,n Burke v. 
Utah Transit Auth. and Local 382, 462 F.3d 1253, at 1258 (10th Cir. 2006), and 
does not concern itself with other provisions to which the parties.might agree. 
City of Colorado Springs v. Solis, 589 F.3d 1121 1 1132-33 (10th Cir. 2009). 
Despite the fact that the Secretary of Labor was instructed to examine each state's 
arrangement to make sure that it provided transit workers with certain minimum labor rights, 
Congress by passing UMTA "made it absolutely clear that it did not intend to create a body of 
federal law applicable to labor relations between local governmental entities and transit 
workers." See Jackson Transit, 457 U.S. at 27. While federal labor policy would inform the 
Secretary's "minimal standards" inquiry, UMTA 
would not supersede state law, [and] would leave intact the exclusion of local 
government employers from the National Labor Relations Act, and state courts 
would retain jurisdiction to determine the application of state policy to focal 
government transit relations. Congress intended that [UMTA] would be an 
important tool to protect the collective-bargaining rights of transit workers, by 
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ensuring that state law preserved their rights before federal aid could be used to 
convert private companies into public entities. But Congress designed [UMT A] 
as a means to accommodate state law to collective bargaining, not as a means 
to substitute a federal law of collective bargaining for state labor law. 
Id. at 27-28 (internal citations omitted). 
In this case, both sides recognize that the question of whether the UTA rail operations 
supervisors can organize and collectively bargain is ultimately a question of state law, and not of 
federal law. See Union's Br., at 7; UTA's Br., at 3. However, UTA argues that the state-law 
question is to be informed by "federal labor policy," see UTA's Br., at 31 and points out that 
federal labor law, at least since 1947, provides that "supervisors" are not "employees" who have 
a right to organize or collectively bargain. UTA's assertion-that current federal labor policy 
does not allow "supervisors" to organize or collectively bargain-is surely correct, as discussed 
below. But in the Court's view, UTA misperceives the role federal labor policy plays in 
answering the question before the Court. The Union argues that federal labor policy supplies 
minimum standards-a "floor" but not a 11cei1in911 -below which state law protections for local 
transit workers cannot go without jeopardizing federal funds flowing to state transit districts, but 
that nothing in UMTA (or the policies behind UMTA) prevents a state, if it wishes, from providing 
additional labor relations protections to workers above and beyond those afforded to workers 
under federal law. The Court is persuaded by the Union's position on this point. The question 
is ultimately governed by state law, irrespective of federal labor policy, unless state law 
protections for transit workers fall below those minimum protections afforded by federal law. 
As noted, UT A is correct when it asserts that current federal law provides no labor 
relations protection for "supervisors." See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (providing that "[t]he term 
'employee' ... shall not include ... any individual employed as a supervisor"). And there. may 
in fact be good policy reasons for legislative bodies to enact an exclusion for "supervisorsu from 
the statutory definition of 11employee. 0 See,~, Smithfield Packing Co. v. NLRB, 510 F.3d 507, 
516 (4th Cir. 2007) (stating that supervisors are not protected "for good reason: management, 
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like labor, must have faithful agents" and because "supervisors are management obliged to be 
loyal to their employer's interests"). But federal law did not always exclude "supervisors" from 
the statutory definition of "employee. n 
The National Labor Relations Act was originally passed through Congress in 1935, in the 
midst of the New Deal. The original law, which was known as the "Wagner Actt contained an 
extremely broad definition of "employee," which definition contained no exclusion for 
supervisors. See Union's Br., at Exhibit 2 (citing the original Wagner Act, which stated that 
"[t]he term employee shall include any employee," with no exception for supervisors, and 
containing only an exclusion for "any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the 
domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent 
or spouse"). From its original passage in 1935, until 1947 (when Congress passed the Taft-
Hartley Act), federal law contained this expansive definition of "employee," which applied to any 
"employee" whose job affected interstate commerce. 
Because the Wagner Act only governed employees engaged in interstate commerce, 
and because in the 1930s-before widespread air travel or. certainly. the Internet-the reach of 
interstate commerce was not as broad as it is today, the passage of the Wagner Act did not 
cover all of the nation's employees. At that time, there were still quite a number of employees 
who worked for small businesses that did not engage in interstate commerce. To cover these 
employees, many states followed up passage of the Wagner Act by enacting labor relations 
statutes of their own, which statutes were commonly called "Little Wagner Acts.n Utah was one 
of the states that passed a "Little Wagner Act, n in 1937, and that statute is still on the books 
today, codified at Utah Code Ann.§ 34-20-1 et seq. That statute was originally passed with an 
expansive definition of "employee" that was substantively identical to the original federal 
Wagner Act, without any exclusion for "supervisors": and that definition remains more or less 
unchanged to this day. 
9 
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Over the decades following passage of Utah's Little Wagner Act, as the reach of 
interstate commercial activity has gradually grown, the applicability of Utah's law has 
proportionately decreased, to the point where, today, the statute has more or less fallen into 
disuse. For instance, that statute calls for the creation of a Utah Labor Relations Board, a state 
agency that was for many years active and vibrant. See Utah Code Ann. § 34-20-3; see also 
Hotel Utah Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 211 P.2d 200 (Utah 1949) (discussing the actions of the 
Utah Labor Relations Board). However, no such state labor board exists today; the parties 
agreed at oral argument that no such board has existed for many decades. Indeed, at oral 
argument, in an answer to a question from the Court, the parties could not come up with any 
examples of workers to whom Utah's Little Wagner Act today squarely applies. 
Despite its apparent obsolescence, the statute remains on the books today, and in 
substantially the same form as when it was passed in the 1930s. Notably for the purposes of 
this case, Congress in 1947 passed the Taft-Hartley Act (over President Truman's veto), which 
amended the Wagner Act by, inter alia. adding an exclusion for "supervisors" to the definition of 
"employee." See Pub. L. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136, enacted June 23, 1947 (now codified at 29 
U.S.C. § 152(3), and excluding from the definition of 11employee" "any individual employed as a 
supervisor'). Thus, under federal law, in effect since 1947, "supervisors" are not "employees" 
who are entitled to organize and collectively bargain. However, the Utah legislature did not ever 
amend the Little Wagner Act in the same way, whether in 1947 or at any time thereafter. Even 
today, the Little Wagner Act's definition of "employee" is the same as the pre-1947 federal law, 
with no exclusion for "supervisors. 11 See Utah Code Ann.§ 34-20-2(4). 
B. 
Wrth that historical background in mind, the Court now turns to the question at hand, 
namely, whether UTA's rail operations supervisors are "employees" under the Act, which 
provides that 11[e]mployees of a public transit system" have certain labor relations rights, 
including the right to organize and collectively bargain. The Union urges the Court to apply a 
10 
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Aplain meaning" definition of "employee," or to look to Utah's Little Wagner Act for guidance as 
to how the Utah legislature intended the term to be denned. UT A, by contrast, urges the Court 
to look to current federal law conceptions of "employee/' which since 1947 have excluded 
"supervisors.~ UTA argued passionately at oral argument that allowing these supervisors to 
organize would run contrary to nearly 70 years of established federal labor law and practice. In 
the Courfs view, the Unio"n has the better of the argument. 
As noted above. the question is ultimately governed by state law. See Jackson Transit, 
457 U.S. at 24 (stating that "Congress intended that labor relations between transit workers and 
local governments would be controlled by state law'). Under UMTA, states accepting federal 
aid for local transit systems must provide local transit workers with a certain basic level of 
protection for labor relations and colfectively bargaining rights. See 49 U.S.C .. § 5333(b). 
Federal labor policy is involved simply to provide certain "minimal standards" below which state 
law mechanisms put in place for protection of these rights may not fall. See Solis, 589 P .3d at 
1133. The fact that Utah law may afford certain rights to workers that federal law does not 
provide does not violate federal law or policy. The Court is simply not persuaded by UT A's 
argument that federal labor law (which excludes supervisors} should trump state law (which 
does not). State law provides the answer to the question, unless state law provides fewer rights 
than federal law. Here, because state law appears to create more rights th.an federal law, 
federal law and/or policy is simply not dispositive.2 
2 At oral argument, UTA argued that, if the Court rufes in the Union's favor and allows UTA1s rail 
operations supervisors to organize and collectively bargain. such a ruling would upset and run counter to 
well-established federal labor laws and· practices. The Court considers these concerns overstated. As 
the Court explored with counsel at oral argument. this Memorandum Decision and Order will affect only 
supervisors who work for UT A. Counsel were unable to provide the Court, at oral argument, with 
examples of any other employees, either inside Utah or across the country. who will be affected by this 
decision. Indeed, UTA1s supervisors-if, in fact, they are llsupeniisors"-may very well be the only 
supervisors in the United States with the rightto organize and collectively bargain. And this fact, by itself, 
demonstrates the hyperbolic nature of UT A1s concerns: if this decision only affects a small number of 
supervisors working for one single public transit district in one single state, it will hardly spell the end of 
established labor law as we know it. 
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In the end, the Court's task in this case is relatively straightforward: what does the term 
"employee" mean as used in the Act? See Utah Code Ann.§ 17B-2a-813(2). If the Act itself 
had a definition of .. employee," the Court would of course look there first. See State v. 
Rasabout. 2015 UT 72, 1J43, - P.3d - (Lee, J., concurring) (stating that "a threshold question is 
whether the legislative text conveys some specialized meaningJI such as ~ "statutorily defined 
term" or a "legal term of art" and stating that, if it does, ''the specialized meaning contro!s11). But 
in . this case, the Utah legislature did not provide any statutory definition of the term within the 
Act, or otherwise within the Act provide any indication that it was using the term "employee'' .in 
some spe~ializecf or unique way .. In such cases, courts are to interpret the statutory language 
"according to the prafn meaning of pts] text." See Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City. 2011 UT 10, 
1{9, 248 P.3d 465. 
A "starting point" for a courtis 1'assessment of ordinary meaning is the dictionary:• See 
State v. Bagnes, 2014 UT 4, 1{14. 322 P.3d 719 (citing Hi-Country Prop. Rights Grp. v·. Emmer, 
2013 UT 33, 1{19, 304 P.3d 851). The term "employee,11 as used in comrnon dictionaries and in 
Qrdin$ry parlance, clearly includes supeivisory employees. Webster's Dictionary defines 
"employee., simply as "o.ne .employed by another." Dictionary.com defines "employee11 as "a 
person working for another person or a business firm for pay. i1 And the American Heritage Desk 
Dictionary defines "employee" as "a person who works for another person or business in return 
for salary, wages, or other compensation." See Union1s Br. 1 at 8. These defin_itions are all 
simple and plain enough, and all of them are easily broad enough to encompass the rail 
operations supervisors who work for UTA. The Court is aware of no dictionary definition of the 
word "employee~ that excludes "supervisors11 from its definition, and UTA cites none. 
Another ptace that courts look to when a term is not defined within a particular section of 
the Utah Code is to other sections of the Utah Code. See Wasatch Crest Ins. Co. v. LWP 
Claims Adm'rs Corp., 2007 UT 32, fflJ 13-14, 158 P.3d 548 (stating that "[a]lthough the Utah 
Insurance Code does not define the tenn 'distribution,' the term is defined elsewhere in the Utah 
12 
00288 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 222 v. UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY Case No. 140902884 
Code as a portion of equity"); see also Territorial Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Baird. 781 P.2d 452, 461 
(Utah 1989) (stating that 11[a]lthough the Utah Fraudulent Conveyances Act does not define 
'good faith,' the term is defined elsewhere in the Utah Code as 'honesty in fact in the conduct or 
transaction concerned'"); LeBeau v. State, 2014 UT 39, 1[34, 337 P.3d 254 (stating that 
"[t]hough the Legislature did not specifically define 'interests of justice' in the aggravated 
kidnapping statute, it has provided guidance elsewhere in the Utah Code"). In this case, while 
the Act itself contains no definition of Cl employee." there is another place within the Utah Code-
and, notably, within the labor relations context-where the Utah legislature has expressly 
defined uemployee": the Little Wagner Act. And as noted, that statute, which in this respect has 
been unchanged for nearly 80 years, defines "employee11 as "any employee unless this chapter 
explicitly states otheiwise," without any exclusion for supervisors. See Utah Code Ann.§ 34-20-
2(4){a). UTA rightly points out that it is not subject to the Little Wagner Act because it is not an 
11employer11 under that statute, since that statute defines "employer" as excluding any ustate or 
political subdivision of a state . ., See id. § 34-20-2{5){b). But while the Little Wagner Act does 
not strictly apply here, it is the only place in the Utah Code where the Utah legislature has 
defined the term "employee" in the labor relations context, and that definition was on the books 
in 1969 when the Utah legislature enacted the Act. Accordingly, the Court finds the Little 
Wagner Act's definition to be very useful guidance in trying to determine what the Utah 
legislature meant when it used the term "employee" in the Act. 
Certainly, the Utah legislature is (and has been for nearly 80 years) free to change its 
definition of "employee" in the labor relations context, both as that term is used in the Act and in 
the Little Wagner Act. To date, however, it has not done so, and continues to define the term, 
within the labor relations context, as a term that does not exclude supervisors. This Court is 
bound to interpret legislative enactments according to their plain meaning, even if the Court may 
think that the current legislature might not necessarily pass that same law. See, ~, Carranza 
v. U.S., 2011 UT 80, 1139, 267 P.3d 912 (Nehring, J., dissenting) (stating that courts "do not 
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interpret statutes by assuming which rights the legislature should want to protect'). Here, the 
term "employee" is used-both in the Act and in the Little Wagner Act-without any exclusion 
for supervisors. which definition squares with the plain language (or "dictionart) definition of the 
term. Despite the fact that this definition provides labor relations protections to persons who 
may not receive it under applicable federal law, the state statutes are plain enough: all 
employees of a public transit system, including supeivisors, have the right to seJf-organization; 
to form, join or assist labor organizations; and to bargain collectively. See Utah Code Ann. § 
178-2a-813(2)(a). The Court therefore holds that UTA's rail operations supervisors are indeed 
#employees" as that term is currently used in Utah state labor relations law. 
II. THE COURT WILL CONDUCT A CARD CHECK TO VERIFY THAT A MAJORITY OF 
THE RAIL OPERATIONS SUPERVISORS HAVE CHOSEN THE UNION 
Next. the Union asks this Court to determine that a "card check" is an appropriate 
method for determining whether or not a majority of UTA's rail operations supervisors have 
chosen the Union to be their bargaining representative. A "card check" entails simply 
comparing the ucards11 obtained by Hogue, the Union official, with a certified list of UTA's rail 
operations supervisors, with the goal toward verifying that the cards were indeed signed by 
actual rail operations supervisors working for UTA For its part, UTA resists using the "card 
check" method, and asks this Court to order that an election take place where all of UT A's rail 
operations supervisors will be given an opportunity to cast a secret ballot either for or against 
Union representation. 
At root, this question is also one of statutory interpretation. The Act requires UTA to 
"recognize and bargain exclusively with any labor organization representing a majority of the 
district1s employees in an appropriate unit." See Utah Code Ann.§ 178-2a-813(2)(c)(i). Neither 
side here contests the issue of whether the rail operations supervisors are, or would be, "an 
appropriate unit." Rather, the dispute centers on the language compelling UTA to bargain with 
any "labor organization representing a majority' of the rail operations supervisors. The Union 
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maintains that a "card check" is a perfectly acceptable way to verify whether or not a "majority" 
of the supervisors have asked for Union representation. UTA, by contrast, claims that a "card 
check" is less reliable than an election, before which both sides can campaign and at which 
each supervisor can cast a secret ballot. The Act itself, unfortunately, contains no additional 
guidance with regard to the appropriate method for determining whether any particular labor 
organization has garnered majority support. 
Once again, however, the Court looks to the Little Wagner Act for guidance, even though 
it is not directly applicable in cases involving UTA. As noted, it is the Utah legislature's only 
guidance in the labor relations context, and the Court again finds that statute helpful in 
construing the terms of the rather spare Public Transit District Act. In the Little Wagner Act, the 
Utah legislature stated that the question of whether a labor organization actually does represent 
a particular set of employees can be answered by "tak[ingJ a secret ballot of employeesn or by 
"utilizpng] any other suitable method to ascertain such representatives." See Utah Code Ann. § 
34-20-9(3). 
This section of the Little Wagner Act was the subject of the Utah Supreme Court's 
decision in Hotel Utah Co. v. Industrial Comm•n. 211 P.2d 200 (Utah 1949). In that case, the 
Court affirmed the decision by the then-robust Utah Labor Relations Board to use a "card check11 
method to ascertain union representation, holding that a "card checku was indeed a '1suitable 
method'' under the Little Wagner Act, and that the Board 11did not abuse the discretion vested in 
it by the. statute" in using the card check method. Id. at 203. However1 after "sustaining the 
Board in the method used, 11 the Court noted that an "electionf' by secret ballot is the "most 
effective way of obtaining an untrammeled expression of the desires of the employees," and the 
best way to minimize the risk of "undue influence/ and strongly encouraged the Board to use 
elections rather than card checks in the future. Id. 
The Court notes, however, that the debate taking place in the Hotel Utah opinion was 
occurring within the context of the existence of a robust Utah Labor Relations Board, whose 
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task it was to oversee any such elections and to conduct any such card checks. Even today, 
where most labor issues are governed by federal law, the National Labor Relations Board takes 
care of administering union elections and overseeing card checks. Because this is not a federal 
issue, assistance from the National Labor Relations Board is not available. And the Utah Labor 
Relations Board is no longer functional. Thus1 there exists no administrative body to preside 
over or conduct either an election or a card check in this case. And this practical reality is highly 
relevant to the Court's decision here. 
lf a robust Utah Labor Relations Board existed, the Court may well be inclined to take 
the Hotel Utah Court at its word, and instruct the Board to oversee and administer an election, in 
light of the fact that the Court went out of its way to express its view that secret ballot elections 
are "the most effective way" to ascertain whether a union really does represent the 11majority" of 
employees. But that option appears to the Court, as a practical matter, to be foreclosed here 
simply by virtue of the absence of any competent and operational administrative body to 
oversee and administer any such election. UTA urges this Court to do so itself, or to appoint a 
special master for the purposes of overseeing an election. See. UTA Br .• at 11. But this strikes 
the Court as a task generally beyond the ordinary ken of the judiciary. Courts interpret the law, 
and apply it to the facts of the cases that come before them. Courts do not typically oversee or 
administer elections, even labor relations elections. Simply entertaining the notion brings to 
mind a host of unanswered questions, including:· where would the election take place? What 
would the ballot look like? When would the election take place? What rules would be in place 
with regard fo campaigning? Who would practically enforce any such rules? Who wourd 
physically be present to oversee the ballot process? What would be the mechanism for dealing 
with the inevitable disputes that would arise between the parties regarding campaigning and 
balloting? In the present context, the Court is simply unwilling to step into that arena. 
In the absence of any functioning administrative body to oversee any such election, the 
Court falls back on the method that was {despite the Court's stated preference for elections) 
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actuaJly sustained as "suitable" in the Hotel Utah case: a card check. See Hotel Utah. 211 P.2d 
at 202-03. The Court recognizes that, in the federal setting, it is the same National Labor 
Relations Board that conducts card checks as oversees and administers elections. The Qourt 
arso recognizes that verifying card checks is, like administering elections, also not within the 
usual job description of a judge. But as a practical matter, a judge is much better equipped to 
conduct a card check than to oversee and administer an election. In practice, conducting a card 
check verification can be done in chambers, following the in camera submission of the signed 
cards (from the Union) and an employee list (from UTA). As noted, this method has, at least 
once, been sustained by the Utah Supreme Court as a "suitable method," under Utah's Little 
Wagner Act, to verify whether a union really does represent a majority of employees. And in the 
absence of any operational administrative entity to oversee elections, the Court views a card 
check verification as the best and most practicar alternative available. 
Accordingly, the Court concludes that a card check is a lawful, acceptable, and ''suitable" 
method of verifying whether the Union really does represent a "majority" of UT A's rail operations 
supervisors. The Court will conduct the card check verification itself, fn chambers. Within 
fourteen days of the issuance of this Memorandum Decision and Order, the Union shall submit 
the cards it believes it has procured, and UTA shall submit an official list of its rail operations 
supervisors. Both submissions shall be made via hand delivery to the Court's chambers. The 
Court will make those submissions part of the record, but those submissions will be marked 
"SEALED" and will not be available for review by anyone other than the party who submitted 
them, without further order of the Court. The Court specifically finds that these submissions 
need to be kept private from the other side, and that whatever interests that might exist in favor 
of public access to these records are substantially outweighed by the Union's and UTA's 
interests in making sure that their employee lists as well as the list of those alleged to have 
signed "cards" are kept private. As soon as practicable following in camera submission of the 
cards and the employee list, the Court will conduct an in camera review and comparison of the 
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cards to the employee list, and will make a determination as to whether a majority of the rail 
operations supervisors listed on the employee list have in fact signed cards authorizing the 
Union to represent them. 
CONCLUSION 
For an of the foregoing reasons, the Union's Motion is GRANTED in its entirety. The 
factual dispute between these parties about whether UT A's rail operations supervisors are 
actually employed in a supervisory capacity is tendered moot by the decisions made herein. 
This case can be resolved on legal grounds. Under Utah law, UTA's rail operations supervisors 
are "employees" who have a right to organize and bargain collectively, regardless of whether or 
not they are acting in a supervisory capacity. The Court will determine, through an in camera 
review of the cards and the employee list, whether or not a majority of those rail operations 
supervisors have authorized the Union to represent them. 
This Memorandum Decision and Order is the order of the Court with regard to the 
Motion, and no further writing is necessary to effectuate this decision. 
DATED this I :>.\-I,\ day of October, 2015. 
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Page 9375 TITLE 49.-TRANSPORTATION § 1611 
which is appropriate, in the Judgment of the Ad-
ministrator, for a public transportation system to 
serve commuters or others in the locality taking 
into consideration the local patterns and trends 
of urban growth; 
(5) the term "mass transportation" means 
transportation by bus or rail or other conveyance, 
either publicly or Privately owned, serving the 
general public (but not including school buses or 
charter or sightseeing service) and moving over 
prescribed routes. 
(e) Authorization of appropriations. 
There are hereby authortzed to be appropriated, 
out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise ap-
propriated, the funds necessary to carry out all func-
tions under this chapter except loans under section 
1602 of this title. All funds appropriated under this 
chapter for other than administrative expenses shall 
remain available until expended. 
(f) Regulation of operation of system, rates, rentals, 
or other charges; compliance with undertakings. 
None of the provisions of this chapter shall be 
construed to authorize the Administrator to regulate 
in any manner the mode of operation of any mass 
transportation system with respect to which a grant 
ls made under section 1602 of this title or, after such 
grant ts made, to regulate the rates, fares, tolls, 
rentals, or other charges fixed or prescribed for such 
system by any local public or private transit agency; 
but nothing In this subsection shall prevent the Ad-
ministrator from taking such actions as may be 
necessary to require compliance by the agency or 
agencies involved with any undertakings furnished 
by such agency or agencies In connection with the 
application for the grant. (Pub. L. 88-365, § 9, July 
9, 1964, 78 Stat. 306.) 
§ 1609. Labor standards. 
(a) Action or Administrator. 
The Administrator shall take such action as may 
be necessary to insure that all laborers and mechanics 
employed by contracors or subcontractors in the 
performance of construction work financed with 
the assistance of loans or grants under this chapter 
shall be paid wages at rates not less than those 
prevailing on slmJlar construction in the locality 
as determined by the Secretary of Labor in accord-
ance with the Davis-Bacon Act, as amended. The 
Administrator shall not approve any such loan or 
grant without first obtaining adequate assurance 
that required labor standards will be maintained 
upon the construction work. 
(b) Authority of Secretary of Labor. 
The Secretary of Labor shall have, with respect to 
the labor standards specified in subsection <a> of 
this section, the authority and functions set forth 
in Reorganization Plan Numbered 14 of 1950 (15 
F.R. 3176; 64 Stat. 1267, and section 276c of Title 40. 
(c) Interests of employees; protective arrangements: 
terms and conditions. 
It shall be a condition of any assistance under 
this chapter that fair and equitable arrangements 
are made, BS determined by the Secretary of Labor, 
to protect the lnterests"of employees e.trected by 
such assistance. Such protective arrangements shall 
include, withoub being limited to, such provisions 
BS may be necessary for Cl) the preservation of 
rights, privileges, and benefits (including continua-
tion of pension rights and benefits) under existing 
collective bargaining agreements or otherwise; <2> 
the continuation of collective bargalning rights; <3> 
the protection of individual employees against a 
worsening of their positions with respect to their 
employment; <4> assurances of employment to em-
ployees of acquired mass transportation systems and 
priority of reemployment of employees terminated 
or laid off; and (5) paid tralning or retraining- pro-
grams. Such arrangements shall include provisions 
protecting individual employees against a worsening 
of their positions with respect to their employment 
which shall in no event provide benefits less than 
those established pursuant to section 5(2) (f) of this 
title. The contract for the granting of any such 
assistance shall specify the terms and conditions 
of the protective arrangements. (Pub. L. 88-365, 
§ 10, July 9, 1964, 78 Stat. 307.> 
REFED.ENCES IN TzxT 
The Da.vts-Baeon Act, as amended, referred to In subsec. 
(a.), Is classified to sections 276a. to 276a.-5 of Title 40, 
Public Buildings, Property and Works. 
Reorga.niza.tlon Pla.n Numbered 14 ot 1950 ( 15 F .R. 
3176; 64 Stat. 1267). referred to In subsec. (b), ls set out 
as a. note under section 133z-15 ot Title 5, Executive De-
partments and Government Officers e.nd Employees. 
§ 1610. Air pollution control. 
In providing financial assistance to any project 
under section 1602 of this title, the Administrator 
shall take into consideration whether the facilities 
and equipment to be acquired, constructed, recon-
structed, or improved will be designed and equipped 
to prevent and control air pollution 1n accordance 
with any criteria established for this purpose by the 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. (Pub. 
L. 88-365, § 11, July 9, 1964, 78 Stat. 308.) 
§ 1611. Limitation on grants within one State. 
Grants made under section 1602 of this title (other 
than grants for relocation payments in accordance 
with section 1606Cb) of this title> for projects tn any 
one State shall not exceed in the aggregate 12 ½ 
per centum of the aggregate amoWlt of grant funds 
authorized to be appropriated pursuant to section 
1603 (b) of this title. (Pub. L. 88-365, § 12, July 9, 
1964, 78 Stat. 308.> 
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§ 5333. Labor standards, 49 USCA § 5333 
f": KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment 
Proposed Legislation 
United States Code Annotated 
Title 49. Transportation (Refs & Annas) 
Subtitle III. General and Intermodal Programs (Refs & Annos) 
Chapter 53. Public Transportation (Refs & Annas) 
49 U.S.C.A. § 5333 
§ 5333. Labor standards 
Effective: October 1, 2012 
Currentness 
(a) Prevailing wages requirement.--The Secretary of Transportation shall ensure that laborers and mechanics employed 
by contractors and subcontractors in construction work financed with a grant or loan under this chapter be paid wages 
not less than those prevailing on similar construction in the locality, as determined by the Secretary of Labor under 
sections 3141 through 3144, 3146, and 3147 of title 40. The Secretary of Transportation may approve a grant or loan 
only after being assured that required labor standards will be maintained on the construction work. For a labor standard 
under this subsection, the Secretary of Labor has the same duties and powers stated in Reorganization Plan No. 14 of 
1950 (eff. May 24, 1950, 64 Stat. 1267) and section 3145 of title 40. 
(b) Employee protective arrangernents.-(1) As a condition of financial assistance under sections 5307-5312, 5316, 5318, 
5323(a)(l), 5323(b), 5323(d), 5328, 5337, and 5338(b) of this title, the interests of employees affected by the assistance 
shall be protected under arrangements the Secretary of Labor concludes are fair and equitable. The agreement granting 
the assistance under sections 5307-5312, 5316, 5318, 5323(a)(l), 5323(b), 5323(d), 5328, 5337, and 5338(b) shall specify 
the arrangements. 
(2) Arrangements under this subsection shall include provisions that may be necessary for--
(A) the preservation of rights, privileges, and benefits (including continuation of pension rights and benefits) under 
existing collective bargaining agreements or otherwise; 
(B) the continuation of collective bargaining rights; 
(C) the protection of individual employees against a worsening of their positions related to employment; 
(D) assurances of employment to employees of acquired public transportation systems; 
(E) assurances of priority of reemployment of employees whose employment is ended or who are laid off; and 
(F) paid training or retraining programs. 
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§ 5333. Labor standards, 49 USCA § 5333 
(3) Arrangements under this subsection shall provide benefits at least equal to benefits established under section 11326 
of this title. 
(4) Fair and equitable arrangements to protect the interests of employees utilized by the Secretary of Labor for assistance 
to purchase like-kind equipment or facilities, and grant amendments which do not materially revise or amend existing 
assistance agreements, shall be certified without referral. 
(5) When the Secretary is called upon to issue fair and equitable determinations involving assurances of employment when 
one private transit bus service contractor replaces another through competitive bidding, such decisions shall be based 
on the principles set forth in the Department of Labor's decision of September 21, 1994, as clarified by the supplemental 
ruling of November 7, 1994, with respect to grant NV-90-X021. This paragraph shall not serve as a basis for objections 
under section 215.3(d) oftitle 29, Code of Federal Regulations. 
CREDIT(S) 
(Added Pub.L. 103-272, § l(d), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 835; amended Pub.L. 104-88, Title III,§ 308(e), Dec. 29, 1995, 
109 Stat. 947; Pub.L. 105-178, Title III, § 3029(b)(9), June 9, 1998, 112 Stat. 372; Pub.L. 107-217, § 3(n)(3), Aug. 21, 
2002, 116 Stat. 1302; Pub.L. 109-59, Title III,§§ 3002(b)(4), 3031, Aug. 10, 2005, 119 Stat. 1545, 1625; Pub.L. 112-141, 
Div. B, § 20030(h), July 6, 2012, 126 Stat. 731.) 
Notes of Decisions (39) 
49 U.S.C.A. § 5333, 49 USCA § 5333 
Current through P.L. 115-45. Title 26 current through 115-52. 
End of Documt!nt t<,';1 2017 Thomson Reulers. No claim t,) original U.S. Government Works. 
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LAWS 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH, 1969 
Passed at the 
FIRST SPECIAL SESSION 
THIRTY-EIGHTH LEGISLATURE 
BANKS AND BANKING 
CHAPTER 1 
H. B. No. 7 (Passed May 7, 1969. In effect May 9, 1969) 
INDUSTRIAL LOAN CORPORATIONS 
An Act Amending Chapter 17, Laws of Utah 1969 (H. B. No. 201 of the 
38th Legislature); Providing For a Different Date For It to Become 
Effective; and Providing For an Effective Date For This Act. 
Be it enacted by the Legislatur.e of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Chapter amended. 
Chapter 17, Laws of Utah 1969, (H.B. 201 of the 38th Legislature), 
is amended by adding Section thereto to read as follows: 
"Section 1· This act shall take effect on July 1, 1969." 
Section 2. Act effective. 
This act shall take effect upon approval. 
Approved May 9, 1969. 
CHAPTER 2 
H. B. No. 9 (Passed May 8, 1969. In effect July l, 1969) 
CONSUMER CREDIT CODE: CONFORMING TO FEDERAL 
· ACT AND REGULATIONS 
An Act Amending Sections 3.104, 3.105, and 6.104 of the Utah Uniform 
Consumer Credit Code, as Enacted by Chapter 18, Laws of Utah 1969 
(H.B. 200 of the 38th Legislature), Relating t.o Certain Consumer 
and Other Credit Transactions; Conforming This Code More Closely 
to the Requirements of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act 
and the Regulations Issued Thereunder; and Providing an Effective 
Date. 
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Ch. 12 Miscellaneous [1160] 
be held and utilized by the university, directly or indirectly, for pur-
poses of its own research or as common areas supervised and controlled 
by it and not leased to private persons or parties, even though such 
portions may be utilized by lessees of other areas of the research park 
or by other private interests in connection with the general purposes 
of the research park. Upon expiration of termination of any lease of 
property lying within such research park resulting in reversion of direct 
control to the university of the subject land, improvements and/or 
equipment, such land, improvements and equipment shall immediately 
become exempt from taxation and contribution in lieu thereof, and the 
proration of the annualized taxes or contribution in lieu thereof shall 
be made as of the date of such lease expiration or termination. 
Section 6. Salt Lake City to provide services - Fire - Police -
Facilities. 
The board of commissioners of Salt Lake City is hereby authorized 
and directed to provide police and fue protection and to furnish, install 
and maintain customary municipal services and facilities for street light-
ing, traffic control, sidewalks, curb, gutter, drainage, sewage disposal 
and water supply with respect to all areas of the research park to be 
established upon lands conveyed to the University of Utah under the 
patent. Such services and facilities shall be provided as the need there-
fore shall be determined by the state board of higher education and 
shall be furnished and provided subject to connection fees, use charges 
and other service fees customarily assessed against similar persons, com-
panies or properties within the territorial limit.a of Salt Lake City. No 
special improvement district shall be created or special taxes imposed 
with respect to the services and facilities provided under this section. 
Section 7. Roads part of state highway system. 
The state road com.mission of Utah is empowered between regular 
sessions of the legislature to enter into agreements with the University 
of Utah designating all or part of the roads within or adjacent to the re-
search park hereby established as part of the state highway system-. 
Section 8. Savings clause. 
H any provision of this act, or the application of any provision to any 
person or circumst.ance, is held invalid, the remainder of this act shall 
not be affected thereby. 
Approved May 15, 1969. 
CHAPTER 12 . 
PUBLIC TRANSIT DISTRICT LAW 
S. B. No. 4 (Passed May 9, 1969. In effect July 9, 1969) 
An Act Relating to the Creation, Organization and Governance of Public 
Transit Districts; Providing for the Powers and Functions of These 
Districts, Designation and Manner of Appointment of Officers, Tenure, 
Acquisition and Exemption From Taxation and Execution of District 
Property, ~uance of Bonds, Levy and Collection of Taxes, Annexa-
tion and Withdrawal From These Districts, Payment of Claims Against 
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Ch. 12 Miscellaneous (1168] 
fied to the court for judgment and in that case the part of the evidence 
specified and the stipulation specifying the evidence shall be the record 
on review. 
Section 25. Written decision and findings of fact. 
Within 30 days after conclusion of the hearing the board shall render 
its decision in writing together with written findings of fact. Copies of 
the findings and decision shall be sent to the petitioners and intervenors 
by certified mail, postage prepaid. 
Section 26. Safety appliances and procedures. 
The district shall be subject to regulations of the public service com-
mission relating to safety appliances and procedures, and the commis-
sion shall inspect all work done pursuant to this act and may make 
further additions or changes necessary for the purpose of safety to em-
ployees and the general public. 
Section 27. Subject to existing traffic laws. 
The district shall be subject, in the operation of its transportation fa-
cilities and equipment, to the laws and regulations of the State of Utah 
and of applicable municipalities relating to traffic and operation of ve-
hicles upon the streets and highways of the state. 
Section 28. Power to issue bonds, borrow money, incur deb.ts. 
The district may issue bonds, borrow money and incur debts as author-
ized by law or this act. The district may satisfy any indebtedness as 
provided in this act or in any other applicable law and may, for purposes 
of satisfaction of said indebtedness, incur new obligations of the type 
satisfied. 
Section 29. Powers of district. 
"The district may contract, accept grants, contributions or loans ( di-
rectly through the sale of securities or equipment trust certificates, or 
otherwise) from the United States, or any department, instrumentality, 
or agency thereof, to establish, finance, construct, improve, maintain 
or operate transit facilities and equipment or to study and plan transit 
facilities in accordance with any legislation congress has adopted or may 
adopt. The district may do all things necessary within the limitation 
imposed by this act, including the creation of any indebtedness per-
mitted by this act, in order to avail itself of any aid, assistance, or co-
operation available under federal legislation, including, without limita-
tions, compliance with such labor standards and the making of such ar-
rangements for employees as may be required by the United States or 
any department, instrumentality or agencies thereof." 
Section 30. Rights of employees upheld. 
The rights, benefits and other employee protective conditions and 
remedies of section 13 (c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 
1964, as amended (49 U.S.C. 1609(c)), as determined by the Secretary 
of Labor, shall apply to the establishment and operation by the district 
of any public transit service or system and t.o any lease, contract, or 
other arrangement to operate such system or services. Whenever the 
district shall operate such system or services, or enter into any lease, 
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contract, or other arrangement for the operation of such system or serv-
ices, the distict shall take such action as may be necessary to extend to 
employees or affected public transit service systems furnishing like 
services, in accordance with seniority, the first opportunity for reason-
ably comparable employment in any available non-supervisory jobs in 
respect to such operations for which they can qualify after a reasonable 
training period. Such employment shall not result in any worsening 
of the employee's position in his form.er employment or any loss of 
wages, hours, working conditions, seniority, fringe benefits and rights 
and privileges pertaining thereto. 
Section 31. Right of employees to organize, assist organization, bargain 
collectively - Striking excepted. 
Employees of any public transit system established and operated by 
the district shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or 
assist labor organizations and to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing provided, however, that such employees and 
labor organizations shall not have the right to join in any strike against 
such public transit system. The district shall recognize and bargain ex-
clusively with any labor organization representing a majority of its em-
ployees in an appropriate unit with respect to wages, salaries, hours, 
working conditions, and welfare and pension and retirement provisions, 
and, upon reaching agreement with such labor organization, to enter into 
and execute a written contract incorporating therein the agreements so 
reached. 
Section 32. Submit to arbitration board if bargaining has no results -
Board membership - Determination board final - Selection of third 
arbitrator - Term "labor dispute" broadly construed. 
Whenever any labor disputes arise in the operation of any public 
transit service or system established and operated by the District and 
collective bargaining does not result in an agreement, the District and 
the labor organization shall submit such dispute to arbitration by a 
board composed of three (3) persons, one appointed, by the District, one 
appointed by the labor organization representing the employees and a 
third member to be agreed upon by the labor organization and the Dis-
trict. The member agreed upon by the labor organization and the District 
shall act as chairman of the board. The determination of the majority 
of the board of arbitration thus established shall be final and binding 
on all matters in dispute. If, after a period of ten days from the date 
of appointment of the second-named of the two arbitrators representing 
the District and the labor organization, the third arbitrator has not been 
selected, then either arbitrator may request the Director of the Federal 
Mediation and Concilliation Service t.o furnish a list of five persons quali-
fied to act as an impartial arbitrator from which list the third arbitrator 
shall be selected. The names submitted shall be local persons or within 
as close a proximity to the local area as possible. The arbitrators ap-
pointed by the District and the labor organization, promptly after the re-
ceipt of such list, shall determine by lot the order of elimination and 
thereafter each shall, in that order, alternately eliminate one name until 
only one name remains. The remaining person on the list shall be the 
third arbitrator. The t.erm "labor dispute" shall be broadly construed 
and shall include any controversy concerning wages, salaries, working 
conditions, hours, or benefits, including health and welfare, sick leave, 
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Utah Code 
17B-2a-813 Rights, benefits, and protective conditions for employees of a public transit 
district -- Strike prohibited -- Employees of an acquired transit system. 
(1) The rights, benefits 1 and other employee protective conditions and remedies of Section 13(c) 
of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 5333(b), as determined by the 
Secretary of Labor, apply to a public transit district's establishment and operation of a public 
transit service or system. 
(2) 
(a) Employees of a public transit system established and operated by a public transit district have 
the right to: 
(i) self-organization; 
(ii) form, join, or assist labor organizations; and 
(iii) bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. 
(b) Employees of a public transit district and labor organizations may not join in a strike against 
the public transit system operated by the public transit district. 
~ (c) Each public transit district shall: 
(i) recognize and bargain exclusively with any labor organization representing a majority of the 
district's employees in an appropriate unit with respect to wages, salaries, hours, working 
conditions 1 and welfare 1 pension, and retirement provisions; and 
(ii) upon reaching agreement with the labor organization 1 enter into and execute a written 
contract incorporating the agreement. 
(3) If a public transit district acquires an existing public transit system: 
(a) all employees of the acquired system who are necessary for the operation of the acquired 
system, except executive and administrative officers and employees, shall be: 
(i) transferred to and appointed employees of the acquiring public transit district; and 
(ii) given sick leave, seniority, vacation, and pension or retirement credits in accordance with 
the acquired system's records; 
(b) members and beneficiaries of a pension or retirement plan or other program of benefits 
that the acquired system has established shall continue to have rights 1 privileges, benefits, 
obligations, and status with respect to that established plan or program; and 
(c) the public transit district may establish, amend, or modify, by agreement with employees 
or their authorized representatives, the terms, conditions, and provisions of a pension or 
retirement plan or of an amendment or modification of a pension or retirement plan. 
(4) A pension administrator for a retirement plan sponsored by a public transit district or a 
person designated by the administrator shall maintain retirement records in accordance with 
Subsection 49-11-618(2). 
Amended by Chapter 448, 2013 General Session 
Page 1 
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1142 TITLE 29.-LABOR Page 8290 
which payment shall be mnde ln advance, or by relm• 
buraement, from funds of the Commission In such 
amounts as may be agreed upon by the commlaalon and 
the Secretary or Labor, 
"Sec. 10. !Hearings.} ~e Commlsalon, or on the 
authorlzatlon ot the Comm1BSlon, any subcommittee or 
panel thereof, may, tor the purpose of carrying out lts 
runctlon.s and duties, hold such hearings and alt and act 
at such times nnd places e.s the commission or such sub-
committee or panel may deem advisable. 
"Sec, 11. }Contracts.) The Commlsaton ls authorized 
to negotiate and enter Into contracts with private or-
ganlzatlons to carry out such studies and to prepare such 
reporta as the Commlaalon determines to be necessary In 
order to carry out lta dutlea. 
"Scc.1Z. (Information from other agencfes.1 The Com-
mission ls authorized to secure directly rrom any execu-
tive department, agency, or independent. lnatrumentallty 
of the Government any lnformatlon It deems neceesary to 
carry out lta runctlons under thla A-:t; and each such 
department, agency, and Instrumentality ls authorized 
and directed to cooperate with the Commlaalon and, to 
the extent permitted by law, to rurnlah such lnforma.tlon 
to the Commission, upon request made by the Chairman. 
"Sec. 13. (.Report to the Presfdent and the Congreu,· 
termination of e:tbtcnce of Commfs,fon.J The Commls-
slon shall submit a ftnal report ot lta findings and recom-
menda.tlona to the Prealdent and the Congreaa by January 
I, 1966. The Commission shall cease to exist thirty days 
atter submitting Its ftnal report. 
"!',,r.. 14. (Autl,oruation of approprfatfon.7.J There 
are here'Jy authorized to be npproprlnted to the Commls-
alon, out or any money ln the Treasury not otherwise 
appropriated, such sums not In excess of &l,000,000, as 
may be necessnry to carry out the provisions or this Act.'' 
Ex. ORD, No. 10918. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
LADOR•MANAOEMENT POLICY 
Ex. Ord. No. 1091B, Feb. 16, 1961, 26 P.R. 1427, provided: 
By virtue of the authority vested In me aa President 
or the Unlted States, It ls ordered as follows: 
SEcrION 1. There la hereby established the President's 
Advisory Committee on Labor-Management Polley (here-
lnart.er referred to ns the Committee), The Committee 
shall be composed of the Secretary or Labor, the Secretary 
of commerce, and nineteen other members who shall be 
designated by the President from time to time. or the 
nineteen dealgnnted members, ftve shnll be from the 
public at large, seven shall be from labor, nnd seven shall 
be trom mnnngement. The Secretary or Labor 11nd the 
Secretary or commerce shall each alternatively serve 
as chairman or the Committee for periods or one year, the 
Secretary of Labar to so serve during the ftrst year fol-
lowing the date ot this order. 
SEC. 2. The Committee shall study, nnd shall advise 
with 11nd make recommendations to the President with 
respect to, pollcles t.hnt mny be rollowed by lnbor, manage-
ment, or the public which wlll promote rree and respon-
sible collective bnrgalnlng, industrial pence, sound wnge 
and price poUcles, blgher stnndnrds ot llvtng, and In-
creased productivity. The Committee shall lnclude 
among the matters to be considered by lt ln connection 
with lts studies nnd recommendations (1) policies 
designed to ensure that Amertcnn products are com-
petitive In world markets, and (2) the beneftta nnd 
problems created by 11.utomatlon and other technological 
advances. 
SEC. 3. All executive departments and ngenclei: or the 
Feder11.l Government Rre authorized and dlrecti:<t to co-
operato with the Committee and to furnish It such ln-
rormatlon ancl assistance, not Inconsistent with law, a.s 
It may require ln the performnnce or Its duties. 
SEC. 4. Conaon1mt with lnw, the Department. of Lnbor 
and the Department or Commerce shall, aa may be neces-
sary tor the effectuation ot the purposes ot this order, 
furnish assistance to the Committee In nccordnnce with 
section 214 ot the net of Mn.y 3, 1945, 69 Stnt. 134 (31 
u.s.c. 691), Such nsslstance may Include detalllng em• 
ployeea to t.be Committee, one or whom mny serve as 
executive omcer or the Commlttec, to perform such runc-
tlons, consistent wlth the purp06es or this order, as the 
Committee mny assign to them, nnd shall lnclude the 
rurnlshlng of necessary office sp11.ce 11.nd faclllttca to the 
Committee by the Department of Lllbor. 
JORN P. KJ:NNEDT 
§ 142. Deftnitions. 
When used In thls chapter-
< 1 > The term "industry affecting commerce" 
means any Industry or o.cUvlty In commerce or in 
which a labor dispute would burden or obstruct 
commerce or tend to burden or obstruct com-
merce or the free now oI commerc~. 
<2> The term "strike" Includes any strike or 
other concerted stoppage of work by employees 
<1nctuci1ng 11 stoppage by reason of the cxplro.tion 
of a. collectlve-bargo.lnlng agreement> o.nd any 
concerted slowdown or other concerted tnterrup-
Uon of operations by employees. 
(3) The terms "commerce", "labor disputes". 
"employer'\ .. employee", 11labor organization", 
.. representative .. , .. person", nnd "supervisor" shall 
have the same meaning as when used in sub-
che.pter II of this chapter ns amended by this 
chapter. 
<June 23, 1947, ch. 120, title V, I 601, 61 Stat. 181,) 
§ 143, Saving provisions. 
Nothing In this chapter shall be construed to re-
quire an Individual employee to render labor or 
service withouL his consent, nor shall anything In 
this chapter be construed to make the quitting of 
his lnbor by an Individual employee an 111ego.l act; 
nor shall any court Issue any process to compel the 
performance by an individual employee of such labor 
or service. without his consent; nor sho.11 the quitting 
of labor by an employee or employees in good f alth 
because of abnormally do.ngerous conditions for 
work at the pince of employment of such employee 
or employees be deemed a strike under this chapter, 
<June 23, 1947 ch. 120, title V, I 602, 61 Stat. 162.) 
§ J.t4. Separability or provisions. 
If any provision of this chn.pter, or the npi::Jlcntlon 
of such provision to any person or circumstance, 
shnlJ be held lnvnlld, the remainder of this chapter, 
or the nppllcntlon of such provl!.!on to pcrsous or 
circumstances other than those as to which It 1s 
held inva.lld, sha.11 not be affected thereby, <June 
23, 1947, ch. 120, title V, I 603, 61 Stat. 162.) 
SUBCHAPTER Il.-NATIONAL LABOR RELA-
TIONS 
§ 151. Findings and declaration or policy. 
The denlnl by ~ome employers of the right of 
employees to organize and the rerusal by some em-
ployers to accept the procedure of collectlve bargain-
Ing lead to strikes nnd other rorms of tndustrlni strlf e 
or unrest, which have the Intent or the necessary 
effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by (a) 
Impairing the efficiency, safety, or operation of the 
lnstrumentniltles or commerce; Cb> occurring in the 
current or commerce; <c> materially affecting, re-
straining, or controlling the flow of raw materials or 
manufactured or processed goods from or Into the 
channels of commerce, or the prices of such materials 
or goods in commerce; or (d) causing ditnlnutlon of 
employment and wages ln such volume as substan-
tially to lmpalr or disrupt the market for goods flow-
ing from or Into the channels of commerce. 
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The inequality of bargaining power between em-
ployees who do not possess run freedom of assocln-
tion or actual Uberty or contract, and employers who 
are organized in the corporate or other Corms or 
ownership association substantially burdens and 
affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate 
recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage 
rates and the purchasing powe1· or wage earners in 
industry and by preventing the stabtllzaUon or com-
petitive wage rates and working conditions within 
and between industries. 
Experience has proved that protectlon by law of the 
right of employees to organize and bargain collec-
tively safeguards commerce from Injury, Impairment. 
or Interruption, and promotes the flow or commerce 
by removing certain recognized sources of Industrial 
strife and unrest, by encouraging practices funda-
mental to the friendly adjustment of Industrial dis-
putes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or 
other working condltlons, and by restoring equaUty 
of bargaining power between employers and em-
ployees. 
Experience has further demonstrated that certain 
practices by some labor organlzathins, their officers, 
and members have the Intent or the necessary effect 
of burdening or obstructing commerce by preventing 
the Cree flow of goods In such commerce through 
strikes and other forms of industrial unrest or 
through concerted actlvttles which Impair the In-
terest or the public In the free flow of such commerce. 
The elimination or such practices ls a necessary con-
dition to the assurance or the rlghts herein guar-
anteed. 
It ls declared to be the policy or the United States 
to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstruc-
tions to the free flow of commerce and to mltlgntc 
and eliminate these obstructions when they have 
occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure 
or collective bargaining and by protecting the exer-
cise by workers or full freedom or association, self-
organization, and designation or rcpresente.tlves or 
their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating 
the terms and conditions of thell' tmployment or 
other mutual aid or protection. <July 5, 1935, ch. 
372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449; June 23, 1947, ch. 120, tJUe I, 
§ 101, 61 Stat, 136.> 
AMENDMENTS 
1047-Act June 23, 1947, amended section generally to 
restnte the declaration or poUcy nnd to make the ftndlng 
nnd policy or this subchnpter "two-sided", 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1047 AMENDMENT 
Section 104 or net June 23, 1947, provided: ''The nmend-
ments mndc by this title ( this subchnpter I Ehnll take 
cJl'ect sixty days after the dnte or the enactment of this 
Act (June 23, lll47), except that the authority of the 
President lo appoint certnln omcers conferred upon him 
by section 3 of the NnUonnl Lnbor Relntlons Act ns 
nmended by this Utlc (section 153 or thls title) may be 
exercised Co.rthwlth." 
§ 152. Definitions. 
When used In this subchapter-
C l) The term "person" includes one or more in-
dividuals, labor organizations, partnerships, asso-
ciations, corporations, legal representatives, trus-
tees, trustees tn bankruptcy, or receivers. 
C2> The term ''employer" includes any person 
acting as an agent of nn employer, directly or in-
directly, but shall not include the United States or 
any wholly owned Government corporation, or any 
Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political 
subdivision thereof, or any corporation or associa-
tion operating a. hospital, if no part of the net earn-
ings Inures to the benefit of any private share-
holder or individual, or any person subject to the 
Ratlwny Labor Act, as an1ended from time to time, 
or any labor organization <other than when actlns 
as an employer>, or anyone acting 1n the capacity 
of officer or a.gent of such labor organization. 
(3 > The term "employee" shaJl include any em-
ployee, and shall not be limited to the employees of 
a particular employer, unless this subchapter ex-
plicitly states otherwise, and shall include any in-
dividual whose work has ceased as a consequence 
or, or in connection with, any current labor dis-
pute or because or uny unfair labor practice, and 
who has not obtained any other regular and sub-
stantially equivalent employment, but shall not 
include any individual employed as an agricultural 
laborer, or in the d'>mestlc service of any family 
or person at his home,~!' dny Individual employed 
by his parent or spouse, or any individual having 
the status of an Independent contractor, or any 
individual employed as a supervisor, or any tndl-
vldunl employed by an employer subject to the 
Ratlway Labor Act, a.s amended fl'om time to time, 
or by any other person who Is not an employe1· as 
herein defined. 
<4> The term "representatives" Includes any in-
dividual or lnbol' orgnnizatlon. 
<5> The term ·'labor organizntlon" means any 
organization of any kind, or any agency or em-
ployee representation committee or plan, in which 
employees pa1-tlclpate and which exists for the pur-
pose, in whole or in part, of dealing wtth employers 
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates 
of pay, hours or employment, or conditions of 
work. 
<6> The term "commerce'' means t1·ade, traffic, 
commerce, transportation. or communication 
among the several States, or between the Dlst.dct 
of Columbia or any Territory of the United States 
and nny State or other Territory, or between any 
foreign country and any State, Territory, or the 
L'isti-ict of Columbia, or within the District of 
Columbia or any Territory, or between points in 
the same State but through any other State or any 
Territory or the District of Columbia or any r or-
elgn country, 
<7> The term "affecting commerce" means tn 
commerce, or burdening or obstrucLlng commerce 
or the f1•ee flow of commerce, or having led or 
tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or 
obstructing commerce or the free flow of com-
merce. 
(8) The term "unfair labor pro.ctlcc" means any 
unfnir labor practice listed in section 158 of this 
title, 
<9> The term "labor dispute" includes any con-
troversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of 
employment, or concerning the e.ssoclntlon or rep-
resentation of persons in negotlatlng. fixing, 
maintaining, chnnging, or seeking to arrange 
terms or conditions of employment, regardless o! 
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whether the disputants stand in the proximate 
relation of employer and employee. 
< 10 > The term "Natlonnl Labor Relations Boo.rd" 
means the National Labor Relations Boo.rd pro-
vided for in sccUon 163 of this title. 
<11> The term .. supervisor" means nny indi-
vidual having authority, in the interest of the 
employer. to hire, transfer, suspend, lay oft, recall, 
promote. discharge. nsslgn, reward, or discipline 
other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or 
to ndJust their grievances, or eff ectlvely to recom-
mend such nctlon, if ln connection with Lhe fore-
going the exercise of such authority is not of a 
merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the 
use of Independent Judgment. 
Cl2> The term "prof esslonal employee" means-
<o.> any employee engaged in work (1) pre-
dominantly intellectual and varJed Jn character 
ns opposed to routine mental, mnnual, mechani-
cal, or pbyslcnl work; <ll> involving the consist-
ent exercise of discretion and Judgment in Jts 
performar.r.e; <Un of such a character that the 
output produced or the result accomplished can-
not be standardized In relation to n given period 
of time; CM 1·equlring knowledge of an ad-
vanced type ln a field of science or learning cus-
tomnrUy ncquJred by n prolonged course of spe-
clallzed inteJlectual instruction and study f n an 
1nstltut1on of higher learning or o. hospital, ~s 
dlsttngulshcd Crom a general academic education 
or from o.n o.pprentlceshJp or from training in 
the performance of routine mental, manual, or 
physical processes; or 
Cb> any employee, who (I) has completed the 
courses of specJalized intellectual Instruction 
nnd study described ln clause <!v> of subpo.rn-
graph <a> of this po.ragrnph, nnd <U> is per• 
forming related work under the supervision of a 
professional person to qualify him:,elf to become 
o. professional employee as defined Jn said pa1·n-
graph <a). 
C13) In determining whether any person ts act-
ing ns o.n "agent., ot another person so o.s to make 
such other person responsible for his acts, the 
question of whether the specific nets performed 
were actunlly authortzcd or subsequently ratified 
shaJl not be controlllng. 
(July 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 2, 49 Sto.t.150; June 23, 1947, 
ch. 120, title I,§ 101, 61 Stnt. 137.> 
REFERENCES 1N 'l'ExT 
The Rnllway Labor Act, ns amended from time to time, 
referred to In tho text, le classified to chapter a of 
Title 45, RnUroads. 
AMENDMENTS 
1947-Act June 23, 1947, 11mended section generally to 
redefine the terma used ln this subchnpter an~ to define 
several new terms. 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1947 AMENDMENT 
Effective d11te or net June 23, 1047, ace note set out. 
under aectlon 161 or this tJtle. 
C0MMVNIST ORGANIZATIONS, AND M!:MDERS 
Prohlbttlons placed on Communist orgnnlzntlana, nnd 
members ,hereat, with respect to lnbor, ace chnpter 23 
or Title 60, Wnr and NuUonnl oerenso, p:ntlcularly acc-
tlona 782 (4A), 784, 792a, and 841--a44 or that title. 
6153. National Labor RelaUons Board. 
(a) Creation, composition, appointment, and tenure; 
Chairman; removal of members. 
The Natlonnl Labor Relations Boo.rd <here-
inafter cnlled the "Board"> created by this subcho.p. 
ter prlor lo lts amendment by the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, 1947, ls continued ns an agency 
or the United States, except that the Boo.rd shnll 
consist or five Instead of three members, appointed 
by the Presldcnt by and with the advice and consent 
of Lhe Senate. or the two nddlttonnl members so 
provided for, one shall be appointed !or a term of 
five years nnd the other for a term of two years. 
Their successors, and the successors of the other 
members, shall be appointed for terms of five years 
each, excepting that nny 1ndMdual chosen to fill a 
vacancy shnll be appointed only iJr the unexpired 
term of the member whom he shall succeed. The 
President shall designate one member to serve as 
Chairman of the Board, Any member of the Board 
may be removed by the P1·esfdent, upon notice and 
hearing, for neglect of duty or mnlfenso.ncc in office, 
but for no other cause. 
(b) DclcgaU011 of powcrR to members and rcgiounl 
directors; review and stay of actious of regional 
directors; quorum; scat. 
The Board ls authorized to delegate to any 
group of three or more members any or all of the 
powers which It may Itself exercise. The Board ls 
also autho1·fzed to delegate to its regional directors Its 
powers under section 159 of this title to determine 
the unit o.pproprfo.te for the purpose of collective 
bargaining, to !nvestlgate o.nd provide for hearings, 
and determine wl.ether a. question of representation 
exists. nnd to direct an election or to.kc a secret 
ballot under subsection <c> or <e> or section 159 of 
thls title nnd certify the results thereof, except that 
upon the fl Ung of a request therefor with the Boa.rd 
by any Interested person, the Board may review 
any action of a regf anal director delegated to him 
under this paragraph, but such a review shall not, 
unless specifically ordered by the Boo.rd, operate as 
a stay or any action taken by the regional director. 
A vncanc!' In the Board sho.11 not Impair the right 
of the remaining members to exercise all of the 
powers of the Boo.rd, and three members of the 
Board sho.Jl, at all times, constitute a quorum of the 
Bonrd, except that two members shnll constitute a 
quorwn of any group desfgnnted pursuant to the 
first sentence hereof. The Board shall have an 
official seal which shall be Judicially noticed. 
(c) Annual reports lo Congress and the President. 
The Bon1·d shall at the close of each flscnl year 
make o. report fn writing to Congress nnd to the 
President stating tn detafl the cases lt has heard, 
the decisions it has rendered, the names, salaries, and 
duties of nu employees nnd officers in the employ or 
under the supervision of the Boo.rd, and an account 
of o.11 moneys it has disbursed. 
(d) General Counse\; appointment nnd tenure; powers 
and duties; vacancy. 
There sho.Jl be a. General Counsel or the Board 
who shall be appointed by the President, by and with 
the advice and consent of the Senate, for a term of 
four years. The General Counsel of the Boo.rd shall 
exercise general supervision over nll attorneys em-• 
ployed by the Board <other than trial examiners and 
legal o.sslstants to Board members> and over the offi-
cers and employees ln the regional offices. He shall 
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have final authorJty, on behalf of the Board, 1n re-
spect of the lnvcstJgatlon of chnt•ges and issuance of 
complaints under sectlon 160 of this title, and in 
respect of the prosecution of such complaints before 
the Board, and shall have such other dutJes ns the 
Board may prescribe or as may be provided by law. 
In case of a vacancy in the office of the General 
Counsel the Pl'esident is authorized to designate 
the officel' or employee who shall net as General 
Counsel during such vacancy, but no person or per-
sons so designated shall so act c 1) for more than 
!arty days when the Congress is In session unless a 
nomination to flll such vacancy shall have been 
submitted to the Senate, 01· C2) after the adjourn-
meut sine die of the session of the Senate in which 
such nomination wa.s submltt.cd. rJuly 5, 1935, ch. 
372, § 3, 49 Stat. 451; June 23, 1947, ch. 120, title I, 
§ 101, 61 Stat. 139; Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. 86-257, 
title VII, §§ 701 Cb>, 703, 73 Stat. 542.> 
REFEnENCES IN TEXT 
The Lnbor Mnnngement Relations Act, 1947, referred to 
In text ls the oct or June 23, 1947, clnsslfled to this chnpter. 
AMENDMENTS 
1950-Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 86-257, I 701(b), nuthor-
lzed the Boord to delegnte to Its reglonnl directors Its 
powers under section 159 of this title to determine the 
unlt 11pproprlnle for tlle purpose or collective b11rgnlnl11g, 
lo lnvestlgnto nnd provide for henrlngs, nnd determine 
whether I\ question of represcntnllon cxlsta, nnd to direct 
nn clcctlon or tnke I\ secret bnllot under &ectlon 159(c) 
or 150(c) or t,hls title nnd certify the results thereof. 
Subsec. (d). PUb. L. 86-257, I 703, nuthorlzed the 
President to designate the officer or employee who shnll 
net ns Oeneral Counsel ln the cnse of n vncnncy In the 
office of the Oenerut Counsel. 
1047-Act June 23, 1047, nmendecl section genernlly by 
lncreuslng members!llp from three to fi\'e, dcJegnt-
lng lts powers o.ud dutle· 1.0 n quorum or nny three mem-
bers, nnd by nppolntlug n Oenernl Counsel nnd outllnlng 
hls powers and duties. 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1050 AMENDMENT 
Section 707 or Pub. L. 86-257 provided thnt: ''Tho 
nmcnd:nents mode by this tltlo I to subsecs. (b) and (d) 
of thls section end sections 158 (b)(4-7), (e). (l), 
150(c) (3), 100 (Z), (m) or this tltlcl shnll tnke effect. sixty 
dnys nrter the dnte of the ennctment or this Act I Sept. 14, 
1050 I nnd no provlslon or this title shnll be deemed to 
mnke on unfnlr lnbor prnctlcc, any net which ls perrormed 
prior to such effcctlvo date which did not constitute nn 
unrnlr labor practice prior thereto." 
§ 154. Same; l'ligibility for reappointment; officers nnd 
employced; payment of expenses. 
Ca) Each member of the Board rind the General 
Counsel of the Hoard shall be ellsJble for reappoint-
ment, and shall not eng11ge In any other business, 
vocation, or employmer,t. 'I1l1! Boa.rd shall appoint 
nn executive secretary, and such attomcys, exnm-
lners, and regional directors, and such other em-
ployees as It may from time to time nnd necessary 
for the proper performant'e of it.s duUes. The 
Board may not employ any attorneys for the pur-
pose ot reviewing transcripts o! hearings or pre-
paring drafts of opinions except that any attorney 
employed for assignment as a legal 11/isistant to any 
Board member may for such Board member review 
such transcripts and prepare such drafts. No trial 
examiner's report shall be reviewed. either before 
or after Its publication, by any person of her than 
a membel' of the Board or his lfgal assistant, and 
no trial examiner shall ndvlse or consult with the 
Board with respect to exceptions taken to his find-
ings, rulings, or recommendations. The Board may 
ci;tabllsh or utilize such regional, local, or other 
agencies, 'and utilize such voluntary and uncom-
pensated services, as may from time to time be 
needed. Attorneys appointed under thls section 
may, at the dircctJon of the Board, appear for and 
repl'esent the Boal'd in any case ln court. Nothing 
In this subchapter shall be construed to authorize 
the Boa.rd to appoint indivlduals for the purpose ot 
conclllatlon or mediation, or for e,:onomfc analysis. 
Cb) All of the expenses of the Boa.rd, including all 
necessary traveling and subsistence expenses outside 
the District o! Columbia Incurred by the members er 
employees of the Board under Its orders, shall be al-
lowed and paid on the presentation of itemized 
vouchers therefor approved by the Board or by any 
Individual Jt designates !or that purpose. <July 5, 
1935, ch. 372, § 4, 49 Stat. 451; June 23, 1947, ch. 
120, title I, § 101, 61 Stat. 139; Oct. 15, 1949, ch. 695, 
§ 5Ca), 63 Stat. 880.) 
CODITTCATION 
Provisions of subsec, (n) which prescribed the basic 
compensation or members or the iloard nnd the Oeneral 
counsel were omitted to conform to tho provisions or 
the Fedcrnl Executive Snlnry Schedule. Seo section 2210 
et &eq. of Tille 5, Executive Depintments nnd Oovernment 
Officers 11nd Employees. 
AMENDMENTS 
!040-Subsec. (n). Act. Oct. 16, 1040, lncrensed r.om-
pensntlon of members of Bonrd nnd Oenornl Counsel from 
$12,000 to $15,000 per o.nnum. 
1047-Act June 23, 1047, nmended section gonern.lly 
by Increasing Bonrd members' snlnrles from e10,ooo to 
012.000 per nnnum, by providing n snlary or $12,000 per 
nnnum ror the oenernl coum:el, omlttlng former subsec. 
(bl relating to the termlnatlon or the "Old Board", and 
redeslgnnUng former subsec, (c) relating to payment or 
expenses or Bon rd, to be subsec. ( b). 
EFFECTIVE DATE 01' 1947 AMENDMENT 
Effective dote or net Juno 23, 1947, see note set out 
under section 151 or this title. 
§ 155. Same; principal o!lkc, conducting inquiries 
throughout country; participation in decisions or 
inquiries conducted hy member, 
The principal office of the Board shall be in the 
DlstrJct of Columbia, but It may meet and exercise 
any or au of its powers at any other place. The 
Board may, by one or more of its members or by such 
agents or agencies as It may designate, prosecute any 
inquiry necessary to its functJons in any part of the 
United States. A mcr.1ber who participates In such 
an lnquJry shall not be disqualified !ram subse* 
quently participating In a decision of the Board In 
the same cose. <July 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 5, 49 Stat. 
452: June 23, 1947, ch. 120, titJe I, 1101, 61 Stat. 140.> 
AMENDl',ll!:NTS 
1047-Act June 23, 1047, reenncted aectlon wlthout 
change. 
EFFECTIVE DATE 01' 1047 AMENDMENT 
ElTectlvc dute or oct June 23, 1047, see noto set out 
under section 151 of thls tltle. 
§ 156. Snme; rules and regulations. 
The Board shall have authority from time to time 
to make, amand, and rescind, in the manner pre-
scrl bed by the Admlni.;trnttve Procedure Act, such 
rules and regulations as may be necessary t.o carry 
out the provisions of this s11bchapter. (July 5, 1935, 
ch. 372, § 6Ca>, 49 Stat. 452; June 23, 1947, ch. 120, 
title I,§ 101, 61 Stat .. F J 
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RZl'ERZNCESINTal' 
The Admlnlatratlve Procedure Act, referred to In the 
text, la clnsslfted to chapter 10 o! Tltle 6, Ex1cutlve De• 
pnrtmenta nnd Government omccra nnd Employees, 
CODIFICATION 
Section fl of net ,July 6, 1036, rild not contn1n a subsec• 
tton Cb). 
AMZNDHJ.NTS 
1047-•Act June 23, 1047, provided that the rules and 
regulotlons Issued by the Bolll'd should be In the mnnner 
prescribed by the Admlnlatrntlve Proce<lure Act. 
EFFECTIVE DATE or 1047 AMENDMENT 
mectln dnte o! net June 23, 1047, see note set out 
under section 161 of thla title. 
§ 157, Right or employees as to organization, collec-
tive bargaining, etc. 
Employees shnll have the right to sal!-orgo.nizn-
Uon, to form. Join, or assist labor organizntfons, to 
bargain collectively th1·ough representntlvcs or their 
own choosing, and to cngnge In other concerted 
activities !or the purpose of collective bnrgalnlng or 
other mutunl nld or protcctlcm, nn1 shnll also have 
the right to refrnln from any or all•>! such acttvitle~ 
except to the extent that such right may be affected 
by nn agreement requiring membership In n lnbor 
orgnnlzatlon ns a condition or employmen~ ns au-
thorized In section 158 (nl <3l of this title. (July 
5, 1935, ch. 372, § 7, 49 Stat. 452: June 23, 1947, 
ch. 120, title I,§ 101, 81 Stnt. 140.> 
AMENl>?otENTS 
1947-Act June :?3, 1947, restatect rlghta o( employees 
to bnrgnlu collectlvely nnd ndded provlslon that they hnve 
lhe right. to refrain from Joining ln concerted nctlvltlea 
with their Cellow employees. 
EFFECTIVE •••• TE or 1047 AMENDMENT 
!Mectlve dnte or net June 23, 1947, 11~e note set out 
under section 161 o! thls tltle. 
COMMUNIST OROANIZATI0NS, AND MEMBERS 
Prohibitions plo.ced on Communist organlzntlons, and 
members thereof, with respect to lnbor, see chnpter 23 
of Tltle 60, Wo.r nnd NQtlonnl Defense, pnrtlculnrly aec-
tlona 782 (4A), 784, 792n o.nd 841-844 of that title. 
§ 158, Unrair labor practices. 
<n> It shnll be an unfair labor practice for an 
employer-
< 1) to Interfere with, restrain, or coerce em-
ployees in the exercise o! the rights guaranteed In 
section 157 of this tltle: 
(2) to dominate or Interfere with the formation 
or ndmlnlstratlon of rmy labor orgnn1zntion or 
contribute flnnncial or other support to it: Pro-
vided, That subject to rules and regulnttons made 
and published by the Board pursuant to section 
156 of this title, a.n employer shall not be pro-
hibited from permitting employees to co!lf er with 
him durtng working hou1·s without loss of time or 
Pt\Y: 
<3> by discrlmlnntion in regard to hire or tenure 
of employment or any term or condition of en,-
ployment to enco·.irnge r,r discourage memb~::-::ihlp 
In nny labor organization: Provided, That nothing 
tn this subchapter, or 1n any other statute of the 
United States, shnll preclude an employer from 
makJng an asreement with a labor organlza.tlon 
<not established, mntntained, or assisted by any 
action defined in thls subsection as an unfair labor 
practice> to require as e. condition of employment 
membership therein on or after the thirtieth lay 
following the beginning of such employment or 
the effective date of such agreement, whichever ls 
the Inter, (1) 1! such lnbor organization is the rep-
resentative of the employees as provided in section 
159<a> of this title, in the nppropriate collecUve-
bnrgalnlng unit covered by such agreement when 
made: and un unless fallowing an election held 
as provided in section 159<e> of this tlUe within 
one yenr preceding the eff ecttve date of such agree-
ment, the Bo11rd shall have certified thnt nt least 
a. maJortty of the employees cltgible to vote in 
such election have voted to rescind the authority 
of such labor orgnnlzatton to make such an agree~ 
mcnt: Provided. furt1ier, Thnt no employer shall 
Justlfy nny dlscrlminatlon against ar. employee 
for norunembershtp 1n a lnbor orgnnization <A> 
i! he has reasonable grounds !o Jellevlng thnt 
such memberahtp was not avnilallle to the em-
ployee on the se.me tenns ani conditions gen-
erally appllcn bie to other members, or (B > if be 
hns reasonable grounds tor believing that mem-
bership was dented or terminated tor rensons 
other thnn the f nllure of the employee to tender 
the periodic dues and the tnlttntlon fees unl-
f ormly required ns e. condition of ncqulring or 
rctalntns membership; 
<4 > to discharge or otherwise discriminnte 
age.Inst nn employee because he has fllrd charges 
or given te~tlmony under this subchnptc1·: 
'5 > to refuse to bargnin collectively with the 
representntlvcs ot hls employees, subject to the 
provisions of section 159 <a> of this tttle, 
<b> It shall be nn unfRlr inbor pr11cttce for a labor 
organization or Its agents-
cu to restrain or coerce CA> employeeli in the 
exercise of the rights gunrnnteed In section 157 of 
this tttle: Provided, Thnt this •:.aragrnph shnll not 
impnlr the right of a labor orgnntzatlon to pre-
scribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition 
or retention o! membership therein: or <Bl nn 
employer in the selecUon of his representatives 
for the purposes of collective bnrgnlntng or the 
ndJustment or grievances: 
C2 > to en use or attempt to en use nn employer to 
dlscrlmtnnte ngn~st Rn employee In vtolntlon or 
subsection <a> (3) of this section or t:> discrimi-
nate Rgalnst an employee wlth respect to whom 
membership in such orgnnlzatlon hns been denied 
01· terminnted on some ground other than his tnll-
ure to tender the periodic cu:?s nnd the tnltiatlon 
fees uniformly required as a condition o! acquiring 
or retnlnlng membership: 
<3> to refuse to bargRin coUcctively with nn em-
ployer, provided it ls the representnttve of his em-
ployees subject to the provtslons or section 159 en l 
of this title: 
• 4 > <f> to cngnge in, or to induce or encourn~e 
any individual employed by any person engaged in 
commerce or in an Industry aff ectlng commerce to 
engage in, a strike or a 1·erusal in the course of 
hts employment to use, mnnuf acture, process, 
transport, or otherwise, handle or work on nny 
1:1oods, articles, matcrinls, or commodttlcs or to 
perform nny services: or <il> to threnten, coerce, 
or restrnln nny person engaged 1n commerce or 
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fn an lndust1·y affecting commerce, where in either 
case on object thereof ls-
< A> forcing or requiring any employer or sell-
employed person to Join any labor or employer 
organization or to enter Into any agreement 
which ls prohibited by subsection Ce> of this 
section: 
<Bl forcing or requiring any person to cease 
usfng, sclUng, handUng, transporting, or other-
wise dealing In the products of any other pro-
ducer, processor, or manufactw·er, or to cease 
doing business with any other person, or f orclng 
or requiring any othel' employer to l'ecognlze or 
bargain with a labor organization as the repre-
sentative of his employees unless such labor 
organization has been certified as the repre-
sentative of such employees under the provi-
sions of section 159 of this title: Provided, That 
nothing contained 1n this clause CB> shall be 
construed to make unlawful, where not other-
wise unlawful, any primary strike or primary 
picketing; 
re> forcing or requiring any employer to 
recognize or bargain with a particular labor 
organization as the representative of hls em-
ployees If another labor organization has been 
certified as the 1·epresentat1ve of such employees 
under the provisions of section 159 of this title; 
t D> f oi·clng or requiring any employer to as-
sign particular work to employees In a particu-
lar labor organization or In a particular trade, 
craft, or class rather than to employees In an-
other labor organization or in another trade, 
craft, or class, unless sn:•;1 employer ls fallln~ 
to conform to an ordr. or certlflcatlon of the 
Board determining the bargaining representa-
tive tor employees per!ormlng such work: 
Provtded, 'That nothing contained in this subsec-
tion shall be construed to make unlawful a re-
fusal by any person to enter upon the premises 
of any employer Cother than his own employer>, 
1! the employees of such employe1· are engager. !:1 
a strike ratified or app1·oved by a 1·epresentatlvc: r l 
such employees whom such employer ls requ1--e" 
to recognize under this subchapter: Provided 
further, That for the r.,urposes of this paragraph 
f4> only, nothing contained ln such paragraph 
shall be construed to p1·ohlblt pubJ.clty, other than 
picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advlsinl? 
the public, lncludlug consumers and members of 
a labor organization, that a r.,roduct or products 
are produced by an employer with whom the la-
bor organization has a primary dispute and are 
dlstrJbuted by another employer, as Jong as sueh 
publicity does not have an effect of inducing any 
individual employed by any person other than 
the :.,rtmary employer in the course of his employ-
ment to refuse to pick up, dellve1·, or transport any 
goods, or not to perform any services, at the estllb-
lishment o! the employer engaged in such 
distribution; 
(5) to require of employees covered by an agree-
ment authorized under subsection (a> C3) ot this 
section the payment, as a condition precedent to 
becomlnB a member of such organization, of a tee 
in nn amount which the Bonrd finds excessive or 
discriminatory under all the circumstances. In 
making such a finding, the Board shall consider, 
among other relevant factors, the practices anc1 
customs ot labor organizations In the partlculr 
Industry, and the wages currently paid to the em 
ployees affected: 
C6> to cause or attempt to cause an employer to 
pay or dellvcr or agree to pay or dellver any money 
or other thin@' of value, in the nature of an exac-
tion, tor services which arc not performed or not to 
be performed; and 
C7 > to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten 
to picket or cause to be plclceted, any employer 
where an object U1ereof ls forcing or retiulrlng an 
employer to recognize or bargain with a labor or-
ganization as the representatlve of his employees, 
or forcing or requiring the employees or an em-
ployer to accept or selec~ such labor organization 
as their collective barge •nlng rcpresentatlvP, un-
less such labor organlzatlon ls currently certified 
as the representative of such employees: 
<A> where the employer has lawfully rec-
ognized In accordance with thJs subchapter any 
other labor organization and a question concern-
Ing representation may not approp1·lately be 
raised under section 159<c> of tills title, 
CB> where within the preceding twelve 
months n valid election under sec.tlon 159(c) of 
this title has been conducted, or 
CC) where such picketing has been condt.cted 
without a petition undt!. section 15D<c> of this 
title being flied within a reasonahle period of 
time not to exceed thirty days from the com-
mencement of such pi:ketlng: Provided, That 
when such a petition has been filed the Board 
shall forthwith, without regard to the provisions 
of section 159Cc> Cl> o! this title or the abgance 
of a showing of a substantial interest on the part 
o! the labor organization, cllrect an election ln 
sueh unit as the Boa1·d finds to be appropriate 
and shall certify the results thereof: Provided 
furtll.er, That nothing In this subparagraph cc> 
shall be construed to prohibit any picketing or 
other publi ~tty for the purpose of truthfully 
advising the puhllc <Including consumers> that 
an employer docs not employ members of, or 
have a contt·act with, a labor orcanlzatton, un-
less nn effect a! such picketing ls to Induce nny 
individual employed by any other person in t,he 
course o! his employment, not to pick up, de-
l!ver or transport any goods or not to pertonn 
any services. 
Nothing In this paragraph <7> shall be construed 
to pennit ~i,y act which would otherwise be an un-
fair labo,· practice under this s11bsectlon. 
Cc) The e>.!'ressJng of any views, argument, or 
opJnfon, or the dissetnlnntlon thereof, whether In 
written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not 
constitute or be evidence of nn unfair labor practice 
under any of the provisions of this subchapter, If 
such rxpresslon contains no threat of reprisal or 
r orce or promise or benefit. 
Cd) For the purposes of this section, to 1,nrsain 
collectively ls the performance of the mutual ohll-
gatlon of the employer nnd the representative of 
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the employees to meet at rensonable times and co11-
fcr in good fnith with respect to wnges, hours, o.nd 
other terms o.nd conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of nn ncrecmcnt, or any queslton arising 
thereunder, and the execution or a written contract 
Incorporating nny ngrecment reached IC requested 
by either pnrtY, but such oblfcatlon docs not com-
pel either party to ngree to n proposnl or require 
the mnking of a concession: Provided, That where 
there ls in effect a collect1ve-bn1·gnlnlng contrn..:t 
covering cniploYccs ln o.n Industry nff ectlnc com-
merce, the duty to bnrgnln collectively sho.11 aJso 
mcnn thnt no pnrty to such contrnct shnll terminate 
or modify sucll contract. unlc~s the pnrty desiring 
such tcnnlnatlon or modlflcntlon-
< 1 > serves a w1·1tten notice upon the other party 
to the cont1·act of the proposed terminntlon or 
modlficntion sixty days prior to the explrntlon date 
thereof, 01· in the event such contract contains no 
explrntf on date. sixty do.ys prior to the time It ls 
proposed to mnke such termination or modifi-
cation; 
<2> offers to meet and confer with the othe1· 
party for the purpose of ncgotlo.tlng n new con-
tract or a contract contnlnlnc the proposed modi-
fications: 
<3) notifies the Fcdl'ral Mediation and Concllla-
Uon Service within thirty dnys after such notice or 
the existence of a dispute, and simultaneously 
therewith notifies any State or Territorial agency 
established to mediate nnd conciliate disputes 
within the State or Territory where the dispute 
occurred, provided no agreement, has been reached 
by thnt time; nnd 
C4) continues in full Carce nnd effect, without 
resorting to strike or lock-out, ~u the terms nnd 
conditions or the existing contract for n period or 
sixty days after such notice is elven or until the 
expirntlon date of such contract, whichever occurs 
lnter: 
The duties imposed upon employers. employees, and 
lnbor organlzntlons by pnrngraphs 12)-(4) of this 
subsection shnll become innppllcablc upon nn i:1tcr-
venlng certiflcatlon ol' the Board, under which the 
lnbor orsanlzntlon or lndlVldunl, wl1lch ls o. pe.rty 
to the contract, hns been superseded as or ceased to 
be the rcpresentntlve of the employees subject to 
the provisions of section 159Cn> of this title, nnd 
the duties so Imposed shall not be co:1strued ns re-
quiring either party to discuss or agree to nny modl-
fica tlon of the te1·ms o.nd conditions contained In a 
contract for n fixed period, If such modification Is 
to become effective before such terms and conditions 
can be reopened under the provlslo:is of the contract. 
Any employee who engages In n strike within the 
slxty-dny period specified In this subsection shall 
lose his stntus ns nn employee of the employer en-
ca[tcd In the pnrtlcular labor dispute, !or the pur-
poses or sections 158-160 of this title, but such loss 
of slntus for .such cmplol•ce shaJl terminate l! and 
when be ls reemployed by such employer. 
Ce> It, shall be nn un!nlr lnbor practice tor any 
labor orgo.nJzat1011 o.nd any employer to enter into 
any contract or agreement, express or implied, 
whereby such employer ccnses or refrnlns or agrees 
to ceaso or rcfrn.in from handling, using, selllng, 
transporting or otherwise deallng in nny of the 
products of nny other employer, or to cease doing 
business with nny other person, and nny contract 
or agreement entered into heret.orore or herenfter 
conto.lnlng such an o.greement shnll be to such ex-
tent W1enf Ol'Clble o.nd void: Provided, That nothing 
in this subsection sht11l apply to nn r,grccmcnt be-
tween n. labor orgnnlzo.tlon nnd an employer ln the 
construction industry relating to the contmctlng 
or subcontrnctlng of work to be done at the site of 
the const1"Uctlon, alteration, painting, or repnir or 
a. building, structure, or othe1· work: Provided fur-
ther, That for the ·purpoEes of this subsection 1md 
subsection Cb> or this section the terms "nny em-
ployer", "nny person engaged in commerce or llil 
Industry affecting commerce", and "nny person" 
when used in reletlon to the terms "any other pro-
ducer, processor, or mnnuract.url'r", "nny other em-
ployer", or "nny other person" shall not include 
persons In the relation of 11 Jobber, manufacturer, 
contrnctor, 01· subcontractor working on thl' goods or 
premises of the Jobbe1· 01· mnnufncturcr or pcrf arm-
ing pnns of an Integrated process or productlo11 In 
the npparcl nnd clothing industry: ProvfdC'd further, 
That notlllng tn this subchnpter shall prohtb!L the 
enforcement of nny agreement which ls wlt11in the 
foregoing cxcept.lon. 
en It shall not be nn unfair lnbor practice under 
subsccUons <n> nnd Cb) of thts section for nn em-
ployer engaged primarily in the building nnd con-
struction Industry to mnko an agreement covering 
employees encnccd Cor who, upon their employ-
ment, \Vlll be engaged> ln the building nnd construc-
tion Industry with o. labor orgnnlzntlon of which 
building and const1·uctlon employees nre members 
<not established, maintained, or nsslsted by any nc-
tlon defined in subsection <n> or this section as nn 
unfair labor practice) becnuse Cl) the majority 
status of such labor on;nnizatlon ho.s not been es-
tablished u.,der the p1·ovtsions of section 159 or this 
title prior to the making of such nin-cement, or (2> 
such ngreement requires ns a condition of employ-
ment, membership In such labor or~anlzntion after 
the seventh dl\Y following the beginning of such 
employment or the effective dnte of the agreement, 
whichever ls later, 01· (3) such ngrccment requires 
the employer to notify such labor orgnnizntlon or 
opportunities for employment with such employer, 
or gives such labor orgo.nizntlon nn opportunity to 
ref er quo.lifted l\ppllcants for such employment, or 
< 4 > such ngreement specifies mlnlmum trnlnlng or 
experience qunliflcatlons Car employment or pro-
vides for priority in opportunltlcs ror employment 
bn.sed upon length of service with such employer, 
tn the industry or in the partlculn.r geographical 
arc~: Provided, Tho.t nothing in this subsection 
shall set aside the flnnl proviso to subsection Ca) <3> 
or this section: Provided Jurtlier. That any agree-
ment which would be Invalid, but for clause Cl) of 
this subsection. shall not be a bnr to 11 petition fllcd 
pursuant to section 159Cc) or 159Ce) of this tltle. 
<July 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 8, 49 Stat. 452: June 23, 1947, 
ch. 120, title I, I 101, 61 Stnt. 140; Oct. 22, 1951, ch. 
534, 1 l<b), 65 St.at. 601: Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. 86-
257, title II, § 201Ce>, title VII, §§ 704Co.>-<c>, 705 
<o.>, 73 Stat. 525, 542.) 
ID\ 
'1'i:I Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 6297 TITLE 29.-LABOR 1169 
AMENDMENTS 
1050-Subsec. (n) (3). Pub. L. 80-257, ~ 20l(e), ellm-
lnnt.ed worda "nnd hna nt the time the ngreement wns 
mnde or within the preceding twelve montbe received 
rrom the Bonrd n notice of compllnnco with secllons 150 
(f) 1 (BL (h) of this Utlo" tollowlng "such ngreemcnt 
when mndo" ln cl. (1). 
Subsec. (b) (4). Pub. L. 86-267, § 704(n), nmong ot.hor 
chnngcs, eubslltutod "induce or encourngc nny lndlvldunl 
employed by nny person engngcd in commcrco or ln on 
Industry nffecUng commerce to engngo ln, n ttrlko or n 
rerusnl In the course ot his employment" tor "Induce or 
encournge the employees ot nny employer to ongnge In, 
n strike or n concerted rerusnl In the coura~ or their 
employment" In cl. (l), nddod cl. (II), nnd Inserted pro-
visions relntlng to ngreements prohibited by subsection 
(e) or this section In cl. (A). tho proviso rein Ung to 
prlmnry atrlkoe nnd prlmnry plckeUng ln cl. (B), nnd the 
Inst proviso relnt.lng to publlclly. 
Subsec, (b) (7). Pub. L. 86-257, I 704(c). ndded sub-
sec. (b) (7). 
Subscc. (c). Puh.L.80-257, i'l04(b),nddrdsubsec. (e). 
Subsec. (t). Pub. L. 80-257, § 706(n), nddcd subsec U). 
1051-Subsec. (D) (3). Act Oct. 22, 1051, substituted 
"nnd hns ot • • • such an ngrcemcnt" "nnd (II) • • • to 
mnko such nn ngreement:" 
1047-Act June 23, 1047, amended &ecLlon genernny by 
stntlng whnt were unfnlr lnbor prnctlces by n union as 
well ns by nn employer, nnd by oddlng provisions protect-
Ing the right or free speech for both employers nnd 
unions. 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1050 AMENDMENT 
Subsecs. (b) (7), (e), nnd (f) or this section, nnd 
nmendmcnts to subsecs. (b) (4)-(6) ot thlA section ef-
fective sixty dnys n!ter Sept. 14, 1059, seo section '107 ot 
Pub. L. 86-25'1, set. out ns n note undor section 153 or 
this title. 
Ern:CTJVE DATE OJ:' 1047 AMENDMENT 
Ef1'ecUvo dnte or net Juno 23, 1047, see note set out 
under section 161 of this title. 
UNFAtlt LA.Don PRACTICES Pmoa TO JONE 23, 1047 
St>ctlon 102 or net June 23, 1047, provided: "No provl-
slon or this title !this subchnpt.er] shnll be deemed to 
mnke nn unfnlr lnbor pinctlce nny n.ct which wne per• 
rormed prior to the dnte or the enoctment of this 
net !June 23, 10471 which did not constltuto nn unfnlr 
lnbor prnctlce prior thereto, nnd the provisions or section 
8 (n) (3) nnd section 8 (b) (2) ot the Nn.tlonnl Lo.bar Roln• 
Uons Act na amended by this tlUe (subseca. (o) (3) and 
(b) (2) or this scctlonl ahnll not mako nn untnlr labor 
proctlce the pertormnnce of nny obligation under a. col-
lectlve-bnrgnlnlng ngreement entered lnt.o prior to the 
dote ot the ennctment of this Act I June :.?3, 1047], or (In 
tllo cnac or on ngreomcn t for n. period or not more thnn 
one yenr, entered Into on or net.er such dntc of enactment, 
but prior to the ef1'cctlve dnte -:ir thl.l:I title, If the perrorm-
nnce or such obllgotlon would not hnve constituted nn 
untnlr labor practice under section 8 (3) 1subd. (3) of this 
_aectlon I of the Nn.Uonnl Lnbt•r Rclo.tlons Act prior to the 
elfectlvo dnte or this title I sixty dnys nrter June 23, 10471 
unleas such ngToement wo.s renewed or extended aubse-
quent thereto." 
A0REENENTS REQUIRING MEMDERSHIP IN A LADOR 
OROANJZATION AS A CONDITION OF EMPLOYMENT 
Section 'l06(b) of Pub. L. 86-257 provided thnt: "Noth-
ing contained ln the omendment mnde by subsection (n) 
I o.ddlng subsec. ( !) or this sect1on I ehnll be construed 
n.s n.uthorlzlng I.he execution or nppllcntlon o! ngree-
ments requiring membership ln 11 lnbor orgnnlznUon o.a 
n cond1Uon o! employment In ony Stotc or Torrlt.ory 
In wl1lch such execution or o.ppllcnUon ls prohibited by 
St11te or Terrltorlnl Lnw." 
cnoss REJ:'ERENCES 
Actlone by cmd ngnlnst la.bor orgnnlzntlons, see section 
186 or this ttlle. 
Boycotts nnd other unlo.wful comblnotlons. right. to 
sue, aeo section 18'1 of this title. 
Federnl Credit Unions, providing !ncllltlcs tor opera-. 
Uons or, see section 16Ba. of this title, 
30-IS00 0-0G-vol, 1--31 
Federot employment denied persons who assert right to 
strike ngnlnet Oovernment, see sections 188p, 11Br or 
Title 6, Executive Deportments ond Government Officers 
nnd Employees. 
InJunctlvo relier grnnted to Boord ngnlnst unfnlr lnbor 
practices nnd boycotts, sec dectlon 160(J) nnd (l) or 
this title. 
Restrictions on pnymonts nnd lonns to employee repre-
sentntlvee, see section 180 of this tit.le. 
Right to strike pre11erved, see section 163 of this Ut~e. 
Strikes eubJect to lnJunctlon, see 6CCtlon 1 '18 of this 
title. 
§ 158n. Pro\'iding fncilitie11 for operntlons of Fcdernl 
Credit Unions, 
Provision by nn employer of facilities for the opera-
tions of n Federn1 Credit Union on the premises of 
such employer shnlJ not be deemed to be intimidation, 
coercion, interference, restraint or discrimination 
within the provisions of sections 157 nnd 158 of this 
ttt1c, or nets nmcndntory thereof. <Dec. 6, 1937, ch. 
3, § 5. 51 Stat. 5.> 
§ 159. Hepre1umt11th-es 11nd elections. 
(n) Exclusin representatives; employees' adjust-
ment of grie,·nnces directly with employer. 
Representatives designated or selected !or the pur-
poses of collective bargaining by the majority of the 
employees In a unit appropriate for such purposes, 
sha11 be the exclusive representatives of all the em-
ployees In such unlt for the purposes of colJectlve 
barcninlng In respect to rates of pay, wages, hours 
of employment, or other conditions of employment: 
Provided, That any indlvlctuat employee or a group 
of employees shall have the right nt any time to pre-
sent grievances to their empir.yer and to have such 
grievnnces adjusted, without the intervention of the 
bnrgainlng represcntnllve, ns long ns the adjustment 
ls not Inconsistent with the terms of a collecllve-
bnrgainlnc conlrnct or agreement then In effect: 
Provided further, That the bnri;:alninc representntlve 
has been elven opportunity to be present at such 
adjustment. 
(b) Determinnlion of bnrgnlning unit by Ilonrd, 
The Board shnlt decide In each cnsc whether, In 
order lo nssure to empJoyees the fullest. r recd om tn 
cxerclslnc the rights guarnntccd by this subchapler, 
the unit appropriate for the purposes of col'ectlve 
barcalnlng shn11 be the employer unit, craft unit, 
p1nnt unit, or subdivision thereof: Provided, That ttie 
Bonrd shall not <l) dt'clde thnt any unit Is npproprl-
nte fat• such purposes If such unit lnc1udcs both pro-
f csslonn1 employees and employees who are not 
p1·ofcsslonnl employees unless a majority of such 
professional employees vole for Inclusion In such 
u11it: or (2) decide lhnt any crnft unit Is lnnppro-
prlntc for such purposes on thr. ground that a differ-
ent unlt has been established by a prior Board deter• 
mlnatlon. unless a majority of the employees In the 
proposed craft unit vote ngnlnst separate representa-
llon or f3) decide thnt any unit ls appropriate for 
such purposes if It lnc'udes, together with other em-
ployees, nny individual employed ns a guard to 
enforce against employees nnd other persons rules 
lo protect property of the employer or to protect 
the safety of persons on the employer's premises: but 
no labor orgnnlz.1.tlon shall be certified ns the rep-
resentative of employees In n bnrgnlnfng unit or 
guards If such organization ndmlts to membership, 
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or ls affiliated directly or Indirectly with an orcani• 
z:itlon which admits to membership, employees other 
than guards. 
(c) Hearings on questions affecting commerce; rules 
and regulnlions, 
Cl> Whenever a petltion shaJl ho.,•e been flied, in 
accordance with such regulations as may be pro-
scribed by the Board-
CA> by an employee or croup of employees or 
any lndtvldual or lal>or orcn.nb:atlon acting ln 
their behalf alleging that a. substantial number of 
employees (I) wish to be represented for collective 
bargaining and that their employer declines to 
recognizo their representative as the rcpresenta-
tlvo defined ln subsection <a> of this section, or 
<11> assert that the individual or labor organiza-
tion, which has been certified or ts belnc currently 
recognized by theJr employer as the bargaining 
representative, Is no longer a representative as 
defined ln subsection <a> of this sectlon: or 
<B> by an employer, nllegtng that one or more 
lndlvlduols or labor organizations hnve presented 
to him a claim to be recognized as the representa-
tive denned 1n subsection <a> of thls ~ectlon: 
the Board shnll lm•cstlcate such petition and if It has 
reasonable cause to believe that a question of repre-
~entatlon nffect1nc commerce exists shnll provide for 
an npproprlate hearing upon due notice. Such hear-
Ing may be conducted by nn officer or emplc.yec of the 
recionnl office, who shall not make any recommenda-
tions with respect thereto. If the Board finds upon 
the record or such he11ring that such a question of 
representation exists. it shall direct an election by 
~ecret ballot nnd shall certify the results thereof, 
f2) In determining whether or not a question of 
representation aff ectlng commerce exists, the same 
regulations and rules of decision shnll apply Irre-
spective or the Identity or the persons filing the peti-
tion or the kind of relief sought and ln no case shnll 
the Board deny a labor organlzntlon a pince on the 
ballot by reason of an order with respect to such 
labor orsantzntlon or Its predecessor not Issued ln 
conformity wtth section 160 Cc) of this title. 
C3 > No election shall be directed tn any bargain-
Ing unit or any subdivision within which ln the pre-
cedtng twelve-month period, a valld election shnll 
have been held. Employees engaged ln an economic 
strike who are not entitled to reln~tatement shall be 
el1glblc to voto under such regulations as the Board 
shall find are consistent with tho purposes and pro-
visions of thls subehapter in nny election conducted 
within twelve months after the commencement of 
the strike. In any election whero none of the 
choices on the ballot receives a majority, a. run-off 
shall be conducted. the ballot pro\'Jdlng for a ~elec-
tion between the two cLolccs receiving the largest 
and second largest number of valid votes cast ln the 
election. 
<4> Nothing ln this seetlfln shall b:? construed to 
prohibit the waiving or hearings by stipulation for 
the purpose of u. consent e'ectlon ln conformity with 
regulations and rules of decision of the Board. 
(5) In determining whether a untt ls appropriate 
for the purposes specified ln subsection (b) of this 
section the extent to which the employees have or-
sanlzcd shall not be controlllnll, 
(d) Petition for enforcement or review; transcript. 
Whenever an order or the Board made pursuant 
to section 160 Cc> of this title ls based ln whole 
or ln part upon facts certlfled following on lnves-
tlgatlan pursuant to subsection Cc) of this section 
and there ls a petition for the enforcement or 
review of such order, such certlflcatlon and the 
record of such Investigation shall bo Included ln tho 
transcript or the entire record requJred to bo filed 
under .subsection Ce) or en or section 160 of this 
tltle, and thereupon the decree or the court en-
f orctng, modifying, or setting aside in whole or tu 
part the order of the Board shall be made and en-
tered upon tho pleadings, testimony, and proceed-
lngs set forth In such transcript. 
(e) Secret ballot; limltallon of elections. 
Cll Upon the tlltng with the Board, by 30 per 
centum or more of the employees tn a bargaining 
unit covered by a'l agreement between their em-
ployer nnd r.. labor organlzntlon made pursuant to 
section 158 <n> ca> of this title, of a petltlon a.Ueclng 
they desire that such authority be rescinded, the 
Bonrd shall tnke a secret ballot of the employees In 
such unit and certify the results thereof to such 
labor orgnnlzatlon and to the employer. 
C2) No election shall be condncted pursuant to 
this subsection In any barcalnlng unlt or nny sub-
dlvlslon wlthln whtch, Jn the preceding twelve-month 
period, a vnlld election shall have been held. 
(f)-(h) Repealed. Pub, L. 86-257, title II, § 201(d), 
Sept. 14, 1959, 73 Stnt. 525. 
CJuly 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 9, 49 stat. 453: June 23, 1947, 
ch. 120, title I, 1101, 61 Stat. 143: Oct. 22, 1951, ch. 
534, § 1 Ca), <b>, 65 Stat. 601: Sept, 14, 1959, Pub. L. 
86-257, title n. § 201Cd>, tltle vn. I 702, 73 stat. 
525, 542,) 
AMENDMENTS 
1959-Subsec. (c) (3). Pub. L. 86-267, 0 70:1, 11ub11tl-
tuted "Employees engnged 1n nn economic strike who 
nre not entitled to reinstatement eho.11 be eUglble to 
vote under such regulntlona na the Boo.rd sho.U find are 
conalstent wlth the purposes nnd provisions of tbls RUb• 
chapter ln any election conducted within twelve months 
after the commencement or the strike" tor "Employeea 
on strike who a.re not entitled to relnstntement sho.11 not 
be eUglbJe to vote," 
Subsecs. (f) nnd (g). Pub, L. 86-257, I 201(d), re-
pea.led aubscca. (f) a.nd (g), wblch requlred unlona to 
ftle their conatltutlona, bylnws nnd a report, prescribed 
the contents of the report nnd directed the ftllng of 
annual ftnnnclal reporta, nnd nre now covered by section 
431 of this tltle. 
Subsec. (hl, Pub. L. 86-257, I 201 (d}, repenled sulr 
sec. (h), whlch related to nffldnvlts showing union's offl• 
cers tree from Communist Pnrty nffltln Uon or ballet. 
1951-Subaec. (o), Act Oct. 22, 1051, I Uc). de1eted 
former subdlvlalon (1) nnd renumbered aubdlvlalone (2) 
cmd (3) 11.8 (1) nnd (2). 
Bubseca. (O-(h). Act Oct. 22, 1051, I l(d), deJeted 
"No pet! tlon under section 159 ( e) ( 1) aho.11 be enter-
tnlned" wherever nppearlng. 
1047-Act June 23, 1947, a.mended section genernlly to 
allow employees to cnn-y their grievances directly to the 
employer, to circumscribe certnln powers of the BoEll'd, 
to make the union file with the Becretnry or Lnbor its 
const.ltutlon, bylaws, nnd report before being certlfled ns 
n bargnlnlng agent, to requlre nnnunl reports by labor 
unions, nnd to require lnbor unions to rue o.ffldnvlts with 
the Bonrd showing thnt none or lta omcer11 uro nmuated 
with or believe In the Communist Pnrty. 
EFFECTIVE DATZ OJ' 1959 AMENDMENT 
Amendment or subsec, (c) (3) ot thls aectlon by Pub. 
L. 86-267 effective slxty do.ye ntter September 14, 1969. 
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see sect.Ion 707 or Pub. L. 86-267, LJt out na 11 note under 
oectlon 163 or thla tltle, 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1047 AMENDMENT 
Effective dnte or net June 23, 1047, see note set out 
under section 161 or thls title. 
CERTAJN'CERTJnCATJONS OF BARGAINING UNITS UNAFFECTED 
Secllon 103 or net June 23, 1047, provided: "No provl-
alons of this tit.le I thle subchnpter) oho.11 nffect nny cer-
tlficnUon or representntlvee or nny determlnntlon ns to 
the npproprlnle collccllve-bnrgnlnlng unit, which wo.s 
mnde under secllon O or lhe Nntlonnl Lnbor Relotlons Act 
(this sect.Ion) prior to the errectlve dnte or this tllle 
[sixty dnys nrtcr June 23, 10471 untll one yenr orter the 
dnte or such Cf!rlUlcntlon or lr, In respect or nny such 
ct'rtlncotlon, n collectlvf!-bnrgnlnlng contrnct wos entf!red 
lnto prior to lhe effective dnlc or thls Utle f sixty dnys 
nCler June 23, 10471, unlll the end or the contrnct period 
or unlll one yenr orter such dote, Whichever flrst occurs." 
COMMUNIST OnCANIZATI0NS, AND MEMDEI\S 
Proh1b1tlons plnccd on Communist orgonlzn.tlons, nnd 
members thereor, with rCEpcct to lnbor, see chnptcr 23 
or Tille 60. Wnr nnd Nn.tlonnl Defense, pnrtlculnrly sec-
tions 782 (4A}, 784, 70211 nnd 841-844 of thnt title, 
Fl:.,lfl\AL ROL~ OF CIVJL PROCEDORE 
AppllcR~'>n :,r rules, see rule 81, Tltle 28, Appendix, 
Judiciary niid .'udtc1nl Procedure. 
§ IGO, Prevention of unfair labor practices. 
(a) Powers of Bonrd generally. 
The Board ls empowered, ns hcrelna!ter provided, 
to prevent nny person from engngfng fn any unfair 
tabor prnctlce (listed In section 158 or this title) 
nffcctlng commerce. '1.'hls power shall not be aff ectcd 
by nny other menns ot ~'iJustment or prevention thnt 
has been or mny be est1bllshed by agreement. lnw, 
or otherwise: Provided, 'fhnt the Board ls empowered 
by ngreement wlth nny agency of nny Stnte or Terri-
tory to cede to such ngency Jurisdiction over any 
cases In nny Industry <other than mining, manufac• 
turlng, communications, and transportation except 
where predomlnnntly local In character) even though 
such cases may Involve labor disputes affecUng com-
merce, unless the provision o! the State or Territorial 
statute appllcnble to the determlnntton of such cnses 
by such agency Is Inconsistent with the correspond-
Jng provision oi this subchapter or hns received n 
construction Inconsistent therewith. 
(b) Complaint and notice of hearing; nnswcr; court 
rules of evidence Inat1plicablc. 
Whenever Jt Is charged thnt any person has en-
gnged in or Is engaging In any such unfair lnbor 
practice, the Board, or any agent or agency deslg-
nnted by the Board for such purposes, shall have 
power to issue and c.ause to be served upon such 
person a. complaint. stating the charges ln thnt 
respect, and containing a notice of hcnring before the 
Board or n member thereof, or before a designated 
agent or agency, at a place therein fixed, not less than 
five days after the serving of said complaint: Pro-
vided, That no complaint shnll issue based upon any 
unfair labor practice occurring more than six months 
prior to the filing of the charge with the Board and 
the service of n copy thereof upon the person against 
whom such charge is made, unless the person ag-
grieved thereby wns prevented from fllfng such 
chnrge by reason of service In the nrmed forces. in 
which event the six-month period shnfl be computed 
from the dny o! his dJschnrge. Any such complaint 
may be amended by the member, agent, or agency 
conducting the henrlng or the Bonrd In Its discretion 
at any time prior to the Issuance or an order based 
thereon. The person so complained of shnll have the 
right to file an answer to the original or nmended 
complnlnt nnd to appenr in person or otherwl~e and 
give testimony nt the place nnd ttmc fixed In the 
complaint. In the discretion or the member, agent, 
or agency conducting the hearing or the Boa1·d, any 
other person may be nllowed to Intervene in the said 
proceeding and to present testimony. Any such 
proceeding shall, so !nr ns practicable, be conducted 
In nccordnncc 'n'lth the rules of evidence applicable 
In the district courts o! the United States under the 
rules o! clvll procedure for the district courts of the 
Uniled States, adopted by the Supreme Court o! the 
united States pursuant to section 20'12 of Title 28. 
:c) Reduclion or testimony to writing; findings and 
orders of Board, 
The testtmony taken by such member, ngent, or 
agency or the Board shall be reduced to writing nnd 
filed with the Board. Therenfter, in Its discretion, 
the Board upon notice may take further testimony 
or henr argument. I! upon the prepondernnce or the 
testimony tnken the Board shnll be of the opinion 
t.hat any person named In the complnlnt has engnged 
In or is engaging ln nny such unfair labor practice, 
then the Board shall state its findings o! r net and 
shnll Issue and cnuse to be served on such person nn 
order requlrlng such person to cease and desist from 
such unfal r lnbor prnctlce, nnd to take such affirma-
tive nctlon including reinstatement of employees 
with or without back pay, as wm effectunte the 
policies of this subchnpter: Provided, That where an 
order directs relnstntement or an employee, back 
pay may be required of the employer or labor organ• 
IZntlon. as the cnse may be, responsible for the 
discrimination suffered by him: And provided 
further, That Jn determining whether a comptnlnt 
shall Issue allegmg n violation or subsection Ca> <l > 
or Ca) <2> of section 158 of this title, and ln deciding 
such cases, the same regulatlons and rules or decision 
shnll appJy irrespective or whether or not the labor 
orgnnlzatlon affected is afflllnted with n lnbor orgnn-
!Zntlon national or international In scope. Such 
order may further require such person to make 
reports from time to time showing the extent to 
which 1t hns compllcd with the order. If upon the 
preponderance or the testimony taken the Board 
shall not be of the opinion that the person named 
In the complaint hns engngcd in or Is engaging In 
nny such unfair lnbor prnctlcc, then the Bonrd shnll 
state Its findings of !net and shnl1 Issue an order dis-
missing the said complaint. No order of the Bonrd 
shnll require the reinstatement of nny indivldunt ns 
an employee who hns been suspended or discharged, 
or the payment to him of any back pay, if such in-
dividual was suspended or discharged !or cnuse. ln 
cnse the evidence Is presented before a member of the 
Board, or before an examiner or examiners thereof, 
such member, or such examiner or examiners ns the 
case mny be, shall issue and cause to be served on 
the parties to the proceeding n proposed report, 
together with a recommended order, which shall be 
ftled with the Bonrd, and tr no exceptions arc flied 
within twenty dny.:; after service thereof upon such 
parties, or within such further period as the Board 
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mny authorize, such recommended order shnll be-
come the order of the Board nnd become effective ns 
thc1·e!n prescribed. 
(d) Modific.ntion or findlngtt or orders prior to filing 
record in court. 
Until the l'ecord in n cnse shnll hnvc been filed 
in a court, ns hereinafter provided, the Bonrd may 
nt any Ume upon reo.sonnble notice and in such 
monner ns it shnll deem proper, modify or set n.slde, 
in whole or In pnrt, ony finding or order mnde or 
issued by it. 
(e) Petition to court for enforcement of order; pro-
ct•eding~: rc,·ic,v of judgment. 
The Bonrd shnll hnve power to petition nny court 
o! a.ppenls o! the United States, or 1f all the courts 
or appeals to which &pplicaUon may be mnde are 
in vnclitlon, nny district court o! the UnJted States, 
within any circuit or distrlcL, respectively, wherein 
the unfair lnbo1· prncUce In question occurred or 
wherein such person res1des or transncts business, 
fo1• the e11f orcement o! such order and for npproprl-
ate tempornry relief 01· restrolnlng order, nnd shall 
flle ln the court the record in the proceedings, ns 
provided in section 2112 or Tltle 28. Upon the fll-
ing o! such petition, the court shall cnuse notice 
thereof to be served upon such person, nnd there-
upon shall have Jurlsdlctton of the proceeding nnd 
ot the question determined therein, nnd shnll have 
power to grant such tempornry relief or restraining 
order as it deems Just and proper, and to mnke and 
enter a decree enforcing, modifying, nnd enforc.lng 
ns so modified, or setting nslde in whole or in pnrt 
the order or the Bonrd. No ob}ect1on thnt. has not 
been urget. be!ore the Board, its member, a.gent, 
or agency, shnlt be considered by the court, unless 
the !allure or neglect to urge such obJectlon shnll be 
excused becnuse of extraordinary circumstances. 
The findings of the Board with respect to questions 
or fact if supported by subsb.ntlnl evidence on the 
record considered as a, who)(! she.11 be conclusive. 
If either po.rty shall apply to the court for leave to 
ndduce nddltlonal evl dence and shall show to the 
sntls!actfon or the court thnt such additional evi-
dence ls material nnd thnt there were reasonable 
°Frounds for the fnllure to ndduce such evidence in 
the hearing before the Board, its member, agent, or 
ngenr.y, the court mny order such nddltlonnl evi-
dence to be tnken before the Board, its member, 
agen~. or agency, and to be made a part of the 
record. The Bonrd mny modlfy Its findings as to 
the !nct.s, or mnke new findings by reason of addi-
tional evidence so taken nnd filed, and it shall file 
such modified or new findings, which findings with 
respect to questions o! fnct if supported by substan-
tlnl evidence on the record considered ns a whole 
shnll be conclusive, and shnll file Its recommenda-
tions, if any, for the modiflcntJon or setting a.side 
or its original order. Upon the filing o! the record 
with it the Jurisdiction of the court shnll be exclu-
sive and its Judgment and decree shall be finol, 
except thnt the snme shall be subject to review by 
the appropriate United States court o! appeals 1f 
nppUcntion was mo.de to the district court as here-
lno.bove provided, nnd by the Supreme Court of the 
United States upon writ o! certiorari or certlflca-
t1011 as provided ln section 1254 of Title 28. 
(f) Re,·icw of final order of Board on petition lo court. 
Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board 
gr anting or denying 111 whole or in part the relief 
sought mny obtn!n a. review or such 01·dcr In nny 
United Stntes court of nppc11ls in the circuit 
wherein the unfair labor prnctice In question was 
alleged to hn ve been engaged in or wherein such 
person resides or transacts business, or in the United 
States Court of Appenls for the District or Colum-
bln, by filing In such a court n written petition pray-
ing that the order of the Boo.rd be modified or set 
aside. A copy of such petition shall be forthwith 
transmitted by the cle1·k or the court to the Board, 
o.nd thereupon the nggrieved pnl'tY shall file In the 
court the record In the proceeding, certified by the 
Bonrd, ns provided in section 2112 of Title 28. 
Upon the filing of such petition, the court shall pro-
ceed in the snme manner o.s In the co.se o! nn appli-
ca.tlon by the Board under subsection Ce) of this 
section. nnd shnll have the snme Jurisdiction to 
grant to the Bonrd such temporary l'elle! or restrain-
ing order ns It deems just nnd proper, nnd In like 
manner to mnke nnd enter n decree enforcing, 
modifying, and enforcing as so modified, or setting 
aside Jn whole or in part the order of the Boo.rd; 
the findings or the Board with respect to questions 
of !net Ir supported by substantlnl evidence on the 
record considered as a whole shnll in like manner 
be conclusive. 
(g) Institution of court proceedings ns stay of Board's 
order. 
'I11e commencement of proceedings under subsec-
tion <ei or U> of this secUon shall not, unless spe-
clflcnllY ordered by the court, operate as a. stay of 
the Board's order. 
(h) Jnrisdfction of courhi unnfrl'cted hv limltatlons 
prescribed in Hectlons 101-115 of this title, 
When granting approprlo.te temporary relier or 
a. restraining order, or mnklng and entering n decree 
enforcing, modifying, nnd enforcing as so modlfled 
or setting aside in whole or in part nn order of the 
Board, as provided In this section, the Jurisdiction 
or courts sitting tn equity shnll not be limited by 
sections 101-115 of this title. 
(i) Expeditious hearings on petitions. 
Petitions filed under this subchnpter shall be henrd 
~xpeditlously, nnd if possible within ten dnys after 
they have been docketed. 
(j) Injunctions. 
The Board shnll have power, upon Issuance of 11 
complaint as provided ln subsection (b) o! this sec-
tion charging that nny person has engnged In or ts 
engagJ1.g In an unfo.lr lnbor prnctlce, to petition any 
United states district court, within any dfst.rict 
wherein the unralr labor practice In question is 
alleged to have occurred or wherein such person 
resides or transacts business, for appropriate tempo-
rary relief or restraining order. Upon the filfng of 
any such petition the court shall en.use notice 
thereof to be served upon such person, and there-
upon shall have jurisdiction to grant to the Bonrd 
such temporary relief or restraining order as Jt 
deems Just and proper. 
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(k) Hearings on jurisdictional strikes. 
Whenever it is charged that any person has en-
gaged in an un!alr labor practice within the mean-
ing of pnrasraph <4> (0> o! section 158 (b) o! this 
title, the Board Is empowered and directed to hear 
and detcnnine the di sputc out o! which such unfair 
labor practice shnfl have arisen, unless, mthln ten 
days after notice that such charge hns been fllcd, the 
parties to such dispute submit to the Board sntJsf ac-
tory evidence that they have adjusted, or agreed 
upon meU1ods for the voluntary adjustment of, the 
dispute. Upon compliance by the parties to the dis-
pute with the decision of the Board or upon such 
voluntary adjustment of the dispute, such charge 
shaJl be dismissed. 
(I) Boycotts and strike.If to force recognition or uncer. 
tified Jnhor orgnnizntions; injunctions; notice; 
Mervicc or process. 
Whenever It Is charged that any pe1·son has en-
gagPd in an unfair labor practice within t11e mean-
Ing of paragraph <4 > <A>, CB>, or CC> of section 
158Cb) of this title, or section 158ce, o! this title or 
section 158(bl C7> of this title, the prellmlnary in-
vestlgaUon of such charge shall be made forthwith 
and given priority over all other cases except cases 
of like character In the office where It ls fifed or to 
which It ls referred. If, arter such Investigation, 
the officer 01· regional attorney to whom the mnttcr 
may be refe1·red ho.s reasonable cnusc to believe 
such chnrge ls true and that a complaint should 
issue, he shall, on behalf of the Board, petition any 
United States dlstrJct court within any district 
where the unfair labor prnctice In question hns 
occurred, is aUegcd to have occurred, or wherein 
such person resides or transacts business, for ap-
propriate inJunctlve relief pending the final ad-
Judlcntlon of the Bonrd wJth respect to such matter. 
Upon the filing of any such petition the district 
court shall have Jurisdiction to grant such JnJunc-
tlve relief or temporary restraining order as it 
deems Just nnd proper, notwlthstandJng nny other 
provision of law: Provided further, That no tem-
porary restraining order shall be issued without 
notice unless a petltion o.Jlegcs thn t substantial 
and irreparable injury to the charging party w1Il 
be wiavoldo.ble nnd such temporary restraining 
order shnll be effective !or no longer thnn five dnys 
and wlll become void nt the expiration of such 
pel'iod: Provided further, That such officer 01· 1·e• 
gional attorney shall not apply for nny rcstralning 
order under section 158 Cb) C7> or this title if a 
charge against the employer under section 156Ca> 
<2> of this title has been flJed and after the pre-
liminary investigation, he has rensonable cnuse to 
believe that such charge Is true nnd thnt a com-
plaint should issue. Upon filing or nny such peti-
tion the courts shall cause notice thereof to be 
served upon any person involved in the charge and 
such person, including the charging party, shall be 
given an opportunity to appear by counsel nnd 
present any 1·clcvnnt testimony: Provided further, 
That for the purposes of this subsection district 
courts shall be deemed to have Jurisdiction of n 
labor organization ( 1 > In the district in which such 
organlzntlon maintains its Principal office, or <2> 
ln any district In which its duly authorized officers 
or agents are engnged In promoting or protecting 
the intcrc::.t:; of employee members. The service of 
legal pro::e:;~ u1,on such officer or agent shall con-
stitute service upon the lnbor organization and 
make such 01·gn.nlzat1on n party to the suit. In 
situations where such relief 1s appropriate the pro-
cedure specified herein shall apply to charges with 
respect to section 158<b> <4> <D> of this title. 
(m) Priority or cases. 
Whenever it is charged that any person ho.s en-
gaged in an unfair labor practice wlthln the mean-
Ing o! subsection Ca) (3) or Cb> C2) o! section 158 
of this title, such charge shall be given priority over 
nll other cases except cnscs of like character In the 
office where it is filed or to which it 1s referred nnd 
cases given priority under subsection m o! this 
section. <July 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 10, 49 Stat. 453: 
June 25, 1936, ch. 804, 49 Stat, 1921; June 23, 1947, 
ch. 120, title I, § 101, 61 Sta-;. 146; June 25, 1948, ch. 
646, § 32 <a>, (b), 6!! Stat. 091: May 24, 1949, ch. 139, 
§ 127, 63 Stat. 107; Aug. 28, 1958, Pub. L. 85-791, 
§ 13, 72 Stat. 945; Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. 86-257, title 
VII,§§ 104Cd), 706, 73 Stat. 544,l 
REFERENCES lN TExT 
"Sections 101-115 ot this title." ret.-rred to In the text, 
la a reference to net Mo.r. 23, 1932, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70, 
popularly known aa the Norrls•Lo.Ounrdlo. Acli. 
Section 11 o: tho.t net, formerly clo.salOed to section 111 
of thls title, wo.a repented nnd reenacted as section 3602 
or Tltle 18, Crlmea and Criminal Procedure, by act June 
26, l<l48, ch. 645. f 21, 62 Stnt. 86~, efT. Sept. 1, 1948. 
Section 12 ot that net, formerly clnsstOed to 11ectlon 112 
of this t1tle, was also repealed by 11ct June 26, 1048, 11nd Is 
now covered by rule 42 (b), Fcder11l Rules or Crlmlnnl 
Procedure, Title 18, Appendix. 
CODIFICATION 
In subsec. ( e), reference to the D1strlct Court at the 
United States tor the Dlrtrlct of Columbln, which was 
cllmlnntcd by Pub. L. 85-701, I 13 (b), w11a prevlously 
omltted on authority of net June 26, 1948. 
AMENDMENTS 
1969-Subscc. (l), Pub. L. 86-267, I '104(d). lncludetl 
unto.Ir l11bor practices wlthln the mennlng ot sections 
158(e) and 168(b) (7} of this tltle, and Inserted the pro-
viso prohlbltlng the officer or regional attorney trom 
applying tor any rcstr11tnlng order under section 16B(b) 
(7} or this title 1t n chnrge ngnlnst the employer under 
section 15B(a) (2) of thls tltle hns been filed and ofter 
the prellmlnnry Investigation, he hM rcnsonahle co.use to 
bellevo tho.t such chnrge ls true and that n complaint 
should Issue. 
Subscc, (m). Pub. L. B6-257, f 706, added subsec. (m). 
1968-Subscc. (d). Pub. t. 85-791, § 13(n), ellmlnnted 
"a. transcript of" following "until", 
Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 85-701, § 13(b), ellmlnnted "(ln-
cludlnr;r the United Stntes Court of Appcnls tor the Dis-
trict of Columblfl.)" preceding", or 1! nll tbe court.a", nnd 
substituted "file In tho court the record ln the proceed-
ings, ns provided tn section 211~ or Title 28" !or "certify 
nnd file ln the court n trnnscrtpt of the entire record ln 
th~ proceedings including the plendlngs nnd testimony 
upon which such order wns entered nnd the ftndlnge nnd 
order or the Boord" In the first sentence, In second sen-
tence suhstltut.ed "t.he filing of such petition" tor 
"such nung or" nnd ellmlnatcd •·upon t.he plcndtnga, 
testimony nnd proceedings set forth ln such transcript" 
Collowlng ''mnke nnd enter", ln fttth sentence substltuted 
"member" tor .. members" !ol!owlng "betore the Boo.rd, 
lts", nnd aubstltut.ed "record" tor "transcript", and In 
seventh sentence, substituted "Upon the Ollng of the 
record with it the'' tor "The", 1md "section 1254 at 'I'ltle 
28" tor "sections 346 and 347 of Tltle 28". 
Subsec. Ct). Pub. L. 86-701, I 13(c), substituted 
"transmitted by the clerk of the court to" ror "served 
upon" a.nd "the record In the procecdlng, certified by the 
Bonrd, aa provided In section :;u 12 ot T1tlo 28" tor "n 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
§181 TITLE 29.-LABOR Page 6302 
trnnscrlpt of the entlri, record In the proceeding, certl• 
fled by the Bonrd lncludl11g tht: plendlng nnd testimony 
upon which the order complnlncd or wna entered, nnd the 
findings nnd order or the Bonrd" In tho second r;entel'\ce, 
and ln third aentenco substituted "the flllng or such 
petition," tor "such filing", and ellmlnated "exclusive" 
preceding "Jurisdiction". 
10-17-Act June 23, 19-17, nmended section genernlly 
nnd added subsec:s. (J)-(1) which glves the Boo.rd gen-
crnl power to petition district court for tempornry relief 
11r restraining order, directs Bonrd to hear nnd determine 
Jurlsdlctlonnl strikes, nnd to Investigate boycotts and 
strikes tc rorce recognition oC an uncertified tnbor union 
nnd to petition district court for lnJunctl\'e relief, 
CHANDE OF NAME 
The "circuit courts or nppenl" nnd the ''circuit courts of 
nppenls of the United Stntes" hn\'e been ch•mged to 
''United States courts or nppcnls" by net June 25, 19-18, 
J 32 ( n). ns nmended by net Mny 2-l, 1049. 
The "District court of the United States for the District 
or Colutnbla" wns changed to the "United Btntes District 
Court ror the District or Columbia" by net June 25, 1948, 
I 3:! ( b), ns nn1ended by net Mny 24. 1049. See sections 88 
and 132 or Title 28, Judlclnry and Judlclnl Procedure. 
supreme court or the District of Columbln wns c11nnged 
to "District court or the United Stntes tor the District 
of Colutnbln" by net June 25, 1936. 
Court or Appeals or the District or Columbia wna 
chnngcd to United States Court or Appeals ror the District 
or Columbia by act June 7, 1934, ch, 426, 48 Stnt. 926. 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1969 AMENDMENT 
Amendment or section by Pub. L. 86-257 effective sixty 
dnys after Sept. 14, 1959, see section 707 or Pub. L. 86-257, 
set out a.s a note under section 153 or this tltle, 
EFFECTIVE DATE or 1947 AMENDMENT 
Effective date or oct June 23, 1947, see note set out 
under section 151 or thlB title. 
COMr.ltTNIST ORGANIZATlONS, AND MEMBERS 
Prohibitions placed on Communist organlzl\ttons, nncl 
members thereof, wlth respect to lnbor, see chnpter 23 
or Title 60, War ancl Nntlonal Defense, pnrtlculnrly 
sect:ons 782 (4A), 78-1, '70211 nnd 8-11-844 or thnt title. 
FEDERAL RULES or CtvtL PROCEDURE 
Appllcatlon or rules, see rule 81, Tltlo 28, Appendix, 
Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, 
§ 161. Investigatory powers or Board. 
For the purpose or nil hearings and investigations, 
which, in the opinion of the Bonrd, nre necessary and 
proper for the exercise of the powers vested In it t.Jy 
sections 159 and 160 of this title-
()) Documentary e,·idence; summoning witnesses 
nnd taking testimony. 
The Bonrd, or its duly authorized agents or 
ngenoles, shnll at all reasonnble times hnve access 
to, for the purpose of examination, and the right 
to copy any evidence of any person being investl• 
gated or proceeded ngninst that relates to any 
matter under lnvestlgntion or ln question. The 
B:>ard, or any member thereof, shall upon appli-
cation c,f nny party to such proceedings, forthwith 
Issue to such party subpenas requlrlng the attend-
nnce and testimony of Witne~ses or the prcductlon 
or any evidence In such proceeding or lnvestlgn-
tlon requested in such appUcntlon. Within five 
days after the service or a. subpenn. on any person 
requiring the production of any evidence ln his 
possession or under his control, such person mny 
petition the Boo.rd to revoke, and the Board shall 
revoke, such subpena if In its opinion the evidence 
whose production is required does not relate to 
any matter un :ier Investigation, or any matter In 
question In such proceecUngs, or Jf In Its opinion 
such subpenn. does not describe with sufficient 
particularity the evidence whose production ls re• 
quired. Any member of the Board, or any agent 
or agency designated by the Board fol' such pur• 
poses, may administer oaths and affirmations, ex• 
amine witnesses, and receive evidence. Such at• 
tendnnce of witnesses and the production of such 
evidence mny be required from nny place In the 
United States or any Territory or pos~esslon 
thereof, at any designated place of hearing, 
(2) Court nid in compelling production of e,·idence 
and nttendnnce of witnes!les. 
In case of contumacy or refusn.l to obey a sub• 
penn. Issued to nny person, any district court of 
the United States or the United Stntes courts of 
any Territory or possession, within the Jurlsdlc• 
tlon of which the inquiry ls carried on or within 
the Jurisdiction of which said person guilty of 
contwnncy or ref us al to obey ls found or resides 
or trnnsacts business, upon applicn.tlon by the 
B:>ard Ehall hnve Jurisdiction to issue to such per• 
son nn order requiring such person to appenr 
before the Board, Its member, agent, or ngency, 
there to produce evidence 1f so ordered, or there 
to give testimony touching the matter under ln-
vestlgn.tlon or In question: nnd nny f allure to obey 
such order of the court may be punished by sa~d 
court ns a. contempt thereof. 
(3) PrMlege or witnessesi immunity from prosecu• 
tion. 
No person shall be excused from attending and 
testifying or from producing books, records, cor-
respondence, documents, or other evidence In 
obedience to the subpenn. of the Boa1·d, on the 
ground that the testimony or evidence required of 
him may tend to Incriminate him or subject him 
to o. penalty or forfeiture; but no lndlvldunl shall 
be prosecuted or subjected to nny penalty or tor-
!elture !or or on account of any transaction, 
matter, or thing concerning which ha ls com• 
t>clled, after having claimed his prlvllege against 
self-lncrlmlnntlon, to testify or produce evidence, 
except that such lndlvldunl so testlfylng shall not 
be exempt from prosecution and punishment for 
perjury committed In so testl!ytng. 
(0 Process, service nnd return; Cees of witnesses. 
Complaints, orders, and other process nnd 
papers o! the Board, Its member, agent, or agency, 
mo.y be served either personalty or by registered 
mall or by telegro,ph or by leaving n. copy thereof 
at the principal omce or place of business of the 
p~rson required to be served. The verified return 
by the lndlvldual so servlng the same setting 
forth the manner of such service shall be proof 
of the same, and the return post office receipt or 
telegraph receipt there!or when reglstered and 
mniled or telegraphed as aforesaid shall be proof 
of service or the same. Wltn,:,sses summoned 
before the Board, lts member, agent, or ngency, 
shn.11 be paid the same feei: and 1.Dileage that are 
paid witnesses In the courts of the United States, 
and witnesses whose depositions are taken and the 
persons to.king the same shall severally be entitled 
to the same fees as are paid for like services Jn the 
courts of the United States. 
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(5) Process, where scncd, 
All process of any court to which npplicatfon 
may be made under this subchnpter may be served 
In the judlcio.l district wherein the defendant or 
other person required to be served resides or may 
be!ound. 
(6) Information and aRKiHtance from departments. 
The several departments and agencies of the 
Government, when directed by the President, shall 
furnish the Board, upon Its request, all records, 
papers, nnd lnf ormatfon In thelr possession re-
lating to nny matter before the Board. 
<July 5, 1936, ch. 372, § 11, 49 Stat. 455; June 25, 
1938, ch. 804, 49 Stat. 1921: June 23, 1947, ch. 120, 
title I, I 101, 61 Stat. 150.> 
CoDrrrcATJON 
In pnr. (2), reference to "the Dlatr!ct court or the 
United Stntes !or the Dlstrlrt or Columbln" wn11 omitted 
on nuthortty or net June 25, 194B, ch. 646, I 32 (b), 62 
Stnt. 991, since the District or Columbia constitutes a 
JUdlclnl district, nnd the D "trlct Court or tho Un1trd 
States tor the Dlrtrlct or Columbln ts Included within 
t.he term "a.ny district court o! tho United Stntes" ns 
used In such subsection. See sections BB nnd 132 or 
Title 28, Judlclnry and Judicial Procedure. 
AMENDMENTS 
1047-Act June :?3, 194'7, restnled the ecctlon with the 
nddltlon or provisions requiring the lssunnce o! subpenns 
n11 n mnttor ot <"ourae on the request or lilly pnrty. 
CHANGE OF' NAME 
Suprt"me Court or the District or Columbln wns changed 
to the "District Court or the United Slates Cor the D!i;lrlct 
ot Columbln" by net June 25, 1936. 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 194'7 AMENDMENT 
Etrectlvc dnte ot act June 23, 194'7, sea note set out 
under section 151 ot this tllle. 
F'EDrRAL RULES OF CIVIL l'R'lCEDORE 
Subpenn, sec rule 45, ntlt 2B, Appendix, Judlclnry nnd 
Judlclnl Procedurr.. 
§ 162. orrcnseH and penalties, 
Any person who shall wlllfuIJy resist. prevent. Im-
pede, or Interfere with any member of the Bonrd 
or nny of Its agents or nscncies In the performnnce of 
duties pursuant to this subchapter shnll be punished 
by n. fine of not more thnn $5,000 or by imprison-
ment for not more thnn one year, or both. <J11ly 5, 
1936, cb. 372, § 12, 49 Stat. 456: June 23, 1947, ch. 
120, title I,§ 101, 61 Stat.151.> 
AMENDMENTS 
1947-Act June 23, 1047, reenacted section without 
chnnge. 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1047 AMENDMENT 
EITectlvc da.te or net June 23, 1947, see note set out 
undrr i;cctlon 151 or this title. 
§ 163. Right to strike preserved. 
Nolhlng In this subchnptcr, except ns speclflcally 
provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to 
interfere with or Impede or diminish In nny way the 
right to strike, or to affect the limitations or quaUfl-
cntlons on tha.t right. <July 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 13, 
'i9 Stat. 457; June 23, 1947, ch. 120, title I, § 101, 61 
Stat.161,) 
AMENDMENTS 
1947-Act Juno 23, 1947, amended section so ns to pro-
vide thnt except ns speclftcnlly provided for ln thls sub-
chnpter nothlng shnll lntcrtc>re wlth or dlmlnlsh the 
right to strlko nnd thnt nothing wa.s to be construed 
to n!Tect the llmltntlons or qunllftcntlons on the right 
to utrlke, thus recognlzlng that the right to strike ls 
not nn unllmllrd nnd unqunllOed right. 
EfTECTIVB DATE OF lD-\7 AMENDMENT 
Etrectlve date ot net June 23, 1047, see note set out 
under i;ectlon 151 of thls title. 
§ 164, Supervisors as union members; recognition by 
employers; declination of jurisdiction by Don rd 
over Jahor disputes; aHsertlon of Jurisdiction by 
Stale or Territorial agencies and courts. 
<a> Nothing herein shnll prohibit any individual 
employed as a supervisor from becoming or remnln-
lng a member of a labor organizntlon, but no em-
ployer subject lo this subchapter shall be compelled 
lo deem lndlVldunls defined herein as supervisors as 
emp'oyces for the purpose of any lnw, either national 
or loc11l, relnllns to collective bargaining. 
<b> Nolhin6 in this subchnpter shall be construed 
ns authorizl,1g the execution or nppllcnllon ot agree-
ments requiring membership In n labor orsnnlzallon 
ns n condition ot employment In any State or Terri-
tory In wh!ch such execution or nppllcnl!on ts pro-
hlbltcd by Slate or Territorial law. 
<c> (1) The Board, In Its discretion, may, by rule 
of decision or by publlshed rules adopted pursuant 
to the Admln!stratlve Procedure Act, decline to 
assert Jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving 
nny class or category of employers, where, ln the 
opinion of the Bonl'd, the effect of such lnbor dis-
pute on commerce Is not. sufficiently substnntlnl tu 
wnrrnnt. the exercise of its Jurisdiction: Provided., 
Thal the Board shall not. decllne to assert Jurisdic-
tion over any labor dispute over which It would 
assert jurisdiction under the standards prevnlllng 
upon August 1, 1969. 
<2> Nothing In this subchapter shall be deemed 
to prevent. or bar any agency or the courts o! nny 
State or Terrltol'y (including the Commonwealth 
of Puerto Rico, aunm, and the Vlrgln Islands>, 
lrom assuming and asserting Jurisdiction over lnbor 
disputes over which the Board declines, pursuant to 
paragraph C 1 > of this subsection, to nssert. Jurls-
dict!on. <July 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 14, 49 Stat. 457; 
June 23, !947, tltle I,§ 101, 61 Stat.151: Sept, 14, 1959, 
Pub. L. 86-257, title VII,§ 701<n>, 73 Stnt. 541.) 
REFERENCES IN TEXT 
The Admlnlstrntlve Proctldure Act, referred to In sub-
sec. (c), ls clnsslftcd to chapter 19 ot Title 5, Executive 
Depnrtments a.nd Government ornccrs and Employees. 
AMENDMENTS 
1050-Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 86-257 added sub5CC. (C). 
1047-Act June 23, 1047, amended section g~nernlly 
by Inserting new subject mntter. Section formerly rc-
Ce: red to conflict or Jnws n.nd ls now covered by sccllon 
165 or tills title. 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1947 AME:NDMENT 
Effective date or a.ct June 23, 1047, eec note set out 
under section 151 or this title. 
§ 165. Conflict of laws, 
Whether the npplfcatlon of the provision of sec-
tion 672 of Title 11 conflicts with the nppllcatlon of 
lhe provisions ot this subchapler, this subchaplcr 
shall prcvnU: Provided, Thnt in any situation where 
the provisions of this subchnpter cannot be validly 
enforced, the provisions of such other Acts shnll re-
mnln In full force and effect. <July 5, 1936, ch. 372, 
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§ 5, 49 Stat. 45'1; June 23, 194'1, ch. 120, title I, I 101, 
61 Ste.t.151.> 
AMENDMENTS 
1047-Act June 23, 1947, nmended section gcnernlly by 
tnsertlng new subject mntler which wns formerly covered 
by section 164 or this Utle. Section formerly referred 
to sepnrnblllty provlslons nnd ls now covered by section 
100 or this title. 
EFTECTl\'E DATE or 1047 AMENDMENT 
Effectlvc date or net June 23, 1047, see note set out un-
der sectlon 151 or this title. 
§ 166. Scparabllit)' or pro,·islons. 
U any pro\'lslon or thls subchnpter, 01· the nppllca-
tlon or such provision to nny person or circum-
stances, shall be held Invalid. the remninder or this 
subchnptcr, or the npplicntlon or such provision to 
pcrsrms or circumstances other than those as to 
whlcl1 It is held lnvnlid, shall not be affected thereby. 
1 July 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 16, 49 stat. 457; June 23, 
1947, ch.120, title I,§ 101, 61 Sta.t.151.l 
AMENDMENTS 
1947-Act June 23, J947, nmended section gcnernJly 
by Inserting new subject mntter wt.lch wns rormerly 
covered by sectlon 165 or this tltle. Section formerly 
referred to short tltle or chapter and Is now covered by 
section 167 or thin tltle. 
EFFECTIVE DATE 01' 1947 AMENDMENT 
Eff'ectlve date or net June 23, 1947, see note set out 
under section 151 or this title. 
§ 167. Short title or subchapter. 
This subchnpter mny be cited as the ''Nntfonal 
Lnbor Relations Act·•. CJuly 5, 1935, ch, 3'12, § 17, 
ns added June 23, 1947, ch. 120, Utle I, § 101, 61 
Stat. 152.> 
En'!X:rrvE DATE 
Eff'ectlve do.te or act June 23, 1947, see note set out 
under section 151 01' this title. 
§ 168, Validation of certificates and other Board 
actionR. 
No petition entertained. no investigation made, no 
election held, and no certfflcnUon Issued by the Nn-
tfonnl Labor Relations Bonrd, under nny or the pro-
visions of section 159 or this title, shnll be invalid 
by reason of the failure or the Consress or Industrial 
o,·gnnizatlons to have complled with the require-
ments or section 159 m. lg), or 'h > or this title 
prior to December 22, 1949, or by reason of the 
ranurc or the Amcricnn Federation of Labor to have 
complied with the provisions of section 159 Cf), Cg), 
or Ch) or this title prior to November 7, 1947: Pro-
vided, That no UnblUty shall be imposed under any 
prov4.slon or this chnpter upon nny person £or failure 
to honor any election or certlficnte referred to nbove, 
prfor to October 22, 1951: Provided, however, That 
this proviso shnll not have the effect or setting aside 
or In nny wny nftectlng Judgments or decrees hereto-
fore entered under section 160 te> or in of this 
title and which hnve become final. 1July 5, 1935, 
ch. 372, § 18, ns added Oct. 22, 1951, ch. 534, § l ,n>, 
65 Stat. 601. > 
REl"EJIENCES lN TEXT 
Section 169 (r), (g), or (h) or thh; title, referred to In 
tho text, were rcpca.lcd. Sec section 431 or thla tl1.le, 
SUBCHAPTER III.-co:'lCILIA110N OF LABOR 
DISPUTES; NATIONAL EMERGENCIES 
§ 171, Decloratlon or purr,oae ond policy. 
It ls the policy of the United States that-
Cal sound and stnblu Industrial peace nnd the 
advancement or the general welfare, healt11, and 
safety or the Nation end of the best interests o( 
employe1·s nnd employees can most satisfactorily 
be secured by the settl<im<'nt or Issues between em-
ployers and employe~- through the processes oC 
conrercnce and collective bargaining between em-
ployers and the representatives or their employees; 
Cb> the settlement c,r Issues between employers 
and employees through collecUvc bargaining may 
be advnnced by mnldng ava1lnble full and adequate 
sovcrnmentnl facffltles for concllintlon, mediation, 
and voluntary arbitrntk>n to aid and encourngc em-
ployers nnd the representatives or their employees 
to rcnrh and maintain agreements concerning totes 
of pay, hours, and working conditions, and to make 
all reasonable efforts -:o settle their dlftcrences by 
mutual agreement reached through conferences and 
collccUve bargaining or by such methods ns may be 
provided for in any E,ppllcable agreement for the 
~ettlement or disputes: and 
<c> certain contro\·ersies which arise between 
pnrt1es to collectlve-bnrgalnlng agreements may be 
avoided or minimized by making available full and 
ndequate governmentnl racllltles Cor furnishing as-
st.stance to employers llnd the representatives or their 
employees in r ormulaUng for inclusJon w1thln such 
agreements provision for adcqunte notice or any 
proposed changes in the terms or such agreements, 
ror the flnnl adjustment or grlevnnces or questions 
regarding the appllcation or interpretation or such 
agreements, and other provisions designed to pr:?-
vr.nt the subsequent arising of such controversies. 
<June 23, 1947, ch. 120, title II, I 201, 61 Stat. 152.) 
§ 172. Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, 
(n) Creation; appointment of Director. 
There ls created an Independent agency to be 
known as the Federal Mediation and Conciliation 
Service (herein ref erred to as the "Service", except 
that for sixty days after June 23, 1947, such term 
shall rerer to the Conclllatlon Service or the De-
partment or Labor). The Service shall be under 
the direction or a Federal Mediation and ConclU-
atlon Director Cherelnarter rererred to ns the "Di-
rector">, who shall be appointed by the President by 
and wlth the advice and consent or the Sennte. The 
Director shnU not engage f n any other business, 
vocation, ar employment. 
(b) Appointment of officers and employees; cxpendi-
llircs for supplies, fncillties, and S<!rvicea. 
The Dh·ector ls authorized, subject to the civil 
service laws, to appoint such clerical nnd other per-
sonnel as may be necessary for the execution of the 
functions or the Service, and shall flx their compen-
sation 1n accordance with the Classlflcntton Act or 
1949, and may, without rl~gard to the provisions of 
the civil service laws, appoint such conc1l1at01·s 
a.nd mediators as may be necessru-y to carry 
out the functions of the Service. The Director Is 
authorized to mnke such expenditures for supplies, 
Cacllitles, nnd services ns he deems necessary. Such 
I 
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§ 151. Findings and declaration of policy, 29 USCA § 151 
United States Code Annotated 
Title 29. Labor 
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annos) 
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annos) 
29 U.S.C.A. § 151 
§ 151. Findings and declaration of policy 
Currentness 
The denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by some employers to accept the 
procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent 
or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by (a) impairing the efficiency, safety, or operation of 
the instrumentalities of commerce; (b) occurring in the current of commerce; (c) materially affecting, restraining, or 
controlling the flow of raw materials or manufactured or processed goods from or into the channels of commerce, or the 
prices of such materials or goods in commerce; or (d) causing diminution of employment and wages in such volume as 
substantially to impair or disrupt the market for goods flowing from or into the channels of commerce. 
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty 
of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially 
burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage 
rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates 
and working conditions within and between industries. 
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards 
commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized 
sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial 
disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining 
power between employers and employees. 
Experience has further demonstrated that certain practices by some labor organizations, their officers, and members 
have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by preventing the free flow of goods in 
such commerce through strikes and other forms of industrial unrest or through concerted activities which impair the 
interest of the public in the free flow of such commerce. The elimination of such practices is a necessary condition to 
the assurance of the rights herein guaranteed. 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to 
the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the 
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, 
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and 
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection. 
CREDIT(S) 
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 136.) 
Notes of Decisions (566) 
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§ 152. Definitions, 29 USCA § 152 
United States Code Annotated 
Title 29. Labor 
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annos) 
Subchapter IL National Labor Relations (Refs & Annos) 
When used in this subchapter--
29 U.S.C.A § 152 
§ 152. Definitions 
Currentness 
(1) The term "person" includes one or more individuals, labor organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, 
legal representatives, trustees, trustees in cases under Title 11, or receivers. 
(2) The term "employer" includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not 
include the United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State 
or political subdivision thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act [45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq.], as amended 
from time to time, or any labor organization ( other than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity 
of officer or agent of such labor organization. 
(3) The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular 
employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased 
as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and 
who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual 
employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual 
employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual 
employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act [45 U.S.C.A. 
§ 151 et seq.], as amended from time to time, or by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined. 
(4) The term "representatives" includes any individual or labor organization. 
(5) The term "labor organization" means any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation 
committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with 
employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work. 
(6) The term "commerce" means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States, 
or between the District of Columbia or any Territory of the United States and any State or other Territory, or between 
any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or within the District of Columbia or any 
Territory, or between points in the same State but through any other State or any Territory or the District of Columbia 
or any foreign country. 
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§ 152. Definitions, 29 USCA § 152 
(7) The term "affecting commerce" means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of 
commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow 
of commerce. 
(8) The term "unfair labor practice" means any unfair labor practice listed in section 158 of this title. 
(9) The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or 
concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to 
arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of 
employer and employee. 
(10) The term "National Labor Relations Board" means the National Labor Relations Board provided for in section 
153 of this title. 
(11) The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, 
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct 
them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the 
exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment. 
(12) The term "professional employee" means--
(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in character as opposed to routine 
mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work; (ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its 
performance; (iii) of such a character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized 
in relation to a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning 
customarily acquired by a P!olonged course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution of 
higher learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education or from an apprenticeship or from 
training in the performance of routine mental, manual, or physical processes; or 
(b) any employee, who (i) has completed the courses of specialized intellectual instruction and study described in 
clause (iv) of paragraph (a), and (ii) is performing related work under the supervision of a professional person to 
qualify himself to become a professional employee as defined in paragraph (a). 
(13) In determining whether any person is acting as an "agent" of another person so as to make such other person 
responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently 
ratified shall not be controlling. 
(14) The term "health care institution" shall include any hospital, convalescent hospital, health maintenance 
organization, health clinic, nursing home, extended care facility, or other institution devoted to the care of sick, infirm, 
or aged person. 1 
CREDIT(S) 
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§ 152. Definitions, 29 USCA § 152 
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 2, 49 Stat. 450; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 137; July 26, 1974, Pub.L. 93-360, 
§ l(a), (b), 88 Stat. 395; Nov. 6, 1978, Pub.L. 95-598, Title III,§ 319, 92 Stat. 2678.) 
Notes of Decisions (1969) 
Footnotes 
1 So in original. Probably should be "persons". 
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§ 153. National Labor Relations Board, 29 USCA § 153 
United States Code Annotated 
Title 29. Labor 
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annos) 
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annas) 
29 U.S.C.A. § 153 
§ 153. National Labor Relations Board 
Currentness 
(a) Creation, composition, appointment, and tenure; Chairman; removal of members 
The National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter called the "Board") created by this subchapter prior to its amendment 
by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 [29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq.], is continued as an agency of the United States, 
except that the Board shall consist of five instead of three members, appointed by the President by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate. Of the two additional members so provided for, one shall be appointed for a term of five years 
and the other for a term of two years. Their successors, and the successors of the other members, shall be appointed for 
terms of five years each, excepting that any individual chosen to fill a vacancy shall be appointed only for the unexpired 
term of the member whom he shall succeed. The President shall designate one member to serve as Chairman of the 
Board. Any member of the Board may be removed by the President, upon notice and hearing, for neglect of duty or 
malfeasance in office, but for no other cause. 
(b) Delegation of powers to members and regional directors; review and stay of actions of regional directors; quorum; seal 
The Board is authorized to delegate to any group of three or more members any or all of the powers which it may itself 
exercise. The Board is also authorized to delegate to its regional directors its powers under section 159 of this title to 
determine the unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining, to investigate and provide for hearings, and 
determine whether a question of representation exists, and to direct an election or take a secret ballot under subsection 
(c) or (e) of section 159 of this title and certify the results thereof, except that upon the filing of a request therefor with 
the Board by any interested person, the Board may review any action of a regional director delegated to him under this 
paragraph, but such a review shall not, unless specifically ordered by the Board, operate as a stay of any action taken 
by the regional director. A vacancy in the Board shall not impair the right of the remaining members to exercise all of 
the powers of the Board, and three members of the Board shall, at all times, constitute a quorum of the Board, except 
that two members shall constitute a quorum of any group designated pursuant to the first sentence hereof. The Board 
shall have an official seal which shall be judicially noticed. 
( c) Annual reports to Congress and the President 
The Board shall at the close of each fiscal year make a report in writing to Congress and to the President summarizing 
significant case activities and operations for that fiscal year. 
( d) General Counsel; appointment and tenure; powers and duties; vacancy 
There shall be a General Counsel of the Board who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, for a term of four years. The General Counsel of the Board shall exercise general supervision over 
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§ 153. National Labor Relations Board, 29 USCA § 153 
all attorneys employed by the Board (other than administrative law judges and legal assistants to Board members) and 
over the officers and employees in the regional offices. He shall have final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect of 
the investigation of charges and issuance of complaints under section 160 of this title, and in respect of the prosecution 
of such complaints before the Board, and shall have such other duties as the Board may prescribe or as may be provided 
by law. In case of a vacancy in the office of the General Counsel the President is authorized to designate the officer or 
employee who shall act as General Counsel during such vacancy, but no person or persons so designated shall so act 
(1) for more than forty days when the Congress is in session unless a nomination to fill such vacancy shall have been 
submitted to the Senate, or (2) after the adjournment sine die of the session of the Senate in which such nomination 
was submitted. 
CREDIT(S) 
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 3, 49 Stat. 451; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 139; Sept. 14, 1959, Pub.L. 86-257, 
Title VII,§§ 70l(b), 703, 73 Stat. 542; Jan. 2, 1975, Pub.L. 93-608, § 3(3), 88 Stat. 1972; Mar. 27, 1978, Pub.L. 95-251, § 
3, 92 Stat. 184; Dec. 21, 1982, Pub.L. 97-375, Title II,§ 213, 96 Stat. 1826.) 
Notes of Decisions (192) 
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§ 154. National Labor Relations Board; eligibility for reappointment; ... , 29 USCA § 154 
United States Code Annotated 
Title 29. Labor 
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annos) 
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annos) 
29 U.S.C.A. § 154 
§ 154. National Labor Relations Board; eligibility for 
reappointment; officers and employees; payment of expenses 
Currentness 
(a) Each member of the Board and the General Counsel of the Board shall be eligible for reappointment, and shall 
not engage in any other business, vocation, or employment. The Board shall appoint an executive secretary, and such 
attorneys, examiners, and regional directors, and such other employees as it may from time to time fmd necessary for 
the proper performance of its duties. The Board may not employ any attorneys for the purpose of reviewing transcripts 
of hearings or preparing drafts of opinions except that any attorney employed for assignment as a legal assistant to any 
Board member may for such Board member review such transcripts and prepare such drafts. No administrative law 
judge's report shall be reviewed, either before or after its publication, by any person other than a member of the Board or 
his legal assistant, and no administrative law judge shall advise or consult with the Board with respect to exceptions taken 
to his findings, rulings, or recommendations. The Board may establish or utilize such regional, local, or other agencies, 
and utilize such voluntary and uncompensated services, as may from time to time be needed. Attorneys appointed under 
this section may, at the direction of the Board, appear for and represent the Board in any case in court. Nothing in this 
subchapter shall be construed to authorize the Board to appoint individuals for the purpose of conciliation or mediation, 
or for economic analysis. 
(b) All of the expenses of the Board, including all necessary traveling and subsistence expenses outside the District 
of Columbia incurred by the members or employees of the Board under its orders, shall be allowed and paid on the 
presentation of itemized vouchers therefor approved by the Board or by any individual it designates for that purpose. 
CREDIT(S) 
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, §4, 49 Stat. 451; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 139; Mar. 27, 1978, Pub.L. 95-251, 
§ 3, 92 Stat. 184.) 
Notes of Decisions (3) 
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§ 155. National Labor Relations Board; principal office, conducting ... , 29 USCA § 155 
United States Code Annotated 
Title 29. Labor 
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Armos) 
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annos) 
29 U.S.CA. § 155 
§ 155. National Labor Relations Board; principal office, conducting inquiries 
throughout country; participation in decisions or inquiries conducted by member 
Currentness 
The principal office of the Board shall be in the District of Columbia, but it may meet and exercise any or all of its powers 
at any other place. The Board may, by one or more of its members or by such agents or agencies as it may designate, 
prosecute any inquiry necessary to its functions in any part of the United States. A member who participates in such an 
inquiry shall not be disqualified from subsequently participating in a decision of the Board in the same case. 
CREDIT(S) 
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 5, 49 Stat. 452; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 140.) 
Notes of Decisions (4) 
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§ 156. Rules and regulations, 29 USCA § 156 
United States Code Annotated 
Title 29. Labor 
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs &Annos) 
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & An.nos) 
29 U.S.C.A. § 156 
§ 156. Rules and regulations 
Cu1Tentness 
The Board shall have authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by subchapter 
II of chapter 5 of Title 5, such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter. 
CREDIT(S) 
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 6, 49 Stat. 452; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 140.) 
Notes of Decisions (103) 
29 U.S.C.A. § 156, 29 USCA § 156 
Current through P.L. 115-46. Also includes P.L. 115-49 to 115-51. Title 26 current through 115-52. 
End of Document •C 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
WESTLAW @ 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
§ 157. Right of employees as to organization, collective bargaining, etc., 29 USCA § 157 
United States Code Annotated 
Title 29. Labor 
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annos) 
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annos) 
29 U.S.C.A. § 157 
§ 157. Right of employees as to organization, collective bargaining, etc. 
Currentness 
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities 
except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a 
condition of employment as authorized in section l 58(a)(3) of this title. 
CREDIT(S) 
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 7, 49 Stat. 452; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 140.) 
Notes of Decisions (1337) 
29 U.S.C.A. § 157, 29 USCA § 157 
Current through P.L. 115-46. Also includes P.L. 115-49 to 115-51. Title 26 current through 115-52. 
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§ 158. Unfair labor practices, 29 USCA § 158 
United States Code Annotated 
Title 29. Labor 
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annos) 
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annas) 
29 U.S.C.A. § 158 
§ 158. Unfair labor practices 
Currentness 
<Notes of Decisions for 29 USCA § 158 are displayed in eleven separate documents. Notes of Decisions for 
subdivision I are contained in this document. For Notes of Decisions for subdivisions II to XI, see documents 
for 29 USCA § 158, post.> 
(a) Unfair labor practices by employer 
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer--
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title; 
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial 
or other support to it: Provided, That subject to rules and regulations made and published by the Board pursuant to 
section 156 of this title, an employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees to confer with him during 
working hours without loss of time or pay; 
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage 
or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute 
of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization (not established, 
maintained, or assisted by any action defined in this subsection as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition 
of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the 
effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later, (i) if such labor organization is the representative of the 
employees as provided in section 159(a) of this title, in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit covered by such 
agreement when made, and (ii) unless following an election held as provided in section 159(e) of this title within 
one year preceding the effective date of such agreement, the Board shall have certified that at least a majority of 
the employees eligible to vote in such election have voted to rescind the authority of such labor organization to 
make such an agreement: Provided further, That no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee 
for nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was 
not available to the employee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he 
has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure 
of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or 
retaining membership; 
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§ 158. Unfair labor practices, 29 USCA § 158 
( 4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under 
this subchapter; 
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) 
of this title. 
(b) Unfair labor practices by labor organization 
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents--
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title: Provided, That 
this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition 
or retention of membership therein; or (B) an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of 
collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances; 
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against_an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) 
of this section or to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has 
been denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees 
uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership; 
(3) to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is the representative of his employees subject to the 
provisions of section l 59(a) of this title; 
(4) (i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an 
industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, 
process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any 
services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, 
where in either case an object thereof is--
(A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or employer organization or to 
enter into any agreement which is prohibited by subsection (e) of this section; 
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the 
products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person, or 
forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of 
his employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under the 
provisions of section 159 of this title: Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make 
unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing; 
(C) forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or bargain with a particular labor organization as the 
representative of his employees if another labor organization has been certified as the representative of such 
employees under the provisions of section 159 of this title; 
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(D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization 
or in a particular trade, craft, or class rather than to employees in another labor organization or in another trade, 
craft, or class, unless such employer is failing to conform to an order or certification of the Board determining the 
bargaining representative for employees performing such work: 
Provided, That nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed to make unlawful a refusal by any person 
to enter upon the premises of any employer ( other than his own employer), if the employees of such employer are 
engaged in a strike ratified or approved by a representative of such employees whom such employer is required 
to recognize under this subchapter: Providedfurtlzer, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing 
contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of 
truthfully advising the public, including consumers and members of a labor organization, that a product or products 
are produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another 
employer, as long as such publicity does not have an effect of inducing any individual employed by any person other 
than the primary employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or 
not to perform any services, at the establishment of the employer engaged in such distribution; 
(5) to require of employees covered by an agreement authorized under subsection (a)(3) of this section the payment, 
as a condition precedent to becoming a member of such organization, of a fee in an amount which the Board fmds 
excessive or discriminatory under all the circumstances. In making such a finding, the Board shall consider, among 
other relevant factors, the practices and customs of labor organizations in the particular industry, and the wages 
currently paid to the employees affected; 
(6) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or deliver or agree to pay or deliver any money or other thing of 
value, in the nature of an exaction, for services which are not performed or not to be performed; and 
(7) to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be picketed, any employer where an object 
thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative 
of his employees, or forcing or requiring the employees of an employer to accept or select such labor organization 
as their collective bargaining representative, unless such labor organization is currently certified as the representative 
of such employees: 
(A) where the employer has lawfully recognized in accordance with this subchapter any other labor organization 
and a question concerning representation may not appropriately be raised under section 159(c) of this title, 
(B) where within the preceding twelve months a valid election under section 159( c) of this title has been conducted, or 
(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition under section 159(c) of this title being filed within a 
reasonable period of time not to exceed thirty days from the commencement of such picketing: Provided, That when 
such a petition has been filed the Board shall forthwith, without regard to the provisions of section 159(c)(l) of this 
title or the absence of a showing of a substantial interest on the part of the labor organization, direct an election in 
such unit as the Board finds to be appropriate and shall certify the results thereof: Provided further, That nothing in 
this subparagraph (C) shall be construed to prohibit any picketing or other publicity for the purpose of truthfully 
advising the public (including consumers) that an employer does not employ members of, or have a contract with, 
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§ 158. Unfair labor practices, 29 USCA § 158 
a labor organization, unless an effect of such picketing is to induce any individual employed by any other person in 
the course of his employment, not to pick up, deliver or transport any goods or not to perform any services. 
Nothing in this paragraph (7) shall be construed to permit any act which would otherwise be an unfair labor practice 
under this subsection. 
(c) Expression of views without threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit 
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or 
visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this subchapter, 
if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit. 
(d) Obligation to bargain collectively 
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and 
the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and 
the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession: Provided, That where there 
is in effect a collective-bargaining contract covering employees in an industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain 
collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract, unless the party 
desiring such termination or modification--
(1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the proposed termination or modification sixty days 
prior to the expiration date thereof, or in the event such contract contains no expiration date, sixty days prior to the 
time it is proposed to make such termination or modification; 
(2) offers to meet and confer with the other party for the purpose of negotiating a new contract or a contract containing 
the proposed modifications; 
(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within thirty days after such notice of the existence of a 
dispute, and simultaneously therewith notifies any State or Territorial agency established to mediate and conciliate 
disputes within the State or Territory where the dispute occurred, provided no agreement has been reached by that 
time;and 
(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the terms and conditions of the existing 
contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever 
occurs later: 
The duties imposed upon employers, employees, and labor organizations by paragraphs (2) to (4) of this subsection shall 
become inapplicable upon an intervening certification of the Board, under which the labor organization or individual, 
which is a party to the contract, has been superseded as or ceased to be the representative of the employees subject 
to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title, and the duties so imposed shall not be construed as requiring either 
party to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms and conditions contained in a contract for a fixed period, if 
such modification is to become effective before such terms and conditions can be reopened under the provisions of the 
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contract. Any employee who engages in a strike within any notice period specified in this subsection, or who engages in 
any strike within the appropriate period specified in subsection (g) of this section, shall lose his status as an employee of 
the employer engaged in the particular labor dispute, for the purposes of sections 158, 159, and 160 of this title, but such 
loss of status for such employee shall terminate if and when he is reemployed by such employer. Whenever the collective 
bargaining involves employees of a health care institution, the provisions of th.is subsection shall be modified as follows: 
(A) The notice of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be ninety days; the notice of paragraph (3) ofth.is subsection 
shall be sixty days; and the contract period of paragraph (4) of this subsection shall be ninety days. 
(B) Where the bargaining is for an initial agreement following certification or recognition, at least thirty days' notice 
of the existence of a dispute shall be given by the labor organization to the agencies set forth in paragraph (3) of this 
subsection. 
(C) After notice is given to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service under either clause (A) or (B) of 
this sentence, the Service shall promptly communicate with the parties and use its best efforts, by mediation and 
conciliation, to bring them to agreement. The parties shall participate fully and promptly in such meetings as may be 
undertaken by the Service for the purpose of aiding in a settlement of the dispute. 
(e) Enforceability of contract or agreement to boycott any other employer; exception 
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to enter into any contract or agreement, 
express or implied, whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, 
transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing business with any other 
person, and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such 
extent unenforcible 1 and void: Provided, That nothing in this subsection shall apply to an agreement between a labor 
organization and an employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be 
done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a building, structure, or other work: Provided further, 
That for the purposes of this subsection and subsection (b)(4)(B) of this section the terms "any employer", "any person 
engaged in commerce or an industry affecting commerce", and "any person" when used in relation to the terms "any 
other producer, processor, or manufacturer", "any other employer", or "any other person" shall not include persons in 
the relation of a jobber, manufacturer, contractor, or subcontractor working on the goods or premises of the jobber or 
manufacturer or performing parts of an integrated process of production in the apparel and clothing industry: Provided 
further, That nothing in this subchapter shall prohibit the enforcement of any agreement which is within the foregoing 
exception. 
(t) Agreement covering employees in the building and construction industry 
It shall not be an unfair labor practice under subsections (a) and (b) of this section for an employer engaged primarily 
in the building and construction industry to make an agreement covering employees engaged ( or who, upon their 
employment, will be engaged) in the building and construction industry with a labor organization of which building and 
construction employees are members (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in subsection (a) of 
this section as an unfair labor practice) because (I) the majority status of such labor organization has not been established 
under the provisions of section 159 of this title prior to the making of such agreement, or (2) such agreement requires 
as a condition of employment, membership in such labor organization after the seventh day following the beginning of 
such employment or the effective date of the agreement, whichever is later, or (3) such agreement requires the employer 
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to notify such labor organization of opportunities for employment with such employer, or gives such labor organization 
an opportunity to refer qualified applicants for such employment, or (4) such agreement specifies minimum training or 
experience qualifications for employment or provides for priority in opportunities for employment based upon length 
of service with such employer, in the industry or in the particular geographical area: Provided, That nothing in this 
subsection shall set aside the final proviso to subsection (a)(3) of this section: Provided further, That any agreement which 
would be invalid, but for clause (1) of this subsection, shall not be a bar to a petition filed pursuant to section 159(c) 
or 159(e) of this title. 
(g) Notification of intention to strike or picket at any health care institution 
A labor organization before engaging in any stiike, picketing, or other concerted refusal to work at any health care 
institution shall, not less than ten days prior to such action, notify the institution in writing and the Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Service of that intention, except that in the case of bargaining for an initial agreement following certification 
or recognition the notice required by this subsection shall not be given until the expiration of the period specified in 
clause (B) of the last sentence of subsection ( d) of this section. The notice shall state the date and time that such action 
will commence. The notice, once given, may be extended by the written agreement of both parties. 
CREDIT(S) 
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 8, 49 Stat. 452; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 140; Oct. 22, 1951, c. 534, § l(b), 65 
Stat. 601; Sept. 14, 1959, Pub.L. 86-257, Title II,§ 20l(e), Title VII,§§ 704(a)-(c), 705(a), 73 Stat. 525, 542 to 545; July 
26, 1974, Pub.L. 93-360, § l(c)-(e), 88 Stat. 395, 396.) 
Notes of Decisions (344) 
Footnotes 
1 So in original. Probably should be "unenforceable". 
29 U.S.C.A. § 158, 29 USCA § 158 
Current through P.L. 115-46. Also includes P.L. 115-49 to 115-51. Title 26 current through 115-52. 
End of Document i, 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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§ 158a. Providing facilities for operations of Federal Credit Unions, 29 USCA § 158a 
United States Code Annotated 
Title 29. Labor 
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs &Annos) 
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & An.nos) 
29 U.S.C.A. § 158a 
§ 158a. Providing facilities for operations of Federal Credit Unions 
Currentness 
Provision by an employer of facilities for the operations of a Federal Credit Union on the premises of such employer shall 
not be deemed to be intimidation, coercion, interference, restraint or discrimination within the provisions of sectiot1s 
157 and 158 of this title, or acts amendatory thereof. 
CREDIT(S) 
(Dec. 6, 1937, c. 3, § 5, 51 Stat. 5.) 
29 U.S.C.A. § 158a, 29 USCA § 158a 
Current through P.L. 115-46. Also includes P.L. 115-49 to 115-51. Title 26 current through 115-52. 
End of Document 1<) 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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United States Code Annotated 
Title 29. Labor 
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annos) 
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annos) 
29 U.S.C.A. § 159 
§ 159. Representatives and elections 
Currentness 
(a) Exclusive representatives; employees' adjustment of grievances directly with employer 
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit 
appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes 
of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment: 
Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances 
to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as 
long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: 
Provided further, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment. 
(b) Determination of bargaining unit by Board 
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights 
guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, 
craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof: Provided, That the Board shall not (1) decide that any unit is appropriate 
for such purposes if such urut includes both professional employees and employees who are not professional employees 
unless a majority of such professional employees vote for inclusion in such unit; or (2) decide that any craft unit is 
inappropriate for such purposes on the ground that a different unit has been established by a prior Board determination, 
unless a majority of the employees in the proposed craft unit vote against separate representation or (3) decide that 
any unit is appropriate for such purposes if it includes, together with other employees, any individual employed as a 
guard to enforce against employees and other persons rules to protect property of the employer or to protect the safety 
of persons on the employer's premises; but no labor organization shall be certified as the representative of employees 
in a bargaining unit of guards if such organization admits to membership, or is affiliated directly or indirectly with an 
organization which admits to membership, employees other than guards. 
(c) Hearings on questions affecting commerce; rules and regulations 
(1) Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such regulations as may be prescribed by the Board--
(A) by an employee or group of employees or any individual or labor organization acting in their behalf alleging that 
a substantial number of employees (i) wish to be represented for collective bargaining and that their employer declines 
to recognize their representative as the representative defined in subsection (a) of this section, or (ii) assert that the 
individual or labor organization, which has been certified or is being currently recognized by their employer as the 
bargaining representative, is no longer a representative as defined in subsection (a) of this section; or 
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(B) by an employer, alleging that one or more individuals or labor organizations have presented to him a claim to be 
recognized as the representative defined in subsection (a) of this section; 
the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a question of representation affecting 
commerce exists shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice. Such hearing may be conducted by an officer 
or employee of the regional office, who shall not make any recommendations with respect thereto. If the Board finds 
upon the record of such hearing that such a question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot 
and shall certify the results thereof. 
(2) In determining whether or not a question of representation affecting commerce exists, the same regulations and rules 
of decision shall apply irrespective of the identity of the persons filing the petition or the kind of relief sought and in no 
case shall the Board deny a labor organization a place on the ballot by reason of an order with respect to such labor 
organization or its predecessor not issued in conformity with section 160(c) of this title. 
(3) No election shall be directed in any bargaining unit or any subdivision within which in the preceding twelve-
month period, a valid election shall have been held. Employees engaged in an economic strike who are not entitled to 
reinstatement shall be eligible to vote under such regulations as the Board shall fmd are consistent with the purposes and 
provisions of this subchapter in any election conducted within twelve months after the commencement of the strike. In 
any election where none of the choices on the ballot receives a majority, a run-off shall be conducted, the ballot providing 
for a selection between the two choices receiving the largest and second largest number of valid votes cast in the election. 
( 4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the waiving of hearings by stipulation for the purpose of a 
consent election in conformity with regulations and rules of decision of the Board. 
(5) In determining whether a unit is appropriate for the purposes specified in subsection (b) of this section the extent to 
which the employees have organized shall not be controlling. 
( d) Petition for enforcement or review; transcript 
Whenever an order of the Board made pursuant to section 160(c) of this title is based in whole or in part upon facts 
certified following an investigation pursuant to subsection (c) of this section and there is a petition for the enforcement 
or review of such order, such certification and the record of such investigation shall be included in the transcript of the 
entire record required to be filed under subsection (e) or (f) of section 160 of this title, and thereupon the decree of the 
court enforcing, modifying, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the Board shall be made and entered upon 
the pleadings, testimony, and proceedings set forth in such transcript. 
(e) Secret ballot; limitation of elections 
(1) Upon the filing with the Board, by 30 per centum or more of the employees in a bargaining unit covered by an 
agreement between their employer and a labor organization made pursuant to section 158(a)(3) of this title, of a petition 
alleging they desire that such authority be rescinded, the Board shall take a secret ballot of the employees in such unit 
and certify the results thereof to such labor organization and to the employer. 
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(2) No election shall be conducted pursuant to this subsection in any bargaining unit or any subdivision within which, 
in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid election shall have been held. 
CREDIT(S) 
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 9, 49 Stat. 453; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 143; Oct. 22, 1951, c. 534, § l(c), (d), 
65 Stat. 601; Sept. 14, 1959, Pub.L. 86-257, Title II,§ 201(d), Title VII,§ 702, 73 Stat. 525, 542.) 
Notes of Decisions (3150) 
29 U.S.C.A. § 159, 29 USCA § 159 
Current through P.L. 115-46. Also includes P.L. 115-49 to 115-51. Title 26 current through 115-52. 
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§ 160. Prevention of unfair labor practices, 29 USCA § 160 
United States Code Annotated 
Title 29. Labor 
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annas) 
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annos) 
29 U.S.C.A. § 160 
§ 160. Prevention of unfair labor practices 
Currentness 
<Notes of Decisions for this section are displayed in two separate documents. Notes of Decisions for roman 
heads I through XI are contained in this document. For additional Notes of Decisions, see the second document 
for 29 USCA § 160.> 
(a) Powers of Board generally 
The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed 
in section 158 of this title) affecting commerce. This power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or 
prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise: Provided, That the Board is empowered 
by agreement with any agency of any State or Territory to cede to such agency jurisdiction over any cases in any industry 
(other than mining, manufacturing, communications, and transportation except where predominantly local in character) 
even though such cases may involve labor disputes affecting commerce, unless the provision of the State or Territorial 
statute applicable to the determination of such cases by such agency is inconsistent with the corresponding provision of 
this subchapter or has received a construction inconsistent therewith. 
(b) Complaint and notice of hearing; answer; court rules of evidence inapplicable 
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, the Board, or 
any agent or agency designated by the Board for such purposes, shall have power to issue and cause to be served upon 
such person a complaint stating the charges in that respect, and containing a notice of hearing before the Board or a 
member thereof, or before a designated agent or agency, at a place therein fixed, not less than five days after the serving 
of said complaint: Provided, That no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six 
months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board and the service of a copy thereof upon the person against whom 
such charge is made, unless the person aggrieved thereby was prevented from filing such charge by reason of service 
in the armed forces, in which event the six-month period shall be computed from the day of his discharge. Any such 
complaint may be amended by the member, agent, or agency conducting the hearing or the Board in its discretion at 
any time prior to the issuance of an order based thereon. The person so complained of shall have the right to file an 
answer to the original or amended complaint and to appear in person or otherwise and give testimony at the place and 
time fixed in the complaint. In the discretion of the member, agent, or agency conducting the hearing or the Board, any 
other person may be allowed to intervene in the said proceeding and to present testimony. Any such proceeding shall, so 
far as practicable, be conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence applicable in the district courts of the United 
States under the rules of civil procedure for the district courts of the United States, adopted by the Supreme Court of 
the United States pursuant to section 2072 of Title 28. 
( c) Reduction of testimony to writing; fmdings and orders of Board 
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The testimony taken by such member, agent, or agency or the Board shall be reduced to writing and filed with the 
Board. Thereafter, in its discretion, the Board upon notice may take further testimony or hear argument. If upon the 
preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion that any person named in the complaint has 
engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue 
and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, 
and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate 
the policies of this subchapter: Provided, That where an order directs reinstatement of an employee, back pay may be 
required of the employer or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the discrimination suffered by him: 
And provided further, That in determining whether a complaint shall issue alleging a violation of subsection (a)(l) or (a) 
(2) of section 158 of this title, and in deciding such cases, the same regulations and rules of decision shall apply irrespective 
of whether or not the labor organization affected is affiliated with a labor organization national or international in 
scope. Such order may further require such person to make reports from time to time showing the extent to which it has 
complied with the order. If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall not be of the opinion that 
the person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall 
state its findings of fact and shall issue an order dismissing the said complaint. No order of the Board shall require the 
reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any 
back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause. In case the evidence is presented before a member of 
the Board, or before an administrative law judge or judges thereof, such member, or such judge or judges as the case may 
be, shall issue and cause to be served on the parties to the proceeding a proposed report, together with a recommended 
order, which shall be filed with the Board, and if no exceptions are filed within twenty days after service thereof upon 
such parties, or within such further period as the Board may authorize, such recommended order shall become the order 
of the Board and become effective as therein prescribed. 
(d) Modification of findings or orders prior to filing record in court 
Until the record in a case shall have been filed in a court, as hereinafter provided, the Board may at any time upon 
reasonable notice and in such manner as it shall deem proper, modify or set aside, in whole or in part, any finding or 
order made or issued by it. 
(e) Petition to court for enforcement of order; proceedings; review of judgment 
The Board shall have power to petition any court of appeals of the United States, or if all the courts of appeals to 
which application may be made are in vacation, any district court of the United States, within any circuit or district, 
respectively, wherein the unfair labor practice in question occurred or wherein such person resides or transacts business, 
for the enforcement of such order and for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order, and shall file in the court the 
record in the proceedings, as provided in section 2112 of Title 28. Upon the filing of such petition, the court shall cause 
notice thereof to be served upon such person, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and of the question 
determined therein, and shall have power to grant such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper, 
and to make and enter a decree enforcing, modifying and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part 
the order of the Board. No objection that has not been urged before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be 
considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary 
circumstances. The findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the 
record considered as a whole shall be conclusive. If either party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce additional 
evidence and shall show to the satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence is material and that there were 
reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence in the hearing before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, 
the court may order such additional evidence to be taken before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, and to be made 
a part of the record. The Board may modify its findings as to the facts, or make new findings by reason of additional 
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evidence so taken and filed, and it shall file such modified or new findings, which findings with respect to questions 
of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive, and shall file its 
recommendations, if any, for the modification or setting aside of its original order. Upon the filing of the record with 
it the jurisdiction of the court shall be exclusive and its judgment and decree shall be final, except that the same shall 
be subject to review by the appropriate United States court of appeals if application was made to the district court as 
hereinabove provided, and by the Supreme Court of the United States upon writ of certiorari or certification as provided 
in section 1254 of Title 28. 
(t) Review of final order of Board on petition to court 
Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or denying in whole or in part the relief sought may obtain 
a review of such order in any United States court of appeals in the circuit wherein the unfair labor practice in question 
was alleged to have been engaged in or wherein such person resides or transacts business, or in the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, by filing in such a court a written petition praying that the order of the Board 
be modified or set aside. A copy of such petition shall be forthwith transmitted by the clerk of the court to the Board, 
and thereupon the aggrieved party shall file in the court the record in the proceeding, certified by the Board, as provided 
in section 2112 of Title 28. Upon the filing of such petition, the court shall proceed in the same manner as in the case 
of an application by the Board under subsection (e) of this section, and shall have the same jurisdiction to grant to the 
Board such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper, and in like manner to make and enter a 
decree enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the Board; 
the findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered 
as a whole shall in like manner be conclusive. 
{g) Institution of court proceedings as stay of Board's order 
The commencement of proceedings under subsection (e) or (f) of this section shall not, unless specifically ordered by the 
court, operate as a stay of the Board's order. 
{h) Jurisdiction of courts unaffected by limitations prescribed in chapter 6 of this title 
When granting appropriate temporary relief or a restraining order, or making and entering a decree enforcing, modifying, 
and enforcing as so modified or setting aside in whole or in part an order of the Board, as provided in this section, the 
jurisdiction of courts sitting in equity shall not be limited by chapter 6 of this title. 
{i) Repealed. Pub.L. 98-620, Title IV,§ 402(31), Nov. 8, 1984, 98 Stat. 3360 
(j) Injunctions 
The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint as provided in subsection (b) of this section charging that 
any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, to petition any United States district court, within 
any district wherein the unfair labor practice in question is alleged to have occurred or wherein such person resides or 
transacts business, for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order. Upon the filing of any such petition the court 
shall cause notice thereof to be served upon such person, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction to grant to the Board 
such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper. 
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(k) Hearings on jurisdictional strikes 
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph (4)(D) 
of section l 58(b) of this title, the Board is empowered and directed to hear and determine the dispute out of which such 
unfair labor practice shall have arisen, unless, within ten days after notice that such charge has been filed, the parties to 
such dispute submit to the Board satisfactory evidence that they have adjusted, or agreed upon methods for the voluntary 
adjustment of, the dispute. Upon compliance by the parties to the dispute with the decision of the Board or upon such 
voluntary adjustment of the dispute, such charge shall be dismissed. 
(I) Boycotts and strikes to force recognition of uncertified labor organizations; injunctions; notice; service of process 
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph ( 4)(A), 
(B), or (C) of section 158(b) of this title, or section 158(e) ofthis title or section 158(b)(7) of this title, the preliminary 
investigation of such charge shall be made forthwith and given priority over all other cases except cases of like character 
in the office where it is filed or to which it is referred. If, after such investigation, the officer or regional attorney to whom 
the matter may be referred has reasonable cause to believe such charge is true and that a complaint should issue, he shall, 
on behalf of the Board, petition any United States district court within any district where the unfair labor practice in 
question has occurred, is alleged to have occurred, or wherein such person resides or transacts business, for appropriate 
injunctive relief pending the fmal adjudication of the Board with respect to such matter. Upon the filing of any such 
petition the district court shall have jurisdiction to grant such injunctive relief or temporary restraining order as it deems 
just and proper, notwithstanding any other provision oflaw: Provided further, That no temporary restraining order shall 
be issued without notice unless a petition alleges that substantial and irreparable injury to the charging party will be 
unavoidable and such temporary restraining order shall be effective for no longer than five days and will become void at 
the expiration of such period: Provided further, That such officer or regional attorney shall not apply for any restraining 
order under section l 58(b )(7) of this title if a charge against the employer under section 158( a )(2) of this title has been filed 
and after the preliminary investigation, he has reasonable cause to believe that such charge is true and that a complaint 
should issue. Upon filing of any such petition the courts shall cause notice thereof to be served upon any person involved 
in the charge and such person, including the charging party, shall be given an opportunity to appear by counsel and 
present any relevant testimony: Provided further, That for the purposes of this subsection district courts shall be deemed 
to have jurisdiction of a labor organization (1) in the district in which such organization maintains its principal office, 
or (2) in any district in which its duly authorized officers or agents are engaged in promoting or protecting the interests 
of employee members. The service of legal process upon such officer or agent shall constitute service upon the labor 
organization and make such organization a party to the suit. In situations where such relief is appropriate the procedure 
specified herein shall apply to charges with respect to section 158(b)(4)(D) of this title. 
(m) Priority of cases 
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of subsection (a)(3) 
or (b )(2) of section 158 of this title, such charge shall be given priority over all other cases except cases of like character 
in the office where it is filed or to which it is referred and cases given priority under subsection (1) of this section. 
CREDIT(S) 
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 10, 49 Stat. 453; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 146; June 25, 1948, c. 646, § 32(a), 
(b), 62 Stat. 991; May 24, 1949, c. 139, § 127, 63 Stat. 107; Aug. 28, 1958, Pub.L. 85-791, § 13, 72 Stat. 945; Sept. 14, 
1959, Pub.L. 86-257, Title VII,§§ 704(d), 706, 73 Stat. 544; Mar. 27, 1978, Pub.L. 95-251, § 3, 92 Stat. 184; Nov. 8, 1984, 
Pub.L. 98-620, Title IV,§ 402(31), 98 Stat. 3360.) 
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§ 160. Prevention of unfair labor practices, 29 USCA § 160 
United States Code Annotated 
Title 29. Labor 
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annos) 
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annos) 
29 U.S.C..A. § 160 
§ 160. Prevention of unfair labor practices 
CmTentness 
<Notes of Decisions for this section are displayed in two separate documents. Notes of Decisions for roman 
heads XII through XVII are contained in this document. For additional Notes of Decisions, see the first 
document for 29 USCA § 160.> 
Notes of Decisions {8698) 
29 U.S.C.A. § 160, 29 USCA § 160 
Current through P.L. 115-46. Also includes P.L. 115-49 to 115-51. Title 26 current through 115-52. 
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§ 161. Investigatory powers of Board, 29 USCA § 161 
United States Code Annotated 
Title 29. Labor 
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annos) 
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annas) 
29 U.S.C.A. § 161 
§ 161. Investigatory powers of Board 
Currentness 
For the purpose of all hearings and investigations, which, in the opinion of the Board, are necessary and proper for the 
exercise of the powers vested in it by sections 159 and 160 of this title--
(1) Documentary evidence; summoning witnesses and taking testimony 
The Board, or its duly authorized agents or agencies, shall at all reasonable times have access to, for the purpose of 
examination, and the right to copy any evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded against that relates to 
any matter under investigation or in question. The Board, or any member thereof, shall upon application of any party 
to such proceedings, forthwith issue to such party subpenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or 
the production of any evidence in such proceedings or investigation requested in such application. Within five days 
after the service of a subpena on any person requiring the production of any evidence in his possession or under his 
control, such person may petition the Board to revoke, and the Board shall revoke, such subpena if in its opinion the 
evidence whose production is required does not relate to any matter under investigation, or any matter in question in 
such proceedings, or if in its opinion such subpena does not describe with sufficient particularity the evidence whose 
production is required. Any member of the Board, or any agent or agency designated by the Board for such purposes, 
may administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses, and receive evidence. Such attendance of witnesses and 
the production of such evidence may be required from any place in the United States or any Territory or possession 
thereof, at any designated place of hearing. 
(2) Court aid in compelling production of evidence and attendance of witnesses 
In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpena issued to any person, any district court of the United States or 
the United States courts of any Territory or possession, within the jurisdiction of which the inquiry is carried on or 
within the jurisdiction of which said person guilty of contumacy or refusal to obey is found or resides or transacts 
business, upon application by the Board shall have jurisdiction to issue to such person an order requiring such person 
to appear before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, there to produce evidence if so ordered, or there to give 
testimony touching the matter under investigation or in question; and any failure to obey such order of the court may 
be punished by said court as a contempt thereof. 
(3) Repealed. Pub.L. 91-452, Title II,§ 234, Oct. 15, 1970, 84 Stat. 930. 
( 4) Process, service and return; fees of witnesses 
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§ 161. Investigatory powers of Board, 29 USCA § 161 
Complaints, orders, and other process and papers of the Board, its member, agent, or agency, may be served either 
personally or by registered or certified mail or by telegraph or by leaving a copy thereof at the principal office or 
place of business of the person required to be served. The verified return by the individual so serving the same setting 
forth the manner of such service shall be proof of the same, and the return post office receipt or telegraph receipt 
therefor when registered or certified and mailed or when telegraphed as aforesaid shall be proof of service of the same. 
Witnesses summoned before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be paid the same fees and mileage that are 
paid witnesses in the courts of the United States, and witnesses whose depositions are taken and the persons taking 
the same shall severally be entitled to the same fees as are paid for like services in the courts of the United States. 
(5) Process, where served 
All process of any court to which application may be made under this subchapter may be served in the judicial district 
wherein the defendant or other person required to be served resides or may be found. 
(6) Information and assistance from departments 
The several departments and agencies of the Government, when directed by the President, shall furnish the Board, 
upon its request, all records, papers, and information in their possession relating to any matter before the Board. 
CREDIT(S) 
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 11, 49 Stat. 455; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 150; June 25, 1948, c. 646, § 32(b), 
62 Stat. 991; May 24, 1949, c. 139, § 127, 63 Stat. 107; Oct. 15, 1970, Pub.L. 91-452, Title II,§ 234, 84 Stat. 930; June 11, 
1960, Pub.L. 86-507, § 1(57), as added May 21, 1980, Pub.L. 96-245, 94 Stat. 347.) 
Notes of Decisions (265) 
29 U.S.C.A. § 161, 29 USCA § 161 
Current through P.L. 115-46. Also includes P.L. 115-49 to 115-51. Title 26 current through 115-52. 
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§ 162. Offenses and penalties, 29 USCA § 162 
United States Code Annotated 
Title 29. Labor 
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annos) 
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annos) 
29 U.S.C.A. § 162 
§ 162. Offenses and penalties 
Currentness 
Any person who shall willfully resist, prevent, impede, or interfere with any member of the Board or any of its agents or 
agencies in the performance of duties pursuant to this subchapter shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000 
or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. 
CREDIT(S) 
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 12, 49 Stat. 456; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 151.) 
Notes of Decisions (7) 
29 U.S.C.A. § 162, 29 USCA § 162 
Current through P.L. 115-46. Also includes P.L. 115-49 to 115-51. Title 26 current through 115-52. 
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§ 163. Right to strike preserved, 29 USCA § 163 
United States Code Annotated 
Title 29. Labor 
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annos) 
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annos) 
29 U.S.CA. § 163 
§ 163. Right to strike preserved 
Currentness 
Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or 
impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right. 
CREDIT(S) 
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 13, 49 Stat. 457; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 151.) 
Noles of Decisions (49) 
29 U.S.C.A. § 163, 29 USCA § 163 
Current through P.L. 115-46. Also includes P.L. 115-49 to 115-51. Title 26 current through 115-52. 
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§ 164. Construction of provisions, 29 USCA § 164 
United States Code Annotated 
Title 29. Labor 
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annos) 
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annas) 
(a) Supenisors as union members 
29 U.S.C.A. § 164 
§ 164. Construction of provisions 
Currentness 
Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor from becoming or remaining a member of a 
labor organization, but no employer subject to this subchapter shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as 
supervisors as employees for the purpose of any law, either national or local, relating to collective bargaining. 
(b) Agreements requiring union membership in violation of State law 
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring 
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or 
application is prohibited by State or Territorial law. 
(c) Power of Board to decline jurisdiction of labor disputes; assertion of jurisdiction by State and Territorial courts 
(1) The Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or by published rules adopted pursuant to subchapter II of 
chapter 5 of Title 5, decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving any class or category of employers, 
where, in the opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant 
the exercise of its jurisdiction: Provided, That the Board shall not decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute 
over which it would assert jurisdiction under the standards prevailing upon August I, 1959. 
(2) Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to prevent or bar any agency or the courts of any State or Territory 
(including the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands), from assuming and asserting jurisdiction 
over labor disputes over which the Board declines, pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, to assert jurisdiction. 
CREDIT(S) 
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 14, 49 Stat. 457; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 151; Sept. 14, 1959, Pub.L. 86-257, 
Title VII,§ 70l(a), 73 Stat. 541.) 
Notes of Decisions (123) 
29 U.S.C.A. § 164, 29 USCA § 164 
Current through P.L. 115-46. Also includes P.L. 115-49 to 115-51. Title 26 current through 115-52. 
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§ 165. Conflict of laws, 29 USCA § 165 
United States Code Annotated 
Title 29. Labor 
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annas) 
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annas) 
29 U.S.C.A. § 165 
§ 165. Conflict of laws 
Currentness 
Wherever the application of the provisions of section 272 of chapter 10 of the Act entitled "An Act to establish a 
uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States", approved July 1, 1898, and Acts amendatory thereof and 
supplementary thereto (U.S.C., title 11, sec. 672), conflicts with the application of the provisions of this subchapter, 
this subchapter shall prevail: Provided, That in any situation where the provisions of this subchapter cannot be validly 
enforced, the provisions of such other Acts shall remain in full force and effect. 
CREDIT(S) 
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 15, 49 Stat. 457; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 151.) 
Notes of Decisions (1) 
29 U.S.C.A. § 165, 29 USCA § 165 
Current through P.L. 115-46. Also includes P.L. 115-49 to 115-51. Title 26 current through 115-52. 
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§ 166. Separability, 29 USCA § 166 
United States Code Annotated 
Title 29. Labor 
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annos) 
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annas) 
29 U.S.C.A. § 166 
§ 166. Separability 
Currentness 
If any provision of this subchapter, or the application of such provision to any person or circumstances, shall be held 
invalid, the remainder of this subchapter, or the application of such provision to persons or circumstances other than 
those as to which it is held invalid, shall not be affected thereby. 
CREDIT(S) 
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 16, 49 Stat. 457; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 151.) 
Notes of Decisions (2) 
29 U.S.C.A. § 166, 29 USCA § 166 
Current through P.L. 115-46. Also includes P.L. 115-49 to 115-51. Title 26 current through 115-52. 
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§ 167. Short title of subchapter, 29 USCA § 167 
United States Code Annotated 
Title 29. Labor 
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annos) 
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annos) 
29 U.S.C.A. § 167 
§ 167. Short title of subchapter 
Currentness 
This subchapter may be cited as the "National Labor Relations Act". 
CREDIT(S) 
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 17, as added June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 152.) 
29 U.S.C.A. § 167, 29 USCA § 167 
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§ 168. Validation of certificates and other Board actions, 29 USCA § 168 
United States Code Annotated 
Title 29. Labor 
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs &Annas) 
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annas) 
29 U.S.C.A. § 168 
§ 168. Validation of certificates and other Board actions 
Currentness 
No petition entertained, no investigation made, no election held, and no certification issued by the National Labor 
Relations Board, under any of the provisions of section 159 of this title, shall be invalid by reason of the failure of the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations to have complied with the requirements of section l 59(f), (g), or (h) of this title 
prior to December 22, 1949, or by reason of the failure of the American Federation of Labor to have complied with the 
provisions of section l 59(f), (g), or (h) of this title prior to November 7, 1947: Provided, That no liability shall be imposed 
under any provision of this chapter upon any person for failure to honor any election or certificate referred to above, 
prior to October 22, 1951: Provided, however, That this proviso shall not have the effect of setting aside or in any way 
affecting judgments or decrees heretofore entered under section 160(e) or (f) of this title and which have become final. 
CREDIT(S) 
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 18, as added Oct. 22, 1951, c. 534, § l(a), 65 Stat. 601.) 
29 U.S.C.A. § 168, 29 USCA § 168 
Current through P.L. 115-46. Also includes P.L. 115-49 to 115-51. Title 26 current through 115-52. 
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§ 169. Employees with religious convictions; payment of dues and fees, 29 USCA § 169 
United States Code Annotated 
Title 29. Labor 
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annos) 
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annos) 
29 U.S.C.A. § 169 
§ 169. Employees with religious convictions; payment of dues and fees 
Currentness 
Any employee who is a member of and adheres to established and traditional tenets or teachings of a bona fide religion, 
body, or sect which has historically held conscientious objections to joining or financially supporting labor organizations 
shall not be required to join or financially support any labor organization as a condition of employment; except that such 
employee may be required in a contract between such employees' employer and a labor organization in lieu of periodic 
dues and initiation fees, to pay sums equal to such dues and initiation fees to a nonreligious, nonlabor organization 
charitable fund exempt from taxation under section 50l(c)(3) of Title 26, chosen by such employee from a list of at 
least three such funds, designated in such contract or if the contract fails to designate such funds, then to any such fund 
chosen by the employee. If such employee who holds conscientious objections pursuant to this section requests the labor 
organization to use the grievance-arbitration procedure on the employee's behalf, the labor organization is authorized 
to charge the employee for the reasonable cost of using such procedure. 
CREDIT(S) 
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 19, as added July 26, 1974, Pub.L. 93-360, § 3, 88 Stat. 397; amended Dec. 24, 1980, Pub.L. 
96-593, 94 Stat. 3452.) 
Notes of Decisions (4) 
29 U.S.C.A. § 169, 29 USCA § 169 
Current through P.L. I 15-46. Also includes P.L. 115-49 to 115-51. Title 26 current through 115-52. 
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Utah Code 
Chapter 20 
Employment Relations and Collective Bargaining 
34-20-1 Declaration of policy. 
The public policy of the state as to employment relations and collective bargaining in the 
furtherance of which this chapter is enacted, is declared to be as follows: 
(1) It recognizes that there are three major interests involved, namely: that of the public, the 
employee, and the employer. These three interests are to a considerable extent interrelated. It 
is the policy of the state to protect and promote each of these interests with due regard to the 
situation and to the rights of the others. 
(2) Industrial peace, regular and adequate income for the employee, and uninterrupted production 
of goods and services are promotive of all of these interests. They are largely dependent 
upon the maintenance of fair, friendly, and mutually satisfactory employment relations and the 
availability of suitable machinery for the peaceful adjustment of whatever controversies may 
arise. It is recognized that certain employers, including farmers and farmer cooperatives, in 
addition to their general employer problems, face special problems arising from perishable 
commodities and seasonal production which require adequate consideration. It is also 
recognized that whatever may be the rights of disputants with respect to each other in any 
controversy regarding employment relations, they should not be permitted in the conduct of 
their controversy to intrude directly into the primary rights of third parties to earn a livelihood, 
transact business, and engage in the ordinary affairs of life by any lawful means and free from 
molestation, interference, restraint, or coercion. 
(3) Negotiation of terms and conditions of work should result from voluntary agreement between 
employer and employee. For the purpose of such negotiation an employee has the right, 
if he desires, to associate with others in organizing and bargaining collectively through 
representatives of his own choosing, without intimidation or coercion from any source. 
(4) It is the policy of the state, in order to preserve and promote the interests of the public, the 
employee, and the employer alike, to establish standards of fair conduct in employment 
relations and to provide a convenient, expeditious and impartial tribunal by which these 
interests may have their respective rights and obligations adjudicated. 
Enacted by Chapter 85, 1969 General Session 
34-20-2 Definitions. 
(Ji) As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Affecting commerce" means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free 
flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing 
commerce or the free flow of commerce within the state. 
(2) "Commerce" means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication within the state. 
(3) "Election" means a proceeding in which the employees in a collective bargaining unit cast a 
secret ballot for collective bargaining representatives or for any other purpose specified in this 
chapter and includes elections conducted by the board or by any tribunal having competent 
jurisdiction or whose jurisdiction was accepted by the parties. 
(4) 
(a) "Employee" includes any employee unless this chapter explicitly states otherwise, and 
includes an individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, 
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Utah Code 
any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained 
any other regular and substantially equivalent employment. 
(b) "Employee" does not include an individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the 
domestic service of a family or person at his home, or an individual employed by his parent or 
spouse. 
(5) "Employer" includes a person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, but 
does not include: 
(a) the United States; 
(b) a state or political subdivision of a state; 
( c) a person subject to the federal Railway Labor Act; 
(d) a labor organization, other than when acting as an employer; 
( e) a corporation or association operating a hospital if no part of the net earnings inures to the 
benefit of any private shareholder or individual; or 
(f) anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of a labor organization. 
(6) "Federal executive agency" means an executive agency, as defined in 5 U.S.C. Sec.105, of ~ 
the federal government. 
(7) "Franchise" means the same as that term is defined in 16 C.F.R. Sec. 436.1. 
(8) "Franchisee" means the same as that term is defined in 16 C.F.R. Sec. 436.1. 
(9) "Franchisor" means the same as that term is defined in 16 C.F.R. Sec. 436.1. 
(10) "Labor dispute" means any controversy between an employer and the majority of the 
employer's employees in a collective bargaining unit concerning the right or process or details 
of collective bargaining or the designation of representatives. 
(11) "Labor organization" means an organization of any kind or any agency or employee 
representation committee or plan in which employees participate that exists for the purpose, in 
whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates 
of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work. 
(12) "Labor relations board" or "board" means the board created in Section 34-20-3. 
(13) "Person" includes an individual, partnership, association, corporation, legal representative, 
trustee, trustee in bankruptcy, or receiver. 
( 14) "Representative" includes an individual or labor organization. 
(15) "Secondary boycott" includes combining or conspiring to cause or threaten to cause injury to 
one with whom no labor dispute exists, whether by: 
(a) withholding patronage, labor, or other beneficial business intercourse; 
(b) picketing; 
(c) refusing to handle, install, use, or work on particular materials, equipment, or supplies; or 
(d) by any other unlawful means, in order to bring him against his will into a concerted plan to ~ 
coerce or inflict damage upon another. 
(16) "Unfair labor practice" means any unfair labor practice listed in Section 34-20-8. 
Amended by Chapter 370, 2016 General Session 
34-20-3 Labor relations board. 
(1) 
(a) There is created the Labor Relations Board consisting of the following: 
(i) the commissioner of the Labor Commission; 
(ii) two members appointed by the governor with the consent of the Senate consisting of: 
(A) a representative of employers, in the appointment of whom the governor shall consider 
nominations from employer organizations; and 
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(b) 
(B) a representative of employees, in the appointment of whom the governor shall consider 
nominations from employee organizations. 
(i) Except as provided in Subsection (1 )(b)(ii), as terms of members appointed under 
Subsection (1 )(a)(ii) expire, the governor shall appoint each new member or reappointed 
member to a four-year term. 
(ii) Notwithstanding the requirements of Subsection (1 )(b)(i), the governor shall, at the time 
of appointment or reappointment, adjust the length of terms to ensure that the terms of 
members appointed under Subsection (1 )(a)(ii) are staggered so one member is appointed 
every two years. 
(c) The commissioner shall serve as chair of the board. 
{d) A vacancy occurring on the board for any cause of the members appointed under Subsection 
(1 )(a)(ii) shall be filled by the governor with the consent of the Senate pursuant to this section 
for the unexpired term of the vacating member. 
(e) The governor may at any time remove a member appointed under Subsection (1 )(a)(ii) but 
only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance or malfeasance in office, or for cause upon 
a hearing. 
(f) A member of the board appointed under Subsection (1 )(a)(ii) may not hold any other office 
in the government of the United States, this state or any other state, or of any county 
government or municipal corporation within a state. 
(g) A member appointed under Subsection (1 )(a)(ii) may not receive compensation or benefits for 
the member's service, but may receive per diem and travel expenses in accordance with: 
(i) Section 63A-3-106; 
(ii) Section 63A-3-107; and 
(iii) rules made by the Division of Finance pursuant to Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107. 
(2) A meeting of the board may be called: 
(a) by the chair; or 
(b) jointly by the members appointed under Subsection (1 )(a)(ii). 
(3) The chair may provide staff and administrative support as necessary from the Labor 
Commission. 
(4) A vacancy in the board does not impair the right of the remaining members to exercise all the 
powers of the board, and two members of the board shall at all times constitute a quorum. 
(5) The board shall have an official seal which shall be judicially noticed. 
Amended by Chapter 348, 2016 General Session 
34-20-4 Labor relations board -- Employees -- Agencies -- Expenses. 
(1) The board may employ an executive secretary, attorneys, examiners, and may employ such 
other employees with regard to existing laws applicable to the employment and compensation 
of officers and employees of the state as it may from time to time find necessary for the proper 
performance of its duties. The board may establish or utilize such regional, local, or other 
agencies, and utilize such voluntary and uncompensated services, as may from time to time be 
needed. Attorneys employed under this section may, at the direction of the board, appear for 
and represent the board in any case in court. Nothing in this act shall be construed to authorize 
the board to employ individuals for the purpose of conciliation or mediation ( or for statistical 
work) where and if such service may be obtained from the Labor Commission. 
(2) All of the expenses of the board, including the necessary traveling expenses, incurred by 
the members or employees of the board under its orders, shall be allowed and paid on the 
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presentation of itemized vouchers therefor approved by the board or by any individual it 
designates for the purpose. 
Amended by Chapter 375, 1997 General Session 
34-20-5 Labor relations board -- Offices -- Jurisdiction -- Member's participation in case. 
The principal office of the board shall be at the state capitol, but it may meet and exercise any 
or all of its powers at any other place. The board may, by one or more of its members or by the 
agents or agencies it may designate, prosecute any inquiry necessary to its functions in any part 
of the state. A member who participates in the inquiry may not be disqualified from subsequently 
participating in a decision of the board in the same case. 
Amended by Chapter 297, 2011 General Session 
34-20-6 Labor relations board -- Rules and regulations. ~ 
The board shall have authority from time to time to make, amend and rescind such rules and 
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this act. Such rules and regulations 
shall be effective upon publication in the manner in which the board shall prescribe. 
Enacted by Chapter 85, 1969 General Session 
34-20-7 Organization and collective bargaining -- Employees' rights. 
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, 
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; and such 
employees shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities. 
Enacted by Chapter 85, 1969 General Session 
34-20-8 Unfair labor practices. 
(1) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer, individually or in concert with others: 
(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in 
Section 34-20-7. 
(b) To dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or 
contribute financial or other support to it; provided, that subject to rules and regulations made 
and published by the board pursuant to Section 34-20-6, an employer is not prohibited from ~ 
permitting employees to confer with the employer during working hours without loss of time or 
pay. 
(c) By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of 
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization; provided, 
that nothing in this act shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor 
organization (not established, maintained or assisted by any action defined in this act as 
an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment, membership therein, if 
such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in Subsection 
34-20-9(1) in the appropriate collective bargaining unit covered by such agreement when 
made. 
(d) To refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of a majority of the employer's 
employees in any collective bargaining unit; provided, that, when two or more labor 
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organizations claim to represent a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit, the 
employer shall be free to file with the board a petition for investigation of certification of 
representatives and during the pendency of the proceedings the employer may not be 
considered to have refused to bargain. 
( e) To bargain collectively with the representatives of less than a majority of the employer's 
employees in a collective bargaining unit. 
(f) To discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because the employee has filed 
charges or given testimony under this chapter. 
(2) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employee individually or in concert with others: 
(a) To coerce or intimidate an employee in the enjoyment of the employee's legal rights, including 
those guaranteed in Section 34-20-7, or to intimidate the employee's family, picket the 
employee's domicile, or injure the person or property of the employee or the employee's 
family. 
(b) To coerce, intimidate or induce an employer to interfere with any of the employer's employees 
in the enjoyment of their legal rights, including those guaranteed in Section 34-20-7, or to 
engage in any practice with regard to the employer's employees which would constitute an 
unfair labor practice if undertaken by the employer on the employer's own initiative. 
(c) To co-operate in engaging in, promoting, or inducing picketing (not constituting an exercise of 
constitutionally guaranteed free speech), boycotting or any other overt concomitant of a strike 
unless a majority in a collective bargaining unit of the employees of an employer against 
whom such acts are primarily directed have voted by secret ballot to call a strike. 
(d) To hinder or prevent, by mass picketing, threats, intimidation, force, or coercion of any 
kind the pursuit of any lawful work or employment, or to obstruct or interfere with entrance 
to or egress from any place of employment, or to obstruct or interfere with free and 
uninterrupted use of public roads, streets, highways, railways, airports, or other ways of travel 
or conveyance. 
(e) To engage in a secondary boycott; or to hinder or prevent, by threats, intimidation, force, 
coercion, or sabotage, the obtaining, use or disposition of materials, equipment, or services; 
or to combine or conspire to hinder or prevent the obtaining, use or disposition of materials, 
equipment or services, provided, however, that nothing herein shall prevent sympathetic 
strikes in support of those in similar occupations working for other employers in the same 
craft. 
(f) To take unauthorized possession of property of the employer. 
(3) It shall be an unfair labor practice for any person to do or cause to be done on behalf of or in 
the interest of employers or employees, or in connection with or to influence the outcome of any 
controversy as to employment relations, any act prohibited by Subsections (1) and (2) of this 
section. 
Amended by Chapter 348, 2016 General Session 
34-20-9 Collective bargaining -- Representatives -- Powers of board. 
(1) 
(a) Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the 
majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for those purposes shall be the exclusive 
representatives of all the employees in that unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in 
respect to rate of pay, wages, hours of employment, and of other conditions of employment. 
(b) Any individual employee or group of employees may present grievances to their employer at 
any time. 
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(2) The board shall decide in each case whether, in order to ensure to employees the full benefit 
of their right to self-organization and to collective bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate the 
policies of this act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the 
employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision of same. 
(3) Whenever a question affecting intrastate commerce or the orderly operation of industry arises 
concerning the representation of employees, the board may investigate such controversy 
(4) 
and certify to the parties in writing, the name or names of the representatives that have been 
designated or selected. In any such investigation, the board shall provide for an appropriate 
hearing upon due notice, either in conjunction with a proceeding under Section 34-20-10, or 
otherwise, and may take a secret ballot of employees, or utilize any other suitable method to 
ascertain such representatives. 
(a) Whenever an order of the board made according to Section 34-20-10 is based in whole or 
in part upon facts certified following an investigation under Subsection (3), and there is a 
petition for the enforcement or review of such order, the certification and the record of the Gs. 
investigation shall be included in the transcript of the entire record required to be filed under 
Section 34-20-10. 
(b) The decree of the court enforcing, modifying, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of 
the board shall be made and entered upon the pleadings, testimony, and proceedings set 
forth in the transcript. 
Amended by Chapter 161, 1987 General Session 
34-20-10 Unfair labor practices -- Powers of board to prevent -- Procedure. 
(1) 
(a) The board may prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice, as listed in 
Section 34-20-8, affecting intrastate commerce or the orderly operation of industry. 
(b) This authority is exclusive and is not affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention 
that has been or may be established by agreement, code, law, or otherwise. 
(2) The board shall comply with the procedures and requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4, 
Administrative Procedures Act, in its adjudicative proceedings. 
(3) When it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaged in any unfair labor practice, 
the board, or any agent or agency designated by the board, may issue and serve a notice of 
agency action on that person. 
(4) 
(a) If, upon all the testimony taken, the board finds that any person named in the complaint has ~. 
engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, the board shall state its findings of 
fact and shall issue and serve on the person an order to cease and desist from the unfair 
labor practice and to take other affirmative action designated by the commission, including 
reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, to effectuate the policies of this chapter. 
(b) The order may require the person to make periodic reports showing the extent to which it has 
complied with the order. 
(c) If, upon all the testimony taken, the board determines that no person named in the complaint 
has engaged in or is engaging in any unfair labor practice, the board shall state its findings of 
fact and shall issue an order dismissing the complaint. 
(5) 
(a) The board may petition the district court to enforce the order and for appropriate temporary 
relief or for a restraining order. 
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(b) The board shall certify and file in the court: 
(i) a transcript of the entire record in the proceeding; 
(ii) the pleadings and testimony upon which the order was entered; and 
(iii) the findings and order of the board. 
(c) When the petition is filed, the board shall serve notice on all parties to the action. 
(d) Upon filing of the petition, the court has jurisdiction of the proceeding and of the question to 
be determined. 
(e) The court may grant temporary relief or a restraining order, and, based upon the pleadings, 
testimony, and proceedings set forth in the transcript, order that the board's order be 
enforced, modified, or set aside in whole or in part. 
(f) The court may not consider any objection that was not presented before the board, its 
member, agent, or agency, unless the failure or neglect to urge the objection is excused 
because of extraordinary circumstances. 
(g) The board's findings of fact, if supported by evidence, are conclusive. 
(h) 
(i) If either party applies to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence, and shows to 
the satisfaction of the court that the additional evidence is material and that there were 
reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce the evidence in the hearing before the board, 
its member, agent, or agency, the court may order additional evidence to be taken before 
the board, its member, agent, or agency, and to be made part of the transcript. 
(ii) The board may modify its findings as to the facts, or make new findings, because of the 
additional evidence taken and filed. 
(iii) The board shall file the modified or new findings, which, if supported by evidence, are 
conclusive, and shall file its recommendations, if any, for the modification or setting aside of 
its original order. 
Amended by Chapter 382, 2008 General Session 
34-20-11 Hearings and investigations -- Power of board -- Witnesses -- Procedure. 
For the purpose of all hearings and investigations, which, in the opinion of the board, are 
necessary and proper for the exercise of the powers vested in it by Sections 34-20-9 and 34-20-10: 
(1) The board, or its duly authorized agents or agencies, shall at all reasonable times have access 
to, for the purpose of examination, and the right to copy, any evidence of any person being 
investigated or proceeded against that relates to any matter under investigation or in question. 
Any member of the board shall have power to issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and 
testimony of witnesses and the production of any evidence that relates to any matter under 
investigation or in question, before the board, its member, agent, or agency conducting the 
hearing or investigation. Any member of the board, or any agent or agency designated by the 
board, for these purposes, may administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses, and 
receive evidence. Attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence may be required 
from any place in the state at any duly designated place of hearing. 
(2) In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any person, any district court of 
Utah within the jurisdiction of which the inquiry is carried on or within the jurisdiction of which 
the person guilty of contumacy or refusal to obey is found or resides or transacts business upon 
application by the board shall have jurisdiction to issue to the person an order requiring the 
person to appear before the board, its member, agent, or agency, to produce evidence if so 
ordered, or to give testimony touching the matter under investigation or in question; and any 
failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the court as a contempt. 
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(3) In the event a witness asserts a privilege against self-incrimination, testimony and evidence 
from the witness may be compelled pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 22b, Grants of Immunity. 
(4) Complaints, orders, and other processes and papers of the board, its member, agent, or 
agency, may be served either personally, by certified or registered mail, by telegraph, or by 
leaving a copy at the principal office or place of business of the person required to be served. 
The verified return by the individual serving the documents setting forth the manner of the 
service shall be proof of the service, and the return post office receipt or telegram receipt 
when certified or registered and mailed or telegraphed shall be proof of service. Witnesses 
summoned before the board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be paid the same fees and 
mileage that are paid witnesses in the courts of the state, and witnesses whose depositions are 
taken and the persons taking them shall be entitled to the same fees paid for the same services 
in the courts of the state. 
(5) All departments and agencies of the state, when directed by the governor, shall furnish to the 
board, upon its request, all records, papers, and information in their possession relating to any 
matter before the board. i,, 
Amended by Chapter 296, 1997 General Session 
34-20-12 Willful interference -- Penalty. 
Any person who shall willfully resist, prevent, impede or interfere with any member of the board, 
or any of its agents or agencies, in the performance of duties pursuant to this act shall be punished 
by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. 
Enacted by Chapter 85, 1969 General Session 
34-20-13 Right to strike. 
This chapter does not interfere with, impede, or diminish in any way the right to strike. 
Amended by Chapter 201, 1991 General Session 
34-20-14 Determining joint employment status ... Franchisors excluded. 
(1) For purposes of determining whether two or more persons are considered joint employers 
under this chapter, an administrative ruling of a federal executive agency may not be 
considered a generally applicable law unless that administrative ruling is determined to be 
generally applicable by a court of law, or adopted by statute or rule . 
(2) 
(a) For purposes of this chapter, a franchisor is not considered to be an employer of: 
(i) a franchisee; or 
(ii) a franchisee's employee. 
(b) With respect to a specific claim for relief under this chapter made by a franchisee or a 
franchisee's employee, this Subsection (2) does not apply to a franchisor under a franchise 
that exercises a type or degree of control over the franchisee or the franchisee's employee 
not customarily exercised by a franchisor for the purpose of protecting the franchisor's 
trademarks and brand. 
Enacted by Chapter 370, 2016 General Session 
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shall constitute the grand jury. I£ more than seven of such persons nre 
present, their muncs must be written by the clerk on separate ba11ots, folded 
so as to conceal the names. and p]accd in a box. The clerk must then draw 
out of the box seven ballots, and the persons whose names are thereon shall 
constitute the grand jury. 
01•rtn<l jury to consist of seven: n,•e m:is fln1l Fees at sr;iml Jurors, § 26-12. 
nn lncllctmcnt,· Con. n.rt. 1, sec. 13; §§ 87S7, 
8820. 
3620. (1320.) Jurors in justice•s court. Summoning. When jtmn. :ire 
required in nny jnsice's court, the number required by law must, upon thr 
order of the justice thereof, he summoned by a peace officer of the juris• 
diction. 
Fees or Jurors In Justices' courts, § :?550. Pn}·n1cnt or recs In nll,•a.nce, § 2aii-J, 
3621. (1321.) Id. Qualifications. Such jurors must be summoned from 
the persons resident in either the city or precinct, competent to serve as 
jurors, nnd not exempt from such service, by notifying them orally that they 
arc so ~ummoncdl and of the time and plncc at ,,;hich their attendance is 
required. 
3622. (1322.) Id, Return. The officer summoning such jurors must. 
at or before the time fixed for their appenrancc, return the order to the court, 
with a list of t_hc persons summoned inclorscd thereon. 
3623. (1323.) Id. Number summoned. How drawn. At the time ap-
pointed for a jury trial in justices' courts, the list of jurors summoned, which 
shall be eight, or double the number ~greed upon before the tria.1 by the 
parties, must be called, and the names of those ntlending nnd not C"-cused 
11111st be written upon separate slips of paper. folded so ns to conceal the 
names, and placed in a box, fro,n which the trial jury must be clraW'n. 
l\ront. Ch•. c. § 3·10•, ,TurY trial ln j\Jstlco's court, crlmfnnl pro-
Jury trln.1 In justlcc1s coul't_. ctvU procedure, ce<lure. n D-13-l-!1•145. 
§§ 7485-7-1S7. 
TITLE 58. 
LABOR. 
CHAPTER I. 
BOARD OF LABOR 
3634. (1324.) Appointment. Qualifications. Term. Upon the ap-
prova.t of this chapter (1\·farch 14, 1901), the governor, by nnd with the con-
sent of the senate, sha11 appoint three persons, not more than two of whom 
shall bc1ong to the same political party, who shall be styled a state board 
of labor, conciliation, and nrbitrntion. One shall he an employer of labor; 
another shall be nn cmployc and be selected from some labor organization; 
the third shall be some person who is neither an cmpJoye nor an employer 
of manual lnbor, and shal1 be chnirman of the board. One shall serve for 
one year, one for three years, and one for five years. ns may be designated 
by the governor nt the time of their appointment. At the expiration of their 
terms their successors shall be appointed in like manner for the term of 
four years. Should a vacnncy occur at any time, the governor slmII, jn the 
same manner, appoint some one to serve the unexpired term, a.nd until the 
appoinment and qun.Hfication of bis successor. Each member of said board 
shall, before entering upon his duties, take the constjtutional oath of office. 
Amid '01, p. 68. 
Autborlty ror crea.tlon oC botlt'tl, con. nrt. 10, Dulles or bonru lmposctl on ln<.lustrln.1 com-
sr.c. !?. mission, sub, !I § · 30i0. 
3635. (1325.) Secretary. The board shall select from its members n 
secretary and shall establish suitable nt1es of procedure. Atn'd '01, p. 68. 
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3636. (1326.) Daty of board when strike or lockout is threatened. 
Whenever it shall come to the know1cdgc of the said board that a strike1 or 
lockout is seriously threatened in the state, involving any employer and his e_m-
ployes, if he is employing hot less than ten pci•sons, it shall be the duty of 
the said board to put itsc]f into communication as soon ns may be with such 
employer and employ cs, nnd cndca vor by mediation to effect ·an a:n,icable 
· settlement. Said ban.rd shall also request each of the parties to forward to 
its secretary an application for arbitration. R. S. '98, § 1333; '01, p. 68. 
Burc:iu or lmmlsrntlon, lll.bor, n.ncl sl:illsllcs, Duties or lh{s cl10ptcr hnposc,l on the Jn-§1 ao::-t-303-1. dustl'lnl commission. sub. !l, § 3076. 
Ln.uorers mny organize, §§ 3G51-3G5S. 
3637. (1327.) Duty of board after application to arbitrate received. 
As soon as practicable after receiving such applications, the board shall re-
quest each of the parties to the dispute to agree upon a written statement 
of facts relating to the controversy, and to submit the same to the board; 
providrd, that, when such agreement and statc·mcnt cannot be reached, each 
of sn.icl parties may separately submit to the hoard a writtc11 stn.temc11t of 
grievances. Applications to the said board for arbitration on the part 
of employers must precede any lockout, and, on the part of the employcs, 
any strike; proi.-'idcd, that, in case lockout or strike already exists, the board 
shall accord arbitration if the parties shall resume their refations with each 
other, as employers and cmploycs. Said applications shall include a promise 
to abide by the decision o[ the board and shall be signed by the employer 
or employers, or his or their authorized agent, on the one side, and by a 
mnjority of his or. their cmploycs on the other. '01, p. 69. 
3638. (1328.) Bo~d to arbitrate. .May employ stenographer. As soon 
as 1:>racticable after teceiving said applications, the board shaH proceed to 
arbitrtLte. When it shall be necessary, in the judgment of said board, it may 
engage the services of a stenographer to take and transcribe an account 
of any arbitration proceedings. '01, p. 69. 
3639. (1329.) May subpa!na witnesses. General powers. The board 
~hatl have power to summon as witnesses by subpccna any operative or ex-
pert in departments of business affected, and nny person who keeps the 
record of wages catned in those departments, or any other person, and to 
adminrstcr oaths, and to examine said witnesses, and to require the -produc-
tion of books, papers, and records. In case of disobedience to a sttbpccna 
the board may invoke the aid of any court in the state in requiring the at-
tendnnce and testimony of witnesses, and the production of books, papers, 
and documents under the provisions of this section. Any of the district 
courts of the state, within the juris<lictio11 of which such inquiry is carried 
on, may, in case of contltmncy, or refusal to obey a subpccna issued to any 
such witness, issue an prdcr requiring such witness to appear before said 
board a.nd produce books and papers if so ordered, and give evidence touch-
ing the matter in question. Any refusal to obey such order of the court may 
be punished by such court as a contempt thereof. R. S. '98, § 1330; '01, p. 69. 
3640. (1330.) Mayors and sheriffs to notify board of threatened strikes 
or lockouts. It shall be the duty of mayors of cities and sheriffs of cou_nties, 
when any condition likely to lead to a strike or lockout exists in the cities .or 
districts where they have jurisdiction, to immediately forward information o[ 
the same to the secretary of the state board of conciliation and arbitration. 
Sttch information shall include the names and addresses of persons who should 
be communicated with by the board. '01, p. 69. 
3641. (1331.) Sheriff to serve process. Any notice or process issued 
by the state board of labor, conciliation, and arbitration shall be served by 
~riy sheriff to whom the same mny be directed, or in whose lmicls the same 
may be placed for servicc1 without charge. R. S. 198, § 1335; '01, p. 69. 
3642. (1332.) Decision of board. As soon as practicable after the board 
has investigated the differences existing between employer and employes, it 
shall make an equitable decision, which shall state what, if anything. should 
00747 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
780 LABOR-BETTERING CONDITIONS OF. 
be done by either or both parties to the dispute, in order to amicably settle and 
adjust the differences e.~isting between them. The findings of a majority of 
the board shall constitute its decision. R. S. '981 § 1331; '01, p. 70. 
3643. ' (1333.) Decision to be recorded and made public. This decision 
shall at once be made public; shall be recorded upon the propc1· book of record 
to be kept by the secretary of said board, und a short statement thereof pub-
lished in an annual report to be made to the governor before the 1st day of 
March, of each year. R. S. '98, § 1327; '01, p. iO, 
3644. (1334.) Compensation of members. The members of the boa.rd 
shall each receive a compensation of $4 for each day's service while engaged in 
arbitration, said compensation to be paid by the parties to the controversy in 
such proportion as the board may decide; they shall also r!!ccive the actual 
and necessary expenses incurred in the performance o( their official duties, 
which expenses shall be paid out of the state treasury. 
R S. '98, § 1334; '01, p. 70. 
CHAPTER 2. 
BETTERING CONDITIONS OF LABOR. 
('17, p. 210.) 
3651. Labor unions not unlawful. It shall not be unlawful for working 
men and women to organize themselves into, or tat·ry on, labor unions for the 
purpose of lessening the hours of labor, increasing the wages, bettering the 
conditions of the members of such organization; or carrying out their legiti-
mate purposes as freely as they could do if acting singly. 
Unlawful to coerce one to join or sur,1,ot·t or- Penalty ror soUdUns 01· rcccl\ltns- moncl· 
ganl7.atlon, ~, 8329, S330. Crom cmplorcs, § 83.2G. 
3652. Injunctions in labor disputes prohibited. No restraining order or 
injunction slrnlt be granted by any court of the state of Utah, or a judge or 
the judges thereof, in nny case between nu employer and employcs, or be-
tween employers and employes, or between employers, or between vcrsons 
emplo.yed and per.sons seeking employment, involving, or growing cmt of, 
a dispute concerning terms or conclitions of employment, unless necessary to 
prevent irreparable injury to property, or to n property right of the party 
making the application, for which injury there is 110 adequate remedy at law, 
and such property or property rights must be described with particularity in 
the application, which must be in writing and sworn to by the applicant, or by 
his agent or attorney. 
3653. Right to cease labor secured. Right to assemble. And no such 
restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person or persons, whether 
singly or in concert, from terminating any relation of employment, or from 
ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from recommending, advising, or 
persuading others by peaceful means so to do; or from attending at nny place 
where such person or persons may lawfully be, _for the purpose of pcacc[ully 
obtaining or communicating information, or from peacefully pcrsuadfpg any 
person to work or to abstain fro in working; or from ceasing to patronize or 
to employ any party to such dispute, or from recommending, advising, or per-
suading others by peaceful means and lawful means so to do; or from paying 
or givjng to or withholding from any person cngnged in such dispute nnv· 
strike benefits or other moneys or things of value; or from peaceably as-
sembling in a lawful manner, and for lawfol purposes; or from doing any act 
or thing which might lawfully be clone in the nbsencc of such dispute b,r any 
pa.rtv thereto; nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be consid .. 
crel or held to be violations or the law of the state of Utah. 
3654. Contempts. Orders to show cause. Procedure. Bail. Whenever 
it shaJl be made to aJ~pear to any district court or ju?ge thereof, or to any 
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judge therein sitting, by the return· of a proper officer on lawful process, or 
upon the affidavit of some crcclitable person, or by in formation filed by any 
district attorney, that there is reasonable ground to believe that any person 
has been ·guilty of su<!h contempt, the court or judge thereof, or any judge 
thcrdn sitting, may issue .a rule requiring the said person so charged. to show 
cadsc upon n day certain why he should not he punished therefor, ,\'vhich ·ru1e, 
together with a copy a£ the affidavit or in formation, sha~I be served upoit 
the J>crson charged, with sufficient promptness to enable him to prepare for 
and make return to the ordci- at the time fix.:?d therein. If 111>011 or by such 
return, in the judgment of the court, the alleged contempt be not sufficiently 
purged, a trial shall be directed nt a time and place fixed by the court; pro-, 
,•iclcd. howc'i·cr. that if the nccusccl, being a natural person, fail or refuse to 
make return to the rule to show cause, an attachment may issue against his 
person to compel an answer, ancl in case of his continued failure or refusal, 
or if for any reason it be impracticable to dispose of the matter on the :return 
day, he ma.y be required to give reasonable bail for his attendance atthc trial 
and his submission to the final judgment of the court. Where the accused is 
n body corporate, an attachment for the scclucstrntion of its ·property ihtty be 
issued upon like refus'1.l or failure to answer. 
3655. Trial by jury. In all cases within the purview of this chapter, such 
trial may be by the court, or, upon clcmancl of the accust:cl, by n jury; in which 
latter event the court may impanel a jury from the jurors then in attendance, 
or the court or the judge thereof in chambers may cause a sufficient 1imnher 
CJf jurors to be selected and summoned, as provided by law, to attend at the 
time and place of tria11 at which timr. a jury shall be selected and impaneled 
as upou n trial for misdemeanor i and such trial shall conform, as near as may 
be, to the practice in criminal cases prosecuted by indictment or upon informa-
tion. 
3656. Judgment. Payments. Limitations. 1f the accused be found 
guilty, judgment shall be entered accordingly, prescribing the punishment, 
either by fine or imprisonment, or both, in the discretion of the court. Such 
line shall be paid to the state of Utah, or to the complai11ant1 or other pnrty 
injured hy the net constituting the contcmpt1 or may, where more than one is 
so damaged, be divided or apportioned among them as the 1.:ourt may direct, 
lnit in no case shall the fine to be paid to the sta~c of Utah exceed, in case 
the accused is a natuntlpcrson, the sum of $1000, nor shall such iniprisonmcnt 
exceed the term of six months; prodded., that in any cnsc the court or a judge 
thereof may, for good cause shown, by affidavit, 01· proof taken in open court 
or before such judge and filed with the papers in the case, dispense with the 
rule to show cause, nnd may issue nn attachment for the arrest of the person 
charged with contempt i in which event such person, when arrested; shall be 
brought before such court or a judge thereof without unnecessary delay, and 
shall be admitted to bail in reasonable penalty for his appearance to answer 
to the charge or for trial for the contempt; mid thcrca rtcr the proceedings 
shall be the same as provided herein in case the rule had issued in the first 
instance. 
3657. Anti-trust laws not applicable to labor organi'lations. The lnbor 
of a human being is not a commodity or article. oi conuncrce. Nothing con-
tained in the anti-trust Jaws shall be construed to f orbicl the existence and 
op_cration of labor1 ngrkulturaJ, or horticultural organizntions, instituted for 
the purpose of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for 
profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations f ram 
lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organiza-
tions, or the members thereof, he held or <:onstrucd to he illegal combinations 
or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the anti-trust laws. 
3658. Right of trial by jury-practice. _ li, nll cases where persons. arc 
charged with contempt ·of court for the ,,iolation or writs of injunction. issued 
within the pun•icw of this chapter, unless ~uch contempt be committed in the 
immediate presence of the court, the accused shnll have the right to a jttty trial 
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upon demand, and, in case a jury trial be demanded, such jury shall be se-
lected and impaneled as in criminal cases, and the trial shall conform as nearly 
as may be to the district court practice in criminal cases. 
CHAPTER 3. 
EIGHT-HOUR LAW. 
3666. (1336.) On public works. Eight hours shall constitute a day's 
work in all penal institutions in this state, whether state, county, or municipal. 
ailcl on all works and undertnkings carried on or aided by the state, co1mty, or 
municipal governments. Any officer of the state or of any county or mu-
nicipal government, or any person, corporation, firm, contractor, agent, mnn-
ngcr, or foreman, who shall require or contract with any person to work in 
any penal institution or upon st1ch works or undertakit1gs longer than eight 
honrs in 011e calendar day, except in cases of emergency, where life or prop-
erty is in imminent danger, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. · 
Am'd '01, p. 37 i '03, p. 85. 
3667. (1337.) In mines and smelters. The period of employment of 
working men in an underground mines or workings, and in smelters and all 
other institutions for the reduction or refining of ores or metals, shall be eight 
hours per day, except in cases of emergency, where life or property is in im-
minent danger. Any person, body corporate, agent, manager, or employer 
who shall ,·iolatc any of the provisions of this section shall be deemed guiltv 
o{ a misdmcanor. · 
Autho1•f7.ed Lly Con. ni·t. 16, sec. 6, 
Llmlllnc hom-s or employment or remnlcs, 
§ 3Gi'l. 
This lnw held to be constltutlonal. 
Sta.le v. Hotucn. H U. ns: 46 P, 1105. 
Ex J>a.rta Hoh.lan, 1-1 U. 71; 4G P. 7iiG; nlllrmell 
lG!I U. S. 3GG. 
'rhe pro,·lslons or this s!!<:tlon nnu clmp. 'i!l, 
p. !ll!I, ru.w!i 18!16, npply with equnl force to 
cmplo)·er and cmploye, n.nd a. person who works 
for nnotber In a. mill or reduction works more 
ll11tn clsht hours per duy cn.nnot recover on :t. 
qunntum meruit for his scr\'lces during the 
overUine. 
Short v. DutJJon n. & C. :\£. Co., 20 u. 20: 
li1 I?. 720. 
CHAPTER 4. 
EMPLOYMENT OF FEi\·IALES AND CHILDREN. 
3668. (1338.) In mines and smelters forbidden. It shall be unJawfu] for 
any person, firm, or corporation to employ any child under fourteen years of 
age, or any female, to work in any mine or smelter in the state of Utah. Any 
person, firm, or corporation who sha.11 violate any of the provisions of this 
section sh~U be dccmecl guilty of a misdemeanor. 
Authorl:7.el1 t,1• Con. nrt. lG, sec. 3. 
3669. (1339.) Proprietor to provide seats for female help. The proprie-
tor, manager, or person having charge of any store, shop, hotel, restat1rant, or 
other place where wori1cn or girls arc employed as clerks or help therein, shal1 
provide chairs, stools, or other contrivances. where such clerks or help may 
rest when not employed in the discharge of their respective duties. Any per-
son who shall Yiolatc any of the provisions of this section shall be guilty of n 
misdemeanor. 
:Ml~llllJl( WAGE SC.ALl!: FOR l!"Ei\IALES. 
('13: p. 9.J..) 
3671. Unlawful to pay less than scale. It shall be unlawful for any reg-
ular employer of female workers in the state of Utah to pay any woman less 
than the wage in this section spccilicd, to wit: l1or minors, under the age of 
eighteen years, not less than iS _cents per day; for ndult ]earners and appren-
tices, not Jess than 90 cents per day; pro,:itlc,,C that the learning period of 
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apprenticeship shall not extend for more than one year; for adults who arc 
experienced in the work they arc employed to perform1 not less than $1.25 
per day. 
3672. Certificate of apprenticeship. All regular employers of female 
workers shall give a certificate of apprenticeship £or time served to aU ap-
prentices. 
3673. Penalty. Any regular employer of fomalc workers who shall pay 
to any woman less than the wage specified in § 3671 shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor. 
3674. Commissioner of immigration, labor, and statistics to enforce chap-
ter. The commissioner of immigration, labor, and statistics shall have gen-
eral charge of the enforcement of this chapter, but violations of the same shall 
be prosecuted by all the city, state1 and county prosecuting officers in the same 
manner as in other cases of misdemeanor, . 
Duties or commlsslonc1· or lmml~rritlon, lnbot·, 
nnu stntlstlcs hnposo,1 on tn,1t1strlnl comm.Js-
tilon, § 307G. 
I~~IPLOYMENT OF 1.-E:UALES. 
('11, p. 265.) 
3677. Limiting hours of employment. Exceptions. No female shall be 
employed in any manufacturing, mechanical, or mercantile ~stnblishmcnt, 
laundry, hotel, or restaurant, or telegraph or telephone estabhshmcnt, hos-
pital or office, or by a.ny express or transportation company in this state, more 
than nine hours during any one day, or more than fifty-four hours in any one 
wcck1 except in cases o[ emergency in hospitals and in cases of emergency or 
where li[e or property is in imminent danger or where materials arc liable to 
spoil by the en forccment of this section. 
3678. Penalty. Any person or persons, corporation1 or other associa-
tion engaged in conducting or operating a.ny of the business institutions oL· 
enterprises set forth in the foregoing section, requiring or employing any fe-
male to work longer than the period of nine hours constituting a day1s labor. 
except a5 above prnvidedt or more than fifty-four hours in any one week, shall 
l>c guilty of n misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof shall be fined not 
less than $25 nor more than $100, and costs of prosccL1tion. 
D\ll)' or conuuhislonl!r or hnmll,;ratlon, lnbor, slonc1• or hrm1isrntlo11, Jnbor nnd sltLtlslll's, 
allll !:tl:tllsllcs, to curo1·cc, § :lO!!'i. sub. !l, § :l07G. 
'£he lndustrlnl commission Is lhc commls-
CHAPTER 5. 
BLACKLISTING. 
3680. (1340.) Forbidden. No co~np.tny, corporntion, nor individual 
shall blacklist> or publish, or cause to be published or blacklisted, any employc, 
mechanic, or laborer, discharged or voluntarily leaving the service of snch 
company, corporation, or individual, with intent and for the purpose of pre-
venting such emplc_>ye, mechanic, or laborer from engaging in or scci1ring sim-
ilar or other employment from any other corporation, company, or indjviclual. 
Exchn.n,;Cl o! hhtcltllsts !orbldtlen, Con. n.rt. 12, sec. W: nrt. 16, sec. 4, 
3681. (1341.) Penalty. If any person or nny officer or agent of uny 
company, corporation, or individual shall blacklist1 or publish, or cause to be 
published, nny cmployc, mechanic, or laborer, discharged by such corpora-
tion, compnny1 or individual, with the intent nnd for the purpose of prevent-
ing such cmployc, mechanic, or laborer from engaging in or securing similnr 
or other employment from any other corporation, company, or individual, or 
shall in any manner conspire or contrive, by correspondence, or otherwise, to 
prevent such discharged employe from securing timploymcnt, he shall be 
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deemed guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, shall be fined not less than 
$500, nor more th~n $1,000, and be imprisoned in the state prison not less th:rn 
sixty days nor more than one year. 
CHAPTER 6. 
FELLOW SERVANTS. 
3682. (1342.) Who arc vice-principals. All persons engaged· in the 
service of any pc1·son, firm, or corporation, foreign or domestic, doing busi-
ness in this state, who arc intrustcd by such person, firm, or corporation as 
employer with the authority of supcrinkndencc, control, or command or other 
persons in the employ or service or such employer, or with the authority to 
direct any other cmployc in the pcrf ormancc or any duties of such cmployc, 
arc \'ice-principals of 5uch employer nnd arc not fellow servants. 
,vlio nrc follm\• Ncrwrnts, l !lti8!l, n111I 11ulc. A mucker cttllcll lo nsslst In rcmo,•lng rcr• 
N1·J.{l1~1•u1·c ,·n:ioN 1ml bcutlui; 111111n un~- 111·11- lalnUml1e1~ from cnrn h>,· num:is of thtl hulsl-
,·ll{lon or llm i.tatul~s um uut hwhulcd In I.hi~ 1111,: onJ;'fue with the m1,;-lnl!cl'. 
,·olumo. Votn. \·. Ohio Co111,cr Co., •12 u. J!!!l; r:.!!l P. 
NOT FELLOW SERY' ANTS: :l,l!t, Employcs working under a superlntcndcl'lt 
wllh n In rcJ)illrln~ the rlr:ht-of-\\·1L,-· of tl mllro:ul, T.he conductor of a mUwny trnlu 
hmkr.nmn upuu lhc tho trnln. 
Openshaw \'. U. & N. R}·. Co,. Ii U, 13:?. 
A brakem.:in wJLh a ~nr ln:-1w1•tor. 
Dnlllt'l:i \'. U. P. Rr. Co •• Ii u. :t5i; 2:1 P. 71i:!. 
An engineer \\ilh it hrakNn:lll. 
131'UWll \·. Hnu. Pnr. n,-·. Co., 7 u. :!SS: :!G P. 
rm•. 
A switchman i;l~nnllng to nn cn~lnc \\'llh lhc 
while being c:u-rtc,l hr n lmtn ln their work 
wJlh Lhc lr,tln crew. 
J:u:·hctl1L "· S:111 Pc1lro t!tc. n. n. Co., 36 l!. 
·li0; l0a P. 100. 
Where two sections of a tr.trn are operated 
as two distinct .u1d Independent trains, th" 
mcmhc1-:s of tho ,~1·cw or onr. scdlon with the 
mcmbcmi of l he ,·row of lhu olhar Sl't:Uon. 
uwn r~1mlrln,: the c::1r. 
Pool , .• Sou. Puc. Co., 'i U. !103; 
case, lliO U, ~. :.t:tS. 
~{eyers , •• S;tn Pc,lro etc. n. R, Co., :JO u. 
:;ec .!tl\lllC !107; 10.f P. 736. 
A mnn working on the rnltroad tr:ic:ks with 
A car rc:p:1lrer wHh nn engineer. 
Wubh \'. l'L G. W. R)·. Co., 7 U. :lll:I: !!G P. 
, 981. 
Neither .a section foreman nor those working 
umlor him, uor ll. lolcgt-:lJlh 0111milor, with nn 
•m1:lnccr. 
Nrcslc:y , •. Sou. Pac. ~·. Co., 3;; U. !?lill: 99 
P. lOGi. I 
A ~iirdman with the foremun or hlH own 
t•rc,,· nor wltll the forcnmu of nnt'lthrr c?rcw 
worlcln~ In lhc smnc l't\l'tl nt th(? smna lime. 
Arm:.Lroni: \'. 0. S. L. ny. Co •• S U. •120: :1!? 
P. G!l:1. 
A rnllro;id foreman h:n-tn~ run clmr~c of 
toa<lhlJt l'SU1' Inn grm·el pit with :-iuch lnllorc~. 
Antlct,;on , •• OJ:clcm R~• ttlltl Dc1>ot Co .. S U. 
1:?S; :10 l,. :JO;i, 
A l;iborer In car' shops uml f()l't'lntln c,f 
swlldunen In lrnln clc1mrtmcnt. 
Pool , •• 8. P. en., :!0 u. 210; liS P. :J!!G. 
Plaintiff held to be a volunteer, not u St1l'\'-
aniiMcchmi1 , •• East 'l'lntlc R)•, Co., 2:r U. •l!?; 
G·l P. -lfi:I. 
Tne foreman of .i mine h,·wlnb cnllrc rh:1r1,~ 
or the t1t,,lar~1·011nll worlclugs with 11 miner 
working umlcr his lllrc.•dlon. 
Cunnlni;lmlll ,._ U. P. R>·· Co., .\ U. :.?Oti: 'i 
P. 7!1ii. 
'trlhnr ,.. nrooldyn i\llnln,; Co .• -I U. 4!iS; 
11 P. GJ2. . 
A superintendent of il mine with n c:ommcm 
Jnbnrcr. 
Rcfl(lon ,._ U. P, Ry. Co., ii U •. 34,J; Hi P. 
202. 
A miner wilh one Cnt(lloyccl ni; a tool•t~nrr(er, 
who!ic onh· dul)' It bi to tnke Hhnrpcnect tooli; 
Into the mine uncl thro\\" them off nt ,•,u•Jous 
lc,·ch; niul h1·ln~ up the dull ones. 
JcnklnM v. ;unmmolh .\1. Co., :?~ U. i,J:J; GS 
r. sm. 
A miner with on~ whrnic dul)• It I~ lo m11n-
n1;c mill ·opcrntc n <':t.i:c >w whh-h Ute rulncn; 
UJ"t! cum-crcu In unrl 1.mt or the min<': 
Id. 
Acting forem.in on telegr.1ph llne wll h tt lluc-
mnn. 
Ji'rlt7. \', \V<'Htam Union T. Cn,, 2:i U, ~Ii:':: 
71 P. :!0!I, • 
Two miners working on df1Teri:nt levels. 
Shfehllf ,·. Sllvar mni:: Cnnllllon, r,o U. -: 
lGG P. !ISS. 
A fum.icemiln with gmter whom he dlrt:cu, 
Ulnh Con. :\J. Co, v. Paxton,' liiO F. lH. 
those 01,emtln,: Lhc lmlns, 
Grou \'. O. S. L. It. R. Co., ,17 U. !?Ii: 150 
P. !170. 
Where- a forem.:in of a mine, a.'! the a~cnt 
or tho "ompnn)', ~clorts un cm11lurc to tnlcc the 
place lcm11orn.ril~• of :inothcr ~m11lo:rl'! who Is 
excm;crl frotit worlr, nnrl the 11crsi:Jn ao se)ec:tccl 
l,i subject to tha illrcc-llon und control of lhc 
c-011111,mr. \\-Idell mar tllsduu•ge J1tm nt nil)' 
llmc, the rclnUonRl1IJ1 hclwccn him nnd tho 
cmnpany IH lhnt o( mnslcr ancl scrrnnl. 
Wilson v. Slou:. Con. ~[. Co., lfi U. :m2; :i:? 
P. G~G •. 
VICE PRINCIPALS: 
Whatever w.is done by the foreman In the 
mine tn lct\\'lni;- the hole In lhc plntrorm wus 
t•luu·g~tLhlc lo tho ,~cm11mm·. 
lJO\\"ncy , •• Gemini 1\I. Co., 2-1 U. ~JI; liS P. 
-11-1. 
Where, In an nctlon for Injuries, the mwon-
tJ'tltllcLccl c\•hlcrwc ohowctl lhut n. wu~ <lcfon-
rlnnt 's rorcnmn. It wns uot ·error- tor tha t·ourt 
lo 11.SSttn1c llmt he wns n \'h:c-nrfnt"frml. 
nlnck v, norJcy lrt. Dell Tel. Co., !?G U. 4/i I; 
i3 P. 51-1. 
Persons eno.ioed In the service or the mas• 
ter, who are lntrusted by hlrn with th~ man-
Hh"l'mcnt or ,1Jrcl'llOn of his gcncrnt w<irlt, or 
wJlll some purllL•ulnl' p1Lrl lhcrcof, .,trc nnt rcl-
lo,\· scr,·n.nls. with the subordlni1tc cm1lloyc:1. 
hut vtcc-prlnclpn.ls. 
,Johnson \', U. P. Cont Co., !?S U. ·IG: iG P. 
1 osn. 
In the nbsence or a statute In Nevada daUn-
lng fcllo\~· sct'\'nnts, tho test lo b~ RJlfJll01l I~ 
whether cho ncgll,;ont net which cnusNl U1c Jn-
Juri• wns n brcneli or n. posllh'c duty c.w!n,; hy 
lhc mnstcr to hi~ ticn·nnt, ln which c•1H1a thc-
JlCl'!',>n performing lltc ncl ht n \'ll"C•Jlrlndpnl, 
:iml .not ti. (CIIO\\· ::ICT\":ln l. 
Morrh,on ~. Sl\n Pc,lro R. Co., ~ U. 85; SS 
P. ll!IS. 
Mcrrlll "· o. s. L, lt n. Co •• !!!l u. 26·1: 
81 P. 85. 
Pool v •. S. P, Co., 20 U. 210; GS P. :l!!G. 
Where the f.icts .ire undisputed, whether co~ 
Cf11Jllorcs nrc fcJIO\\'•SCl"\'Janls IR :t. CJUClHlou. or 
!IL\\' for the l'Ourt: hut fl fnC'ts ure dlsrmtc,l, 
th.c t~oul·t sltoul,1 l'onslruc the stntult?s, niut 
lcn.vc the riucsllon to the Jun·. 
Shephcl'd' v, O. & R. G. R. R. Co •• 41 U. 
·I Gil: l:?11 I'. G!J!?, 
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ln an action for wrongful death of n servant 
of a. rallroad company lt11lcd in :i. foreign st:,tc, 
It will ho tfr:!sttnuHl, In the allM1,n1t•e ur m•lden<-'c 
thereon~ LJ111l Jn,vs shulhu· lo the nhn\'C 1mc:llori 
;mtl § 6505 wcrn. In forc:t, nl tho r1lm:c of the 
nc,•htcnt, flntl Lh:i.l umJ~t· 8lWh bt\\'li L.lm (!Ill• 
plnycs h1 charge or the r.nllruad u-aln wcreo nol 
fallow s01-vnnt." nf tt1wk hLhorl!~. 
Grow , •• 0, 8. L. JL lL co., -!-I U. IGO; 
138 P. !HIS. 
A. ch:iroe In the f.tnguage ~f the st.Jtute :1~ 
tn \\'hill (!(H\~tllULt!li \'lco-1>rh1cl11nh1 tlllll fello\\' 
ser\':tnls ,vn~ c1·roJ', bul tl!i the c\'hleurc ~howt!tl 
llmL lhc pl:Lhtllff 1tncl lh(' 1m1·son l~llllilng the 
lnjur1• · were not fclluw sc1·\·anti;, IL wmi not 
prcjmll cln I. 
Dfmmlclc v. Ut11b Fuel Co., 40 U. 430; 164 p. 
8i2. 
An engineer who operntes .a mine hoist cnrry-
ing mlni1rs lo •.mcl from the lower lcvol ls Lo 
them n vlco-p1·l1wi1lul. 
l•"m•non ,.. SU\"cr King Conllllon lf. Co., 50 
U. -: lli7 P. Gili. 
One hnvlng the oenernl control and euper'." 
vision of r.illro.i.tl repnlr \\'Ork u.nd gh•ln,: ccn-
cm1 cllrc1:Uons rC."lJJC1!Un1: the mo\·cmcnt.B or 
work frahis ls n \·kc-1>rJncl1>1LJ or lllc htbot·c1·s 
1.m1111oyc1l to tlo rt?J'llllr work. 
.Jc1'.ht:lltl , •• Snn Pedro, etc., n. R. Co., 3ti 
U. •17U; tOi, P. 100. 
3683. (1343.) Who are fellow servants. All persons who nrc engaged 
i11 the scn•icc of such employer. and who, while so engaged, arc hi the same 
grade of service and arc working together at the ~tune time and place ai1d to 
a common purpose, neither of !-inch pcr:;e>ns being intrustcd by such employer" 
with any superintendence or control over his fellow cmploycs. are fellow 
scrvnnts with each c,thcr; pror·idcd, that nothing herein contained shall be so 
construed as to make the cmplnycs of such employer fellow servants with 
other cmplnycs engaged in any othci- <lcpnrtment of service of such employer. 
Employcs who do not come within the provisions of this section sh~tll not be 
con!-';idcred f cl1ow sc1~v:ti1ts. 
Whn arc nc.it (clhm• i;cr,·unl~. ~ ~r;s~. and 
noLe. · 
l)(~tcnsc or fc~Unw ~M,'nnl nU11wc(I. whnn e111-
11lo>·cr l'lll'l'.IC~ lmm1·:11wll, ~ !U:!_i: m11I. d(.'lllr:1I 
whi:iu «ll!ll1loyl'l' clocM nnl 1·a1·ry ln~uram·e. ·§ 
:11:!!f. . 
WHO ARE FELLOW SERV_ANTS: 
The nbove definltlon of the te·rm ''fellow serv-
ants" t:; on~ llmt lbc lci;lslallll'C tmd nulhnrlll' 
tu urnlcc, · · 
Dt·yhm·,.; , •• lh.:J'CUl' lt. Co., 18 u. ·110: i'iii P. 
:IG7. 
In _an actfon ror Injuries recel."ed prfor to· fel• 
low serv.ant law of 1896, lhc 1·ch1llun or pliitn;. 
tin• ;tnd the· C!Jl~lnuct Wllll tn l1c 1lclcl'JlJln1!tl ht 
,~ommon t:1 w ruto. :tnd, under l t, they were (clluw ·~cr\·nnts. 
Sloll v. l)al.\.• l{. Co., 1!1 u. :m; ii7 r. !!!Hi. 
A tr:icl< wnlker of r.tllronrl cc,rmiun:r. 1mclrr 
c:onunun htw, IH fellow :.cr,·;ml wllh nn C'llgl-
nccr. 
~t~ph:tnl "· S. P. Co •• HI U. l!lti; 57 P. ~M. 
The common lnw rule that n tr.tin t·n111hw• 
lor iH nol u fcUo\\' scit\·unl with hht nuhorrH-
tmlc;; c:umol be clmni;ml hy u r<>gulnllon or 
tho COUlll•lUY, 
ltl, 
The shift bosses were, .JS to one another, .fol-
low· :iC!1·vnnlf1, uncl rlcfcmliml wa~ not lhthl~ ror 
their Ntrclc!iimes.", unl~s the r•:1r~lc:tsn~~s · w:is 
brou~lll lo the ntt('nllo!l or lhc dcfcmliu1f, \\·Im 
nc~llgC!ntly fnllctl lo c:omnumlt·utc lhc dan1;cl' 
to the plnlnllrr. • 
.An,lcrson v. D:tly M. Co .. 16 u~ :!S; fiO P. 81:i. 
rn Idaho the fnrrmnn wns 11 follow 1-ervunl or 
pla1ntlrr, who \\':lN zL mcm.hm· of n ff'tH'C g:uaJ;", 
nncl hence plaintiff coultl not rcc:o\'C!r fo1• his 
nusllJ.:"l'JH'C Ill J>crmlLllllg lhc _r,ui:r (•lll' Co lie rmt 
111 ,·lolntlou or Lite rules. 
~nt·tln v. 0, S. L, IL n. Co •• 2i U. Hi; iG 
P-. !WI. 
ln_structloi1 definlno fellow servllnts ht.•ld :mJ-
·ffolcnt. . . 
nrm~ggcl· v, o. s. L. u. n. Cu., 2-1 tt. :rn1; 
118 P. 1-10 
In Nevi!da, whose sl1Lluics tin nol tlcfb1c \\•ho 
:u-o fellow SP.!"\'lmts. n foreman l::1 n fellow scr\'-
u nt with one of bridge? crew. 
Owcn.!t "· Sun Pedro Co., 31 U. !!OS: 89 P. 
S!?ii; 
lJcclslons on. lhc lest lo Ile n1>11llcll In No• 
,·:ula, note IQ § lGS:!, 
Where an Injury Is the result of two con-
t:urrlng ("1Luse~ •. nnd. the mm1tcr (s rcspnnslhle 
for or c1:mttlhulc1l to ona or U1em, he_ Jff not" 
<'XCin1H. fmm llublllly hecu.uso 11 fcllo\\· acn·nnt 
W'I\O IM rCMl)Unslblc ror Lhlt olhcl' t.•nusc ttillY 
· h1wc n.lso bC<!n cultmhlc, The se1·,·unl iu,sutncs 
the d::ik nml nc-gUccncc ot n rcllow scrv:rnt. 
but nol llui.l or lh1! master, 
.Jankins , •.. Mnmmolh l\1; Co., :?-I U. l'il3; GS 
1:,. s-m. 
Hnndlcy v. D:tly M. Co., 1fi u. m;: -rn p. 
!?!Hi. 
Pool ,,. S. P. Co.,.20 U. 210; ii8 P. 32G. 
The -employer Is llable for an Injury to an 
employe rrom the concurrent ncglli;cncc or the 
mnslet· nnd Jcllnw scr,•anls. 
Hkl.:i. , •• S. P. Co., 21 tr. 6.'!G: 7G P. 625. 
lfC!rrlll 1·. 0. S. I.. R, R. Co., 2!1 U. !!6-1; 81 
P. 85. 
Wrlghl ,._ Sou. Puc. Co,, 15 U. •121; ·IG P. a~. . . 
A laborer eng.iged In the .ccnstru~tton of a 
re.id bed and a brakeman on 11 constntctlon 
trnln hnuUng grnvcl for tho rontl bed nrc fel-
low scr\'nnts. 
Lultfc v. So. Pat·. Co., 160 F. t:m. 
CHAPTER 7. 
WAGES 1\ PREFERRED DEBT. 
3684. (1344.)· When business is suspended. \,\!hen any property of any 
company, corporation, firm. or person sliall be seized upon by any prnccss of 
any court, or when their business shnl1 be suspended by the act of creditors, 
or be put into the hnnc1s of a rccch•cl', assignee, or. trustee, either by voluntary 
or involtmfary action, the wages, not to cxccccl $400 to each claimant, owing 
to work111cn, clerks, fra.vcling or city salcsmci1, or servants for work or labor 
performed within rive months next preceding the seizure or transfer of such 
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property o'r mcrchni1disc, shall be considered and treated as preferred deb~, 
and such ·workmen, clcr~{SJ tmve1iug or city salesmen, or servants shall be 
preferred t,·cditors and shall first be paid in f.ull; nnd if there be not sufficient 
to pay them in full, then the same slmll be pnid to them 11ro 1·nta, nftcr paying 
costs; provi,frd! ho1c'c1:cr, that no 'lfficcr, director, or general manager of 
such a corporatfon nor any 111cmbcr _in such a$sociatio1i or partnership shall 
be cntit1cd to the preference herein provided. Am 1d tJJ, p. 26~ 
Lien or mecll1tnlcs, etc.. § :1722. docs nol ur:rccl. the rights nC. the cxl~Ung z;rnn-
Wnges prrrarrccl In nssJi;mrumts, § 296, tt?C~, mm·t1mgcs, or Ucnholclcm;. 
· . . - t ll . Snit L:,.lte Lltho, Co. v. lbcx l\J. flnd S. Co., 
'.l'hc ~lnbn.'i or the opcrn.llvcs or n strcc · rn - 1r, .U. •HO: 49 P. 7GS; 
r~nu t'or wor1t pcrCormcd sixty cl1\.l'S ne?Xt pre- Id,, tu u. 4-15; .f!I ·P. S:t:?, 
ccc1tus the nppolntmcnt or n. receiver nre f!n--. A court or equity. w·hen cnllctl upon to np-
uuoq to priority over a. trust. cu~cct on the com~ Jlolnt a receiver or mllt·na.tl p1·opcrty, with pow-
pnny s property, ~Ince such- worlc. ls tlonc for er to apcrntc ti1c ro:ul nml conduct Its lmsl-
thc l)encflt or the morti::io:ccs, ncss penlllns n. !Mcclmmre ittlt, mil)', tn the 
Lltzcnhcr,;-ct· v. Jarvi:l-Contclln Trust Co., S cxcrdsc or its juclklnl cllscretfon, ns n.. comll-
U. 15; 2S 1,. 811. . . . .. _ . . lion or fs$ulng tltc 01'tlcr,. dlrcct Ut8 rccclvct•, 
Ch:tp. 30, lnws or 1S!1:?, {lccl11.rln,; lhnt. tlchls out or money· ccunlr:ig to his hnmls Crom sneh 
<luo fol' scr,•J~cs 1,crformctl 'hl' lt1bore1·s within boslncss, to pny tho outstnn<lJJlg tlchls ror ln.-
sl~ 111ontl1~ hcfore tho sclz11r~ nC the clcbtnr's bor, suppUcs, equipments, .nr poi·rn:tncnt lm-
in·oporly on JJL'Oc.:crm. or the sm~ponslon or hlff provcmcnts of the> lnl'IL'lgrti;c<l prrmcrEy ns mny 
buslno~ by the nctlon of creditors, or hcC01·c under the clrcumstnnccs or the ortlcr be rc:t-
ltls prnr,crty .shnll be put Jn the hnnds 1:1! n re- sonu.blo 
c:•ch•cr or trustee, slmll 110 1ren.tcd ns prcfcrrc1l, Ccntrnl '.I'rust Co~ v. Utiib CcnL Rr. Co,, lG 
. . U, · 12i GO P. 813, . 
3685. (13'15.) Claim. Notice to persons interested. Any such cmployc, 
laborer, or scrvaut desiring to en force his dah11 for wages under this· <:haptcr 
shall present a statement. under oath. showing the amount clue .a.£tc1~ nltowing 
-all just credits nncl set-offs, the kind of \\'Ork for which such wages are clue, 
and when performed, to the officer, pcr~pn. or court charged with ~uch prop;. 
erty. within ten days after th~ seizure thereof on any writ of attachment, or 
within thirty days after the same may have been placed in the hands of any 
receiver, assignee,_ 01· trustee; nny person ,vith whoin any such ·ctaim shall 
have been filed shall give immediate notice thereof by mniJ to all persons in-
terested; and i_t_ sh~H he the duty ·of the person or the court receiving such 
statcmcnt_to pay the amount of such c1ahh or claims to the person or pci:-sons 
cntit1ccl thereto, after first paying a11 costs occasionc<l l>y the seizure of s1ich 
property. out of the proceeds of the sale of the pmpctty seized, if the cla1m 
be not contested as proyidcd h1 the next succeeding section. 
3686. (1346.} Contest of claim. Costs. A11y pcrso11 interested may 
conteSt ~uch cfaim or claims, or any p,trt thereof, by filing exceptions thereto, 
supported by affidavit, with the officer ha vitig the custody of sitch property, 
within ten clnys after the notice of pt-escntmcnt of said stateri1ent, and thcri· 
·upon the cfainrnnt shaU be required to reduce his dah11 to judgment before• 
some court luiving jurisdiction thereof, before ni1y part thereof shall be paid. 
and the party contesting shnll be made a party de(endant in any sttch action 
and slmll ha\re the right to contest such claim, and the prcvniling ·party shnl1 
recover proper costs. 
CHAPTER 8. 
ATTORNEYS' FEES IN SUITS FOR "WAGES. 
3687. (1347.) When allowed. Amount. Whenever a mechanic, arti-
san, miner, laborer, servant, or cmployc shnl] ha:vc cause to bring suit for 
,vnges earned and due according to the terms of his employment. nncl shall 
establish by the decision of the court or verdict of the jury that the amount 
for which he hns brought suit is justly due, nnd that a dcinnnd had been mndc 
in writing, at least fifteen days before stiit was hroughtJ for a sum not to e~-
cccd the amount so found due, then it shall be the duty of the court before 
which the case shall be tried to nllow to, the plaintiff a reasonable attorney's 
foe in addition to the amount found due £or wagest to be taxed as c·osts of 
:;nit. In a justice's court such attorney's fee shall not be more than $5, ~md in 
00754 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
LEGISLATURE-LIBEL. 787 
the district court not more than $10, except in cases on appeal from a. justice's 
court· to the distl'ict eourt, when he plaintiff mny rcco,•cr an attorney's foe, 
11ot exceeding $25 • 
.A ttorncrs' fees scnct:111)., § :HG. Sec. 3il'i0 '()rovltllns- !or nttorm:ws' fee t.o m:m 
.Attorneys' !ces ln foreclosure of llcn for In- chtfmnnt hcltl uncom,UluUonal 11rlor lo n.iucntl-
bor, clc. 1 § 3750; In. nclfun on bond for 1mhllc mcnl of 1811!1. 
work; § 3155; on tl.[)pcnl from in1lustrb1.I com- Hrub;l!ic1· v. Dennett, l!J U, •IOI: 67 P. lil\, 
mtsslon, § 3)48, 
· CHAPTER9. 
INTERFERENCE \:\.'ITH PERSONAL RIGHTS. 
3688. (1347x.) Unlawful to interfere with the rights of any individual. 
It shall be unlawful for any person, persons, association 0£ persons, combina-
tion of persons, or body o[ pcl"sons to interfere with the rights of any indivicl-
ual engaged in labor, to exercise his full privileges under the constitution of 
this state or of the United States, as to where he shall be employed, by whom 
he shall be employed nn<l at what compcnsntion he shalt be employed. Any 
one violating the provisi9ns of this section shalJ be guilty of a misdemeanor. 
107, p. 82. 
lUghts oi uic lntlMtluul. Con. m·t.. 1, sec. 
1-27. 
lnthn!tlnlln,; nn cmplo)"c n mlstlamcm1or1 § 
8-193. 
Unfawful coercion 1n·oh11Jltcll, ! sa::?:•. 
Workers mny orgnnlic, § !JG['iJ. 
TITLE 59. 
LEG IS LATU RE. 
('11, p. 2.) 
3690. Bills and documents to be engrossed or typewritten. AU bills and 
other documcnts·ordcrcd enrolled or engrossed by the legislature shalJ b~ de-
livered to the engrossing clerk o( the hous<! ordering the enrollment or en-
grossment, who shall, without delay, have them properly engrossed with pen 
and ink or typewritten with record ink on suitable paper in the order received 
by him. 
TITLE 60. 
LIBEL. 
3692. (1348.) Libel published in good faith. Retraction. Damages. If 
it shall appear 011 the tdnl of nny nction bronght for the publication oi any al-
leged libel in any newspaper published in this stah~, that the said alleged libel 
was published in good faith, that the publication thereof was due to mistake or 
misapprehension of the facts, and that a full and fair retraction of any state-
ment therein alleged to be crroncou~ was published in the next regular issnc 
of such newspaper, 01· in case of daily p:ipcrs, within th1~cc dnys after such mis-
take or misnpprchcnsbn wns brought to the notice of such publisher or pub--
lishers, at the head of the second column on the editorial page in the same 
type as was the article complained of as libelous, for three days, reference to 
such retraction to be made also on the local page of such pnpcr; prot•idcd, that 
i[ such libel was published in the Sunday edition of such newspaper. one of 
the publications of the rctrnction herein provided [or shall be in an edition of. 
such newspaper published on a Sunday; then the plaintiff in such cases shall 
recovci· only actual damages; prodded, that the provisions of this titl<! shall 
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of the United States of Mexico. In the event that such lands are Pa;me.nt to owners. 
RO deformincd to be lands subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States of Mexico nnd that · ns n result o:f such determination the 
owners or their nssjgnees lose their title thereto and the lease is can-
celed, the United Stnt~s shall p11y to the owners or their assi!!Ilees 
the fair Yaluc of the building at the completion of its construction 
(but not in excess of the actual cost of construr.tjon), less an amount Deducttt'>n. 
equal to one-third of 1 per centum of snch cost or value for enrh 
month that the lease wns in effect prior to such determinntio~ 
SEO. 2. There is authorized to lie appropriated such amounts as tii!fJ::i>riAtlon eu-
may be necessary to pay the installments of rent provided for in · 
such lease." 
.ApproYcd, July 3, 1935. 
l CHAPTER 372.) 
AN ACT 
1uly ~. 1935. 
To diminish the causes of labor disputes burdening or obstructing interstate and __ [S. 1~~- __ 
foreign commerce, to create ti. National Labor Relations Board, nnd for other l~o. J9S.1 
purposes. 
Be it e11acted by tlte Senate and House of Representatfres of tlie 
United States of Ame1-ica in Congress assembled, 
Fil.'."'Dil<lGS ..U.."1> POLICY 
SEC:ION 1. The denial by employers of tho right of employees to 111~=- Labot Re-
orgn.mze ond the reiusa.l by employers to accept the procedure of 1-·int:Ungsand pollc:r, 
collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial 
strife or unrest, which hnYe the intent or the necessary effect of 
burdening or obstructing commerce by (a) impairing the efficiency, 
safet,, or operation of tho instrumentalities of commerce; (b) occur-
ring m the current of commerce; ( c) materially affecting, restraining 
or controlling the flow of raw materials or manufactured or proccsse~ 
goods from or into the channels of commerce, or the prices of such 
materials or goods in commerce; or ( d) cau!)ing diminution of 
employment and wages in such yolume as substantially to impair or 
disrupt the market for goods flowing from or into the channels 
of commerce. 
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do 
not possess f':1-U freedom of a~oci~tion or actual liberty of cont.ract1 
and employers who aro organized m the corporat~ or other forms ot 
ownership nssocintion subsumtinlly burdens and a:ffects the flow 
oi commerce, rind tends to aggrn vote recurrent business depressions, 
by depressing wage rat~ and the purchasin~ power of wae;e earners 
in industry and by preventing the stabilization oi competitive wage 
rates and working conditions within and between industries. 
Experience has proved that prot~ction by law of tho right of 
employees to organize and bargain collectiYely snf eguards com-
merce from. injurv, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the 
flo,v of commerce .. by removing certain recognized sources of indus-
trial. stt-ife nnd unrest, by encouru&ing practices fundamental to the 
friendly adjustment pf industrial ctisputes arising out of differences 
as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring 
equality of bargaining power between employers nnd emplovees. 
It is hereby aeclnred to be the policy of the United States to 
eliminate the en.uses of certain substantial obstructions to the free 
flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions 
when they have occurred by encouraging the practke and procedure 
of collecth·c bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers 
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of full :freedpm of association, self-organization,. and designation of 
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating 
the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or 
protection .. 
DEFINITIONS 
SEc. 2. When used in this Act-
"Penon." (1) The term " person " includes one or more individuals, part~ 
nerships, associations, corpora~ions, legal representatives, trustees, 
trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers. 
''.llmplorei:-.'• (2) . The term ~,employer" includes any person acting in the 
interest. 0£ an employer, directly or indir~ctly, bu~ ~h~ll not include 
the Uruted States, or any Stale . or pohbcal subd1vis1on thereof, or 
any person sµbject to the Railway Labor Act, as. amended :from tinie 
to time, or any labor organization ( other than when acting as an 
employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer ~r agent of 
such labor organization. 
"Empl0100.'• (3) The term "employee" shall include any empl(IJee, and shall 
not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the 
Act explicitly sfates otherwise, and. shall include any individual 
whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, 
any current labor dispute or because o:f any unfair· labor practice, 
nnd who has not obtained any other regular 'and substantially equiv-
alent employment, but shall not include any individual employed 
as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service. of any family 
or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent 
or spouse. 
"Ropresou.tativcs:• ( 4) The tern1 "representatives n includes any individual or labor 
or<.rnnization. 
ci;;.;!bi;>r organiza- (5) The term '' labor organization ,t means any organization of 
any kJnd, o,r any agency or e?nployee repres~nfati~:m comiuittee or 
plan, m which employees partmpnte and wh1ch exists for the pur-
pose, in whole .or in part, of denling with employers concerning 
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, ho1u-s 0£ employ-
ment, or conditions o:f work. 
"Cou:unerce.'' (6) The term "commerce" ineans trade, trnffic, conimcr~, trans-
portation, or communication among the several State~ or between 
the District of Columbia or any Territory of the united States 
uiid a.ny Stat.a or other Territory, or between any foreign country 
and any State, Territory, or the District of Cofombfo., or within 
the District of Columbia or any·Territory, or between 1_>oints in the 
same State but through any other State or any Terntory or the 
District of Columbia.·or any foreign country. 
".A.Hecunr com• (7) The term "affecting cominercc" meuns .fo com1nerce, or bur-
merce.'' <lening or obl:!tructing commerce or the free . flow of conuner~, or 
having led or tending to lead to a, labor dispute burdening or 
obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce . 
• 
0 u.r1IA1r Jnhor. prac- ( 8) The term lt unfafr labor practice '' 1neans any unfair labor 
tioe. • practice listed in . section 8. 
"Lahordispure:• (9) The tenn" labor dispute" includes any controversy concernina 
terms, tenure or conditions o:f employment, or concerning the assocf-
ntion or representation of pers.ons in negotiatfng, fi,xing, maintain-
ing, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of emyloy-
ment, regarclless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate 
re.lation of employer and employee; 
·:Naetonal½bor:a&- . (10) The term "National Labor Relations Board '1 riieans the 
IaUoDS Board. N . 1 L b .R 1 t· d • 
. afaona a C>r e a ions Boar. created by section 3 of this Act. 
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(11) The term'' old Board'' means the National Lnbor Relations 
Board established by Executive Order N.umbered 6763 of the Presi-
dent on J m;ie 2S, 1934, pursuant to Public Resolution Numbered 44, 
RJ?proved June 19,. 1934 (48 Stat. 1183), and.reestablished ~nd co11-
t1nued by Executive Order Numbered 701' 4 of the Pres1tlent of 
June 15, 1035;.. purs_uant to Title I of tho N_ atlonal Industrial R~cov-
ery .A.ct ( 48 ::;tn.t. 195) as amended and continued by Senate Joint 
Resolution 133 1 approved June 14, 1935. 
451 
"Old13oiird.'.' 
Executive Order 0763. 
· VoL •8. p. 1183. 
Executive Order70i•. 
Vol. 48, p. l~. 
Antr, p. 375. 
NA"rrO:N'.A.t. unon llELATIPNS no,um ln~~0B:1e:J~bor llo-
SEc. 3. (a) There is hereby created a board, to be known as the 9C:P0fltrun: ap-
,~ National Labor Re~atio11s Board ,, (hereinafter referred to as 11010,,, ~ hi,. 
the ''Board''), which shall be composed of three members, who 
shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate. One of the. original 1nembers shall be Tennsoromcc. 
appointed for a terni 0£ one year, one for a term of three years1 and 
one for a term of five years, but their successors slulll be appomted 
for terrns of be years eacli, except that any individual chosen to 
fill a vacancy shah be appoi_ntec,l only .for the µne.s:pired t~nn of 
the member whom he shall succeed. The President. shall desiguate Cbaimisn. 
one. me111ber to ser,·e tts chairman of tbe Board. A:ny member of Remouls. 
the Board may be removed by the President, upon notice and hear-
ingt for neglect df duty or malfeasance in office, but for 1io other 
cause. (b) .A. vacancy in the Board shall not inipair the right of the Quoru~., seal~ e~c. 
remaining members to exercise all the pcn,vers of the Board, a.nd 
two members o:f the Board shall, at all times, constitute a quQrum. 
The Board shaUhave n.n official seal which shall be judicially noticed. 
(c) The Board shnll at the dose of ea~h 'fiscal y~ar rnake a report Annual report. 
in wr~ting to Congress and to the P1·E!sidcnt stating in detail the 
cases it has heartl, the decisions it has rendei;-ed, the names, salaries, 
and duties of all employees and officers in the employ or under the 
supervision of the. Board, and an account of all moneys it has 
disbur~cd. 
· · SEo. 4. (a) Each member of ·the Board sha11 receive a salary of i~~~i:,-m2, $10,000 .a year, shall be. eligible f9r reappointment, a-nd s}ldl µot . . 
engage m ?-llY o~her business voc~t1on, or ~~ployment. 'F~e Ho~rd so~gJi~wtmcnl ot per-
shall a_ ppomt1 m_ tllout re~a1_:a. for the provmons of the ·cml-. service c v·o_ 1. -10, ~· 100.;; u. s. laws ~ut subJect to th~ l.ilassifi.cntion Act ~£ 1~23, ns amende~, an .. p. ss. . . 
e~ecntive sect.etaryj. and .such attorneys, examiners, .and regional di!~=:~. n,g1ona1 
dlI'ec~rs, and shall appoint such other employees with regard to · 
existing laws npplicable to the e!Ilployment and. compensation_ of 
officers and employees of the· Untted States; as 1t may from time 
to time .find necessary for the proper performance .of its duties and 
as may be from time to tune appropriat.ed . for by Congress~ The Agen<:leii &\"ailablu, 
Board may establish or utilize such regional, local, or other agencies, 
and utilize such voluntary and uncompensated services, as. may :from 
time to time be needed.· Attorneys appointed under this section 
.may, at the direction of the Bos.rd, appear for nnd represent. the 
Board in any case in _court. Nothing in this Act shall be construed A.p~olntmentofmed-
to authorize the Board to appoint individuals for the Ellrpose. of IAtors,.rostrlctloo. 
conciliation or · m~diA,tion ( or for st:;ttisti<::al work), -y;her~ such 
service may be obtained from the Department of Labor. 
· (b) Upon the appointment of the thr~e original members of the Old Board abOlbbed. 
Board and the designation of its chairman, the old Board sluill cease 
J So in orlgin11L 
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Trsnsfer o! emplo?• to exist. All employees or the old Board shall be transferred to 
es.
1
' tteord.or, eta. and become employees of the Board with salaries under the Classi-
fication Act of 1923, as amended, without acquiring by such trans:fer 
a pennanent or civil .service status. All records, papers, and prop-
erty of the old Board shall become records, papers, and property 
o:f the Board, and all une;tpcnded funds and appropriations for the 
use and maintenance of the old Board shall become funds and a.Ppro-
z,riations available to be expended by the Board in the exercISe of 
the powers, authority, and duties, confor:red on it by this Act. 
Ei:peZIS& allo-qnces. (c}_ All of the expen..c::es of the .Board, including all necessary 
travelina and subsistence e..~enses oµtside the Distr1c:t of Columbia 
incurred'by the members or employees of the Board u11der its orders, 
shall be allo~ed and paid on the presentation of itemized vouchers 
therefor approved by the :Board or by any individual it designates 
for that purpose. . 
Prmolpol omoo. SEO. 5. The principal office of the Board shall be in t.he District 
of Columbia, but it mav meet and exercise any or all. of its powers 
qu1:i:s~utlon or 1::- at any other place. The Board may, by one or more of its members 
or by such agents or agencies ns it may deSignate, prosecute any 
inquiry nec~ssary to its functions in a.ny part of the United States .. 
A · member who participates in such an inquiry shall not be dis-
qualified from subsequently participating in a decision of tl:ie Board 
in the same case; 
A<lm!nfstratr-aorulos. SEO. 6. (a) The Board shall have authority :from timo to time 
t9 :make, amend, and rescind such rules and regulations a$ may be 
necessary- to carry out the provisions of th.is Act. Such rules and 
regt!lations shall he· effective upon pubHcation in the manner which 
the Eon.rd shall prescribe. 
rJOHTS OF E:Ml'LOY.EES 
s~id o1 e7np1oyee.9 SEc. 1. Employees shall have tho right to self-organization, to 
· :form, join, qr assist labor orga.nizatio!}S, to 1:>argain collectively 
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in 
concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other 
mutual aid or protection. 
uDin1r labor pmc.- SEc. 8. It shall be an un.fair labor practice for an eroployer-
uces. (1) To interfere witb, restrain, or coerce employees in the exer-
cise of tho rights guaranteed in section '7. . 
(2) To dominate or interfere with the formation or a~-
trati9n of any labor organization or contribute financial or other 
support to it: Pro~-i<led, Tliat subject to rules and regulations made 
n.nd published by _th_e Board pursua!lt.to section .6 (a), a:,n emplo1.er 
$ ..hall not h_e .. proh1.b1ted from_ penmttmg em_Ployees to _confer mth 
him durino- working hours without loss of time or pay. 
(3) By ~criminntion in regard to hire or tenure of employment 
or any term or condition of employment.to encourage or discourage 
membership in any lnbor organization: P.roviae.il, That nothing 
';'ok 48, P• 19.;; Ame, in this Act, ·or in the N ationaI Industrial Recovery Act (U. S.. C., 
P·•
7 
• Su_vp. VII, title 15, secs. 701-712), as amended :from time to time, 
or m any code or agr_eem.ent api;>roved or prescribed thereunder, or 
in any other statute of the Unfted States, shall preclude an employer 
:from making n.n. ugreement with a. labor orgnnization (not cstab~ 
lished, maintained, or assisted by any a~tion defined in this Act 
as ~n unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employ-
ment membership tlierein, i£ such labor organization is the repre-
sentative of the employees as provided in section 9 (e.), in the apprp-
priate· collective bargaining unit covered by such agreement when 
made. 
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( 4) To discharge or .otherwise discriminate aga.fost an employee 
because he has filed char~es or give11 testimony uncle.1· this Ac~ 
(5)To refu$e to bargnm colle~tivelv with ·the representatives of 
his e~ployees, subject to the provisions of Section O (a). 
453 
)OtPltES:ENT • .\Tiv'ltrS AND :Etl.:et·roNs ReDresontatlves and 
elcetfomi, 
SEc. 9. (a.) Representatives designated or selected £or the pur- .M1 ~tortt:vnnilo, prbm-f 11 t • b • • b tli • • · · f th l · • ctp e m co ect \"& ar-poses o co cc 1ve argamuig y e ma3or1t,y o e emp oyees in g11in£ng,etc. 
et unit appropriate for such purposes,. shnll be the ~xclus1ve repre_-
senta.tives of all the employees iu such unit for the purposes of 
collecth·e bargaining in r~p~ct to rates of pay, wages1 hours of . 
empl?YIJ?-e!'it, or other conditions of_ employment: Pro'lnaed, 'l'hat fr:'lf!~~iuat ri bt to 
any mdiv1dual employeo o_r a group o.f emplqyees shall have the present grlevan~11. 
right at any time to present grievances to their employer. 
(b) The Donrd shall decide in each case whetlier, in. order to f~\urt1si~opi,;1r 
insure to ·employees the full benefit of thek ri~ht to self-organizn"'.' pr fl 111P s. e c. 
ti01~ .arid to ~ollective bn.riaining, n!ld otherwise to effectuate the 
policies of t.lt1s Act, the umt appropnn.te for the purposes of collec-
th·e bargaining shall be the employer unit, crn:ft unit, plant unit, or 
subdivision thereof. 
(c) Whenev~r a._ question _affecting commerce a-:ises ?oncerning ot~~:J~~tatlves 
the. representation of employees, the Donrd may m•tcst1gate such l'tletbodtarselecting. 
controversy nnd certify to the parties, in writing, the ·name or etc. · 
names o·f the repreBentat.ives that b~ive been desi~ated or selected. 
In any such investigation, the Board shall provide for an appro:- neartnis. 
priate hearing ppon du~ notice, ~ithe1· in conjunction with a proceed-
mg under section 10 or otherwise, and may take a secret £allot of 
employees, or utilize nny other suitable. 1nethod to asce.rtin 1 such 
representatives. 
( d) 1Vhene, .. er_ u11 order o~ the Boo.rel made pur~ant to sec~Jon onBf:c~ot':f~csu~d 
10 ( c) 1s based m whole 01.· m part upon fads cert1fied following 
nn myestig_nt}~n pursuant to su~ection { c) of this. section, ancl vi:;i.forcement or re-
there· is n. petition fot· the enforcement or rev1ew of such order such 
ee1~tifie1)tion and the record of such investigation shall be inciudetl 
in the tr-anscript of the entire record requil'ed to .be filed under sub-
sections 10 {e) or 10 (£), and thereupon the decree of the court 
enforcing; :r.nodHying, or setting aside in wliole or in part ~he order 
of the Board shall be made and entered upon the pleadings, testi-
mony, and proceec:Ungs_ set forth in such trunscript. 
PRE~~~ON OF lJlli-i".iUR L.-\BOR :PRACTICES 
S. 10· ( ) Th B d · d h • fte "d d Prevention or uu-EC. ~ a . . e oar . IS emp?wer_e , as . ere1!1a r. prov1. ~ , ratr · -lu.\lor pmetices, 
toprcvent any person from engn.gmg m any unfair labor hra.ctice afl~}~i: ~~ro:srce. 1 (1. d • ·t• 8) l.'f! t· . . Tl • 11 .b .... uu,.on • ., o oar,. ISte •. m sec 10.n . . nu.ec mg c_ommerce. · . ~IS power s a •.. _e · 
exclusive, and shall not be affected by any other means of ad3ust~ 
meat or prevention-that bas been or may be established by ngree• 
ment, code, law, or otherwise. 
(b) Wllenever it is charged that. any person has ~ngaged in- or is ~ompln.lnts; ,m~,. 
engaging in any ~~ch unfair labor practice, the Doard, Ol". a~y 
agent or agency <les1gnated by the Board for such purposes, shall servrcea or ctw~. 
have power to issue and e:nuse to be served upon i:iuch person a com-
plaint $roting the _charges in thnt respect, nnd. contruning a notice xouceor.hearlll!!-
of hearing before the Board or: n: member thereof, or be:fore a 9-esig-
n~ted agent"or agency, at a place therein fixed, not less thnn five dnys 
alter the serving of said complaint. .Any ·such ·complaint may be ~mcnd:ocm or <.-om-
amended by the member, ugent> or ngcncy cond·ucting the hearing pJo:r:it. 
-i So ln. od(.•.hml 
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or the Board in its discretion at any time prior to the issuance oi 
. Appeota.Dc& ond an• an order based thereon. The person so complained of shall have 
swer of occnm. the right to file an answer to the original or amended complaint 
and to appear in person or otherwise and give testimony at the 
place and titne fixed in the complaint. In the discretion of the 
lllembar, agent or agency conducting the hearing or ,the BQard, any 
other person may be allowed to intervene in the said proceeding 
Prevaflini: ruJss ot .and to pi·ese:nt testimony. In any such proceeding the rules of 
evidence; enectot. evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling. 
Pre~tfoil orte.~ti• _ (c) Tlie testimony taken by such member, a~ent or agency or 
:mon;v. the Board shall be red-uced to writing and :6.lea. with the Board. 
Thereafter, in its discretion, the Board upon notice J:ilay take £ur-
ccase ruid dc:5ie.t or• ther testimony or heo.r argument. I£ upon all the testimony taken 
ders. the Board shall be of the opinion that any person named in the 
complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor 
practice, then the Board shall state 1ts findings o:f fact n.nd ~~all 
:issue nnd cause to be served on such person nn order reqrurmg 
such person to cease and desist fyom . such unfair labor practice, 
and to tak~ such a_ffirmative action, · ioc~udini reinstatemeri~ pf 
employees with or mthout back pay, as will effectuate the pol,c1es 
lt~ports. or compll• of this Act. ~uch _ ol'qer may f_urtlier require such :{>ers~m to ma~e 
ang3~~en:,ft.com• reports from time to time showma the e:de!it to wh1clt 1t has coin-
pfnint. plied with the order. I:f upon afi the testimony taken the Board, 
shall be of the opinion that no person named in the complaint has 
engaged in or is enga~ing in _ any such unfair labor practice,. then 
the Board shall state 1ts findings of fact and shall issue an order 
dismissing the said ·complaint. . 
ModUlcstioo,ctc..,cJ' (d) Until a transcript pf the l.'ecord in n ca.s~ shall. have been 
or&r. filed in a court, as hereinafter pro,dded, the Board may at any 
time, upo,n r~asonable no~ice <!-.nd in such J!lanner as it_ shal~ deem 
proper, modify or set aside, in whole or in· part, any .finding 01· 
order mnde or issued by it. 
Enforcement. (e) The Boa.rd shall have power to petition ~ny. circuit court. 
ti~~ffo': a~~~uW of appeals qf the United States (including the_ Court of Appeals 
court orapveil.ls. of the. District. of polumbia), or H all t1:ie. ci~cu_it gourts of a~pe~ls 
to which application may be made are _ m vacation, any d1Str1ct 
court of the United States (including the Supreme Court of the 
District of Columbia), within any: circuit or district, respectively, 
wherein the unfair labor practice in question occurred or wherein 
Tempora.r)' nBtmin• such person resides or transacts business, for the enforcement 0£ 
iai; order s,ro'rided. such order and for appropriate temporary relief 01• restraining 
Pl\pers to bo filed, order, and shall certify ana file in the court a transcript of the 
entire record in the· proceeding, including the pleadings and testi. 
iliony' up<m which such order was. entered ancl the findings ap.d 
Notice; iurisdicUOII order of the Board. Upon sucl1 filing, the court shall cause notice 
~
nd power.sot '-'Ourt. thereof to be se:rved upon such person, nud thereupon sha.U ha;ve 
jurisdiction of the proceeding and of the question determined 
therein, ancl shall have power to grant such temporary relief or 
restraining order as it deems just and proper, and to make and 
enter upon the pleadings, testimony, and proceedin!?'S set forth in 
such transcript a decree_ enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as 
so modified,_ or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the 
Objections; c:onsider• Board. No objection that has not been urged before the Board, its 
utioaot. member, agent o.t agency, e;hall be considered by the court, unless 
the failure ~r negle~t to urge such objection. shall be excused because 
rfiwllni;s conclusive of extraordinary circumstances. The findmgs 0£ the Board as to 
0 l3~tionnl eviden~. the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive. _ If either 
party shall app1y to the court for leave to adduce additional evi-
dence and shall show to the satisfaction o;f the court·that such addi .. 
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tional evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds 
for the failure to adduce such evidence in the hearing before tho 
Board, its member, agent, or agency, the court may order such 
additional evidence to be taken before the Boa.rd, its member, ngcnt. 
or agency, n.nd to be made a part of the transcript. The Board mny Moditlcatfoa hr 
mog1fy its findings ns to the £nets or make new findings, by reason B«rJrd. 
of additional evi clence s6 taken and filed, n.nd it shall file such modi-
fied or new findings, which, if supported bl7' ~Yidencc, shall be con-
clusive, and shall file its recommendations, if nny1 for the modifica-
tion or setting aside of its original. order. The Jurisdiction of the ~!:~~?tr::;; 
court shall be exclusive and its judgment nnd decree shall be final, allowed. • 
except that the same shall be subject to review by the appropriate 
circuit court of appeals if application was made to the district court 
as hereinabove provided, and by the Supreme Court of the United 
States upon writ of certiorari or certification as proYided in sections r. s. C' •• r,. i:r.i. 
_289 ancl 240 of the Judicinl Code, ns nmcnded (U. S. C., title 28, 
secs. 346 and 34,). 
(f) ~ny person aggr~e,·ed by a fin~l order of the Boa~d grantjng o..t~:~g~11 to set 
or denymg m whole or m part the relief sought may obtam a review 
of such order in any cirr.uit court of appeals of the United States in 
the circuit wherein the unfair Jnbor prnct.ice in question was alleged 
to linve been en~g~d in or wherein such person resides or transacts 
business, or in tne Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, by 
filing in such court a '\\'Titt~n petition praying tha.t the order of the 
Board be modified or set aside. A copy of such petition shn.ll bo 
forthwith served 11pon the Board, and thereupon the n~grieved part_y 
8hall file in the court a transcript of the entire record m the proceed-
ing,. certified by the Boar~l, including the pleading and testimony 
upon which the order complnined of was entered and the findings 
and order of the Board. Upon such filing: the court shall proceed Prnoo<tqro,oto. 
in the same mnnner ns in the case of. nn application by tl1e Board 
under subsection (e) t and shall have. the snme exclusiYe jurisdict-ion 
to grant to the Board su~h temporary relief or restraining order as it 
deems just and r.roper, and in like manner to make and enter a decree 
enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside 
in whole or in part the order of the Board; and the findings of the 
Board as to the facts, if supported by e,idence, shall in lik~ manner 
be conclusiYe. 
(g) The commencement of procee<lin!!B under subsection { c) or ( f) sta~:t~ :~~C::~ 
of this section slrnll not, unless specifically ordered by the courtt mcnt.otprocccdlni;s. 
operate as a stay of the Bonrd:s order. 
Jh) When grnntin~ npproprinte tempora17c relief or n restraining JiirL,<1Jct!onoteQutty 1:· • d . d"fy' d courtsnotunpaircd, or er, or mn11mg nnc entering n ecree en orc1ng, mo i mg, an 
enforcing as so modified or setting aside in whole or in part an order 
of the Board, as provided in this section, the jurisdiction of courts 
sitting in eq~itv shnll not be limited by the Act entitled "An Act to VoL <tic. P· ;o. 
amend the Jud~cial Code and to define and limit the jurisdiction of u.s ... p. 13-ir.. 
courts sitting in equity, and £or. other purposes'', approved March 
23, 1932 (U.S. C., Supp. Vil, title 29, secs. 101-115). (i) Petitions filed unaer this Act shall be heard expeditiously, and Expcditlocs hoiu-
if p.ossible within ten days after they ha \7e been docketed. ings. 
INVESTIGATORY P01\""ERS 
SEC. 11. For the purpose of all bearings and invcstiiations, "'hich, cr!nvestii:ntory pow• 
in the opinion of the Board, are necessary nnd proper tor the exercise .1.m'c, p. 453. 
of the powers vested in it by section 9 :ind section 10-
(l) The Board, or its duly authorized agents or agencies; shall nt iu=~o~:;ccur• 
all reasonable times have access to, for the purpose of exnminntion, ' 
and the right to copy nny cvjdence of nny person being investigated 
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or pro:ceeded aiainst that-relates to any matter under investigatioI.'!- or 
subpena powers. in question. ...'Uly member 0£ the Board shall have power to issue 
subpenas requiring the attendance . and testimony of witnesses and 
the production of any evidence tbnt relates to any matter under invesM 
tigation or in question, before the Board, its member, agent, or agency 
or!"n~i:CJ.stration conducting the hearing odr ir}vestigdatbion.h AnBy mdemf her ofhthe Board, 
• or any agent or agency eSianate y t e oar or sue purposes, 
may administer oaths and nffirmntions, examine witnesses, and l'eceive 
WitDesSes,titc. eviaence. Such attendance of witnesses and the,production of such 
evidence may be required from any place in the Unit~d States or any 
Territory or possession thereof, at any desio-nated place of hearing. 
Contwnaey or re- (2) In case of contumacy or refusal to ~ey a subpena issued to 
~;~b'!:c~~ns. any person, any District Court of the United States or the United 
States courts of any: T<frritory or possession, or the Su})reme Court 
of the District of Columbia, witlun the jurisdiction of which the 
inquiry is carried on or within the jurisdiction of which said person 
guilty of contumacy or refusal to obcv is found or resides or trans-
act~ busine!:S, u_pon application by the ~~ard shall have jurisdiction 
to issue to such person an order requiring such person to appear 
before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, there to produce 
evidence if so ordered, or there to give testimony touching the matter 
under investigation or in question; and any failure to obey such 
order o:f the court may be punished by said court a.s a contempt 
thereof . 
.u~t~Jlege or wit- (3) No person shall be exc11sed from att.e.nding and te..t;tifying or 
from producing books, records,. correspondence, document.a,. or other 
evidence in obedience to the subpena of the Board, on the ~ound 
that the testimony or evidence required of him may tend to incrim-
inate him or subject him to .a penalty or £or£eiture·; but no indi-
vidual shall be prosecuted or subje~ted to any penalty or forfeit!,l.te 
.for or on account of any transaction, matter, OI" thm,€; concernmg 
Personallmmumty. which he is cpmpelled, after having claimed his priV1lege against 
self-incrimination, to testify or proauce £vidence, except that stich 
individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution artd 
punishment for perjury committed in so testifying. 
Se:rvico or orders, ate. ( 4) Com plaints, orders, nnd other process and papers of the Boa,rd, 
its_ '.!llember, a~ent, or agency, may he serv~d either personally or by 
rei?stered mail or by telegraph or by leavmg a copy thereof at the 
principal office or place of business of the perscm required to be 
sei•ved .. The verified return by the individual so serving the same 
setting forth the manner of such service shall be proof of the same, 
and the return po$t office receipt or telegraph receipt therefor when 
regi~tered and mailed or ~elegraphed as aforesaid shall be proof of 
Witness rees, etc. service of the same. Witnesses summoned before the Board, its 
member, agent, .or agen~y, shall be paid the sa!l.1e fees and milea.W3 
thn.t are paid witnesses in the tourts of the United States, and wit• 
ncsses whose depositions are taken and the persons taking the same 
shall severally be entitled to the same :fees as are paid for like 
services in the eourts of the United States. 
venue provisiollS, ( 5) All process of n.ny court to which application ma.y b~ made 
under this .Act may be served in the judicial district wherein the 
defendant. or other person required to be serve.d resides or may be' 
found. · 
oo':ernmeaucencies ( 6) The several de:eartments and a~encies of the Government, 
to assist. when directed by the Presidtmt, shall 1:urnish the Board, upon its 
i•equest, all records, papers, and information in their possession 
relating to any matter before the Board. 
I'rotection ot Board SEo. 12. Ariy person who shall willfully resist,. prevent, imped-a, 
m0Ii1bcn;, otc. f h · Qr interfere with any member o t e Board or any of 1ts agents or 
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and one or more employees or nssoclntions of em-
ployees; (2) between one or more employers or asso-
clatlons of employers and one or more employers or 
assoclnUons of employers; or (3) between one or 
more employees or associo.tlons Qt employees and one 
or more employees or assoclatlons · of employees; or 
when the Cfl.SC tn:votves any confiJctlng or compct1nB 
Interests In a "labor dispute•• Cns defined ln this sec-
tion) of "persons partlcipntlng or Interested" therein 
<n.s defined fn this section>. 
(bl A person or nssoclntion sha.11 be held to be t\ 
person pnrtlclpnttng or Interested Jn a 1nbor dispute 
It relief ts sought Mainst hlrn or lt, and If he or it Is 
engngcd In the snrnc Industry, trade, ci'l\ft. or occu-
p:ition Jn which s\;ch qisputc occurs, or has a. dlr.!ct 
01~ Indirect Interest therein. or ls u m<'mbcr. officer, 
or ngcnt ofQ.ny assoclntlon composed In whole or ln 
part of employers 01• employees cngnged tn such 
industry, trnde, crnft, or occupnt1011. 
Cc) The term "lnbor disputc11 Includes any contro• 
vcrsy concerning tenns or conditions of employment, 
or concerning the nssocl~tton or 1•cprC1scntntf011 ot 
persons f.n negot!n.ting, :fudng, mn.fntnlnJn~. changing, 
or seeking to nrrangc tenns or cohdltfon~ o! employ .. 
mcnt, regBi'dless of whether or not tho dlsputnnts 
stand tn the proximate rclntfon of employer nnd 
employee. 
Cd) Tha term 11,;ourt of the United StntQs" means 
nny court of the Unlted Stutes whose Jurlsdlctlon hns 
been or may be con!erred or defined or limltt:u by 
Act of Congress1 including the courts of the District 
of Columbfa.. <Mnr. 23, 1932, ch. 90, § 13, 47 Stnt. 
73.) 
§ 11-i. Inmlidity of pro•,isions oC chapter; validity oC 
remaining provislons. 
If nny provision ot sections 101-115 ct this title 
or ~ho O:ppllcation there.of to nny per.son or clrcum-
stnncc Js held unconstitutloJ1?.I or otherwise tnvo.Ud, 
the rcmnin!ng provisions of such .sections and the 
npplicatlon· or such IJrovlslons to other persons or 
circumstances shall not be affected thereby. (Mar. 
23, 1932, ch. 90, § 14t 47 Slat. 73.} 
§ 115. R<!pcnl of confficting nets. 
All nets nnd parts ol. nets In conflict with the pro-
visions of sections 101-115 or this title nrc hereby 
r~pcaicd. <Mnr. 23, 1932, ch. 90, § 15, 47 stat. 73.> 
Chapter 7.-NATIONAL LABOR RF.:I,ATIONS 
Sec. 
151. Findings and qcclnrl\Uon or policy. 
152. Detlnlt1ons. 
163, Nallonnl Lnbor Relntlcns Donrd; crcnUon nnd. ccm-
posltlon;. nnnun1 reports. 
154 B1UI10; sn1nTJcs; omcers o.nd employees; tcrmtnnUon 
or "Old Bonrdi'; payment ot expenses. 
155 Same; prJnclpnl omco, conducting tnqulrlcs 
tbrougltour. country: pnrtlclpntlon ln dcclsfons 
or lnqulrlcs conducted by rneinbor, 
166. Bnmc; rulca nnrl rogul11llons. 
un rught of employees ns to orgnnlznt10111 coltcottvc 
bnrgnlnlnc, etc. 
158. untn!r lnbor prncttccs by cmi,Loyer denned. 
1680: Providing tocl11tlcs ror oporn.Uons or Federal credit 
Unlons. 
Sec. 
159. 
180, 
161. 
162 
163. 
164. 
165. 
100. 
Rcprc~ntnUvea or cmployet'a tor c:ollacttvc, bl\rftllln• 
Ing: <tetcrm\nnUon ot unit. by Do11rd: qucallot\ 
ntrccllng commctco. hcnrtng: record on rovlow 
wheto co~inm:o quc,Uous lnvot,r«f. 
Provcutlon of unfair tnbor practices. (~i Po\\·crs of Donrci. sonernlly. 
(b) C(lmplnliit Md notlco ot htnrlnm RMWC1': 
court rules or cvfclcnco tn11ppllc!\btc. 
(c) lleductton ot tcsUmony to writ.Ing: nnct-
lncs nnct ordcra ot Donrct. 
{d) Modlftc~t1ot1 or findings or 0rdc1a prlor to 
nltng, record ln · court. 
(cl I'ctltlon to court ror rnrorcemcnt ot order; 
procccd1ngs; review of Judgment. 
(t) licvicw ot ttnnt order or Donrd on pctltfon 
to court. 
((t) InsUtuHon or cuurt proc~dlnss ns aLny ot 
Bonrd 's order. 
(bl Jutlstllct1on ol courts ,mnJ:tcct.ctt by lhnl--
Lnllons prcscrlbcd In sccttons 101-1.15 of 
thle tJUo. 
(1) ExpcdlUo,,s bcnrlngs . 01~ pcttUons. 
Inv<'sligntory powers or Donrd. 
(l) Docurncntnt)' cvldcncc; summoning wlt-
u'3S1il!S rmd tnklng testimony. 
(2) court nid In compcUJng proctucUon of cvl• 
dcnco ruut nttcndn.nce of wftncSSt:s~ 
(3) Prtvllcgo or wttri~sucs: hntnunity from 
prosccuUon. 
(4) Process. scrvlco ond rclurn; teca or wlt• 
nrs.,;cs. 
( 6) ProcrRs, . whcro served 
(6) Inronnntlon nnd· asslst.ot1co from depurt-
montu. 
OR'(?nscs nnd ponnJtlcs. 
Riel\ t to strike prC1lcrvcd. 
Conn let ot laws. 
Scpnrnblllt:, clnuse. 
Cltntlon of chnpter. 
§ 151. Findings nnd declnrnlion of policy. 
The denial by employers of ·the rlshi of .employees 
to orgnnlzc nnd U1e refusnl by employers to ncccpt 
the procef,iure of collective bnrsnlnlng lend to strikes 
and other f orins or Industrial strife or unrest. which 
have the lnten~ or the necessary effect of burdening 
or obslructing commerce by <a) impn.lrfng the effici-
ency, surety. or operation or the lnstrumentnUtles of 
commerce; Cb) occurring Jn the current of com-
merce; (c) mntcrinlly nffccUng, rcstrain'lng, or con-
trolllng the flow or raw rnaleifals or mnnu!nctured or 
procrssed goods from or into the cbnnncts or com-
merce, or the prices of such materials or soods in 
commerce; or <d> cnustng diminUUon ofcml)loymcnt 
nnd wases In such volume ns substanUntly to Impnfr 
or disrupt the mlll'kct !or goods flowing from or into 
the channels of con1mcrcc. 
The 1ncqunuty of bnrgnlnlng power between em-
ployees who do not possess rull freedom of assoclntton 
or nctua.1 llberty of contrnct, a.nd employers who nrc 
orr:nnlzccl In thc.corporntc or other forms of owner-
ship nssoclatton substnnUaUy burdens a'i1d affects 
the flow of commerce. nnd tends to nggro,vnte recur-
rent business depressto11s, by depressing wngc rates 
nnd the purcb11Slng power of wage earne1·s fn Indus-
try nnd by prevcntln,r the. stnbllizntlon of compctl• 
tlvc wage· rates nnd working conditions within nnd 
between Jndustrfcs. 
Expcr!eI:1ce has proved tlmt protection by Jnw of thi:? 
rlgllt of employees to orsnnlze and hnri::nin collec-
tively snfegun.rds comin<'rce frC'in injury, lmr,nlr-
mcnt, or Interruption, o.nd promotes tl,c flow or com• 
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mci:ce ·Qy re,movh:1g c~rt.run rccoitnlzcd sources or 
fndustrlnl strJle an_d unrest. by encouraging practices 
fundamental to thc.trlcndly adjustment ot 1ndustr1al 
dispute.~ nrlslng out or diff erenccs as to wagesl hours, 
or other working conditions, nnd by nntortng cqunl-
Ity or bnrgnlnJng pmvcr b¢twccn empl~•~ers and em-
ploy~. 
If.is hereby declared to be the policy ot the united 
eta~ tG: ellmlnateJbc ciiuscs ot cert.1dn substont111l 
obst.:-ructfons to ·the free fl.ow or c_ommcrc~ and to miti-
gate an_d climlnnic these obstructions when they ·have 
oc:currcd by cncourn_ging the. prncUce and procedure 
or col!cctlvc bp.rgaln!ng nnd by protect!~ the exer-
cise by. workers of full freedom ot. association,·sclf-
otgo.n.lzatlon, and dcslgIUltlon or rcprcsen·tatlvcs or 
their own cpooslng,_ for the purpDS(!. or negoUatlng 
the. terms. nnd conditions or their employment· or 
other mutual nld 01• protccUon. (July 5, 1935 •. ch. 
3'12,.f i. 49 Btnt. 449,) 
§ 152. D~firtlUona. 
Wbc.n_uscd In ~ec~lon~ 151-166 of this tlUc-
(U The term "person" Jnc1Udcs one or more· lndl-
vldunls, pnrj;ncrsblps, n:ssoclatfons, corpornUops,_lcgal 
reprcscntntlvcs, trustees~ trustees. in bankruptcy, or 
tccriivcrs. ' . 
(2) The. term 1'empl0Yer" lnc:lud~ any person act-
lng 1µ the 1:nicrest ot an employcr.t directly o·r ind! .. 
rcc~ly. but shall not Include the United States, or any 
Stnte o~ poUttcoJ sµbqlvislon tb~rco(Qr nny person 
sublcct to sections 151-163 of Title 46, or any Inbor 
organlztiUon CoUlcr· thlln when nctJrig as an cm..-
·pJoycr>, pr anyone ~cttng fn .th.e cnpacity ot officer or 
air.eni ot such lnbor orgrmizaitori, . . . . . 
<a) ·The. tcnn •~_cmpioyec" sh;aU., tn~lude any em:-
p~oyeo1 nnd ~ball not b.e limited to th_c cmpiQyees _of 
~ partic:Ul_ar employer, unless· the chapter cxpllcttty 
states otherwise, nod shall fnclUdc any lndMduoJ 
. whose, work hns c<?llSed ns a c:o~equence of, or in 
connection with. imy current labor dispute or be~ 
.cause of any unfair fabor p,raqtlc~. ape( ,who Jlns not 
obtained any other rcguJo.r nnd substanUnlJy .equlv-
'·atcnt·· employment. but ·shfill riot 'tricludc'.any fndJ ... 
vtdual cmpt6ye~ ns an nt1rlculturril laborer. or.In the 
doincstfo s~rvJcc of tuiy fnmlly or person at his ·11omc. 
or any' .tndtvldual employed. by hls PClrent or spouse. 
(4) 'I1le term "r.cpr~scnt.ativcs" inclt,tdes any Indi-
vidual or Jnbor organization~ . . . . 
(5) The tenn u1abor orgEintzatlon" mco.ns nny or-
. c~nlzntfon of any kind, or nny ngency or employee 
rcpr~sentatlon cominlttcc or plan; In . which .· em ... 
ployccs pnrtfolpnte. n.nd wblch exl_$~ for the pw:-pose, 
J1;1 :whole or ln pa.rt, of dcnllnEt with employers con-
cerning grlcvnnccs, labor disputes, ··wages, riii~s of 
JiriY., hours of' employment. or condltJons . 6!· work. 
(~) T11c term ••p~nn.merce0 -means· trnd~. tnifflc, 
commerce, transportation, or commtlnlcntlon ~ong 
·the sevcritl States, Qr between the District of Colum-
bia or any Territory or the United St'o.tcs and any 
·Btnie or other Territory, or . between any . !orclgri 
countrY Md nny State, Territory. or the District or 
CojumbJn, or wJthln the DlSt:dct or Columbia or. any 
Territory, or betwecm ·potnts Ju the S.nme ·State· but 
througlJ, any other State . or e..1y Territory or -the 
.District o! Colulilbla or ·e.ny foreign country. 
<7> The term "a1recttng commerce" meansJn. com-
merce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the 
{rec ffQW. of commerc:e. or -havtn11 IC(! oi- ~n@l~ to 
~end _to n. ~lmr dlsput~ bt,IJ'.dcnfng o~ obstruct:titg com-
mcrc_c or the free fiow of commerce. · 
(8) The tenn ·•;untair· labor ptilctice'• means any 
un!nir labor practice listed ii:i section i&S · o! this 
-tltlc. 
(9) -The tern·~ "lnbor ·dispute" -!m;ludes -11lY ~Ii-
. trQy~rsr co.nccrnlna-. term,.s, .· tenure or eondltfons or 
employment, or concerning the;assoclatlon cir repre~ 
scntation or persons In negotiating, fixing. i;nat.n~tn-
lng, changing,. or seekJng to arrange terms or condl .. 
tfons ot= 'employment. rcgti,·~ess -~! Whether :tlle 
dl®Utants -~ia.Jld In t.be ·proxJmntc relation of em-
ployer and employee.. · · · 
<10> The tcim ;•NiiUonnl Labor Relo.tlons Board" 
mcamdhc N~tiona.l ,4~or Rclp.tlons Board>creatcd 
bY section 153 ot this title. · · 
m> The term "old :8oiird0 means tho Nilttonat 
Lubor. Ret~iJons · Board cst~bllsbcd by Executive or-
der Numbered 6763 o1 ~he Presid_ent on Jun:c 29, 1934. 
pursuantto scctlon 702n cit Title 15 approved June 19, 
1034 (48 St.al)183), an~. reestapllsbed a.nd continued 
by ·Executive Order Numbered 7074 of the ·p~sfdent 
of Juµe 16, 1935, pum.iant. to dtapter 15. o.t 'l'ltle · 15 
ns amended and continued by sccLlons '102 nnd· '105a 
of Title 15. CJuJY. 5. 1935~ ch. 372d · 2, 49 ·stat,. ·450~) 
Cnoss RE:F!ll!!N~ 
Tcrmtnntlon of c:dste~ce or· .~~1,i -B~nrd," see subsection 
(b) of section 164 ot thlB tJtle. 
ft 15~. N.ntio~nl .Lnbor.Rclat\o.mi Donrd; cre,ation and 
compos1tion; annual reports. . 
Co.> There 1s created a boaird1 to be known as tho 
'
1Nntll'?t1Lil Labor Relations Board" .(herclnn!ter -re-
terrcd to M the "Board.,>, whlcb sllall be composed 
or three members, who shall be nppolntcd· .by the 
~csld_ent. by .~nd· with the ndvfco. and consent of 
the Sen~t~ •. One o! the orlslno.l members shall be 
appointed foi':a term of Olle year, one .fol' 1itemi.of 
three yenrs, nnd one r or a term ot five ye:irs, but 
their successors shall be ·appointed 1or terms of fl\'e 
years each except .tha.t· any indlvldtiai chosi:b •.o fl.11 
a vncs;,.n~y shall be nppolnt~d 9rily for tile unr: ~pJred 
term rif tJ1e. m,emlJer whom he shnU succeed. The 
Preside.tit shrill. designate. one member. ,ta serve as 
chalrman o! the Board. Any member or t11e Boa.rd 
n,ny l)e removed by the President, llPOJl·notice and 
·belll'Jng, for .. ncglcct of cfotyor mali'casancc· ln office • 
but r or no other cause. 
Cb) A· vncaricy In the Board shall noflmpa.ir the 
right of the ·rcmalnlng ·members to ekerclse· nll the 
powers or the Board. and' two ml?lllbcrs ot the Board 
sbnll, at 1111· times,· constitute a quorw:ii. . The Briai'd 
shnll have· nn ·offlclnl senl which .shall be Jucllclnlly 
notJcod. 
<c> The l3oard_ sl1al1 a.t the close dt each flscnl 
year make a rPport In writtn1;r to Congress and to. the 
PJ:csldent stating In dctan the cases it. ·bas he~rd, 
the dccJsions It bn.s rendered, the names, ·snJnrtes·, 
and dtitlcs· of nll employees and officers in 'the. em ... 
ploy or- under_ th~ supervJslon or_ the.. Board~- .nnd 
lln RCCOU?t of all moneys lt bas. dJsburscti·. (July· S, 
1935,' ch. 372~ §3. 49 Stt1.t. 451.> 
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In the Matter of UNITED STATES ~TAMPING Co:MP.ANY and PORCELAIN 
ENAMEL WoRKERs' UNION No. 18630 
Oa,.se No. R-14 
DIRECTION FOR ELECTION 
Ja'lllUM'V 19, 1936 
By virtue of and pursuant to the power vested in the National 
Labor Relations Board by Section 9 of the National Labor Relations 
Act, approved July 5, 1935, and pursuant to Article III, Section 8 
of the National Labor Relations Board Rules. and Regulations-
Series 1, it is 
DmECTED that as part of the investigation authorized by the Board 
in the above case to ascertain representatives for collective bargaining 
with the United States Stamping Company, Moundsville, West Vir-
ginia, an election by secret ballot shall be conducted within a period 
of one week from the date o:f this direction o:f election, under the 
direction and supervision of the Regional Director for the Sixth 
Region, acting in this matter as the agent of the National Labor 
Relations Board and subject to Article III, Section 9 of said Rules 
and Regulations, among the employees engaged in the production and 
maintenance department 0£ the United States Stamping Company 
on November 5, 1935 and those employed between that date and the 
date of this direction of election in the production and maintenance 
department, excep~ing :foremen, assistant foremen, supervisory and 
clerical employees, and those who quit or have been discharged for 
cause during such period, to determine whether or not they desire to 
be represented by the Porcelain Enamel Workers' Union No. 18630. 
I SAME TITLE] 
Decision, Feb1·ua1·y 11, 1936 
Stanipnig a,nd, Ena111,eU1ig J-11,<1,ustry-Strike-Representatwes: proof of choice: 
comparison of can<.elled pay-roll checks with statements designating; member-
ship in union.----Unit Appropriate for Oolleotwe Barga.ining: community of inter-
est; functional coherence; employees on hourly and piece rate basis; distinc4 
tiveness of occupation; production and maintenance employees-El,ectIOn Or-
dered: question affecting commerce: prior strike caused by ~mployer's refusal 
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124 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 
to recognize representatives-controversy concerning repre.3entation of em-
ployees; majority status disputed by employer; request by substantial number 
in nppropriate unit-Certification of Representatives. 
lll r. Robert H. Kleeb :for the Board. 
Mr. Martin Brown, of Moundsville, W. Va., for the Company: 
Mr. Joseph Rosenf ar,b, of counsel to the Board. 
DECISION 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
On November 4, 1935, H. G. Flaugh, an organizer of the American 
Federation 0£ Labor and representing the Porcelain Enamel ,v ork-
ers' Union No. 18630, hereinafter called the union, filed with the Re-
gional Director for the Sixth Region a petition for an investigation 
and certification of representatives pursuant to Section 9 (c) of the 
Nat.ional Labor Relations Act, approved July 5, 1935. The petition 
~lleges that the union represents approximately 283, employees out 
of about 414 in the production and maintenance department of the 
United States Stamping Company, Moundsville, West Virginia, 
liereinafter called the ~ompany, that no other individua]s or labor 
organizations claim to represent any of the employees, and that a 
question has arisen concerning the representation of the employees. 
The petition further alleges that the question concerning representa-
tion 1s one affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2 ('7} 
of the Act. 
On November 12, 1935, the Board, pursuant to Article III, Section 
3 of N at.ional Labor Relations Board Rules and Regulations--Series 
1, authorized the Regional Director :for the Sixth Region to conduct 
an investigation and to provide for an appiopriate hearing up'on due 
notice. Notice of hearing was issued and duly f:erved, and hearings 
were held on November 25th and 27th, 1935, before a Trial Exam-
iner designated by the Board. 
The company, through its counsel, filed a mot.ion to dismiss the 
petition and an answer wherein, inter alia, the constitutionality of 
the National Labor Relations Act was raised and the position taken 
that t.he case was not within the jurisdiction o:f the National Labor 
Relations Board. The company was represented at the hearing by 
counsel who cross-examined the witnesses called by the Board but 
who introduced no evidence in behalf of the company. The motion 
to dismiss the petition is hereby denied. . 
From the evidence adduced at the hearing and from the entire 
record now before it the National Labor Relations Board promul-
gates the following: 
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DECISIONS AND ORDERS 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
125 
1. The United States Stamping Company is a corporation created 
and existing under the laws of the State of West Virginia and has 
its principal office, main plant and place of business in the City of 
Moundsville, in the County of Marshall and State of West Virginia. 
It is engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of enamel 
cooking utensils. · 
2. A great variety of materials, including cartons, steel, enamel, 
oxides, flint, borax, clay, feldspar, sand, acid, bailwoods, excelsior, 
silicates, wire, chrome covers, wooden handles, knobs and oil board, 
is used in the manu:facture of the finished products of the company, 
95 per cerit of which is purchased from without the State of West 
Virginia, :f. o. b. shipping point. 
at least 90 per cent of the company's finished products is normally 
shipped to destinations outside of the State of West Virginia, to 
points in almost all of the States of the United Sates, all sales being 
made f. o. b. Moundsville, West Virginia. 
The shipments to and from the company are by freight, express, 
trucks and boats of independent companies. The :following freight 
figures covering shipments to and by the company over the Baltimore 
& Ohio Railroad, representing likewise the approximate average for 
express shipments, were picked at random by the agent for that 
Railroad: 
SHIPMENTS TO COMP ANY 
1935 From States outside West V1rg101a 
Within State 
or West 
V1rgm1a 
August ..• ---···---·······--······.......... 9 carloads ........•... ·--············-···-- None 
September .•••...•.•.....•••.•••.•••.....•.. 7 carloads.··---······-----··-----··-·----- 1 carload. 
October ••. ··-·········-·········-····-····· 7 carload':! •••••.•••• _ .•• ___ -- •••• --···-···· None 
SHIPMENTS FROM COMPANY 
To States outside West V1rgm1a 
Within State 
of West 
V1rg1ma 
.Aug 12 .•••••••••.••••.•..•••.....••...••••• 26 shipments ....•••.....••.••••.•••.••••.• l shipment. 
Aug 13 .••. ·----·---···-··-·-·---·······-·-· 49 shipments •••.•..•••••...••••...•••••.•• 1 shipment 
Sept 24 .••••...•••••............••.•.•••••.. 43 sh1pments ••••••••••• ~ •••••••••••••••••• 1 shipment 
Sept 25 ...••••••••••••....•••••.••••.••••.•. 30 shipments ..••.••..••••....•••••......•• None 
Oct 8 .•.•••....•..•..•..••..•.•.••••.••.•... 28 shipments •••••.•...•••...•...•....••... 1 shipment. 
Oct. 9................................. ...... 16 shipments .•.. ··-·······-···---·-·····-· None. 
3. In 1933, Local No. 18630 of the Porcelain Enamel Workers' 
Union, a labor organization affiliated with the American Federa-
tion of Labor, was organized among the employees oi tp.e United 
States Stamping Company. The Financial Secretary of the union 
0 
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testified that the paid-up membership of the union was 229 at the 
time of the hearing. 
During June of 1935 difficulties arose between the management 
and the committee of the union ov~r the negotiation of a new col-
lective agreement concerning wages, hours and conditions of work. 
The management refused to deal with the committee on the ground 
that the union did not represent a majority of the employees of 
the company. 
4. On August 17, 1935, the union held a meeting which was 
open to all of the employees of the production and maintenance de-
partment of the company. At this meeting cards of identical tenor 
were circulated among those present addressed to the National Labor 
Relations Board, marked " ( Strictly Confidential) For Government 
Use Only", designating the Porcelain Ennmel Workers' Union No. 
18630 as the agency for collective bargaining with the company, "for 
the purpose of negotiating an agreement on wages, hours and work-
ing conditions and for the purpose of other mutual aid and protec-
tion.'' 282 such cards were signe~ at the meetmg and subsequently, 
and were then turned over to Ernest Dunbar, an Examiner of the 
National Labor Relations Board. Dunbar ~rlvised Mr. F. S. Earn-
shaw, Secretary and Treasurer of the company, that the cards repre-
sented a majority of the production and' maintenance employees, but 
IYir. Earnshaw still refused to meet the committee of the union ior 
the reason that the union did not represent a majority 0£ the em-
ployees and for the further reason that he would, under no circum-
stances, deal with the representatives of a union, especially one affil-
iated with the American Federation of Labor, but would meet them 
as representatives of the employees of the company. 
5. Dunbar, with the consent of Earnshaw, compared the signa-
tures on the cards with the signatures on cancelled checks of em-
ployees supplied by the comp.any. He :found the signatures on 242 of 
the cards to be the same or identical with those on the cancelled 
checks, 19 signatures on the cards to be doubtful, and 21 to be 
impossible of location among the checks. 
This would give the union a clear majority of the 411 produc-
tion and maintenance employees whom the company employed dur .. 
ing this period. However, the evidence presented by the cards is 
entirely ew parte in character. Although the Board may of course 
act on ew parte evidence and make findings of fact based thereon, we 
feel that under all the circumstances of this case an election should 
be held. 
6. Failing to obtain recognition of the union for bargaining pur-
poses after repeated unsuccessful attempts to settle the matter ami-
cably, the employees o:f the company went out on strike on or about 
November 6, 1935, causing a complete shutdown of the company's 
0 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DECISIONS AND ORDERS --2-
J. ' 
plant. The value of shipments from the company, which for the 
period o:f two weeks prior to the date 0£ the strike amounted to 
$50,000, over 90 per cent of which was interstate, dropped to $7,000 
for the three days succeeding the strike, and then the shipments ceased 
altogether except for desultory parcel post or express shipments. The 
shipment of raw materials to the company, 95 per cent of which was 
also interstate, must have been .correspondingly affected, although 
no evidence on the point appears in the record. 
7. As reported to the lVest Virginia Compensation Board, the 
United States Stamping Company had a total o:f 460 employees as 
of October 31, 1935, exclusive o:f officials of the company. Of this 
number there were 27 employed on the office force, 15 were fore-
men and assistant foremen, and 7 have since been laid off, leaving 
a total of 411 employed in production and maintenance. 
The office force includes typists, clerks and the sales manager. In 
general, it is clear that they constitute a group with functions sharply 
distinguished from that of the employees engaged in actual pro-
cessing operations, are paid on a salary basis as against piece-rate 
and hour-rate bases governing the production and maintenance 
group, are paid on the 15th and 30th of each month while the pro-
duction and maintenance employees are paid on the 7th and 23rd 
of each month, and are regarded by the latter and by themselves as a 
distmct department. .A.t the hearing they made no claim to be recog-
nized as an independent bargaining unit or to be included in a total 
employer unit. 
The foremen, and assistant foremen are paid respectively on a 
salary and an hourly basis and ought also to be excluded as having 
supervisory authority and duties that relate them more directly to 
the management than to the workers. 
The one umt clearly defined as to :function and interest in estab-
lishmg a mechanism for collective bargaining is the production and 
maintenance unit engaged in the actual processing of enamelware 
and mcident activities, and not the total number o:f employees of the 
romp any as contended for by counsel for the company. The produc-
tion and maintenance department was described in the testimony as 
consisting of welding, press, enameling, dipping, spraying, beading, 
baking, packing, shipping, pickling, maintenance, day laborers and 
night watchmen. 
C.0NCLUDING FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF ,LAW: 
1. The United States Stamping Company is a corporation created 
uncl existing under the laws of the State of vVest Virginia and has 
its principal office, main plant and place of business in the City o:f 
:Moundsville, County of :M~arshall and State of West Virginia. It is 
engaged in the manufacture and sale of enamel cooking utensils. As 
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of October 31, 1935 it ,employed 411 persons engaged in the produc-
t1 on and maintenance department. 
2. A great variety of materials is used in the manu:facturing of 
the finished products of the company, 95 per cent 0£ which is pur-
chased from without the State of West Virginia, :f. o. b. shipping 
point. At least 90 per cent of the company's finished products is 
normally shipped to destinations outside of the State of West Vir-
ginia to points in almost all of the states of the United States, all 
sales being made f. o. b. Moundsville, "\,Vest Virginia. 
3. The Porcelain Enamel Workers' Union No. 18630 ·is a labor 
organization organized in 1933 and affiliated with the American Fed-
eration of Labor, whose membership is composed of employees of 
the company engaged in the production and maintenance depart-
ment. The Financial Secretary of the union testified at the hearing 
that the paid-up membership of the union was th.en 229. The evi-
dence tends to indicate that 242 employees in the production and 
maintenance department have designated the union as their repre-
sentative for the purposes of collective bargaining. 
4. The employees ,engaged in the production and maintenance de-
partment o:f the company constitute a unit appropriate for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining, within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of 
the A.ct. 
5. Repeated attempts have been made by the union to negotiate 
with the management of the company as the authorized representa-
tive of the production and maintenance employees for the purpose 
of collective bargaining. The company refused to deal with the 
union as the r,epresentative of the employees o:f the company engaged 
in the production and maintenance department for the purpose of 
collective bargaining, for an alleged reason, inter aUa, that the union 
did not represent a majority of the production and maintenance 
employees of the company. 
6. This controversy ·finally led on November 6, 1935 to a strike o:f 
the employees of the company, precipitating a complete shutdown of 
the production plant of the company and a cessation of production, 
with a consequent interruption of commerce and the free flow of 
commerce. 
7. A question concerning representation has arisen among the pro-
duction and maintenance employees of the company, within the 
m,eaning of Section 9 ( c) of the A.ct. 
8. The question concerning representation which has arisen has 
led and tends to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing 
commerce and the free flow of commerce. 
9. It is the conclusion of the National Labor Relations Board that 
a question affecting commerce has arisen concerning the representa-
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tion o:f the production and maintenance employees of the United 
States Stamping Company, within the meaning of Section 9 ( c) of 
the Act, and that an election by secret ballot should be conducted 
to ascertain who shall represent such employees. 
[ SAME TITLE] 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVES · 
FebniC11·y 11, 1936 
A petition for certification of representatives having been duly 
filed, an investigation and hearing having been duly authorized and 
conducted, and an election by secret ballot having been conducted on 
January 20, 1035 among the production and maintenance employees 
of the United States Stamping Company, located at Moundsville, 
,vest Virginia, pursuant to the National Labor Relations Board's 
Direction for Election dated January 13, 1935, and an intermediate 
report finding that Porcelain Enamel Workers' Union No. 18630 had 
been selected by a majority of such employees having been prepared 
by the Regional Director for the Sixth Region and served upon the 
parties, and no substantial and material issue with respect to the 
conduct of the ballot having been raised by the objections filed with 
this Board by the Company, pu:rsuant to Article III, Section 9 of 
National Labor Relations Board Rules and Regulations-Series 1, 
THEREFORE, by virtue of and pursuant to the power vested in the 
National Labor Relations Board by Section 9 ( c) 0£ the National 
Labor Relations Act, approved July 5, 1935, and pursuant to Article 
III, Section 8 of National Labor Relations Board Rules and Regu-
lations-Series 1, 
IT 1s HEREBY CERTIFIED that Porcelain Enamel Workers' Union No .. 
18630 has been selected by a majority of the production and main-
tenance employees of the United States Stamping Company as their 
representative for the purposes of collective bargaining and that 
pursuant to the provisions of Section 9 .. (a) of said A.ct, Porcelain 
Enamel Workers' Union No. 18630 is the exclusive representative 
of all the production and maintenance employees of the United 
States Stamping Company for the purposes o:f collective bargaining 
in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours o:f employment) and other 
conditions of employment. 
MR. SMITH took no part in the consideration of the above Certi-
fication of Representatives. 
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CHAPTER 5.2 
S. B. No.!!.i • 
. (Pnsscd February 4. um,. In eftect Fcb1·tm1·y 1:i. 
m:r;.) 
LABOR DISPUTES 
DEPUTIZING EMPLOYEES 
An .Act Providing Thnt Sheriffs, Chief~ of 
Pollcet Town 1\-Intshnls, Officers· of the 
Highway Patrol~ or Other Peace orricerR 
Shall Not D~puti7.e the Employees of a 
Private Employer When a Strike, Lockout, 
or r .. nbor Dispute Exists Directly Concerning 
Such· Employer. 
giving to the . industr1nl commission the foll~,v~ 
ing inf ormnUon, to be given . in person or by 
tegistered letter duly addressed to the Utnh stnte 
industrinl commission at Snit Lnke City, Utah: 
(n) Name of person. ..· .· · 
(b) Pince. of residence during the five years 
immedl~tely preceding regif3tnition for work. 
(c) Nnme of person, firm or corporntion·for. 
which he intends to work. 
( d) Time when he .expects to commence 
~~ . . . 
(e) Nature of work to be performed. 
Section 3. Recorda Open ·to Inspection .. 
Be it e11acttd by 11,e Lcoislat,we of the State of The snid industrinl commiasi.on .shnll keep a 
Uta.Tu record of the inf ormntion hQrcin .required :md 
Section 1. Stdkes or Lockouts, Peace O(ficera 
. Not to Deputize Employee~. 
No employee of. any employer whose employees 
arc on. sirike or lockout for arty renson shnU be 
deputized for any purpose a.rising from or in 
connection ,vith such strike by nriy sherHf; chief 
of police, town· marshal, officer of the· highway 
p:itrot, or ·any other pe·ace. officer during· the 
tirne such strike or lockout exists. 
Section 2. Penalty. 
Any person who violate$ the pro,,fsions of thia 
• net •Shall be guilty of n misdemeanor; 
Section. 3. Etfective Dntc. 
This· nc't shnU tnke effe~t upon npprovnl. 
Approved Februnry Ifi, 1937. 
CHAPTER 53 
S. B. No. 27. . (P.nsscd F<!bt•unry. :;, lU!li. In effect Fchrun1•y 10, 
10:r.~) 
the i~ecord shall be open for public ·inspection. 
Section ,J. Violation a l\tisdcmennor~ 
. The violation of any ·of .the provisions of this 
net shnll be co11sidered ns n misdemeanor. 
Section a. Effective Dnte. 
This net shall take effect upon approval. 
Approved February 16, 1937. 
CHAPTER 54 
S. B. No. 34. 
(Passed February 10, rn:r.. ln eff cc:t Fcbruarl-' 
:.m. 1037,) 
f.,ABOR DISPUTES-SETTI.,El\1ENT 
An Act Amending Sc~tion 49-l-,'3t Revised 
Stat~tes of Utah, 1933, ·nelating .to the Dutles 
or the Industrial Commis.tdnn or Utah to 
Ertcd Settlemenb1 or l,nbor Dispute~, nnd 
Repealing Sections 49-l:-6 and 49-1-7, Re-
vised Statutes of Utah, t933. 
Be it c.11actcd bu f./io Legislaht1·e of tire Stata o.f 
LABOR DISPUTES Ulali: 
REGISTERING EMPLOYEES DURING Section J. Section Amended .. 
STRII<E Section 49-1;.3, Revised Statutes of Utah, 10831 
An .Act Requirh;1g RegistrnUon With the Indu~- is nmended to 1-etid as follows: 
trial Commission or Utah · Before Accepting 
Employment During a faibor Strike. 
.Be it enacted In, t.J,e, I .. t[Ji:<ln.hu·r. of the Statn of 
. Uta'li: . 
Section 1. Registration. 
It is the duty of every person before commenc-
ing employment with any person, firm or corpora-
tion. ,vhose employeca are out on labor strike 
called by a. national· recognfaed union to register 
with the industrial commission of Utah. 
Section 2. Id. Information Required. 
Such registratio~ shall be accomplished. by 
49-l--.1.. Duties of Industrinl C()mmission-
Endenvor to Effect Settlements. · 
A~ soon ns practicable alter 1·eceiv1ng such 
application the commissfon shall request c11ch of 
the parties to the dispute to rtg:ree upon a writ-
tct1 statement of fncts relating to the controversy, 
and ~o submi_t the.anme-to ~t. When such agree-
ment cannot be 1·eachcd each of .the parties mny 
s~pnrntely submit to the commlssfort n written 
statement of' grievances. . Applications to the 
coinmfssion for adjustment must precede any 
lockout on the part of employers and any strike 
on the part of employees in the majority and 
00772 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
[111'] LABOR Chs. 54, 55 
shall include a promise to abide by the decisio~ 
of the commission and must be signed by the 
employer on the one side and by a majority 
of his employees on the other. As soon as prac-
ticable after receiving such application the com-
mission shall proceed to n hearing and 
determination. \Vhen it appears to the industrial 
commission that an amicable settlement by con-
ciliation or mediation may not be had the said 
commission. shall request both pnrtics to tl1e 
controversy to submit in writing a full statement 
of its 1,rrievances to the 1;aid commission. A 
mnjority of the employees, at n meeting cnUed 
r or thnt purposo, mny appoint a committee to 
prepare such statement on behalf of such em-
ployees. The industrial commission shnU at all 
times use its office in nn effort to adjust the 
matters in dispute and it may hold hearings 
thereon nt whtcb each p~rty may submit evidence 
in support of its cause. 'fhe said commission may 
require the attendance of witnesses and may 
issue subpoenas to assure their attendance. After 
being fully advised iu the premises the said 
commission shall make findings and recommen-
dntions which shall be submitted to cnch of the 
parties to the controversy and also to the gov .. 
et'nol-. In the event thnt the said parties, within 
five dnys after having received a copy of such 
findings and recommendations, fail to reach an 
agreement, then, upon request of either party, 
tho said findings nnd recommendations shaU be 
published by the commission. 
Scetion 2. Disobeying Subpoenncs-Contempt 
Proceedings. 
In the event of n person having been duly 
subpoenaed to appear before the commission in 
Rnid hearings and wilfully fails to appear the 
commission may file a petition with the district 
coui·t in the county where the hearing is being 
held, stating the fncts and praying for a citation 
agail18t said person for contempt. Upon the fil-
ing of said petition, it shall be the duty of the 
coul't to issue a citation requiring snch person 
to appear nt a time nnd place certain nnd then 
and there show cause why he should not be pun• 
fshed for contempt of court nnd, in the event 
the court finds that such person has wilfully 
di sobcyed the subpoena issued by the commis-
~ion, ft shall be the duty of the court to punish 
said person for contempt. 
8ection 3. Sections Repealed. 
Sections 49•1·0 nnd 49-1-7, Revised Statutes of 
Utah, 1933, are repealed. 
Section 4. Effective Dnte. 
This net shall take effect upon approval. 
Approved February 20. 1937. 
CHAPTER 55 
H, B. No. 03. 
(P:isscd Mnrch 11, 1037. In effect Mnrcl1 221 
1037.) 
U1'AH LAilOU RELATIONS ACT 
An Act Repealing Chapter 1, Title 1 91 Revised 
Statutes or Utnh, 1933, Creating the ••Lnbor 
Relntions llonrdt" nud Designating the In .. 
dustrinl Commission or the Slate or Utnh 
to Act as the '•Lnl>or Rc1atlons llonrd''; 
Defining Tci·ms Used in the Act; Prescribing 
the Powers nnd Duties or the "Labor Rcln-
tiom1 llourd"; Giving J .. nbor lhc Right to 
llttrgllin CoUectively; Prescribing Certain 
Rights nod Duti~s of Em1>loyces; Prohibit• 
ing Unfair Labor Prncticc on the Part of 
Employers; Providing for the lnvcstlgntion, 
llenring, nnd Disposition of IAnbor Disputes 
and Unfair Labor Practice by the "Lnbor 
Relations Bonrd"; Authoriiing the 0 Lahor 
Relations IJonrd" to Petition the Supreme 
Court to Enforce the Orders of the .. Lnbor 
Relations Board"; Providing the Aggrieve<l 
Persons .l\lny Obtain Writs From the Supreme 
Court to Review Orders of the 0 Lnbor 
Relations Board'•; l\lann~r or hu1ulng Sub• 
poenns nnd Enforcing Attendance of Wit, 
ncsscs and Taking 'l'cstimony by the 0 Lnbor 
Relations Ilonrd; Providing the .. Labor 
Relations Iloar<l" 1\luy Obtain Datu From 
Other State Bonrds; Providing Penalties for 
Violntion or the Provisions of this Act; 
Appropriating Funds to Put Into ECrect the 
Provisions of This Act. 
Be it enacted b11 tlrn Legislat1i1·c of (Ile State of 
Utali: 
Section l. Chn1>ter Rcpenled. 
Chnpter 1, 'fitle 49, Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933, is repealed. 
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. 
The deninJ by employers of the right of em-
ployees to orgnnize and the refusal by employers 
to accept the procedure of collective bargaining 
lead to strikes and other forms of industriaJ 
strife or unrest, which have the intent or the 
necessary effect of burdening or obstructing 
int1·nstate commerce by (a) impairing the cW-
ciency, safety or opcrntion ot the insb•umentali-
tles of int1·nstnte commerce; (b) occm·ing in the 
current of commerce; (c) matc1•ially affecting, 
restraining or cont1·0Uing the flow of raw 
materials or manufactured or processed goods 
from or into the channels of intrastate commerce, 
or the pt•icca of such materials or goods in 
inti-nstnte commerce; 01· ( d) causing diminution 
of employment nnd wages in such volume ns aub-
stnntially to impair or disrupt the market for 
goods flowing from or into the channels of in-
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trastatc commerce and the <>rdcrly operation. of 
industry. 
The inequality_ of bargaining power between 
employees who do not possess full freedom of 
asaocintfon or nctual liberty of cotitr~ct, and 
etn"ployers who arc organized in the :cot·porate 
or other forms of o~vnership nssociation sub-
stantially ·burdens_ ~nd n_f(e.cb.l the flow of com".' 
mercc, and . fonds to aggravate recurrent busi-
ness dcl)ressioris, by depressing ,vn1;tc rates and 
·thep1.1rchnaing power of wage ·eo.rners in indus-
try and by preventing the stabilizntion of ~om-
petitive wage rates and ,vorklng conditions 
within and between industries. 
Experience has pi·oved that protection by Ja,v 
of the right of .employees to organize and bar-
gain caJlcf;tively anfegua1•ds commerce from 
injury, impairment or i~te.rruption, ;ind pr<>• 
motes the flow of commerce by removing certain 
recognized sources or indµstrial strife nnd _ un-
rest, by encourngirig practices fundamental to 
the friendly ;1.dfustment of industrinl disputes 
arising out of differences ns to wages, hours or 
other working conditions, and by rcstc,ring equal-
ity of ba1·gaining po,ver behveen employers nnd 
employees. 
It is hereby declared to · be , the policy of the 
state of Utah to eliminnte the' causes of· certain 
substantial obstructions to the free operation of 
• industi-y nnd to mitigate nnd: eliminate these 
ob·sb:uctions when they· have occurred by en-
couraging the practice ni:id, procedure of collec-
tive bargaining and by protecting the exercise 
by· ,vorkers of full ireedom of association,_ sclf-
orgnntzation, and designaUon of ·1•cpreaen~ativcs 
of their o\vn choosing, for the purpose of- nego-
tiating the - terms and conditions of their em-
ployment or other mutunl aid. or protection. 
Section 3. Definitions. 
When used in this aet-(1) The term 
"person" bieludes · one or mor~ indivldunls, part .. 
nershfps, associationsi corporations, legal repra-
sentatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy 01• 
receivers. 
· (2) The term '°'employer'' includes ariy person 
acting in the interest of nn employer, directly or 
indirectly, but shall not .i~clude the United ~tntes, 
or any state or political subdivision thereof, 01· 
any ·person subject to Jhe. railway labor net, 8J! 
mncnded from time to time~ or nny labor organt-
zation (other than when noting as· an ernploY.cr). 
or anyone acting In tha cnpacity of officer or 
agent of.such labQr 01•gnniintion. 
(8) The term "employ_~" shall i11clude nllY 
employee, and shall ~ot ·be, limited to the em-
ployees of a particular employer, unless the net 
explicitly states otherwise, . nnd shnU include 
any· . fodividual whose work, . hns ceased v.s a 
consequence of, or .in conneetion with, any cur-
r.ent labor dispute or bc9D,use of any unfair labor 
practice, 11nd who hns not obtained any other 
regular nnd substnntinlly equ·ivalent employ-
ment, but ahnll not include any individual em-
ployed as .an ng1·icultural lnb.<>rer, or in the 
domestic ·service of nn·y f~miJy or· person at his 
home, or any individual employer by his parent 
01• spouse. 
(4) The term "1·eprescntntives•• includes nny 
individual or lnbor organization. 
( 5) The term "lal)ol" orgnnfantion" means 
nny 01·gnnization o:f any kind, or any agency o,r 
employee representation: committee or plan)· In 
wMch employees pnrtfolpnte nnd which ~xfsts 
for the purpose, in wholc. o~ in _part; _of denting 
with erilployel's concerning grievances, labor 
disputes. wnges, 1,·atca of pny, hours of crnploy-
nfont, or. conditions. of wprk. 
(G) The te1~m "comrilercc';t mcnns trade, 
traffic, commercei transportation, or communf .. 
cation within the state of Utah .. 
(7) The term "affecting ·commerce" means 
in commerce, or burdc11ing or obstructing com-
mci•ce or the free flow of commerce, or hnving 
led 01• tending to lend to a labor dispute burden-
ing or obstructing comi:rierce- or the free flow 
of commerce within the stnte of Utnh. 
(8) The term "unfnir_.l~bor 1>r;icticc" means 
nny unfair labor prnctice _listed. i~ seetion 9. 
(9) The term "labor dispute" includes any 
controversy concerning terms, tenure or con(ii-
tions of employm~nt, or concerning the asso--
cintion. or representation of persons in nego-
tinting, fixing, mnlntninlng, changing or seeking 
to arr:mge terms or' conditions of employment, 
regnrdl~s o_f whether the_ disputants stand in 
the proximnte relation :of employei; or employee. 
(10) The term ·111abor relations· bonrd" means 
the industrinl commission of Utah. 
Section 4.. Lnbor Relntions Board. 
(n) The industrial commission of Utah . is 
designated as the labor relations board harein-
afte1• referred to aa the board. 
(b) A vncnncy in the board shall not impnii; 
the r[ght of the remaining members to exercJse 
all the powers of tho bourd, · nnd two members 
of the bonrd shall,. at all times, constitute a quor-
um. The bonrd shall nave an official senl which 
shall be judicially noticed. 
( c) The board shall at the close of · each 
fiscal yenr make _a report · in . writing to the 
leg.ish1tu1·e .nnd .to the governor .stating in detail 
the cases .it hns hellrd, the- , decisions it has 
rendered, the nanics, salaries and duties of. nH 
employees _ and officers in the · employ -or under 
the supervision of the board, nnd an account 
of all moneys it has disbursed. 
Section 5~ Emtaloyccs-Expenscs of Board. 
(n) The bonrd. may employ· nn cxecutiv~ sec'!' 
retnry, ailcl Rttcb attorneys, examiners, and may 
employ such other: empJoyees with regard to 
existing laws applicnble to the employment and 
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CQtnpensntiQn of officf!ts and employees of the 
state of Ut~h as it mriy f' rom timo to time find 
necessa.ry for th~ pr9per p~rf 01-mµnce 9f its 
duties. The bonrd mny -establish or. utilize suc.h 
regional, "Jocai1 or ·othcr.· agcnci~, and utilize such 
voluntary ijrtq uncQmpensnted .services, ns mny 
from time to time be needed. Attorneys employed 
under this section ·mny, nt .the direction of the 
boar<!, nppcnr·. fot and represent_ the boni~d in 
«.l~Y cnse in .cQurt. ~othing iit tbis ~ct ahnll be 
constr·ued to authorize the hon.rd to cmpioy indi-
viduals :Cor ·t11e purpose~of conciliation 01· medin.-
tfon (or ior statistical work) where· and if sucll 
serYice may be· obtained ft-oin the depnrtment of 
lnbor~ · 
(b) All or the expensea of the):iontd, :inclu4-
i11g· tho necessai·y traveling_· expenses, incurred by 
tho membc1·s or employees of. the. bonrd. unde-r 
its orders, shnll be allowed nn4 paid on the pre• 
seufation of itcrilized votiehc1-s therefor ap .. 
provcc,l by the board 01· by· any individual it 
deslg~ntes for the purpose. · 
Section o. or rices •. 
The pl'incipal . offfoc of- the boa1·d shnU be at 
tbc state capitol but it mny m.eet nnd exercise any 
or nll of its powers at any other place. The bo::u·d 
mny, by one Qr mo1·e Qf. ita members or by such 
u~cnts or agcneica. ns it m_ay designate, prosecute 
ilny hi<(ufry necessary. to 1ts functions ln any 
part or the st_,,te of Utnh. A member who pal'tici-
patcs in ~uch inqui.ry _shall not be disqunllficd 
from subsequently pnrtieipnting in n decision 
of the board in the same crise~ 
Section 7. Rules and Regulations. 
(a) The bonrdshall:hnve.nuthority £~om time 
to time to xrtnke, amend ·and 1-escind such rules 
nnd regulntions as mny b~ neccssar.y to cai-1.-y 
out th~ provisions. of this·_.nct. Such rµles and 
l'egulations shnll be eUeeti.ve ··upon· pubUcntion 
In the m::mner whic}l the board· shall· prescribe. 
Section 8. Self-Organization 
Bnrgaining. 
Collective 
Employee~ ahnU have the right to self-organl-
z:ition, to form, join, . or assist labor . 01•griniza-
tions, to ba.1:gntn collectively through representa-
tives of thei_r ·own choosing. and to eng;lge 'in 
concerted nctiv.ities, for the purpose -of coUeetivo 
~a1·galning o~_othe1~ m-ut\tnl aid or 1n·oteetion. 
Section 9. Unfnir Lnbor P.rncUecs. 
.It shn11. be an unfair fabor practice fi;>r an 
employer-(!) to interfere with, tcst1·:dn- 01· 
coei-ce employees· in the e~er~ise of the ~•igbts 
guarru1toed in .section 8. 
· (2) To dominate or intcl'ferc wlth .the -for-
mution 01· ndtninistration of any labo1~ orgnniza.; 
tion .or contribute iinnncial or other s~pport- to 
it.; 1n·9-.:idc~, that subject. · to 1·ules and regula-
tion~ mndc nnd pubUs~ed by the bonrd puJ;SuQ.nt 
to section 7 (a) :m employer shall not be pro-
hibited from per~itting em.ployecs to ~onfer with 
him during. wo1•kiifg hours ,vithou~ loss of time 
01•pny. 
{3) By d,i:scrjm~nntion in reg~(). tp hiro gr 
tcnu1·e of employment or any term or condition 
of employment to encourage ·or discoufage mem:-
persliip ih -~ny labor organ.~ntion i pi·o~i,jcd, that 
nothing (n this act sh2lU preclude -~n em,ployer 
from making nn .. ngreement with n labor orgnni~ 
zntion (no~ est:,.blished, maintn.h1etl or assisted 
by any ~ctioiI ~efined in this act ns ~n unfair 
hibo1• · p1icticc) . to i~equire as .a- _:co11dition of 
employment, membe1:"3hip ther~in, if such "I~bor 
01•ga11izntion is the rcprescntntive of the em:.. 
ployees ns m·ovided. in sectfo~ 10, (a)_, In the. 
appro1>ri'.',tc collective. ~"Lrgainirig ·unit co~re~ 
by such agreement when ~~de~ 
( 4) ·To discharge or otherwise- dJscriininate 
agninat·:m cmploye_e bec;,1.us_e ~e has filed charges 
oi•- given testimony tinder :tl~is . ~et. 
(5J . To refuse to bnrgnin collectively with the 
1·epl-esent.ntives of .hia employees, ilUbject to the 
p1·ov~ions of section io (n). 
Section 10. C91lect,ive Bargaining ·--- R~pre~ 
r:ientntives. 
(a) Representatives designated oi' selected 
fo1•· the ·purposes Qf collective ·bnrgnining' by. the. 
m~jority of the employees in a unit ;tpproprillte 
for, sttch 1mrposes, shall _be the exclusive r.ep·re• 
~ent~tivcs of ,:ill the employees in ,such. unit :for 
the purposes of ce>ll-acti\fe bargaining. in respect 
to 1·a~es of pay, wages, hours of employment, or 
otbe1• conditions of cmployroent; ·p1·011idcd, that 
nny :individual ctnpl~yee or n, .g1•o~p of em-
ployees shnll' have the 1·ight at any lime to pre-
sent grievances to their· employer •. 
ilpptoptiata Unit. 
(b) The board· !!hall decide . .in each. case 
wbcthet·> in order to h1su1·e to·~mployees the full 
bcncf.it of thcfr right ·to sclf-orgnnJzntion and to 
collec_tive bnrgaining, and othe1·wiee. to efrec.·t--
unte the· policfos of this. act, tlle unit appropriate 
for the pu1•poscs of collective bill'gaining shall 
be. tho ~mploycr uni~-, craft un_it; :plnnt unit., or 
subclivisiou · thereof. · 
Questlous A//ccti11g Int1·astate Com.mo1·cc. 
{ e) Whenever a question affecting intrasiate 
commc1•ce or the ·01·del'ly operation of . industi,y 
ni•isca concerning the tep1•oscntntfon of employ ... 
ocs, the bonrd may inv~stigata such con.troversy 
:iµd ccr~ily to the _parti~, in writing, the ·name 
or names or th_e 1•epresentntives thnf have been 
designated or selected.· I~ nny such investigatfon, 
tho· board shall provide for an appropriate• hear-
ing upon· due notlc~~ either in co1~j'i.rnction with 
n p1·ocecdiug under :$cction 11 or- other,v"is~ and 
Jnny ~c a secirct bnUot of. en,iplQyqes, or utilize 
any other. _ suitable method to ascertain such 
representatives.· · · 
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let. Rcv.ic1u-T,-ci.1iso1'i'ot. 
(d) Wh~ncver a!. v1.Jer of· the board mAde 
pursuant to section 11-· (c) . is based in whole or 
in Jlt.r.rt upon. facts certified following an·. inves .. 
tigntion purstmnt to stibs~tiO.ri ( c) oi · this se<:-
tion, nnd. the1~Js a_ petition for the enforcement 
or review of· at.ich order, such certification and 
the. record of such in11estigntlon shrul be included 
in tile transcript of the entire record required 
to be .tiled -undc1• subsections 11 (e) or 11 (f), 
and the1·eupon the decree of the court e11fo1·cing, 
mo,lifying, 01· setting aside iu wbole or i:n pn1~t 
the order.of tlle board shall be made and entered 
upou tl1c· pleadings, testb11ony nrid. proceedings 
set io1-th in such transcript. 
Section .U. Unf~ir Practices - Powers of 
Ilonrd to l1rcvent. 
(a) The "oard is empowe1~cd, as hercimifte:r 
provided, to prc,•ent any person from engaging 
in n)ly unraJ1· lnbor practice . (li_s~cd . in ,liection 
9) affecting intr:lstntc co~crce or the orderly 
operation or industry. Thi~ PO\Ver shall bC! ex-
chlsivc, and .s11:dl not be n.ffectcd by any other 
~c~ns of adjtistinerit ·01· pi•evention t:h,at has 
been. or may be cs~iblished by agreemen~ code, 
ln.w 01· othe1•wise. • 
Hearings~ 
(b) Whenever it is cha:•ged that any person 
hns engaged in or is cngngej in any such unfair 
labo1•· pi-acticc, the board, 01· an.y agent or agency 
designated by Ute board for such purpo~es, shall 
have power· io issue and cause to be served upon 
such pe1·son a complnin't fJtati11g the charges in 
that' respect,. :ind contnirung a notfce ot henring 
before tl1e board or a member thereof, or before 
~ dqgignuted · ngen,t or agency. nt n, place tber,in 
fixed, · not . less than five days after the serving 
or· said· comphtint. .Any such complaint may be 
amended by t11e membe1·, agent, or agency con-
ducting the hearing 01· tlle boar~ in its diacre-
tio11 nt any ·time prior to the issuance of till 
order _ba.11cd the1·con. The pers·on so complained 
of shall have the. right to file an answer to the 
original or amended complaint nnd to nppcnr in 
pe1:son or otherwise nn<l give tcst1mony at the 
11lncc and time. fixed in the -complaint Iii ·the 
discretion of the member·, ngel\t or agency conN 
ducting the hearing or- tbe board, any other 
person nmy be allowed to int<frveitc in the said 
proceeding and to p1·escnt testimony. In any 
sttch proceeding the 1·ules of evidence pi-evnfiing 
fo courts of faw or ectnity shnU riot be coritroU• 
in~ · · · 
lcl. Repo1;t of l-Ica1·i11us-Or·dcrs of 'Board. 
(c) Th(t testimony taken by such member, 
agent, or ngency or the bom·d ehnll be reduced 
~a ,vr.iting nrid filed with tho boni"d. Thet-enfter 
in it.1 discx-ctio~, the_ b9ard. upon 11otice m~y take 
further testi_mony pr he11r argument. If upon 
nll. the testimony tnken the bonrd shall be of 
the opinion that any person named in the·_ com-
JJlaint has engaged in or is eng:,Lging in any 
such unfair lnbor practice, then tl1e board shall 
.stntc its findings of fact nnd ·ahnll 'issue and 
cause to. be served on sucb Pel'S·on., 1;1n order to 
cease and desist from such unfair labor p~-
tice, and ·to tnke such affirmntive ·action, includ-
ing reinstatement· of employees with or with9ut 
back pay, as will- effectuate_ the policies of th_is 
net. Such order mAY rurtherrcquire such.person 
to make. t~epol'ts from: time to time -showing the 
extent to which it hns complied with the order. 
· If upon· all the testimony taken the board shall 
be of the opinion thnt no :person named in the 
complaint" hns engaged in or ls engaging in any 
such .. unfair lnbo1• prnctice,. then the boo.rd shall 
state its findings of fnctand ~hnll .issue mt .order 
dismissing the said compl~int. 
Ti·inc i11, Wltic/1. Bo(l,rd May Afodi/1.1 Orders. 
(d) Until a. tr~nscrlpt of the record in n 
cusc shall Jlave been filed. in a .court, as herein .. 
after provided,. the bonrd may nt any time, upon , 
reasonable notice and jn such manner ns it may 
deem proper. modify or set aside, in ,vhole or in 
pni·t, any finding ·or order made or issued by it. 
Petitions to Suprema Coit:rt to ·E1iforce Otde,·s~ 
(c) The bonrd aho.11 have power to petition 
the supreme coµrt of Utah (wherein the unfair 
faboi· practice in question oooutred or wherein 
such person resides or tr~nsncbJ ·business) fo1· 
the enforcement of such ordel'.' and for appropri-· 
ntc temporn1·y reli~f or restraining order.. and 
shall certify· and ~ile in the .court a transcript 
of the entire record. in the proceeding, including 
the pleadings ·nnd testimony upon which such 
order was entered and. the findi~gs a.11~ order 
of the board. Upon such filing, the court shall 
cause notice thereof to be served upon s·uc1i· per-
~on, an~ thereupon shrul have jurisdiction of the 
proceeding nnd of the question determinf:!d there-
in, ai1d shall have power to.grant such temporary 
i·cHei 01• restrnining order as it deems just and 
propel', and to make nnd enter upon the.pleadings, 
tcstfmony;, nnd proceedings set forth in ·such 
transcript a decree enforcing, ,rnodtfy!ng, and 
enforcing ns so modified, or setting aside in 
whole or in part the order -of the board. No 
objection that hns not been urged before the 
hom·d, its mcmbcrt ngent or agency, shall be 
comddercd ·by the court, unless · the fnilure or 
neglect to urge such objection shnll be excused 
bccnnse of extraordin:fry cl!'cuinstances. The 
findingR of the bonr<l na to the. !ricts, if supported 
by c\•idencc, Hhttll .be conclusive. If either pnrty 
~hnll npply to the court for lcnve to adduce addi• 
tionnl f!viclcncc nnd 8lu:tll show to the sntisfaction 
of the court that. such additional evidence is 
material nnd thnt there we.re rcnscmabtc· grounds 
fo1· the failure to ndduce such evidence in the 
hearing· before the board, fts member, agent ot; 
agency, the court may order such additional evi ... 
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de·nce to be taken before the bonrd, its metnber. 
agent ·Qr agency, and·· to be made pnrt of the 
transcript. The. board mny modify its Jindb.1gs 
ns to the facts, Qr ·malte n~w findi:ngs,.: by re~~on 
of ndditlon~l <!Vidence so tuken and filed, and 
it shnll file such . modified 01· .ne,,v _ findinbrs, 
which, U supported by ~vidence, shall be_ con-
clusive, and sludl file its .recommendations, If 
any,_ tot the modification or . .-:setting· _:aaide ot i~ 
originul 01•del\ Th~ ju~i~~iction of the_. sblte 
gupr~me ~out~t sha~l be exclim.ive nnd its judg-
ment nnd dec1·ee shall be final. 
Persciils Au1Me.vcd, bv Orde~· of JJoanl-Rc-
·vie10. 
(C) Any pe1~son ngg1·ievcd by_ a final order, 
the bo:ird grnnting 01· · denying in whol~. or in 
pa1-t the relief •sought, may obtaJ~ a revfo,v. of 
such or~~i• in the supreme cotfrt of Utah by 
filing in: such court a writt<in petitio~ praying 
th1lf the u1•der of the board ·be' modified or act 
uside. A copy of such petition shaiJ ·be forth-
\Vith served · U()()n the bo_rird, and thereupon the 
ng1,.rrleved party shnll file in tJ1e co~rt a tran'." 
script of· the cnth-e 'i-ecord. irt the: proceeding, 
certirleo· by tbe board, :Including the plea~Hng 
and ~timony · up<m whJch the order corilplnin~d 
of .was entered and the fh;idings and order o_f 
the board. Upon such filing, the court shall 
pro.ceed in th~ same manner as in t be cnse of an 
application by the board ttilder subsec~i~n (e), 
arid shall have the snme exclusive jurisdiction to 
g1•nnt to the bonrd such temporary relief 01• 
rcstmhllng orde1.· as it deems just and proper, 
und in like manner to make nnd enter a .decree 
enfol'cing, modifying and .. enforcing as -so mo.di-
fied, or setting aside in. whole or in pa1·t the 
ordei• of the boat·d·; nnd the ·ff ndings Qfthe board 
as to .the facts. if supported ·by evidence, shall 
i_n Uke mnnner be conclusive. 
Pr,,ccedi,1(18 Not a Stay of Orde,·a~ 
(g) The comtne11cement of proceedings tinder 
subsection (e) or (f) of this section &hall .not, 
unless spe~i!icnlly ord~re.d by the coui-t, operate 
asa sL~Y of the board's order. 
Petil.fo,1:1 ttJ be Heard Wit1t.in Ten. Day~ .. 
(h) f~titfon., filed undc·r this uct shall be· 
1uml·d ~"tpcdftiou~Jy. a~d if- possible within teu 
.day~ nfter they have been docketed. 
Section 12. Securing Evidence-Witnesses. 
li'or thq ·.purpose of all henrings and h:avesti-
gntions,. which, in the _opinion of the- bonrd. are 
11eccssnry and· proper for the exercise of the 
poweJ-s · vested fn it l)y sectfQn. 9 nnd section ti 
-( i) the board or its duly alitho·rized agents or 
agencies, slmll ri.t all rcnsonnble times have ac-
cess to, for -the _purpose oj _examination. and the 
rightto ·copy any evidence of any person being 
hn·e$1tig~teg or p1·occeded against ·. tn~t -relates 
to any matter U!')der fnveatigAtion or Jn quc~tfon, 
Any m~mber of 'the board shall have po,ver to 
issue subpoenas 1•cqu·iring the attenda11ce an_<l 
testhnony o'C wit~~ea_ n1.1d the IJtOd.u~t~on of. a.,ny 
C\'idence thnt relates to any . matter· uride1• J_n~ 
vcstigntfon or in question, before the- bo;ird, its 
member, __ agent or. ~ge11cy co1,1~uctin1r the ~cni'-in!l 
oi- fnvestfgntion. Any member of the ·board, or 
.iny ngent or agency designated by -the board _for 
such :Pllrposcs, may .~dniinister oaths and affir-
nuitions, examjne·witnesscs, und rcc~iye evidence. 
Such llttcntlancc of··\v1tnesses and the production 
of· ·sucl1 evidence may be req~li~e<i from nn.r· 
place In the stnte of· Utah tlt any duly designated 
place, of hearing. . . 
Stibvocma_~, R.eb~ai to Obev. 
(2) !ii case oi cantumney o~ refusal to obey 
a ~n.Jl,i,oeua _ issued to any person, a_ny distrt~t 
court o! Utnh ,vlthln the jurisdiction of which 
the· lnqu°fry is C4'il~_rted on or within the 3urisdic;;..: 
tion of Which s~id_ llerao1_1 guilty _Q.f c<>ntum~y 
01· >:e!usnl t~ olJQy is found or resides or trans'."'. 
nct8 business ltpou application by the board shall 
hnve .jui•isdiction to iss~e to such .persoll a.n or'.' 
d~r re<1uiring such· perao~. to iippear before the. 
board, its mcinbcri ··agent or agency, there to 
lli•oduce evidence i:£. so order¢d, 01· there to give 
testimony touching the ·matte1~ under investiga-
tion or. in que.stion; and nny :failure to obey 
such- orde1· -of the cot.r.t mny be .punished by said 
court :is a contempt thereof. 
I,,imunitu. 
:c 8) N.o pe1~son. :sh_all be. excused from nttei\d-
ing and testifying 01· from producing books, 
rcco1•ds. corr~qp~nd~nce; documen~ or ~other evi--
dcnccdn obedience to the subpoena of the-board, 
on the ground thnt the testimo.µy or. evidence 
>:equired of l:tim may· te~d to incriminate hint or, 
suJ)ject hiI,n to a• penalty o.r forfeiture; 'put no 
individual .shall be ,prosecuted or ·subjected. ~to 
any ~.natty or forfeiture for or on account of 
:my · trnnsaction, matter or. thing concerningi 
,,;hi~'h he .Is . con1pcdled aftc1· havl~g cl1dmed ·lii~ 
privilege agail}.":tt self-incrimination, ·to_ .testify 
or proditce evidence. exeept .that such individnnl 
so testifying shall not be-exe~pt fro~ ·pr~ecu-
tion nnd 1mnishmerit. for per jury committed · in 
so testifying. 
· ·Sc1•vlce of Processes • 
( 4) Complaints, 01~ders and ot_her processes 
an<l papera of the bo~rd,. its membci•,. agent or 
. ugcncy; mny be S€!'rved either 1>ersolinl1;r or by 
registered mail or by telegraph or by leaving ~ 
_copy the1·eof at the prii1cipaJ off Jee or· place of 
business or ·the ()el'son required to be served. 
The verified 1•(!tu1•n by the intlfvidttal so serving 
thn sam~ setting forth the .manner of such serv-
ice sluill be pl'oor of the snrrie, :ind ,rct1.1rn post 
office. 1·eceipt or telegram receipt therefor when 
1•eg~stcrcd nn~l m.~il~d 9r telC)gr.t1pbcc;l ~ ~fqre-
!:mid shnll be proof of service of the saine._ Wit-
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nesses aummoned before tho bourd, its member, 
agent or agency, shall be paid the same fees 
and milenge that are pnid witnesses in the courts 
of. Utah and witnesses whose depositions are 
taken nnd the persons taking the snme sh:tll 
severally be entitled to the same fees na are 
paid for like services in the courts of the state 
of Utnh. 
Sto.te Aoeucics Required ta Fm-,u·s1, Info,~ma.~ 
tio11. 
(5) The seve1·ul state depa1·tments and agen-
cies of the state when directed by the governor 
shall rumish the bo~rd, upon its request all 
records, papers, and informntion In theil' pos-
session l'elating to nu.y matter befol'e the board. 
Section 13. WilCul InterCerence-Pennlly. 
Any person who shall wilfully 1·esist, prevent, 
impede or interfere with any member of the 
board 01• nny of it~ agents 01· agencies in the 
performance 0£ duties pm-sunnt to this act shall 
be punished by n fine of not more than $5,000 
01· .by imprisonment for not more than one year, 
or both. 
Section 14. Right to Strike. 
Nothing in this net ahnU be construed so as to 
inter! ere with or impede 01~ diminish in any 
way the right to strike. 
Section 16. Pnrtinl Invalidity-Saving Clnuse. 
If any proyision of this act, or the application 
of .such provisions to any .person or circum-
stance1 shnll be held inv1\lidi the 1·emninder of 
this act, or the application of such provision 
to persons r;>r eh·cumstances other than t11osc 
as to which it is held inv.nlid, shall not b,,. af.:. 
fected thereby. 
Section 16. Short Title. 
This net mny be cited as the "Utah Labor 
Relations Act." 
Section 17. Appropriation. 
There Is he1-eby appropriated from tho gen-
eral funds of the state or Utah, not otherwise 
appropriated, the sum of $10,000 for the coming 
biennium for the purpose of cnn·ying out the 
provisions of this act. 
Section 18. E£Ccctive Date. 
This act shnll take effect upon approvnl. 
Approved March 22, 1937. 
CJIAPTER 5(i 
S. B. No. 28. 
(Passed l1'ebrunry ,t1 lo:rr. In effect February li'i, 
w:rr.) 
REGISTUA'l'ION OF LAUOR 
ORGANIZATIONS 
An Act Requiring the Roglstrution With the 
Industrial Commission of All Labor Orgnn-
i:r.ntions or UnJons in the State of Utnh. 
Be it euactcd by tJ,e Legislature of the State of 
Utah: 
Section l. Registration. 
It ia the duty of every lnbo1· orgunizntiou or 
lubor union ,vithin the state of Utah, on or be:. 
fore si::i...-ty days afte1· this net becomea effective, 
to register such labor organiz~tiou 01· union 
with the industrial · commission of the state of 
Utah. 
Section 2. Id. Information Required. 
Such registration shall be made by the presi--
dent or scc1•etai-y giving to the said industrinl 
('ommissfon in writing on Junuary 1st of e:ich 
ycnr the !ollowing information: 
(n) The u~me nnd n<idrcss or .,uch lribot• or--
ganizntion or union. 
(b) The nnme.tt nnd uddresses of its local 
officei•s. 
(c) The name and address of the natiounl 
or intc1·nntioonl oi•gnnizntion 01· union, if nny, 
with which it is affiliated. 
Sedion 3. Changes Reported. 
Notice of nil changes in Ol·gtmfantiou, nd-
dresscs or any of the infot·matfou required by 
Rcction 1 of this act shall be reported to the 
industriul commission within ten dnys after the 
chnnge.q arc made. 
Section •I. ViolationM n l\lisdemeanor. 
The violation of any of the provisions or this 
uct Rhnll be considered ns n misdemeanor. 
SccUon 5. Eff cctive Dt}lc. 
ThiM net shnll tuke effect upon a1>1n·ovul. 
App2·ovcd Februm·y 15, 1987. 
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CHAPTER 57 
S. B. No. ltl, (Pnsscd Fcbrunry l:I, 1037. In effect February 
:.m. 1037.) 
ASSIGNl\lENTS FOR BENEFIT OF LABOR 
AND FARI\I ORGANIZs\TIONS 
An Act l\lnking It the Duty of•'Employers and 
of Processors, or Dealers in•-:Farm Products 
to Recognize Assignments of Their Em .. 
ployees ori of Producers Cor the Benefit or 
Labor Orgimizutions or Farm Organizations, 
or Any Other Organbmtion (!f Employees or 
l•'armt!rs, nnd Providing a Pehalty for Drench 
or Such Duty. 
.lJc it cuacicd by the Lcgislalm·c of lite State of 
Ulall: 
Section 1. Assignmenh1 to Labor Unions--
Effect. 
Whenever nn employee of nny person, firm, 
school district, p1•ivnte or municipal corporntfon 
within the state of Utah executes and delive1•s to 
hia entploye1· nn instrument in w1·iting whereby 
such employer is directed to deduct n sum at the 
rate not exceeding three pe1· cent per month, 
from his wages and to pay the same to a labor 
organization or union 01· any other organization 
of employees as assignee, It sh.ill be the duty 
nf such employer to mnkc such deduction a11d to 
pny the snme monthly 01• as designated by 
employee to such assignee nnd to continue to do 
so until otherwise directed QY the employee 
through an instrument in writing. 
Section 2. Assignments to Farm Organi7.n• 
tions-Effect. 
Whenever any producer of farm pl'oducts 
within the state of Utah executes and delivers 
to a denier or processor of farm products, either 
aa a chluse in a snlcs ngreement 01· other in-
~tt•ument in w1·iting whereby such processor or 
denle1· is directed to deduct a sum or a rate 
not oxceedlng thre<: per cent of the price to be 
paid for anY such produce, such processor or 
dealer shnU deduct from the price to be paid fo1· 
nny fiu,n product being sold by any such pro-
ducer to any such processor or dealer~ the amount 
so authorized and the product?r or dealer ahnll 
pay the same to a farm orgnnfzntion as as• 
signee. 
Section 3. Failure to Comp))'. Penalty. 
Any employer, dealer or processor who wil-
fully fni1s to comply with the duty here imposed 
shnll be guilty of a misdemennor. 
Section 4.. Exceptions From Act. 
The provisions of this act shall not apply to 
cnrricrs as that term is definetl in the railway 
labor act, passed by the Congress of the United 
States June 21, 1934, 48 Statutea 1189, U. S. 
Code, Title 45, Section 151. 
Ecction 5. Partinl lnvnlidlty-Snvlng Clause. 
Should any part of tids act be declnred un-
constitutional it shall not in nny way invalidate 
the remainder of this act. 
Section G. Effective Dntc. 
This net shall take effect upon npproval. · 
.Appro\"cd Fcbrunry 20, 1937. 
CHAPTER 58 
H.B. No. o. (Passed Februney :m, ma;. In cffoct Ma1·ch u, 
lll3i,) 
IUGHT TO \VORIC FREE FROl\i 
INTERFERENCE 
DISSUADING PA'fRONAGE OF BUSINESS 
An Act Repealing Sections 49-2-J, •19-2-5, 
Revised Statutes or Utah, 1933, Pertaining lo 
Dissuading Patronage of a Business. 
Be it cu«cted by llle Lcg?°slatimJ of the State of 
Uta.Ti: 
Section 1. Sections Repcnled. 
Sections 49-2-4, 49-2-5, Revised Stntutetl of 
Utah, 1933, are repenled. 
Section 2. Effective Date. 
This act shall tnke effect upon npp1'0vnl. 
Appro\'ed Mnt·ch 9, 1937· 
CHAPTER 59 
H.B. No. Ori. (Passed Februn1-y :m. 10:17. In effect Mnrch 8, 
Ul37.) 
EIGHT-HOUR LAW 
An Act Amending Scctlon 49-3-2, Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 1933, Relating to the Period 
or Employment of Working l\len in Undet• 
ground l\tines or Workings and in Smelters 
nnd All Other Institutions !or the Reduction 
or Refining of Ores or l\Ietals, Providing 
That the Period or Employment Cor Under• 
ground l\lincs or Workings Shall Ile Eight 
Hours Per Dny. 
Do it enacted by the Legialatu1·c of tile Sta.to of 
Utali: 
Section 1. Section Amended. 
Section 49-3-2, Revised Statutes of Utuh, 1988, 
is nmended to read ns follows: 
-19-3-2. A Day's Work-l\lines and Smelters. 
The pcrJod of employment of working men 
in smelters and all other institutions for the 
reduction or refining of ores 01• metals, shall be 
eight hours per day, and the period of employ-
ment of wotking men in all undet•ground minee or 
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workings shall be not more than eight hours per 
dny, such eight hour period shnll be computed 
from the time men go under ground until they 
• Teturn to the surface, except in cases of emer-
gency where life or property is iu Imminent 
dnngel'; prnvidccl, lwwcver, when unde1· ground 
oists or pumps ,u·e in continuous operation, 
noistmen and pumpmen employed on such hoists 
or pumps may be permitted to be underground 
not to exceed eight hours and thirty minutes. 
Any employer who violates any of the provisions 
of this section is guflty of a misdemeanor. 
Section 2. Effective Date. 
This net slmll take effect upon approval. 
Approved March 8, 1987. 
CHAPTER GO 
H.B. No. ll. 
(Pnsscd Mnrch n. tna,. In effect lrfo.y 11, 1037.) 
PAYMENT OF WAGES 
An .Act to Regulate the Pnyment of Wages or 
Compensation for Lnbor or Service fn Private 
Employments; Establishing Regulnr Pay 
Days. Providing That Notices as to Pay Days 
l\fust Be [(cpt Posted by the Employer and 
1\-lnking Failure to Keep Such Notices Posted 
Prima Fncic Evidence of Violation of the 
Act; Providing Criminal Penalties for the 
Violution of Its Provisions, Authorizing the 
Industrial Commission of Utnh to Enforce 
This Act; Defining the Duties or District 
Attorneys nnd County Attorneys Relative to 
Its Enforcement; Providing for the Collection 
of Certain Penalties by Civil Action nt the 
Direction of the Industrinl Commission of 
Utah for Failure to l\laintnin Regular Pay 
Days nnd the Disposition of Penalties so 
Collected; Providing a Civil Penalty for 
11,ailurc of th.c Employer to Pay Discharged 
Employees or Employees Who Quit, and 
Permitting Such Employees to Sue Directly 
or Through an Assignee for Such Penalties 
ns Well ns Permitting the Industrial Com-
mission of Utah to Sue for Su.me in Such 
Cases as They Atay Deem Proper, and Repeal-
Ing Sections 49-9-2, 49-9-3, 49-9-4, 49-9--.'i, 
49-9-6, 49-9-7, 49-9-9, Revised Statutes of 
Utah, 1933. 
Be ii tmactcd l)JJ the Legi~laf.lu•r. of file State of 
Ufalt: 
Section 1. Sections Repealed. 
Sections 49-9-2, 49-9-3, 119-9-4, 49-0-5, 49-9-6. 
4.9-9-7, 49-9-9, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1983, are 
repealed. 
Section 2.. Definitions. 
(a) Whenever used in this act, 0 cmployer" 
includes every person, firmJ partnership, asso-
cintion, corporntion, receiver or othe1· officer of 
u court of this state, and any agent or officer 
of nny of the nbo,·c mentioned clnsses, employing 
any pcr~on in this stnte. 
< h) 0 \Va~cR~' shall menn all amounts nt which 
the lnhor or service rendered is rer.ompensed, 
wlwf h,•r the amount is fixed or ascertained on a 
time. l:t~k, piece, commission basis or othet 
method of calculating such amount. 
Section 3. Rcgulnr Pay Dnys. 
Evel'y employe1· sbalJ pay to his employees the 
· wages earned semimonthly or twice during each 
calendar month, on days to be designated in ad-
vance by the employer ns the regular pay dny; 
1m1vided, thnt the cntployer shall pay for services 
rendered during each semimonthly period within 
ten dnys after the close of such period. When-
eve1· the employe1· hires his employees .on a yearly 
salary basis, then said employer mny pny the 
employee on n monthly scnle, said wage shall be 
paid by the seventh of the month following the 
month for which services were rendered. He 
Aball pay such wages in full, in h.wful money of 
the United States, or checks on bnnl<s, convertible 
into cash on demand at full face vnlue thereof. 
Section 4. Notice as to Pay Dnys-Postlng. 
(a) It shall be the duty of every employer to 
notify his employees at the time of hiring of the 
day, and pince of pnymen~ of the rate of pny and 
of any change wUh respect to any of these items 
prior to the time of said change. Alternatively, 
however, every employer shall hnve the option of 
giving such notification by posting the afore-
mentioned facts. and keeping them posted, con-
spicuously nt or near the plaee of work where 
such posted notice can be seen by each employee 
n~ he come.t.J 01· goes to his place of work. 
Abstract of Law Postecl--E:rP.nr,r,tions F,·o,n 
Act. . 
(b) Every employer shall post and keep post-
ed, in a similar mnnner as pre~crlbed for the 
posting in paragraph (n) of this section, an 
iibstract of this fu1·nished by the industrial com-
mission; pmvidcd, liowevcr, thnt the provisions 
of pnrngrnph (b) of this section shall not apply 
to domestic labor in private homes or agricul-
tural labor. None of the provisions of this act 
~hall npply to employers or employees engnged 
in farm. dniry, ngricult,11."nl, viticulturnl or horli-
culturnl pursuits or to banks and mercantile 
houses, or to stock 01· poultry raising or to house .. 
hoJd domestic service. 
Faihu·e to Po.lit-Penalty. 
(c) Fnilure to post and to keep posted any 
notice or nbstract as weU as any failure to give 
written notice M prescribed in this section shall 
be dcemecl a misdemeanor, and punishable as 
~uch. 
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Section 5~ Employee Rem_oved From Pny Roll 
-Failure to Pny-Pemdty. 
(n) When.ever an employer separates nn ~m~ 
ployco fr~m th¢ pay roll the unpaid wngcs 9r 
compcnsaiion of .. such employee sh{lll. become due· 
frnmcdintely. and the employer: shall pay such 
,,,ages . to· the employee within 24 hours ·Qf the 
time of sepnr~tfon nt th.e specified pl_ace 9f pay.-
meut. 
In cnse of nny fm\ure to pay wages due au 
~mployee wi~hi;n 24 hcura of a dem~nd 'therefor, 
the \\'Dges . of .such employee shall continue from 
th_e _date of scpnrntion until paid at the.same rate 
whiclt said employee 1·eceived at the time of the 
separnt'fon. The employee may. recover the pen-
alty thus accruing to him iQ n. civil net. s·aid 
tl<:tion .must be _c9m '.'ltCJ.1CCd wJthin GQ days· f1•om 
the dnte. of scpa·rntion, providecl,· Jwiuevct, that 
any employee ,vho_ hns · riot made n· demand for 
1mymcnt shall not be entitled to ~ny su~h penalty 
under this p~rngraph. 
E_1n1,fo_ycc Rcsign(ng, Pay·~n:rm.t of Wages. 
(b) Wheneyer an employee (.~o~ hav_ing a 
wi-ittcn contract for a defiidte period) quits or 
resib'11S his employment, the. Wnges rir compen~ 
sntion earned shall become due and payable ·:not. 
Jntc..: thn11 72 pours th~reafter, unles~ such 
employee shnll have given ,Z:2 hours' previ_ous 
notic~ of Ms. interiticm to quit, in which latt·er 
case such employee s:hnll _receive his .wages and 
compensation. at the specified pince of payment 
nt the time of guitting. 
S·1uip1niaioR of. Work a# Rc.mlt of Diavute. 
iPaymeut of Wage. 
( c) I.n the event of the suspension of ,vork as 
the ·result oi' nn . industdal dispute, the wuges 
m;id compensation earned and u·npn-Jd at the time 
of saf tl suspension sb11ll be~~me duo and pnyaple 
at the next regular Jlc1Y day.,_as provided in sec~ 
tion 2 of this net, including, without abatement 
or r~dtietion, nil am9unts due nU persons. whose 
wo.rk ha~ been :suspencled .as n res11lt of .such 
inclustdal dispute, togethe~• with ~ny . ~eposit 
or othet· guaranty held by the employer for the 
faithful performance of the duties of the em-
t>loyment~ 
Seetion G. DispQte Over W11.g~Notice and 
Payment. 
In ·case of a _disput9 ov~r tvnges, the employer 
shall give written t1.otice to the employee of the 
nmount of.wages whieh he concedes. tQ:he due and 
shall pny such gmount · wiiholit ~ondition within 
the time set by tllis act; p1•ovldcd, that'..ncceptnnce 
by the employee o( i:my payme.nt made here1,1nd~ 
Hhnll · not constitute n release· na to the. bnlnnce 
or:.iiis claim. 
Section 7. Construction of Act. 
Nothing contained ht this act shall hi auy. way 
limit Ol' prohlbtt the payment of . \Yagee or com-
pcnsaiion, at more frequent intervals. or in gr:aat-
o t· amounts or in full when 01• before due~ bnt no 
provisio~ <>f -t4i~ ae~ can. in l\J\Y '\Vay be contr~-
ve1'ed oi• set-aside by a mutual ugr~ement. 
Section 8. EmpJoye1· Liable to Employees of 
· Subcontractor. 
(a) Whenever ~n employer shall contract 
with. nnotlte1•. herein called the subcontractor, 
(01· _the performance .or the employer's work, then 
-ft sh~ll be the dll~Y o( such an employer to p_ro-
vidc in su¢h contract that the employees ,of tile 
su~contrnctor shall be paid ace9r~ing to .the 
pro\'isions of· th.is net; and in the _event that such 
subcontractor shall fnil tq pay wages to his em-
ployees as. ~pccifie~ i~- this act,_ suc-.i employ~r 
shall become civilly li~ble to the· employ~ of the 
subcontractor to the extent that such work la 
perf o·r.nwd. under -such contract i~ the snm~ man~ 
llQl~ as it· said empl~yecs were dire_ctly employ~~ 
by such emplciyer. 
·(l,) The pr0.vi;dons of pai-agraph- (a)' of this 
section ~hnll likewise be deemed nppli~ble to itny 
person, fii-m, p~dnership, . association or. corpo-
l~tltion Who :11Qt being an employer, ·an~ herein-
ZJ..fter. l'efe1• red to in thia act· ns 'an •'indirect .em-
pltiyc'i•," couti·acb! ,vith a subcontractor for the 
1jcr,formance of his ,vork. · 
Scctlpn 9. Enforcetnent or ·A.ct. 
(i,.) Jt shall ba the duty of th~ industrial 
comrrifasion :t.o · ins_ure compliance with. the pl'Oyi-
sions of. this act, to .. investigate as to any.viola-
tions ofthis act, nnd ·to ·institute or· cause fo be 
instituted actions :for pennltl~ ·anci f~rfeitures 
provided hereunder.· 'The industrial «..'Olnmfssion 
rimy hold hearings ·to satisfy ibelf ~tJ° to. the 
justice or. any clain,t •. and it shull c:ooperate with 
any e:µipfoyee in the enforccme~t of .a clatm 
. agninst his' ·emploY,Cr or any "indirect nniployer'' 
as defined in sectfon 'I, ·in any cas~, ~•,wever, 'in 
his opinion, the claim is just nnd vnlf J. 
:(b) It shnll bemnndatory upon all district 
ntto1·.neys nnd county .attorneys of this state .tr, 
p1·osecutc nil cases both civilly and criminally 
wh.foh shall be referred by the industrlal cf,m-
mission to such offjcers. 
(c} lt shall be the duty of· all such officers 
to prosecute actions, b9th civil and criminal, for 
such violations of -this. act as come to their 
knowled_ge -tmd to enfo1·ce. the . provisions hereof° 
independently. 
Section 1_0. Records of Employers. 
(lQ E,rery· employe1· .shall keep a true nnd 
u<.'Citi•nte recoi-d of time worked and \Vnges pa: lei 
euch pay period to ench em1>loyee. who is .en\• 
ployed <m an hourly· or a daily bnsts in such fo:'ln 
ns inay be _prescdb,:d J.>y the industrial cqmm_~• 
sion.. He shnil keep such records on. file for at 
least· <me yea.1• after the entry of the record. 
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Riglit of Visita.tio,i.. 
(b) . · The tndustrit4 comm1ss10~ and its 
authorized representatives shall hnve the right 
to. eriter any place of employment duJ."ing busi-
ness hours for t~e purpose of inspecting such 
records D;nd· seeing that all. provisions of this 
act are complied ,vith; provided, Tio1ucvc1·, thnt 
paragraphs· (n) nnd (b) 01 this section shall 
not npply to domestic service in private homes, 
no1· to agriculturnl labor. 
Obst1•1tctfog Commission in Pti•forniiug 
Duties. 
(c) Any effort or nn employer to ~bstruct 
the lndustrinl commission nnd its authorited 
1~eprescntatiV'(?S in the. pE!dormance . of their 
duties shall be deemed a violation of this act and 
puniahable as such~ . 
Wihiesscs. 
( d) The indtisti·ial commission and its 
authorized representatives Rhall have power to 
ndministcr ·oaths and examine ,vftnesses ·under 
onth, issue subpoenas, compel the attendance 
of . witnesses~ and the produetion of pnpers, 
books, ~cc.ouµts, re~ords, p~y rolls, d9cwnents.: 
and tc$timony, and to to.ke depositio11s and affi-
davits in any proceeding before snid industrial 
commission. 
R~/t.1sal to. Tcstif 11~rmte11ipt Prnreedi,igs. 
(e) In case of. failure of any person to· com-
ply ,vith any subpoena lawfully issued, or Qn the 
refusal of any witness tcr testify ·to any matter 
regarding wMch he may be lnwfL:lly interrogatedt 
it shall be the duty of tbe diahict court of any 
county, or the judge ihcreo'f, on application by 
the commission to compel obedience by· proceed-
ings for contempt, as in the case of disobedience 
of the rcqufrements of n subpoena issued from 
sucli court or a refusal to testify therein. 
Section 11. Commission l'tfny imploy Assist-
ants, 
The industr;nl commission, pursuant to the 
lnw of. this stnte, may employ such clerical and 
other. nssistnnts ns may be necessnry to cari-y out 
the ··purposes Qf this act, and shall fix the· com~ 
pensntion of such employees n11d may nlso, to 
cnr1•y out such purposes. incw· reasonable and 
necessru.•y traveling expenses for the said com-
mission, its deputies, and .nssistnnts. 
Section 12. Failure to Comply With Act-
Pcnulty. 
(a) Any employer who shnll violate or fail 
tQ comply · with any of the provis,ions of this 
act, shall forfeit $10 for each such violntion 
or noncomptinncc.. Each day of failure to pay 
wnges tlue such employees at the time specified 
in ·this net shall 1·aise n separnte and distinct 
forfeiture. AU such io1·!citures shall .be recovered 
in an action of debt in the nnme of the state of Utah~ . . . .. 
(b) Any crnploye1· who shuH violate, or fail 
to comply with nny of tho provisions of this net 
~hnll be guilty of a iniademennorJ ·nnd upon coll .. 
viction thcreof1 .~}lnll be<punishecl lJy a fine .of not 
Jess ihnn $25 nor more than i50 for each sepnr-
nte offense. 
{c) Any emplOl'Cr who, shall refuse to pay 
the wages due and. ·payable when demanded, as 
in this act provided,· or who shnll. falsely deny 
the amount thereof., or that the snmc· i.s due, with 
intent to secure for himself., .01· any• other person, 
any discount upon such indebtedness, with intent 
to nnnoy, hnrnss; oppress, hinder, delay or de-
fraud. the person to whom such indebtedness 
is due, or who hires ad.ditionnl employees with ... 
out advising ench of them of. every wage claim 
du9 arid unpaid nnd of . every judgine~t that the 
employer has failel:l to sat~sfy,. shnll in. addition 
to any other penalty .imposed upori liim by this 
11ct, be guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by 
n fine of not less than $50 and not exceeding 
$100. 
Section t3. A~signment of Wnge Claims-
. PQ~vers or Commission. 
The industrial commjssion sh~ll have power 
und nu! horlty to take nssJgnmcnts oI ,vnge clnirris, 
i•ights of action for penalties provided by section 
4 of this net,. mechnnics' and other liens of 
workers, not to exceed i200 i11 · the case of any 
one clnim without being bound by any of the 
technical rules with reference to the validity of 
such assignments; nud shnff · hnve power and 
authority to prosecute actions for the colleetion 
of such clnims which arc valid aud enforceable 
in th~ courts. The commissio~ shall have po,ve1• 
lo join Vnl'ious claimants in one preferred claim 
or lien. and in case of r;uit to join them in one 
cnuse of action. 
·Section 14. ActioruJ by Commission as Ag .. 
signee-Costs-JJonds. 
(n) In nll actions brought by the industrial 
commission ns assignee· Under section 12 or this 
net, no court costs of any ·11atur~ .shnll. be rer,uired 
to be. advnnced nor ahnll any bond. Qt' i\ther 
sccul'ity thcrefo1· be 1·cquil'ed irom the said com-
mission in connection with the same. 
(b) Any ahe1•iff, · constable or· otller officer 
requested by the saicl. commission to serve sum• 
mon~, writa, compl~int.~, order~, including nny 
gni-nfshment papers· and nil necessary nnd legal 
papers. within his jurisdiction, shnll do so with-
out requiring the comm~ssion to ndvancc the 
fees or furnish any security or bontl thcrcior. 
(c) Whenever the commission shall rcqtiirc 
the aheriff, constnblo or other oCiiccr whose 
duty it is to seize property 01• levy thereon in nny 
uttachment proceedings to .satisfy nny ,vage 
~lnim judgment to perfo~m any such duty, ~aid 
officcl' shall do so without requiring the com-
mission to furnish nily security or bond in such 
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~ KeyCite Red Flag- Severe Negative Treatment 
Superseded by Statute as Stated in N.L.R.B. v. Town & Country Elec., 
Inc., U.S., November 28, 1995 
67 S.Ct. 789 
Supreme Court of the United States 
PACKARD MOTOR CARCO. 
v. 
NATIONAL L-\BOR REIATIONS BOARD. 
No. 658. 
I 
Argued Jan. 9, 1947. 
I 
Decided March 10, 1947. 
Petition by the National Labor Relations Board to 
enforce an order issued against the Packard Motor Car 
Company, wherein the Foreman's League for Education 
and Association and another intervened. To review a 
judgment decreeing enforcement of the order, 6 Cir., 
157 F.2d 80, the Packard Motor Car Company brings 
certiorari. 
Affirmed. 
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, Mr. Chief Justice VINSON, Mr. 
Justice BURTON, and Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, 
dissenting. 
On writ of certioraii to the United States Circuit Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
**790 *486 Mr. Louis F. Dahling, of Detroit, Mich., 
for petitioner. 
Mr. Gerhard P. Van A.rkel, of Washington, D.C., for 
respondent. 
Opinion 
Mr. Justice JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented by this case is whether foremen are 
entitled as a class to **791 the rights of self-organization, 
collective bargaining, and other concerted activities as 
assured to employees generally by the National Labor 
Relations Act. 29 U.S.C.A. s 151 et seq. The case grows 
out of conditions of the automotive industry, and so far 
as they are important to the legal issues here the facts are 
simple. 
*487 The Packard Motor Car Company employs 
about 32,000 rank and file workmen. Since 1937 
they have been represented by the United Automobile 
Workers of America affiliated with the Congress of 
Industrial Organizations. These employees are supervised 
by approximately 1,100 employees of foremen rank 
consisting of about 125 'general foremen,' 643 'foremen,' 
273 'assistant foremen,' and 65 'special assignment men.' 
Each general foreman is in charge of one or more 
departments, and under him in authority are foremen 
and their assistant foremen. Special assignment men are 
described as 'trouble-shooters.' 
The function of these foremen in general is typical of the 
duties of foremen in mass production industry generally. 
Foremen carry the responsibility for maintaining quantity 
and quality of production, subject, of course, to the 
overall control and supervision of the management. 
Hiring is done by the labor relations department, as 
is the discharging and laying off of employees. But 
the foremen are provided with forms and with detailed 
lists of penalties to be applied in cases of violations of 
discipline, and initiate recommendations for promotion, 
demotion and discipline. All such recommendations are 
subject to the reviewing procedure concerning grievances 
provided in the collectively-bargained agreement between 
the Company and the rank and file union. 
The foremen as a group are highly paid and, unlike 
the workmen, are paid for justifiable absence and for 
holidays, are not docked in pay when tardy, receive longer 
paid vacations, and are given severance pay upon release 
by the Company. 
These foremen determined to organize as a unit of 
the Foremen's Association of America, an unaffiliated 
organization which represents supervisory employees 
exclusively. Following the usual procedure, after the 
Board had decided that 'all general foremen, foremen, 
assistant foremen, *488 and special assignment men 
employed by the Company at its plants in Detroit, 
Michigan, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes 
of collective bargaining within the meaning of section 9(b) 
of the Act,' 1 the Foremen's Association was certified as 
the bargaining representative. The Company asserted that 
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foremen were not 'employees' entitled to the advantages 
of the Labor Act, and refused to bargain with the 
union. After hearing on charge of unfair labor practice, 
the Board issued the usual cease and desist order. The 
Company resisted and challenged validity of the order. 
The judgment of the court below decreed its enforcement, 
and we granted certiorari. 329 U.S. 707, 67 S.Ct. 357. 
1 61 N.L.R.B. 26. 
The issue of Jaw as to the power of the National Labor 
Relations Board under the National Labor Relations Act 
is simple and our only function is to determine \Vhether the 
order of the Board is authorized by the statute. 
[1] [2] The privileges and benefits of the Act are 
conferred upon employees, and s 2(3) of the Act, so far 
as relevant, provides 'The term 'employee' shall include 
any employee * * * .' 49 Stat. 450. The point that these 
foremen are employees both in the most technical sense at 
common law as well as in common acceptance of the term, 
is too obvious to be labored. The Company, however, 
turns to the Act's definition of employer, which it contends 
reads foremen out of the employee class and into the class 
of employers. Section 2(2) reads: 'The term 'employer' 
includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, 
directly or indirectly * * * .' 49 Stat. 450. The context of 
the Act, we think, leaves no room for a construction of 
this section to deny the organizational privilege **792 to 
employees because they act in the interest of an employer. 
Every employee, from the very fact of employment in 
the master's business, is required to act in his interest. 
He *489 owes to the employer faithful performance of 
service in his interest, the protection of the employer's 
property in his custody or control, and all employees may, 
as to third parties, act in the interests of the employer to 
such an extent that he is liable for their wrongful acts. A 
familiar example would be that of a truck driver for whose 
negligence the Company might have to answer. 
The purpose of s 2(2) seems obviously to render employers 
responsible in labor practices for acts of any persons 
performed in their interests. It is an adaptation of the 
ancient maxim of the common law, respondeat superior, 
by which a principal is made liable for the tortious acts 
of his agent and the master for the wrongful acts of his 
servants. Even without special statutory provision, the 
rule would apply to many relations. But Congress was 
creating a new class of wrongful acts to be known as 
unfair labor practices, and it could not be certain that the 
courts would apply the tort rule of respondeat supe1ior to 
those derelictions. Even if it did, the problem of proof as 
applied to this kind of wrongs might easily be complicated 
by questions as to the scope of the actor's authority and 
of variance between his apparent and his real authority. 
Hence, it was provided that in administering this act 
the employer, for its purposes, should be not merely the 
individual or corporation which was the employing entity, 
but also others. whether employee or not, who are ·acting 
in the interest of an employer.' 
Even those who act for the employer in some 
matters, including the service of standing between 
management and manual labor, still have interests of 
their own as employees. Though the foreman is the 
faithful representative of the employer in maintaining a 
production schedule, his interest properly may be adverse 
to that of the employer when it comes to fixing his own 
wages, hours, seniority rights or working conditions. He 
does not lose his right to serve himself in these respects 
because he *490 serves his master in others. And we see 
no basis in this Act whatever for holding that foremen 
are forbidden the protection of the Act when they take 
collective action to protect their collective interests. 
[3] The company's argument is really addressed to the 
undesirability of pennitting foremen to organize. It wants 
selfless representatives of its interest. It fears that if 
foremen combine to bargain advantages for themselves, 
they will sometimes be governed by interests of their own 
or of their fellow foremen, rather than by the company's 
interest. There is nothing new in this argument. It is rooted 
in the misconception that because the employer has the 
right to wholehearted loyalty in the performance of the 
contract of employment, the employee does not have the 
right to protect his independent and adverse interest in the 
terms of the contract itself and the conditions of work. 
But the effect of the National Labor Relations Act is 
otherwise, and it is for Congress, not for us, to create 
exceptions or qualifications at odds with its plain terms. 
Moreover, the company concedes that foremen have a 
right to organize. What it denies is that the statute compels 
it to recognize the union. In other words, it wants to be 
free to fight the foremen's union in the way that companies 
fought other unions before the Labor Act. But there is 
nothing in the Act which indicates that Congress intended 
to deny its benefits to foremen as employees, if they choose 
to believe that their interests as employees would be better 
served by organization than by individual competition. 2 
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N.L.R.B. v. Skinner & Kennedy Stationery Co., 8 Cir., 
113 F.2d 667; see N.L.R.B. v. Armour & Co., 10 Cir., 154 
F.2d 570, 574. 
2 If a union of vice presidents, presidents or others of 
like relationship to a corporation comes here claiming 
rights under this Act, it will be time enough then 
to point out the obvious and relevant differences 
between the 1100 foremen of this company and 
corporate officers elected by the board of directors. 
power, we are clear that *492 the decision in question 
does not do so. That settled, our power is at an end. 
(8] We are invited to make a lengthy examination of 
views expressed in Congress while this and later legislation 
was pending to show that exclusion of foremen was 
intended. There is, however, no ambiguity in this Act to be 
clarified by resort to legislative history, either of the Act 
itself or of subsequent legislative proposals which failed to 
**793 *491 (41 [51 There is no more reason to become law. 
conclude that the law prohibits foremen as a class from 
constituting an appropriate bargaining unit than there 
is for concluding that they are not within the Act at 
all. Section 9(b) of the Act confers upon the Board a 
broad discretion to determine appropriate units. It reads, 
'The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order 
to insure to employees the full benefit of their right 
to self-organization and to collective bargaining, and 
otherwise to effectuate the policies * * * of this act, the 
unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining 
shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or 
subdivision thereof.' 49 Stat. 453. Our power of review 
also is circumscribed by the provision that findings of the 
Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be 
conclusive. s I0(e), 49 Stat. 454. So we have power only to 
detennine whether there is substantial evidence to support 
the Board, or its order oversteps the law. N .L.R.B. v. 
Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 61 S.Ct. 358, 85 L.Ed. 368; 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 146, 61 
S.Ct. 908, 85 L.Ed. 1251. 
[6] [71 There is clearly substantial evidence in support 
of the detennination that foremen are an appropriate unit 
by themselves and there is equal evidence that, while the 
foremen included in this unit have different degrees of 
responsibility and work at different levels of authority, 
they have such a common relationship to the enterprise 
and to other levels of workmen that inclusion of all such 
grades of foremen in a single unit is appropriate. Hence 
the order insofar as it depends on facts is beyond our 
power of review. The issue as to what unit is appropriate 
for bargaining is one for which no absolute rule of law 
is laid do\l.'ll by statute, and none should be by decision. 
It involves of necessity a large measure of informed 
discretion and the decision of the Board, if not final, 
is rarely to be disturbed. While we do not say that 
a determination of a unit of representation cannot be 
so unreasonable and arbitrary as to exceed the Board's 
[91 Counsel also would persuade us to make a contrary 
interpretation by citing a long record of inaction, 
vacilJation and division of the National Labor Relations 
Board in applying this Act to foremen. Ifwe were obliged 
to depend upon administrative interpretation for light in 
finding the meaning of the statute, the inconsistency of 
the Board's decisions would leave us in the dark. 3 But 
there are difficult questions of policy involved in these 
cases which, together with changes in Board membership, 
account for the contradictory views that characterize their 
history in the Board. Whatever special questions there are 
in determining the appropriate bargaining unit for *493 
foremen are for **794 the Board, and the history of the 
issue in the Board shows the difficulty of the problem 
committed to its discretion. We are not at liberty to be 
governed by those policy considerations in deciding the 
naked question of law whether the Board is now, in this 
case, acting within the terms of the statute. 
3 The Board had held that supervisory employees may 
organize in an independent union, Union Collieries 
Coal Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 961, 44 N.L.R.B. 165; and 
in an affiliated union, Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 44 
N.L.R.B. 874. Then it held that there was no 
unit appropriate to the organization of supervisory 
employees. Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 
733; Boeing Aircraft Co., 51 N.L.R.B. 67; Murray 
Corp. of America, 51 N.L.R.B. 94; General Motors 
Corp., 51 N.L.R.B. 457; In this case, 61 N.L.R.B. 4, 
64 N.L.R.B. 1212; in L. A. Young Spring & Wire 
Corp., 65 N.L.R.B. 298; Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 66 N.L.R.B. 386, 71 N.L.R.B. 1261; and in 
California Packing Corp., 66 N.L.R.B. 1461, the 
Board re-embraced its earlier conclusions with the 
same progressive boldness it had shown in the Union 
Collieries and Godchaux Sugars cases. In none of this 
series of cases did the Board hold that supervisors 
were not employees. See Soss Manufacturing Co., 56 
N.L.R.B. 348. 
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It is also urged upon us most seriously that unionization 
of foremen is from many points bad industrial policy, 
that it puts the union foreman in the position of serving 
two masters, divides his loyalty and makes generally for 
bad relations between management and labor. However 
we might appraise the force of these arguments as a 
policy matter, we are not authorized to base decision of a 
question of law upon them. They concern the wisdom of 
the legislation; they cannot alter the meaning of otherwise 
plain provisions. 
The judgment of enforcement is 
Affirmed. 
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom The CHIEF 
JUSTICE and Mr. Justice BURTON concur, dissenting. 
First. Over thirty years ago Mr. Justice Brandeis, while 
still a private citizen, saw the need for narrowing the 
gap between management and labor, for allowing labor 
greater participation in policy decisions, for developing 
an industiial system in which cooperation rather than 
coercion was the dominant characteristic. 1 In his view, 
these were *494 measures of therapeutic value in dealing 
with problems of industrial unrest or inefficiency. 
1 
'The greater productivity of labor must not only be 
attainable, but attainable under conditions consistent 
with the conservation of health, the enjoyment 
of work, and the development of the individual. 
The facts in this regard have not been adequately 
established. In the task of ascertaining whether 
proposed conditions of work do conform to these 
requirements, the laborer should take part. He is 
indeed a necessary witness. Likewise in the task 
of determining whether in the distribution of the 
gain in productivity justice is being done to the 
worker, the participation of representatives of labor 
is indispensable for the inquiry which involves 
essentially the exercise of judgment.' Brandeis, 
Business-A Profession, pp. 52-53. 
The present decision may be a step in that direction. It at 
least tends to obliterate the line between management and 
labor. It ends the sanctions of federal law to unionization 
at all levels of the industrial hierarchy. It tends to 
emphasize that the basic opposing forces in industry are 
not management and labor but the operating group on 
the one hand and the stockholder and bondholder group 
on the other. The industrial problem as so defined comes 
down to a contest over a fair division of the gross receipts 
of industry between these two groups. The struggle for 
control or power between management and labor becomes 
secondary to a growing unity in their common demands 
on ownership. 
I do not believe this is an exaggerated statement of the 
basic policy questions which underly the present decision. 
For if foremen are 'employees' within the meaning of 
the National Labor Relations Act, so are vice-presidents, 
managers, assistant managers, superintendents, assistant 
superintendents-indeed, all who are on the payroll 
of the company, including the president; all who are 
commonly referred to as the management, with the 
exception of the directors. If a union of vice-presidents 
applied for recognition as a collective bargaining agency, 
I do not see how we could deny it and yet allow the 
present application. But once vice-presidents, managers, 
superintendents, foremen all are unionized, management 
and labor will become more of a solid phalanx than 
separate factions in warring camps. Indeed, the thought 
of some *495 labor leaders that if those in the hierarchy 
above the workers are unionized, they will be more 
sympathetic with the claims of those below them, is a 
manifestation of the same idea. 2 
2 The Foreman Abdicates, XXXII Fortune, No. 3, p. 
150, 152; Levenstein, Labor Today and Tomorrow 
( 1946) ch. VII. 
I mention these matters to indicate what **795 
tremendously important policy questions are involved 
in the present decision. My purpose is to suggest 
that if Congress, when it enacted the National Labor 
Relations Act, had in mind such a basic change in 
industrial philosophy, it would have left some clear and 
unmistakable trace of that purpose. But I find none. 
Second. "Employee' is defined to include ·any' employee. 
s 2(3), 49 Stat. 449, 450, 29 U.S.C. s 152, 29 U.S.C.A. If 
we stop there, foremen are included as are all employees 
from the president on down. But we are not warranted in 
stopping there. The term 'employee' must be considered in 
the context of the Act. National Labor Relations Board v. 
Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 124, 64 S.Ct. 851, 857, 
88 L.Ed. 1170; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor 
Relations Board, 313 U.S. 177, 191, 61 S.Ct. 845,851, 85 
L.Ed. 1271, 133 A.L.R. 1217. When it is so considered 
it does not appear to be used in an all-embracing sense. 
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Rather, it is used in opposition to the term 'employer'. An 
'employer' is defined to include 'any person acting in the 
interest of an employer'. s 2(2). The tem1 'employer' thus 
includes some employees. And I find no evidence that one 
personnel group may be both employers and employees 
within the meaning of the Act. Rather, the Act on its face 
seems to classify the operating group of industry into two 
classes; what is included in one group is excluded from the 
other. 
It is not an answer to say that the two statutory groups 
are not exclusive because every 'employee' while on 
duty-whether driving a truck or stoking a furnace or 
*496 operating a lathe-is 'acting in the interest' of 
his employer and is then an 'employer' in the statutory 
sense. The Act was not declaring a policy of vicarious 
responsibility of industry. It was dealing solely with labor 
relations. It put in the employer category all those who 
acted for management not only in formulating but also in 
executing its labor policies. 3 
3 Daykin, The Status of Supervisory Employees under 
the National Labor Relations Act, 29 Iowa L.Rev. 
297; Rosenfarb, The National Labor Policy (1940) 
pp. 54-56, 116-120; Twentieth Century Fund, How 
Collective Bargaining Works (1942) pp. 512-514, 
547,557-558,628, 780. 
Foremost among the latter were foremen. Trade union 
history shows that foremen were the aims and legs of 
management in executing labor policies. In industrial 
conflicts they were allied with management. Managenient 
indeed commonly acted through them in the unfair 
labor practices which the Act condemns. 4 When we 
upheld the imposition of the sanctions of the Act against 
management, we frequently relied on the acts of foremen 
through whom management expressed its hostility to 
trade unionism. 5 
4 
5 
See cases collected in Daykin, op. cit. supra, note 3, 
pp. 298-299. 
International Association of Machinists, Tool and 
Die Makers v. National Labor Relations Board, 311 
U.S. 72, 79. 80, 61 S.ct. 83, 88, 85 L.Ed. 50; H.J. 
Heinz Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 311 
U.S. 514,520,521, 61 S.Ct. 320, 323, 85 L.Ed. 309. 
Third. The evil at which the Act was aimed was the failure 
or refusal of industry to recognize the right of workingmen 
to bargain collectively. In s 1 of the Act Congress noted 
that such an attitude on the part of industry led 'to strikes 
and other forms of industrial strife or unrest' so as to 
burden or obstruct interstate commerce. We know from 
the history of that decade that the frustrated efforts of 
workingmen, of laborers, to organize led to strikes, strife, 
and unrest. But we are pointed to no instances where 
foremen were striking; nor *497 are we advised that 
managers, superintendents, or vice-presidents were doing 
so. 6 
6 It is true that for many years some unions included 
supervisory employees, Beatrice and Sydney Webb, 
Industrial Democracy (1902) p. 546, fn. 2; Union 
Membership and Collective Bargaining by Foremen, 
U.S. Department of Labor Bull. No. 745 (1943); 
Report of Panel of War Labor Board in Disputes 
Involving Supervisors (1945) IX; Twentieth Century 
Fund, op. cit. supra, note 3, pp. 67, 216; Northrup, 
Unionization of Foremen, 21 Harv.Bus.Rev. 496. 
But organization of foremen on a broad scale is a 
development of the last few years. Daykin, op. cit. 
supra, note 3, p. 314; Rosenfarb, Foremen on the 
March, 7 Fed.Bar.J. 168; Note, 59 Harv.L.Rev. 606, 
607; Comment, 55 Yale L.J. 754, 756; Foremen's 
Unions, IX Advanced Management Quarterly J. 110. 
Indeed, the problems of those in the supervisory categories 
of management did **796 not seem to have been in 
the consciousness of Congress. Section 1 of the Act 
refers to 'wage rates', 'wage earners', 'workers'. There 
is no phrase in the entire Act which is descriptive of 
those doing supervisory work. Section 2(3) exempts from 
laborer'. But if 'employee' includes a the term 'employee' 
any 'agricultural foreman, it would be most strange to 
find Congress exempting 'agricultural laborers', but not 
'agricultural foremen'. The inference is strong that since it 
exempted only agricultural 'laborers', it had no idea that 
agricultural 'foremen' were under the Act. 
If foremen were to be included as employees under 
the Act, special problems would be raised-important 
problems relating to the unit in which the foremen 
might be represented. Foremen are also under the Act 
as employers. That dual status creates serious problems. 
An act of a foreman, if attributed to the management, 
constitutes an unfair labor practice; the same act may 
be part of the foreman's activity as an employee. In that 
event the employer can only interfere at his peril. 7 The 
complications *498 of dealing with the problems of 
supervisory employees strongly suggest that if Congress 
had planned to include them in its project, it would have 
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made some special provision for them. But we find no 
trace of a suggestion that when Congress came to consider 
the units approp1iate for collective bargaining, 8 it was 
aware that groups of employees might have conflicting 
loyalties. Yet that would have been one of the most 
important and conspicuous problems if foremen were 
to be included. The failure of Congress to fommlatc a 
policy respecting the peculiar and special problems of 
foremen suggests an absence of purpose to bring them 
under the Act. And the notion is hard to resist that the 
very absence of a declaration by Congress of its policy 
respecting foremen is the reason the Board has been so 
much at large in the treatment of the problem under the 
Act. See the cases collected in note 3 of the opinion of the 
Court. 
7 
8 
Cf. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp. v. National Labor 
Relations Board, 5 Cir., 146 F.2d 833; Comment, 55 
Yale L.J. 754, 767-774; Rosenfarb, op. cit., supra, 
note 6. 
Section 9(b) of the Act provides: 'The Board shall 
decide in each case whether, in order to insure 
to employees the full benefit of their right to 
self~organization and to collective bargaining, and 
otherwise to effectuate the policies * * * of this act, 
the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective 
bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant 
unit, or subdivision thereof.' 
Fourth. When we turn from the Act to the legislative 
history, we find no trace of Congressional concern with 
the problems of supervisory personnel. The reports and 
debates are barren of any reference to them, though they 
are replete with references to the function of the legislation 
in protecting the interests of 'laborers' and 'workers'. 9 
9 See H. Rep. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. Rep. 
No. 972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. Rep. No. 1147, 
74th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 
1st Sess., pp. 6-7; Hearings, Senate Comm. on Educ. 
and Labor on S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.; Hearings, 
House Comm. on Labor on H.R. 6288, 74th Cong., 
1st Sess.; Hearings, Senate Comm. on Educ. and 
Labor on S. 1958, 74th Cong., I st Sess.; 79 Cong.Rec. 
2371,7365, 7648, 7668,8537,9676,9713,9736,10720. 
*499 Fifth. When we tum to other related legislation, 
we find that when Congress desired to include managerial 
officials or supervisory personnel in the category of 
employees, it did so expressly. The Railway Labor Act of 
1926, 44 Stat. 577, 45 U.S.C. s 151, 45 U.S.C.A. s 151, 
defines 'employee' to include 'subordinate official'. The 
Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 52 Stat. 953, 46 U.S.C. s 
1101 et seq., 46 U.S.C.A. s 1101 et seq., which deals with 
maritime labor relations as a supplement to the National 
Labor Relations Act (see 46 U.S.C. s 1252, 46 U.S.C.A. 
s 1252) defines 'employee' **797 to include 'subordinate 
official'. 46 U.S.C. s 1253(c), 46 U.S.C.A. s 1253(c). And 
the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 620,647, 42 U.S.C. s 1301, 
42 U.S.C.A. s 1301, includes an officer of a corporation 
in the term employee. 10 The failure of Congress to do 
the same when it wrote the National Labor Relations 
Act has some significance, especially where the legislative 
history is utterly devoid of any indication that Congress 
was concerned with the collective bargaining problems of 
supervisory employees. 
10 Cf. Federal Employers Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65, as 
amended, 45 U.S.C. s 51, 45 U.S.C.A. s 51, under 
which the term 'any employee of a carrier' has been 
applied to foremen. Owens v. Union Pac. R. Co., 319 
U.S. 715, 63 S.Ct. 1271, 87 L.Ed. 1683; Ellis v. Union 
Pac. R. Co., 329 U.S. 649, 67 S.Ct. 598. 
Sixth. The truth of the matter is, I think, that when 
Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act in 
1935, it was legislating against the activities of foremen, 
not on their behalf. Congress was intent on protecting the 
right of free association-the right to bargain collectively 
-by the great mass of workers, not by those who 
were in authority over them and enforcing oppressive 
industrial policies. Foremen were instrumentalities of 
those industrial policies. They blocked the wage earners' 
path to fair collective bargaining. To say twelve years later 
that foremen were treated as the victims of that anti-labor 
policy seems to me a distortion of history. 
~1: 500 If we were to decide this case on the basis of policy, 
much could be said to support the majority view. 11 But 
I am convinced that Congress never faced those policy 
issues when it enacted this legislation. I am sure that 
those problems were not in the consciousness of Congress. 
A decision of these policy matters cuts deep into our 
industrial life. It has profound implications throughout 
our economy. It involves a fundamental change in much of 
the thinking of the nation on our industrial problems. The 
question is so important that I cannot believe Congress 
legislated unwittingly on it. Since what Congress wrote 
is consistent with a restriction of the Act to workingmen 
and laborers, I would leave its extension over supervisory 
employees to Congress. 
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11 Daykin, op. cit. supra, note 3, p. 313; Rosenfarb, op. 
cit. supra, nole 6; Gartenhaus, The Foreman goes 
Union, 113 New Republic 563: Comment 55 Yale L.J. 
754; Hearings, House Comm. on Military Affairs on 
Bills relating to the Full Utilization of Manpower, 
78th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 299; Northrup, The 
Foreman's Association of America, 23 Harv.Bus.Rev. 
187; cf. American Management Association, Relation 
Between Management and Foremen in American 
Industry (1944); Id. The Foreman in Labor Relations 
(1944); Id. Should Management be Unionized? 
(1945). 
I have used the terms foremen and supervisory employees 
synonymously. But it is not the label which is important; 
it is whether the employees in question represent or act for 
management on labor policy matters. Thus one might be a 
supervisory employee without representing management 
in those respects. And those who are called foremen may 
perform duties not substantially different from those of 
skilled laborers. 
What I have said does not mean that foremen have no 
right to organize for collective bargaining. The general 
End of Document 
law recognizes their right to do so. See American Steel 
Foundries v. Tri-City Council, 257 U.S. 184,209, 42 S.Ct. 
72, 78, 66 L.Ed. 189, 27 A.LR. 360; Texas & N.O.R. Co. 
v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 
548, 570, 50 S.Ct. 427, 433, 74 L.Ed. 1034. And *501 
some States have placed administrative machinery and 
sanctions behind that right. 12 But as I read the federal 
Act, Congress has not yet done so. 
12 The state laws are discussed in Northrup, The 
Foreman's Association of America, 23 Harv.Bus.Rev. 
187, 199-200. 
Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER agrees with this opinion 
except the part marked •First' as to which he expresses no 
view. 
All Citations 
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[CHAPTER 114] 
AN ACT 
To a.mend the Act entitled "An Act to provide that the United St.Ates shall aid 
the States in the construction of rural post roads, o.nd for other purposes", 
approved July 11, 1916, as ameDded and supplcmented1 and for other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House ()[ Re'f)'!'esentatives ()j the 
United States of Ame1-ica i1t 0..vngre8s <U!&embled, That para~uph ( d) 
of section 4 of the Federal_,Aid Highwil.J Act of 1944, Public Lnw 521, 
Seventy-eighth Congress, npproved December 20, 1944, is hereby 
amended by striking out the term ''one year" where it appe11rs in srua 
paragrapl1 a.nd inserting in lieu thereof the term «two years". 
Appro,red June 21, 1947. 
[CHAPTER 120) 
AN ACT 
To amend the Nations.I Labor Relatjons Act, to provide additional facilities for 
the meclia.tion of labor disputes affecting commerce to equalize legal respon-
sibilities of labor organizations and employetS, and for other purposes. 
Be it enacted by th8 Sf/lW,te and House of Representatives of the 
Umte<l Sta-tes of .Ame-ricain Congress assembled, 
SUORT TITLE A.."m DECLARATION OF POLICY 
SECTION 1. (a) This Act may be cited as the "Labor Management 
Relations Act, 194:7,,. 
(b) Indus~rialstrife which int~rferes wi~h the normalflow. o_f com-: 
merce and with the full production of articles and. conunod1t1es for 
commerce, can be avoided or substantially minimized if employers, 
employees, nnd fabor organizations each recognize under law one 
anothe1·'s legitimate rights in their relations with each other, and above 
all recognize under law that neither party has any rig11t in its relations 
with any other to enga~e in acts or practices which jeopardize the 
public health, snfety, or interest. · 
It is the purpose and policy of this Act, in order to promote the full 
flow o:f commerce1 to prescrioe the Jegjtimate rights of both employees 
and employers in their re1at.ions affecting c_o_ mmerce, to provide orderly 
and peaceful procedures for preventing the interference by either with 
the legitimate riq;hts of the other, to protect the rights of individual 
employees in their relations with labor organizations whose activities 
affect commerce, to define and proscribe practices on the part of labor 
and management which affect commerce n.nd are inimical to the general 
welfare; and to _protect the rights 0£ the public in connection with 
lnbor disputes affecting commerce. 
TITLE I-AMENDMENT OF NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS ACT 
,oetat.<140, SEc. 101. The National Labor Relations Act is hereby amended to 
21> 0 • s. 0 • IUol- read as follows: 100. 
''FINDINGS AND POLIOIES 
"SECTION 1. The denial by some employers of the right of employees 
to organize and the refusal by some employ-ers to accept tl1e procedure 
of collective bargaimng lead to strikes and other for.ms 0£ industrial 
strHe or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary efl'ect of burden-
ing or obstructing commerce 1?, (a) impairing the efficiency, safety, or 
operation of the instrumentalities of commerce; (b) occurring in the 
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current of commerce; (c) materially affecting, rest-raining, or control-
lin~ the flow of raw mnterials or manufactured or processed goods from 
or mto the. channels of commerce, or the prices of such materials or 
goods in commerce; or (d) causing diminution of employment and 
wages in such ·volume as substantially to impair or disrupt the market 
for goods flowing from or into the cliannels of commerce. 
"'l'he inequality of bargnining power between employees who do not 
possess -full freedom of association or_ actual liberty of contract, and 
employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of owner-
&hip association substantially burdens and affects the flow of com1nerce, 
and tends to agcrrava.te recurrent business depressions, b:v depressing 
wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and 
bv Ereventing the stabilization of. competitive wage rates and ,•torking 
conditions within and between •industries. 
"Experience has proved that protection by faw of the right of 
Pmployees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce 
from injurv. impnirme1it, or interruption, ana promotes the flO\v of 
commerce bj~ removing certnin recognized sources of industrial strife 
and unrest, b:y encouraging practices fundnmental to_ the friendly 
adjustment of mdustrial disputes ari~ing out of differences as to wages2 hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality o:t 
bargaining power between employers and employees. 
"Experience has further demonstrated that certain practices by some 
labor organizations, their officers, and members have the intent or the 
necessilry effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by preventing 
the free flow of goods in such commerce through strikes and other 
forms of industrial unrest or through concerted activities which impair 
the iutere.st of the public in the free flow of such commerce. The 
elimination of such practices is a necessary condition to th~ a.ssurance 
of the rights herein guaranteed. 
. ''It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Unit.ed States to 
eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the .free :Bow 
of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when 
they hn ve occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collec-
tive bargaini~g ~nd by protect!ng ~he exercise ~y workers of full free-
dom of assoc1at1oni seH-orgamzat1on, a·nd designation 0£ representa-
tives of tl1eir own choosing, for the purpose of n:egotiating the terms 
and condjtions of their" employment or other mutual aid or protect.ion. 
"DEFINITIONS 
"8:ec. 2. Wben used· in this Act-
" ( 1) The t.erm 'person: includEls one or more individuals, labor 
organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal repre-
sentatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers. 
"(2) The term 'employer' includes any person acting as an agent of 
an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United 
States or an-;r wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal 
Reserve Bank, or nny Stntc or political subdivision thereof, or any 
corporation or ·associatf:ion operating a hospital, if no part of the net 
earnings inures to th~ benefit of any :private shareholder or individual, 
or any person subjectto the Railway Labor .. Act~ as amended from time 
to time, or any labor organization ( other tl1an when acting as an 
employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such 
labor org11nization. 
"(3). The term 'employee' shall hld1;1de a11y employee, and shall not 
be lumted to the employees of a particular employer, unless the Act 
explidtly stntes otherwise, und ~hall include any_ indi \·idual whose 
work has ceased as a. consequence of, or in connection with, any current 
labor dispute or bec:mse of any unfair labor practice, and who l1as not 
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obtained any other regula.r and substantially equivalent employment, 
bnt shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural 
laborer, or in the domestic serviee of any £runily or person at Iris home, 
or any individual ~mployed by his _parent or spouse, or ~ny individual 
havi~ the status of an independent contractor, or any individual 
employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed byait employer 
subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended :from time to time, or by 
anzr other person who is not an employer as herein defined. 
'(4) TJ1e term 'xepresenfatives' includes a.ny individual or labor 
or§amzation. 
(5} The term 'labor organization' means any organization of any 
kind or any agency or employee rel?resentation committee or plan,· in 
which employees participate and which exists for the purpose; in whole 
o: in part, of d~ling with employers concerning grievan~, labo~ 
dis~utes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of 
work. 
"(6) The term 'commerce' means trade, traffic, -commerce, trans-
portation, or communication among the several States, or between the 
District of Columbia or any Te1Titory of tjle United States and any 
State or other Territory1 or between an1- £oreiW1 country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia~ or within the District or 
Columbia or any Territory, or between points in the ~ame State hut 
tlu·ough any otlier Stat.e or any ·Territory or the District of Coltirilbia 
or any foreign country. 
" ( 7) The term 'a.ff ecting commerce' means in commerce, or burden~ 
ing or obstructing commerc~ .or the free flow of commerc~ or having 
led or rending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing 
commerce or the free flow of commerce. 
''(8) The term 'unfair labor practice" means any uirfair labor prae-
tice iisted in section 8. . · . · 
"(9) The_ term '~o~ dispute' includes any controv'?rsy concer~ 
terms, tenure or conditions of employment2 or coneerrung the assoc1a ... 
tion or representation <>f persons in negqtia.ting, fixing, maintaining, 
changing, or see.Jrlng to arrange terms or conditions of employment, 
regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation 
of employer and empl~ee. 
" ( 10) The term 'National Labor Relations Board' means the 
N atlonal Labor Relations Board provided for in section 3 of this Act. 
" ( 11) The term 'supervisor' means any individual hn. ving authority, 
in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer1 suspend, lay off, recall, promot~l disch~ge, assign, rewardt or di5<?.iph~e ~ther employe~s, or 
respons1l>ly to direct th~m, Oft? adJust th~r grlevances, or eff~ct1vely 
to recommend such action, 1£ m connection with the foregomg the 
exercise of such. authoiity is not of a merely routine or clerical na.tu.re, 
but reg_uires the use_ .. of indepen.· d.· ent judgment. 
''(12) The term 'professional employ~e' means-
" (a) any emP.loy~e engaged in work ( i) predomin~ntly intel-
lectual and vaned m character as opposed to routine mental, 
manual, mechanical, or physical work; (ii} involving the con-
sistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance; 
(ill) of such a character that the output J>roduced or the result 
.accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period 
of time; (iv) requiring knowledge <>f an adva.nced type in a 
field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged 
course of specialized . intellectual in$tr,uction a.ncl study in ·an 
institution of higher learning or a hospital, as distj.ng!}islied from 
a general academic education or from a.n apprenticeship or from 
training in the performance of routine mental, manual, or physical 
processes; or 
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"(b) any employee, who ( i) has completed the courses o:f gecia.lized intel_ l.ectual instruction an. d study described in clause v) of paragraph (a), and (ii) is performing related \Tork under 
o supervision of a pro:fessionnl person to qualify himself to 
bec-0me a professional employe;e_ as defined in par~graph (a). 
"(13) In determining whether any person is acting as· an_'agent' 
of another person so as. to make such other person responsible :for 
his acts, the 41.!Cstion of ~hether the ;iPe-0ific acts performed "!ere 
actually authorized or subsequently ratified shnll not be controlling. 
''NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 
"SEC, 3. (a) The National Labor Relations Board (l1ereinafter 
called tl1e 'Board~) ·created by this Act prior to its. amendment by the 
Labor Management Relations Act,_ 1947, is hereby continued as an 
agency of the United States, except that the Board sl1allconsist of five 
instead 0£ three members, appointed by the President by and with 
the adttice and consent of the Senate. Of the two additional members 
so provided for, one sl1all be appointed for a term of five yen.rs and 
the other for a term of two yeM'S~ Their successors,. and the successors 
of the other.members, shall be appointed for terms, of five years each, 
excepting that any individual chosen to fill a vacancy shall be appointed 
only for the unexpired term o:f the member whom he shall ~ucceed. 
The Pres,ident shall designate one member to serye as Chairman of 
tl1e Board. Any member of the Board may be removed by the Presi-
dent, upon notice and henring, for neglect of dut.y or malfeasance in 
office, but for no other cause. 
'' ( b) The Board is at;lt11orized to delegate to :my group of three 
or more members any or all of the powers which it may itself exercise. 
A ,·acru1cv i11 the Bonrd shall not impair the right of the remaining 
m~nbers to exercise all of the powers of the Boara, and three members 
of the Board shall, ·a.t all times, constitute a quorum of the Boai•d, 
except that two members shnll constitute a quorum of any group 
designated pursunnt to the :first sentence }1ereof. The Board shall 
hn.ve a.n officJal seal which shall be judicially notieed . 
. "{c) _The Bonrd shall _at the close o~ each fisc~l ,~ar ma~e a report 
m writing to Congress and to the President statmg m deta1l the cases 
it has heard, the decisions it hos r~ndered, the no.mes, salaries, and 
duties of nll employees and officers in tho employ or under the super-
vision of the Board, a.nd nn account of all moneys it has disbursed. 
" ( d) There shall be a General Counsel of the Board who sha.11 be 
appointed by the President, by and with the adYice and consent 0£ the 
Senate, for a term of four years. The General Counsel of tl1e Board 
shn.11 exercise general superyision over all n.tt.orneys employe.d by the 
Board ( other than trial e.""tuminers and legal assistants to Board 
members) and over the officers and employees in the regional offices. 
He shall haye final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect of the 
investigation of chnrges and issuance of complaJuts under section· 10, 
and in respect of the prosecution of such complaints before the Board, 
and shall have such other duties as the Board may prescribe or as may 
be Er'orided by law. 
''SEC. ·4. (a) Each men1ber 0£ the Board and the General Counsel of 
the Board ·shall receh1c a snlary of $12,000 a year,sha.ll be eligible for 
reappoiiltment, and shall not engttg~ in any other business, vocation, 
or employment. The Board sha.ll apJ_Joint a~ executive·secretary, and 
such attorneys, examiners, and re~1onal directors, and such other 
em~loyees as it ma:y: from tjme to time find necessa:ry for the proper 
performance of its cluties. The· Board may not employ any attorneys 
for the purpose of re-viewing transcripts of hearings or preparing 
drafts of opinions e~ccpt that any attorney employed for nssignment 
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as a legal assistant to any Board member may for such Boa.rd member 
review such transcripts and prepare such drafts. No trial examiner's 
report shall be reviewed, eitlier -before or after its publication, by any 
person other than a member of the Board or his legal assistant, a,.nd no 
trial examiner shall advise or consult with the Board with respect to 
exceptions taken to his findings, rulings, or recommendations. The 
Board may establish or utilize such regional, local, or other ageneies, 
and utilize such voluntary and uncompensated services, as may from 
time to time be needed. Attorneys appointed under this section may, 
at the direction of the Board, ap)?ear for and represent the Board in 
any case in court. Nothing in thlS Act shall be construed to authorize 
the Board to appoint individuals for the purpose of conciliation or 
mediation or for economic analysis. 
"(b) Ah of the e.~penses of the Board, including all necessary travel- . 
ing and subsistence expenses outside the District of Columbia mcurred 
bJ the members or employees ot the Board under its orders, shall be 
allowed and paid on the presentation of itemized vouchers therefor 
ilpproved by the Boa.rd or by any individual it designates for that 
purpose. 
"SEO. 5. The principal office of the Board shall be in the District 
of Columbia, but it may meet and exercise any or all of its powers at 
any other place. The Board may, by one or more of its members or 
by such agents or a~ncies as it may designat~ prosecute any inquiry 
necessary to its functions in any {>art of the United States. A member 
who p:;i;rticipates in such an inquiry shall not be disqualified from sub-
seiucntly pnrticipating in a decision of the Board in the same case. 
'SEo. a. The Board shall have authority from time to time to make, 
amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by: the Administrative 
Procedure .A.ct, such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry 
out t.he provisions of this Act. 
"RIGHTS OF .EMFLOYEES 
"SEC. 7. Employees shall ha-ve the right to self-organization, to 
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing, nnd to engage in other concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid 
or protection1 and shall also have the right to refrain from. any or all 
of such activities except to the extent that sueh right may be a:ffected 
by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a 
condition of employment as authorized in section 8 (a) (3). 
"u:NF.AIR LABOR l"RAC'l70ES 
"SEo. 8. (a) It shall be an unfair lubor practice for an employer-
"(!) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in theexer• 
cise or the rights guaranteed in section 7; 
"(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or adminis-
tration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other 
support to it: P,rovided, That subject to rules and regulations 
made and published by the Bon.rd pursuant to section 6, an 
employer sliall not be prohibited from permitting employees to 
confer with him during working hours without loss of time or pay; 
"(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employ-
ment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or 
discourage membership in any labor organization : Provided, That 
nothing in this Act, or in any other statute of the United States, 
shall preclude an employer from makiug an agreement with a labor 
organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any 
action defined in section 8 (a) of this Act as an unfair labor 
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practice) to require ns a condition of employment membership 
therein 011 or aftei· the thirtieth .dav following the beginning of 
such employment or the effective date of such :·a!!reement, which-
ever is the fater, (i) if such labor organizntion is the representative 
of the employees as provided in section 9 (a), in the appropriate 
collective-bargaining unit covered by such agreement when mnde; 
n.nd { ii) H, following the most recent ~lection held as provi<.!ed~ in 
section 9 { e) the Board shall have certified that at least a maJonty 
of the employees eligible to vote in such election have voted to 
authorize such ln.bor organization to make such an agreement: 
P'l'o-vided f'(trt-hert That no employer shall justify any d1scrimimt-
tion against an employee for nonmembership in a labor organiza.-
tion (:A.) if he has 1·ea.sonable grounds for believing that such 
members~ip was not available.to the employee on the same ter~s 
and cond1t1ons generally applicable to otl1er members, or {B) 1£ 
he has reusonable grounds for belie·ring that membership was 
denied or terminated for reasons other than the fuilure of the 
employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees 
uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining 
n1embershlp; 
''(4) to discharge.or otherwise discriminate against an employee 
because lie has :filed c11arges or given testimony under this Act; 
" ( 5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives 
of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9 (a), 
''(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or 
its agents-
"(1) to restrain or coerce (A.) employees in the exercise of the 
rights guaranteed in section 7: Provided, That this paragraph 
shall uot impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its 
own rules with resJlect t-0 the acquisition or retention of member-
ship therein; or (B) an employer in the selection of his repre-
sentafiyes for the· purposes of collective bargaining or the adjust-
ment o:f grievances; 
"(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate 
a~~inst .an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) or to 
discriminate against an employee with respect to whom member-
ship in such organization has been denfod or terminated on some 
ground other than his failure to tender theJ)eriodic dues and the 
initiation fees uniformly required as a con ition of acquiri_ng or 
retaining membership; 
'~(3) to re:fuse to bargain collectively with an employer, pro-
vided it is the representntive o:f his employees subject to the 
provisions of section 9 (a}; 
" ( 4) _to engage in, or to induc~ or encourage the employees of 
any employer to engage m, a strike or a concerted refusal in the 
course of their employment to use, manufacture, .Process, transport, 
or otherwise handle or work on any goods, art1cles7 materials, or 
commodities or to perform any services, where an obJect thereof is: 
(A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person 
to 3oin any labor or employer organization or any employer or 
other P.erson !o c~ase · using, se11ing, handling, transporth1g, or 
otherwise dealing in the products of any other ptoducer, processor, 
or manufacturer, or to cense doing business with any other person; 
(B) forcing or requiring any otlier employer to recognize or_ bar-
gain with a labor .organiz_a.tion as the representative of his 
employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the 
representative of such employees under the prm·isions of section 9; ( C). forcing or reguiring a.ny employer to recognize or oargain 
with a particular labor organization as the representative of his 
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employees if another labor organization, has been c-&tifi.ed a.s the 
representative of such employees under the provisions of section 9; 
(D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign parli<iul~ work 
to employees in a. particular labor organiza.tion or in a particular 
tradet era#, or class rather than to ~mployoos in a.not.her la.bar 
or~iza,tion or in another tr~de, cta!t, or cla~.? .unless such 
employer is fa~ to eonform to an order or eertincatfon of the 
Board deter.miip.ng the bargaining representative for employees 
performing such work: PrO'Vided, That nothing contained in this 
subsection (b) sh.all be construed to make unla,dul a refusal by 
any person to enter upon the premis~ of any emplo~r. ( other 
than his own employer), if the employees of such emplo~r are 
engaged in a strike ratified or approved by: a representative of such 
employees whom such employer :is required to recognize under 
this Act; 
" ( 5) to req'ltlre of emrloyees covere4 by an agreetne.t1t author-
ized under subsection (a (3) thepa.yment, as a condition preced:. 
ent to becoming a mem er o:f such organization, o:f a fee in an 
amount which the Board finds excessive or discriminatory mider 
all the circu:ms~1.nces. In making such a, finding, the Board shall 
consider, amoni other relevant factors, the practices nnd customs 
of labor org~zations in the particular industry, a.nd the w~o-es 
currently paid to the~:rµployees aii'~ted; and 
"(6) to cause or attempt to cause an employer·to pay ot deliver 
or agre~ to pu.y or deliver- a.ny money or other thing 0£ value, in 
the nature of n.n exaction, for services which are not performed 
or notto be per:formed. 
''(c) The expressing of a.ny yiews, argument, or opinion, or the 
dissemination thereo£., whether in '!1'1tten, 1frinted, graphic, or vi~al 
form, shall not constitute o:r be evidence of an unfair labor practice 
under any o.f the provisions of this Ac½ if such expression contains no 
threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit. 
"(d} For the purpose$ of this section, to bargain collectively is.the 
periormance of the. mutual ~bligation of the. employer and the repre-
senitative of the ~ployees to meet at reasonable times and con:fer in 
good faith with respect t() wages, hours, a.nd other terms and conditions 
of employment, <;>r the ne_gotfatio:n of an agreement, or any question 
arising thereunder, and tlie execution of a written coil.tract incorpo-
rating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such 
obligati~n does not coinp~l ~ither P!1rtY to agree to ~ propo5?-l .pr ~ire 
the making of a concession: Pr()1Uided, That where there 'ls in effect a 
collective-bargaining contra.ct covering -eI!}ployees in -an industry 
affecting commerce the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean 
t.ho.t no party to such contra.ct shall termi~te or modify such contract, 
unless the party desiring such termination or modification-
,, ( 1) serves a written notice upon the other pa.tty to "the contract 
of ti1e iroposed termination or modification sixty days prior to 
the expiration date thereof, or in the event such contract contains 
no expiration date, sixty day~ _prior to the time it is proposed to 
make such termination or modincation; · · 
"(2) offers to meet and oonfer with the other party :for the 
purpose 9£ negotiating n. new contract or a contra.ct containing 
the proposed modi.fic.at1ons; 
'' ( 3} notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service 
within thirty days after such notice of the exist.ence of a dispute, 
and simultaneously therewith notifies any .State or Territorial 
agency established to mediate and conciliate disputes within the 
State or Territory where the dispute occurred, provided no agree-
menthas been reached by that time; and 
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"(4) .continues in full force and effect, without resorting to 
strike or lock-out, a.11 the terms and conditions of the existing 
eontract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or 
until the expiration dnte of such contract, whichever occurs later: 
The duties imposed upon employers, employee.s, and labor organizations 
by paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) shall become inapplicable upQn an 
interveni~·eertification of the Board, under which the labor orgmiiza.-
tion or indrvidual,which is a party to the contract, has been superseded 
as or ceased to be the representative of the employees subject to the 
provisions of section 9 (a), and the duties so imposed shall not be 
construed ns requiring either _{>arty to discuss or agree to any modifica-
tion of the terms and conditions contained in a contract for a fixed 
period_, if such modification is to become effective before such terms and 
conditions can be reopened under the prO\'isions of the contract. Any 
employee who engages in a strike witliin the sixty-day period specified 
in this s~bsection sl~all lose his s~tus as an employee of the employer 
engaged 111 the particular labor <bspute, for the purposes of sections 8, 
9, and 10 of this Act, as ru,uended, but such_ loss . of ~tatus for such 
employee shall tennmate if and when he is reemployed by · such 
employer. 
''REPRF..SENTATI\'ES .AND ELECTIONS 
"SEC. 9 •. ( a) ReP.r~sentatives d~ign~ted or selected for the _puryos~s 
of colle~t1ve bnrga1mng by the maJor1ty of the employees m: a umt 
appropriate for such purpo$es, shall be tlie exclusive representatives of 
all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining 
in respect to rates 0£ pay, vrn.ges1 hours of emyloyme11ti or other condi-tions of employment: 1>-roviaea, That any mcli vidua employee or a 
group of employees shall have th~ right at any-time to present ~iev-
ances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without 
the intervention of the bargaining representative, a_ s lon __ gas the adju. st-
ment is not inconsistent with tl)e terms of a coll~ct1ve-bargaining 
contract or agreement then in effect: Provided fwrther, That the bar-
gaining representative hns been given opportunity to be present at 
such adj ustroent. 
"(b}. The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure 
to employees the fu]Iest freed~>1n in e.~ercising the rights gua_rn.nteed 
by this Act, the umt approprmte for the purposes of collect-Ive bar-
gaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision 
thereof: Pro1,ided, Thnt the Bonrd shall not (1) decide that any unit 
is appropriate for such purposes if such unit includes both professional 
employees and employees who are .not professional employees 'Qllless 
a majority of such professional employee.s vote for inclusion in such 
unit; or (2) decide tlmt any c~a!t unit i~ inap_propriate ~or such 
purposes on the .ground that a different umt has been established by 
a prior Board dctermfoation7 unless a mnjor1tv of the employees in the JJroposed craft unit vote ngamst separate representation or ( 3) decide 
that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if it includes, together 
with other employees, any individual einployed as a guard to enforce 
against employees and other persons rules to protect proEerty of the 
employer or t.o protect the safety of persons on the employer's premises; 
but no labor organization shall be certified a.s the representative of 
employees i~~ a baJ:'$Uini~g unit ?f guards _if ~uch or~nization a~its 
to membershlp, o:r 1s affiba.t~d directly or md1rectly with an organiza-
tion which admits to membership, employees other than guards. 
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"(e) (1) Whenever n. p~_tition shall have teen ·filed> in accordance 
with such regulations ns may be prescribed by the Board-
" (A)· by nn einpfoyee or ~oup of emploiees or any individual 
or la_bor organization acting m their behalf alleging that asubstan-
tia.1 number of employees (i) ·wish to be.represented for collective 
bargnirung and tliat their employer declines to recognize their 
representative -as the representntive:defincd in section 9 (a), or 
{ii) ·assert tl).at the individ~l or labor organization2 which has been certifie~ ?r is being curr~ntly recognized by their emP.loyer 
as the bargaining reJJresentative, 1s no longer a representative as 
defined in section 9 ( o.) ; or 
''(B) by an employer, alleging that one or more individuals or 
labor organizations have present.ed to him a claim t9 be recognized 
ns the representative defined in section 9 (a} ; 
the Board shall investi,gate such petition and H- it has reasonable cause 
to believe that a question of 1·epresenta.tion affectina commerce exists 
shall provide £_ or. _ an npQrop.ria_ te hearin_ g. u_ pon_ due _no_ ti_ ce._ S.uch 
hearing may be conducted by an officer or-employee of the r~onal 
office, who ~hall not make any recommendations with respect tliereto. 
If the Board finds u~oil. the record of such hearing that such a question 
of representation exists, it shall direct an election by sec1·et ballot and 
shall certify the results thereof. 
· "(2) In determinin~ whether or not a q_uestion of representation 
nff ect1ng COfOIDeree ~ts, the. so.m~ reg!,llabons and ~les of dec!s!on 
shall apply 1rresP,ectlve of the 1d_ent1ty of the persons fili~ the petition 
or the kmd of relief sought and m no case shall the Board deny a labor 
organization a place on the ballot by ·reason of an order with respect 
t-o $Uch fabor 01·ga.nization 9r its predecessor not issued in_ conf9rmity 
with section 10 (c). . . · . · 
"(3) No e]ection shall be directed in any bargaining_ unit onm:y 
sul?division-within 'Yhich, inthe preceding twelve-month period·, a·valid 
election shall have been held. EmEloyees on strike who are not 
entitled to. reinstatement shn.11 not be eligible to vote. In any election 
where none of the choices on the· ballot receives .a majority,. a run~o:fi 
shall be conducted, the ballot providing for a selection .between th_e 
two choices receiving the large.st and second largest number of valid 
votes ca.st in the election. 
" ( 4) Nothing in this section ·sluµl be construed to prohibit the. waiV'-
ing_ · 0£ lrearin~ by sti_p. ulatio. n £_or· the purp_ ose of a. conse.nt efoction in 
conformity with regu.lati_ons and rules of decjsion of the Board .. 
"(5) In determining whether a unit is appropriate for.the purposes 
speci:ffod in subsection (b) the extent to which the employees have 
or~ized shall not be controlling. 
'(d) Whenever an order of the Board made pursuant to section 
J, 0 ( c ). is ~ased in whole or _in p~ u:pon facts. c~rt~ed following 8!1 
invesb_gation pursuant to subsection ( c) of. this section and there lS 
it petition :for the enforcement or review of such order, such c~rtification 
nnd the record 0£ such investigation shall be included in the transcript 
of the entire record required to be filed under -section 10 (e) or 10 ( f), 
an_d ~e~upon the !3ecree of the court enforcing, modifying, or setting 
aside m whole or m part the. order of the Board shall be made and 
e,ntered upon ~he pleadings, testimony, and proceedings set forth in 
such transcr~pt. 
"(e) (1) Upon the filing with the Board by a labor organization, 
which is the r_epresent.ative of employees_ aspro_. vid.ed in section_9 (a_), 
of a petition all~ing that 30 per ccntum or more of the employees 
withiii a unit cfa1i:nea to be ap~ropriate for such purposes d~sire to 
-authorize such labor organization to make. an agreement with the 
employer of such employees requiring membership in such labor organ~ 
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ization as n condition uf employment in such unit, upon an appropriate 
showing thereof the Board sluiH, if no question of 1·epresentation exists, 
take a secret ballot of such employees, a.nd shnll certify the results 
thereof to such labor organizatjon and to the employer. 
"(2) Upon the filing with the Board, by 30 per centum or more of 
the employees in a barrraining unit covered bv an ngreement between 
their _eiµpl9yer and a t1.b<>r orgauization mnde pursuant to section 8 
(a) (3). (ii),- of a. petition nlle0-ing tl1ey desire that such authori~y 
be rescmded, the Board slmll to.kc a secret ballot of the employees lll 
such unitt and shall certify the results tl1ereof to sucl1 labor organization 
and to the employer. 
"(3) No election shall be conducted pursuant to this subsection in 
any bargainiilg·unit or nny subdh•ision within which, in.tho preceding 
twelve-month period, a valid electi1;>n shall have been held. 
~'(f) No investigation sh.nll be made by the. Board o:f any ques~ion 
afiectmg commerce concerning th~ representation of employees, ro.ised 
by a labor organization under subsection ( c) of this section, no petition 
unde1· section 9 (e) (1) shrill be entertained, and no complaint shall be 
issued pursuant to a chnrge made by a labor organizution under sub--
section (b) of section 10~ unless such labor organization and any 
national or internatiom1UnbQr orgnnizntion of w·hich such labor organ-
ization is an affiliate or co11stituent unit (A) shall have prior tl1ereto 
filed with the Secretary of Labor copies of its coustitution and b.ylaws 
and a report, in such form as the Secretary may prescribe. shomng-
" ( 1) the name of $Uch I~bor organization and the address of 
its principal place of business; 
"(2) the names, titles, and compensation and i111owances of its 
three principal officers and 0£ nny of its other officers or agents 
~hose aggregate compensn.tion rtnd nllown.nces for the preceding 
year exceeded $5,000, and the amount of the compensation and 
allowances paid to each such officer or agent during such :vear; 
" ( 3) the manner in which the. officers. and a.gents referred" to in 
clause (2) were elected, appointed,orothenviseselected; · 
" ( 4) the initiation fee or fees which new members are required 
to p~tY on becoming members of such labor organization; 
" ( 5) the regular dues or fees which members nre required to 
pay in order to remain members in good standing of such labor 
oro-anization ; 8 (6} a. detailed statement of, or reference to provisions of its 
constitution and bylaws showing the procedure followed with 
respect to, (a) qun..1ification for or restrictions. on membership, 
(b) election of officers a11d stewards, (c) calling of regu.lar and 
special meetings; {d) leYyirig of assessments, (e) imposition of 
fines, ( £) nuthorizntion for bargaining demands, -(g) ratification 
of contract terms, (h) authorization for strikes, (i) authorization 
for disbursement of uniori :funds, (j) !ludit of union financial 
transactions, (k} participntion in insurance or other benefit plans, 
and (1) expulsion of members and the groui1ds therefor; 
and (B) can show that prior thereto it has-
" ( 1) filed with tl1e. Sect-etn.ry of La.bar, in such form as the 
Secretary may prescribet a report showing all of (a) its receipts 
of any kind nnd the sources of such receipts, (b) its total assets 
and liabilities as 0£ the end of its last fiscal year, ( c) the disburse~ 
ments ~ade by it during such fiscal year, including the purposes 
for wluch made; and 
"(2) furnished to nll of the members of such labor organization 
copies of the financial report required by paragraph (1) hereof 
to befi1ed with the Secretary of Labor. 
953~7°---48-pt.1-10 
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i'(g) It shall be the obligation of all labor or~tioDS ro tile 
ennuitlly with the Secretary o:f Labor, in such fQrm us the .Secretary 
of L~bor may presc~be,.xepo1¥ p~ingii:g up to date ~e.information 
re<JUired_ to be supplied 1~ the 1mt1al fi.liilg b:y subsection (f)_ {A) !)f 
this section, and to file with the Secretary of Labor and :furmsh to its 
members annually financial re_port.s in. the fol'ril nndmrum.er p_.rescl'ibed 
in subsection ff} (B). No 19.bor organization _shall be eligible for 
certification under thjg section as the 1,epresentative of any ~ployees, 
no :petition under section 9 (e) ( 1) shall be entertained, and no com~ 
plamt shall issue under section 10 with respect to a eh~rge filed by 
a labor organization . unless it can show that it and any national or 
international labor organization of, which it is an affiliate or constitue_ nt 
unit h~ complied with its obligation unde~ this subsection~ 
"(h) No investigation ~all oe made by the Board of any question 
nff ecting commerce con~rning the representation of employees, raised 
by a_ labor .organization under subseetio~ { c) of this section, :10 petition 
undel' section 9 ( e) ( 1} shall be enterta.me4, an<i no com_pla.mt shall be 
issued pursuant to a charge made. by a labor -0rga.nizatiol) under sub-
section: (b) of section 10, unless tliere is pn_ file with th~ Board an. 
affidavit executed contemporaneously or within the preceding twelve~ 
month period by each officer of such labor organization and the officers 
of any natfonal or international labor organization of which i~ is an 
affiliate or· constituent unit that he is not a member of the Communist 
Party or affiliated with such party, and that he does not believe in1 and is not a member of or supports any organization that believes m 01~ 
teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government by force or by 
any illegn.l or llhconstitutional methods. The provisions of sectipn 
3!{ . .A. or the Criminal Code .shall be applicable in respect to such 
affidavits. 
'~~ON OF tn-TFAIR LABOR PRACTICES 
"SEC. 10. ( a) The Boa.rd is empowered, as 11oreinaftei· provided, to 
}?teven.t any per.soA from engaging in ~ny unfair labor practice (listed 
m section 8) affecting commerce~· Th1s power shall nqt b~ a:ffected by 
any other means of actjustmerit or prevention that.has been or may be 
established by agreement, Jaw, or otherwise: Provideit, That the 
Boa.rd is empowered by agreement. with any agency of ariy State or 
Territory to cede to such :agency jurisdictfon over any cases in any 
industry (other than mining, manufacturing1 oommun.ications, a.nd 
transportation except _where predom}nail.tly loca~ in character) even 
though such-0ases maym volvelabor disputes aifect1n~ commerce, unless 
th~ pr9'rlsion of the State or Terr,itorial ~~tute a.t>phcabl~ t,o the deter-
nunat1on of such cases by such agency ·1s mconsJstent with the co:r;-re.,. 
s:pond.ing provision· of this A.ct or has. rec~ived a, construction incon-
Sistent theremth. 
''(b) Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is 
engaging in any such unfair labor practice, the Board, or any a.gent 
or agency designated by the Board for such purposes, sho.Irhave power 
to issue al).d cause to be served upon such p~rson a. complaint stating 
the charges in that respect, and containing a notice oi hearing before 
the Boara or a member thereof~ or before a designated agent.or ag~cy, 
at a place therein fixed, not le.ss than five da.ys after the serving of said 
complaint: Provided, That· no complaint :shall issue based upon any 
unfair labo:r practice occurring more than. six months prior to the filing 
of the charge with the Boa.rd and the service of a copy thereof upon 
the l'erson against who~ ~uch charge _is made, unle~ the person 
aggrieved thereby was prevented from :filing such charge by reason of 
.service in the armed :forces, in. which event the six-month period shall 
b.e computed from the dny of his discharge. Any such complaint may 
be amended by the member, agent, or agency conducting the hearing 
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or the Board in its discretion at any time prior to the issuance of an 
order based thereon. The person so complamed of s11nl1 have the right 
!o .file an answer to !he origj!1al or. ~mended complaint and tp appear 
m person or otherwise and give testimony at the place and time fixed 
fo the complaint In tbe discretiou of the member, agent, or ~ency 
conducting the hearing or the Board, any other person may be allowed 
to intervene in the said proceeding and to present testimony. Any 
such proceeding shall, so far as practicable, be conducted in accordance 
with the rules of evideuce applicable in the district courts of the 
United.St;Ltes under tberulf!S of dvil procedure for the district courts 
of the United States. adopted by the Supreme Court of theUnited 
States pursuant to tbe Act of June 19, 1934 (U. S. C., title 28, secs. 
723-B, 723-0). 
;'{c) The testimony taken by such member, agent, or agency or the 
Board shall be reduced to writing._ and filed with the Bou·d. There-
after, in its discretion, the Board upon notice may take :further testi-
mony or l1car ar~ment. If _upon the p.repondemnce of the testimony 
taken the Board shall be of the opinion tliat any person named in the 
comp!ahlt has engnged in or is· e11~ag:ing_ in any such unfn:ir l_abor 
practice, then the Boo.rd shall state its findm_w; of fact and shall issue 
and cnuse to be served 011 such person nn orcter r~u1ring such person 
to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, .and to take such 
affirmative ac~ion including l'einstatement of employees with or without 
back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act: Provided, That 
where an order directs reinstatement of an employee, back pay may 
be required of the employer or labor or£anizatiou, as the case may be, 
responsible for the discrimination sunered by him: And pro-i1ded, 
fu:rfhe-r.,_ That in d~termining whethei· ~ com.plaint shall iss_ue all~g!ng 
a v10lat1on of sed1on 8 (a) (1) or.section 8 (a) (2), and m deciding 
such cases, the so.me regulations und rules of decision shall apply 
irrespective of w hetller or not the fabor organiza:tion tdiected is affili-
ated with a labor organization national or international in scope. 
Such order may :further require such ~erson to make reports :from 
time to time showing the extent to which 1t has complied with the order. 
If. upon the prcpondem1ice of the testimony taken. the Board shaU not 
be of the opinion that the person uamed in the complaint has engaged 
in or is engaging in nnv ~uch unfair labor practice, then the Board 
shall state its findings o} fact and shnll issue an order dismissing the 
said complaint. No order of the Board shall require the ieinstntement 
of any indh·idual as an employee who has been suspended or dis-
charged> or the payment to him of any buck pay, ii such individual 
was suspended or discharged for cause. In case th~ evidence is pre-
~ented before a meml?e1· of the Board, or before an exami!1er or exam" 
mers thereof, such member, or such exwuner or examiners, as the 
case may be, shall issue and cause to be SL:1"'7ed on the parties to the 
proceedmg n proposed report, together with a recommended order, 
which shall be filed with tl1e Board, and if no exceptions are filed 
within twenty days after service thereof UJ?OD such parties, or within 
·such further period as the Board may authorize, such recommended 
order sl1all become the order of the Board nnd become effective as 
therein prescribed. 
"(d) Unti1 a transcript o:£ the record in a case shall have been 
£led in a court, as hereinafter provided, the Board may at any time, 
upon reasonable notice and in such manner as jt shall deem proper, 
modifI or set aside, in whole or in part, anv finding or order made or 
issued by it. ~ -
i'(e) The Board sha.Ulrn:ve power to petition any circuit court of 
appeals of the United Stat.es (including the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia), or if all the circuit courts of 
appeals to which application may be made are in vacation, any district 
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court of the United States (including the rnstrict Court o-f the United 
States for the District of Columbia), within any circuit or district, 
respectively., wherein the m1fair labor practice in question occurred or 
wherein sucn person resides or transacts business, for the enforcement 
o:f such order and for appropriate temporary relief or restrailllllg order, 
and shall certify and file in the court a transcript of the entire reco.rd 
in the proceedings, including the pleadings and testimony upon which 
such order was entered and the findings and order of the Board. Upon 
such filing, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served u~on such 
person, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and 
of the question determined therein, and shall have power to grant 
such temporary relief or restraini~ order as it deems just and proper, 
and to make and enter upon the pleadings, testimony, and proceed!]lgs 
set forth in such transcript a decree enforcing, modifying, and enforc-
ing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in _part the order of 
the Board. No objection that has not been urged before the Board, its 
member, agent, or agency, shall be considered by the cour~ unless 
the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because 
of extraordinary circumstances. The .findings of the Board with 
respect to questions of ftiet if supported by substantial evidence on the 
record considered as a whole shall be conclusive. If either party shall 
apply to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence and shall 
show to the satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence :is 
material and that there were reasonable grounds for the failure to 
adduce such evidence in the hearing before the Boa.rd, its member, 
agent, or agency, the court may order such additional evidence to be 
taken before the Board, its members, agent, or a~nc;y, and to be made 
a part o:f the transcript. The Board may modify its .findings as to 
the facts, or make new findings, by reason of additional evidence so 
ta.ken and filed, and it shall file such modified or new findings, which 
findings with respect to questions of fact if supported by stibstantial 
evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive, and 
shall file it.s recommendations, if any, for the modification or setting 
aside of its original order. The jurisdiction of the court shall be exclu~ 
sive and its judgment and decree shall be final, except that the same 
shall be subject to review b;y the appropriate circuit court of appeals 
if application was made to the district court as hereina.bove provid~ 
and by the Supreme Court of the United States lWOn writ of certioran 
or certification as Erovided in sections 239 and 240 of the Judicial 
Code, as amended ( U. S. C., title 28, secs. 346 and 347). 
" ( f) Any person ng~ieved by a final order of the Board granting 
or denying in whole or in part the :relief sought may obtain a review 
of such oraer in any circuit court of appeals of the United Stafos in 
the circuit wherein the unfair labor practice in question was alleged 
to have been enga~d in or wherein such person resides or transacts 
business, or in the United StlJ.te.s Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia, by .filing in such court a written petition praying that the 
order of the Board be modified or set aside. A copy of such petition 
shall be forthwith served upon the Board, and thereupon the aggrieved 
party shall file in the court a transcript of the entire record in the 
proceeding, certified by the Boa.rd, including the pleading and testi .. 
mony upon which the order complained of was entered, and the findin~ 
and order of the Board. Upon such filing, the court shall proceed m 
the same manner as in the case of an application by the Board under 
subsection ( e), and shall ha vs the same exclusive jurisdiction to ~ant 
to the Board such temporary relief or restraining order as it <1eems 
just and proper, and in like manner to make and enter a decree enforc. 
ing1 modifying, and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole 
or m part the order of the Board; the findings of the Board with 
~-
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respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on 
the record co11sidercd as a whole shall in like manner be conclusive. 
"(g) The commencement of proceedings under subsection ( ~) or ( f) 
of this section shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate 
as a stav of the Board's order. 
''(h) .,When wanting appropriate temporary relief or a. restraining 
order, or maki11g- and entering. a decree enforcing, modifying, and 
enforcing as so modified·, or setth1g aside in whole or in part an order 
on the Boar9-t as provided in this section, the jurisdiction of courts 
sitting in equity shall not be limited by the Act entitled 'An Act to 
amend the Jud1cia] Code and to define and limit the jurisdiction. of 
courts sitting in equity, and for other purposes', approved March 23, 
1932 (U. S~ c~, Supp. VII~·title 29, secs.101-115). 
"(i) Petit.ions filed. unct~r this Act sl1all be heard e;x;peditiously, and 
if Rossible within ten days after they have been docketed. 
~(j) The ]3oard shall ha-ve power, upon issuance of a complaint as 
provided in subsection (b) charging that any person has enga.ged in 
or is engngincr in an unfair laoor practice. to petition any district 
C'ourt of tl1e lfnited States {including the Distrct Court of tho United 
States for the District of Columbia), within any district wherein the 
unfnir labor practice in question is alleged to have occurred or wherein 
such person res~des or trnnsacts business, £or nJ?propriate temvorary 
relief or restraining order. Upon the filing of any such petition the 
court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon sucl1 pel'Son, and 
thereupon shall have jurisdiction to grant to the Board such temporary 
relief or restraining order nsit deemsJjust and proper. 
"{k) ·whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an 
unfair labor pr-'1ctice within the me~ning of paragraph ( 4) (D) of 
section 8 ( b), the Board is empowered and directed to hear and deter-
mine the dispute out of which such un:fair ]abor practice shall have 
arisen, unless, :within tt3n days nfter noti.ce that such charge has been 
filed, the parties to such dispute submit to the Board satisfactory 
e:vidence that they ha.ve adjusted, or agreed upon methods for. the 
voluntary adjustment.of. the dispute. Upon compliance 'by the parties 
to the dispute with the clecision of ·the Board or upon such voluntary 
adjur:.-tment of the di~pute1 such charge shall be dismissed. 
'"(l) Whenever it is charged t.hat any person has engaged in an 
unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph {4) (A.), (B), 
or (C) of section 8 (b), the preliminary investigation of such charge 
shall be made forthwith und given pdority over nll other cas~ except 
eases of like character ill the office where it is filed or :to which it is 
1.·eferred. If, after such investigation, the officer or regional attorney 
to whom the matter may .be referred has reasonable cause to believe 
such charge is true and thnt n compla.int should issue, he shnll, on bclinl£ 
of the Board, petition any district court of the United States (includ~ 
ing the District Court of the United Shi.tes for the District of Colmh-
bia) within any district where. the unf~ir labor practice in question 
has occurred, is alleged fo have occurred. or wherein such person resides 
or transacts business, for appropriate· injunctive relief pending the 
final adjudication of the Board with respect to sucl1 ma.tter. Upon 
the filing of any such petition the district court shnll hu;ye jurisdiction 
to grnnt such injunctive relief or temporary restraining or~er a,s it 
deems j'ust and proper, notwithstanding any other pronsion of law: 
Pro11id~ furtlie·r Thnt no temporary restraming order shall be issued 
without notice uJess a petition alleges that. substantial and irreparable 
injury to the charging party will be unavoidable and such temporary 
1·estraining ord~ shnlJ be effectiye £or no longer than five days and will 
become void at the ex__piration of such period. Upon filing of any such 
petition the courts sha.11 cause notice thereof to be sen·ed upon any 
person involved in the charge and such person, including the chnrgjng 
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party, shall be given an opportunity to appear by counsel and present 
any··relevant testimQny: Provided /'Wf'thffr.,. That for the J.)ttrpOSes of 
this subsection district courts sha.11 be deemed to have jurisdiction of 
a la.bor or~nfaation (1) in the district in which such orga.n.ization 
maintain~ 1ts__prineipal office) or (2) in any district in which its duly 
authorized officers or agents are engaged m promoting or protecting 
the interests of ·employee members. The service of legal process upon 
such officer or agent shall constitute service upon the labor organization 
and make such organization. a. pa.rty to the· suit. In situations where 
such relief is appropriate the proce_ dure ~cified herein shall a.pply 
to charges with respect t.o section 8 (b) ( 4) { u). 
"IJ.\~STIGATORY :ecnv:ERS 
"SEO. 11. For the purpose of all l1earings and investigations, which, 
in the opinion 0£ the Board, are necessary and proper for the exercise 
of the powers vested in. it by section 9.and section 10- • 
"(1) The Bon.rd, or 1t.s duly authorized agents or agencies, shall at 
all reasonable times have access t-0, for the purpose-of examination, 
and the right to copy any evidence of any person being investiiated or 
proceeded ~ainst that relates to any matter under investi~t10n or in 
question. The Boaro., or a~y menilier ~ei:eof, shall upon application 
of any _party to such _proceedings, forthwith issue to sucli party subpenas 
requiring the attendance a.ncl testimony of witnesses or the produ~tion 
of any evidence in such proceeding or investi~ation requested in such 
application. Within five days after the service of a subpena on any 
person requiring the Pl'Odueti~n of any evidence in his posse~on or 
un:der his conttol, such person may petition the Boa.rd to 1·evcike, and 
the. Boarg. sh~l reyoke, s1:1ch subperut if. in it;s opinion the evidenc~ 
whose production 1s reqmred does not relate to any mattm· under 
¥1V~~gation, or any matter in questfo!1 in ~ch pro~edings).. or if_ in 
its op1mon such subpena does not describe with sufficient particularity 
the evidence whose production is required. Any member of the Board, 
or Dlly D.1Jent or agency des~gnated by the l3oard for such purposes, 
xnay ~dminister oaths and affirmations, e::samine witnesses, and receive 
evidence. Such attendance of witnesses and the __ _prpduction of such 
evidence may be required from any place in the United· States or any 
Territory or possession thereof, at any desi~ted place of hearing. 
"(2) In case. o:f contumacy or refusal ii<> o~ey a subpena ~ued to 
any person, a.n:r dist1ict court of the United States or the United States 
courts. . of any _Territo!jl' or possession, or the Di~trict . Court. of the 
United States for the District of Columbia,. within the jurisdiction of 
which the inquiry is carried on or withln the jurisdiction of ·which said 
person gu_ilty of contumacy or refusal to ol:iey is :found or resides or 
transacts business, upon application by the Bo·ard shall have jurisdic--
tion to issue to such person an order requiring such person to appear 
before the Board, its member, agent, or a~ncy, there to produce evi-
dence if so ordered, or there to give testimony touching the matter 
under investigation or in question; and any failure t.o obey such order 
of the court m_ay be punished_.· by' said co'urt as a conteinp. t· the. reof. 
"(3) No person sliall be excused from attendin_g and testi£yina- or 
from producing books, records, correspondence, docwnent:s, or other 
evi<,lenc~ _in obedienc~ to the ~ub:pena of ~e, Boardt on the ~oup~ that • 
the test1mony or evidence reqmred of him may t0nd to mcrrmms.te 
him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture; but no individual shall 
be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on 
account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he is 
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compelled, ~fter having cla.i'~ned his privilege ngn.hl~t s~l~-incriminn-
tion, to testify or produce·ev1dence, except th:tt such mdn·!clual so tes-
tifyina shtdl not be ~~empt from prosecution and punishment for 
perjuty comm.iited in so testifying. 
" ( 4) Complaints, orders, and other process and pa_pers of the Board, 
its ?.1-~mber, a~ent, or age~cy, may be serv~d eitlier personally or by 
reQ1stered mail or by telegrnph or by leavmg a copy thereof nt the 
i:>_r!ncipaJ office or p. face of bu.sin_ess o_f the. person required to be s~rved. 
The verified. return by tl1e individual so serving the snme setting forth 
the manner of suc.h service shall be proof of tfie same, and the return 
post office rece.ipt or telegraph receipt therefor when registered and 
mailed or telegraphed as aforesaid sho.Jl be proof of service of the 
same. Witnesses summoned before the Board, its 1ne1n.ber, agent, or 
~gency, sba.11 be paid t~e same fees and 11:ilcage that are pnid :w1tnesses 1n the courts of the United States~ and witnesses wl1ose depositions ure 
taken and t.he persons taking the same sh~ll severally be entitled to the 
same fees as are paid for like services in the courts of the U 1rited 
States. 
"(5) A}l process of any court. to whi:h :1J?Plic~tio~ may be~ma.de 
ttnder this Act may be served m the ]Ud1c1al d1str1ot wherem the 
defendant or other person required to be served resides or may be found. 
" ( 6) The several departments and agencies of the Government when 
directed by the President, shall furnisli the Board, upon its request, all 
records1. papers., and information in their possession relating to any 
mutter before the Board. 
"SEC. 12. Any person who shall willfully resist1 prevent, impede, or interfere with any member of the Board or any.of its agents or agencies 
in the performance of duties pursuant to this Act shall be punished 
by a fine of not more thail $5,000 or bj~ imprisonment for not more than 
one year, or both. 
"LTMITA TIONS. 
"Sro. 13. Nothing in this Act, except. as spe.cifically proYided fot· 
herein, shall be construed so ns either to inter£ere with or impede or 
diminish in any way the right to strike, or to ttfi'ect the limitation$ or 
qualifications on that right. 
.°SEo. 14. (a) Nothino- herein shall prohibit any individual em• 
ployed as a. supervisor irom becoming or remaining a member o:f a 
labor .or~nization, but no em plover subject to thls Act shall be com-
pelled to deem individual.s defined herein as supervisors as employees 
tor the purpose of any law, either national or local, relating to collec-
tive bargaining. 
"(b) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the 
execution or application of agreements requiring membership_ in a 
labor or~nfan.tion as a condition of employment in any St,at-e or Terri-
tory in which such execution or application is prohioited by Sta.te or 
Territorial law. 
"SEc. 15. Wherever the application of the provisions of section 212 
of chapter 10 of the Act entitled 'An Act to establish a uniform system 
of bankruptcy throughout the United States', approved July 1: 1898, 
and Acts amendatory thereof and supplementary thereto (U~ S. C., 
title 11, sec. 672), conflicts with th~ application of the provisions of 
this Act, this Act shall . :prevail : Pr01Jided, That in any situation 
~h~re the provisions of this .A.ct ca~o~ be yalidly enforced, the pro-
V1S10ns of such other Acts shall remrun m fuU force and effect. 
"SEC. 16. If any provision of this Act, or the application of such 
provi_sion to any person_ or eirc~ta;11ces, shall be. h~l~ invalid, the 
rem~mder of thls Act, or the application o~ su~11 .Provis1~n to parsons 
or c1roumstances other tl1an those as to wl11ch 1t 1s held mvalid, shall 
not be affected thereby. 
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"SEo. 17. This Act may be cited as the '.National Labor Relations 
Act'." 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF CEB.'l'AlN .CHANGES 
Sro. 102. No provision o:f this title shall be deemed to make an 
unfair labor practice any act which was performed ptior to the date 
of the enactment of this Act which did not constitute an unfair labor 
practice prior thereto, and the provisio~ of sootion 8 (a) (3) and 
se~tio~ 8 (b) (2) of the National. Labor Relati?ns Act as amended by 
this title shall not make an unfair labor Eractice the performance of 
any obligation under a colleetive:-barga~11~ agre~~nt entere~ into 
prior t-0 the date of the enactment of this Act, o:i;- ( m the case. of an 
agreement for a period of not more than o_ne year) entered into on or 
a.ft.er. such date of enactment, but pr.io,r to_ tlle effective date o~ this 
title, i.f the per:forman~e of such obligation would not hav~ constituted 
an umair labor practice ll.Ilder s.ection 8 (3) of the National Labor 
.Relations Act prior to the effective date of this title, unless such agree-
ment. was renewed or extended subsequent thereto. 
SEc. 103. No provisions of this title shall affect any certification of 
representatives or any determination as to the appropriate·collective-
bargaining unit, which was made under section 9 of the National Labor 
Relations Act prior to the effective date 0£ this title until one year 
after the date of sud1 certification. or if, in respect of any such certifi-
cation, a collective-°Qa.rgainin~ cQntra.ct was entered into prior to the 
effective date of this title, until the end of the contract period or until 
one:year after such dat.e whichever first occurs. 
$Eo~ 104. The amendments mnde by this title shall take effect sixty 
dais after the date of the enactment of tlus .A.ct, except that the 
authority of the President to appoint certain officers conferr~d upon 
him by_: section 3 of the National Labor Relations Act as amended by 
this title may be exereised forth~ith. 
TITLE II-CONCILI.A.TION OF LABOR DISPUTES IN IN-
DUSTRIES AFFECTING COMMERCE·;. NATIONAL EMER-
GENCIES 
SEo. 201. That it is the policy of the United States that-
(a.) sound and stable industrial peace and the adv~ncement of 
the general welfare, health, and safety of the Nation and .of the 
best mterests of employers ~d employ~ can most satisf~ctoril:y 
be secured by the settlement of issues between employers . and 
employees through the_proce.sses of confet·ence and collective bar-
gaining between empfoyers and the representatives of their 
employees; 
(b) the settlement" of issues between employers and employees 
throu~h collective_bargaining may be·adv~~d.·by :ma.king_av __ ail-
able run and adequate governmental. :facilities for conciha.tion, 
media:tion, and voluntary arbitration to aid and encourage employ-
ers and the representatives of their employees 'to reach and 
main~~in agreements concerning rates of.pay, hours1 anq. ~oi:~ 
conditions, nnd to make all reasonable efforts to settle their differ-
ences l;>y mutual agreement reached through conferences and 
~ollective ~tgaining or by such methods us may be .provided for 
many applicable agreement for the settlement of disputes; and 
{ c) certain. controversies which arise between p~i~ t'9 
collective-bargaining agreements may be avoided or minimized by 
makini. available full and. adeql.11).te governmental :facilities for 
furnisning assistance m emplQyers and the representatives of their 
employees in formulating for inclusion within such· agreements 
p1·ovision for: adequate notice of any proposed changes in the 
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terms of such agreements, .for the final adjustment of grievances 
ot· questions regarding the applicntion or interpretation of such 
agrf.!enumts, ana other provisions designed to prevent the sub-
sequent arising of such controvers.ies. 
SEc. 202 .. { a} There is h~re~y- created an. i?~~pcnden~ agency ~o 
be known as the Federal Mediation nnd Conciliation Service {herem 
referred to as the ''Service'', except that for sixty days aiter the date 
of the enactment of this Act such. term shn 11 refer t.o the Conciliation 
Service of the Department of Labor). The Service shall be under 
the direction of a Federal Mediation and Conciliation Director (here-
inafter referred to as the "Director"), "ho shall be appointed by tJ1e 
President by n.nd with the advice and consent of the Senate. ·Tbe 
Director shall receive compensation rit the rate of $12,000 per annum. 
The Directpl' shn11 not engage in any other busines.<;, vocation, or 
emplovment. 
(b) ~-The Director is authorized, subject to the civil-service laws, to 
appoint such clerical a~d other perso1mel as may be necessary for the 
execution of the :functions of the Service, nnd shnll fix their compensa-
tion in ncco:rda.nce with tl1e·Clnssification Act of 1~23. as amended, and 
may, without regard to the provisions of the civi.1-ser,·iee Jaws and the 
Classification Ad- of 1923, as amended: appoint and fix the compensa-
tion of such conciliators and mediators as may be necessary to carry 
out the functions of the Service. The Director is authorized to make 
such expenditnres for ~upplies, facilities, and services as he deems 
necessary. Such expenditures shall be allowed and paid upon pres-
entation of itemized vouchers therefor approved by the Director or by 
any emp loyce designated by him for that purpose. 
(c) The principal office· of the Sen-ice slmll be in the District of 
Columbia, but the Director may establish regional offices convcnie;p.t 
to localities in which labor controversies are likely to .arise. The 
Director may by order,.subject to revocation at any time. delegate any 
aut~ority Ji-Hd discretion conferred upon him by this Ac_t to any 
regional director, or other officer or employee of the Service. The 
Director may estabHsh suitable procedures for cooperation with State 
and local mediation agencies. The Director shall make an annual 
rep_ort in writing to C.ollgress at the end of th_e nsc:il Jear. 
( d) All mediation and conciliation functions of the Secretary o:f 
Lnbor or the United States Conciliation Se1·vice under section 8 o:f the 
Act entitled "An Act to create. a Department of Labor'\ approved 
l\Inrch 4, 1913 {U. S. C., title 29, sec. 51), n.nd all functions of the 
United States Conciliation Service under any other ]aw are. hereby 
transferred to the Federal l'!ediation and Conciliation Service, 
together with the Ecrsonnel ·and records of the United States Con-
ciliation Service. Such transfer shall take effect upon the sixtieth 
day nfter the date of enactm~nt of this Act. Such. trnrisfer shall not 
affect uny proceedings pending before the United States Conciliation 
Service or any certification, order, rule, or r~<TUlation theretofore made 
by it•or bv the Secretary of L~bor~ The Director and the Service shall 
not besnbject in uny way.to the ju!-'i~diction or authority of the Secre-
tary of Labor or any official or d1v1s1on. of the Department o:f Labor. 
FtnlCI'IONS OF TIIE SERVICE 
&o. 203. (n) It shall be the duty of the Service, in order to pre-
vent or minimize interruptions of the free flow of commerce growing 
out of fo.bor disputes, to nssist parties to labor disputes in inaustries 
affecting commerce to settle such disputes through conciliation and 
mediation. 
(b) The Service may proffer its services in any labor dispute in any 
industry affecting commerce, either upon its owu motion or upon the 
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request of one or more of the parties to the dispute, wlienever in its 
judgment such dispute threatens to cause a substantial interruption of 
commerce. The Director and the Service are directed to avoid attempt-
ing to mediate disputes which would have only a minor effect on 
interstate commerce if State or other conciliation services are available 
to the parties. Whenever the Service does proffe-r its services in any 
dispute, it shall be the duty of the Service promptly to put itself in 
communication with the parties and to use its best efforts, by mediation 
and conciliation, to bring them to agreement. 
( c) If the Director is not able to bring the parties to agreement by 
conciliation within a reasonable timet he s110.ll seek to induce the parties 
voluntariljl' to seek other means of settling the dispute without resort 
to striket lock-out, or other coercion, includin§ submission to the 
employees in the bargaining unit of the employer s last off er of settle-
ment for approval or rejection in a secret ballot. The failure ori·efusal 
of either party to agree to any p1·ocedure suggested by the Director 
sh!l-11 not be deemed a. violation of any duty or obligation imposed by 
thl.S .A.ct. 
( d) Final adjustment by a method a~eed upon by the parties is 
hereby d~lared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievn.noo 
disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existi~ 
collective-bargainin~. agreement. 1'he Service is directed to make its 
conciliation and mectiation services ava.ilahle in the settlement of such 
grievance disputes only as a last resort and in exceptio11al cases. 
SEc. 204. (a) In order to prevent or minimize interruptions of the 
:free flow of commerce growing out of labor disputes, employers and 
emplo~es and their representatives, in any industry affecting com .. 
merce, sha.11-
(1) exert every reasonable eifort to make and maintain agree-
ments concerning- rates of pay, hours, and working conditions, 
including proviSion for adequate notice of any proposed change 
in the terms of such agreements; 
{2) whenever a dispute arises over the terms or application of 
a collective-bargaining agreement a:nd a oonference is requested by 
a party or prospective party thereto, arrange promptly for such 
a conference to be held and endeavor in such conference to settle 
such dispute expeditiously; and 
( 3) in case such dispute is not settled by conference, participate 
fully and promptly in such meetings 8.S may be undertaken by 
the Service under this Act for the purpose of .aiding in a. settlement 
o:f the dispute. 
SEC. 205. (a) There is hereby created a National Labor-Manage-
ment Panel which shall be composed of twelve members appointed by 
the President, six of whom shall be selected from among persons out-
standing in the .field of management and six of whom sliall be selected 
from among persons outstandip.g in the field o:f labor. Each member 
shall hold office for a term of three years, except that any member 
a.ppointed to fill a vacancy occu1Ting prior to the expiration of the 
term for which his predeces...QOr was appointed shall be appointed for 
the remaindei· of such term, and the terms of office of the members 
first taking office shall expire, as designated by the President at the 
time of appointment, four at the end of the first year, four at the end 
of the second year 1.. ,nd four at the end of the third year after the date 
of appointment. Members of the panel, when serv~ on business of 
the panel, shall be pa.id comyensation at the rate of $25 per day, and 
shall also be entitled to receive an allowance for actual and necessag 
travel and subsistence expenses while so serving away from the~ 
places of residence. 
(b) It shall be the duty of the panel, at the request of the Director, 
to advise in the avoidance of industrial controversies and the manner 
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in which mediation nnd voluntary adjustment shn11 be administered, 
particularly with reference to controversies affecting the general ~·el~ 
fare of the country. 
NATION.AL EMERG&''WIES 
Sro. 20G. "\'.\,''1u~never in the opinion of the President of the United 
States, a threatened or actual sh'jke or Jock-out affecting an e11tire 
industry or a substantial part thereof el1gagecl in tracle, commerce, 
transportation, tra11sm1ssion, or communication among the se,•eral 
Suifos or with forei~1 nntio1;1s, or engaged in the pro.ducti~n of ~oods 
for commerce, will, 1f perm1tted t_o occur o:r to contwue, 1mper1l the 
!}ational l1ealth !}r safetv,. he may ~ppoint a board of inquir; to inquir~ 
mto the issues mvolvecI m the dispute and to make a written report 
to him within such time as he shall pre.scribe. Such· report shall 
include a statement of the facts wjth respect to tl1e dispute, inclucling 
each party's statement of jts position but shall not contain rny r.ecom-
mendnt1ons. The President shall file a copy of such report with the 
Service and shall make its t:ontents av,dlablc to. the public. 
SEc~ 207. (a) A board of inquiry shall be composed of a chairman 
nna such other memb~rs as the Pr~sident shall det~rmine, and shall 
have power to sit and act in any place ,vithin the United States and 
to conduct such henrings either m public or in private, as it mny deem 
necessary or proper, to ascertain the facts with respect to the causes 
and circumstances of the dispute~ 
(b ), Members. of a board of inquiry shall receive compensation at 
the rate of $50 for each day actually spent b:v them in tl1c work of the 
board, togethe1· wi ih necessary trn.vel and subsistence expenses. 
(c) For the pui-pose of any hearing or inquil'y conducted by any 
board appointea under this title, the pro~isions 0£ sections 9 and 10 
{relating to the nt-tendnnce of witnesses and the production of books, 
papen'$1 n11d docmn~nts) of the Federal Trnde Commission Act of 
Sept.ember 161 1914, as amended (U7 S. C. 19, t.itle 15, secs. 49 and 50, 
as amended), are hereby made applicable to the powers and duties 
of such board. 
S'.ec. 208. (a) Upon receiving a report from a. boa.rd of inquiry the 
President. mny direct the AttQrney General to petition any district 
court of _the United States having jurisdiction of tJ1e )?.arties to enjoin 
such strike or lock-out or the continuing there.of, and 1£ the court finds 
that such threatened or actual strike or 1ock-out-
( i) aff':cts an entire industry or a su~t.antial pa1:t, ~:reof 
engaged in tl'ade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or 
com.mnnfontion among the se,1ernl States or with foreign nations, 
or engaged in the production of goods for commerce; and 
(ii} if permitted to occur or to continue1 will imperjl the 
national health or safety, it shall have jurisdiction to enjofa any 
such strike or lock-out, or the COI}tinuing thereof, and to make such 
other orders ns may 1:,e appropr1nte. 
(b) In any case, tlie provisions of the Act of March 23t 1932, 
entitled "An Act to amend the Judicid Code and to define and limit 
the ju:risdictiori of courts sitting in equityi nncl for other purposes", 
shall not be a ~plicable. 
( c) The oraer or orders of the court s113]1 ba subject to review hy 
the appropriate circuit c.ourt of appcaJs and by the Supxe.me Court 
upon writ of certiorari or certification as provided in sections 239 
and 240 of the Juclicial Code, as a.mended (U.S. C., title 29, secs. 346 
and347). 
S:ec. 209. (a1 Whene,Ter a district court has issued an order under 
section 208. enJoining acts Qr practic~ which imperil or threaten to 
imperil the national health or safety, it. shall be the duty of the ea.rties 
to the lnbor dispute giving rise to such order to make every effort to 
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adjust and settle their differences, with the assistance of rt.he Service 
created by this Act. Neither parcy shall be under any duty to accept, 
in whole or in part, any _proposal of settlement made by tbe Service. 
(b) Upon the issuance of such order, the President shn.Il reconvene 
the board of inquiry which has prevf_onslJ reported w.ith.respect to 
the dispute. At the end of a sixty-day period (·unless the dispute has 
been settled by that time), the board of inquiry shall report to the 
President the current position of the parties ~nd the eifort~_which have 
been made £or settlement, and shall inelude a statement by each party 
of its position 311d a statement ofth~ employer's last offer of settlement. 
The President shall make such report available. to the ~ublic~ The_ 
National Labor ~elations Boa.rd, within the· succeeding fifteen da~, 
~hall t~~ a sec~t _ballot o~ th~ em.Lployees af ea~_h employer in_ . volved 
m the dispute on the question of whetlier they WJSh to accept the final 
off er of settlement made by their employer as stated by him and shaU 
certify the results thereof to the Attorney Genera.I within five days 
thereafter. · 
SEc. 210. Upon the certificatic;m of the results of such baUot or upon 
a settlement '6eing reached, whichever happens sooner, the Attorney 
General shall move the co"Urt to _discharge the injunction, which motion 
shall then be granted nnd the injunction discharged. When such 
motion is m-anted, the President shaU submit to. the Congress a full 
and comprehensive report of the proceed~as, including the findings 
of the board o:f inquiry and the ballot taken by the National Labor 
Relations Board, together ·with such 1·ecommendations as he may see 
fit to make for <:ionsideration and appropriate aetion. 
COMPILATXO~ OF COLL~CTIVE BARG:AININ<l AGREEMENTS, E'rO. 
SEc. 211. ( a) For the guidance and information of interested repre-
sentatives of employers, employees, and the ~neral public, the Bureau 
of Labor Statjstics of the :Oe:partment of Labor !:lhall maintain a file 
of copies of all ·availt).ble collective bargaining agreements and other 
ayailible agreem~ts and actions thereunder settling Ol' adjusting ln.bor 
disputes. Such file shall be open to inspection u11de:r appropriate eon-
ditions pre.scribedby the Secretary of Labor, except that no specific 
information submitted in confidence shall be disclosed. ·· 
(b) The Bureau of Labor Statistics in· th~ Department of Labor 
is 'authorized to fupiish upon reque~ of th.e 'Service, or employers 
employees, or their° representatives, all available data and £actual 
faformation which. may aid in the settl~en_t of any labor <iisp_ute, 
except that no specific information· submitted 1n confidence shall be 
disclosed. 
:EXEMPTION OF R.AILWAY LA.BOB Ad.r 
SEo •. 212. The provisions of this title shall not be applicable with 
respect to any matter which is subject to the provjsions of the Railway 11 W~1i°3: H m- Laoor Act, as amended from time to time. 
163, lSl-188. 
VfoJation or co~-
tmcts. 
Acts or agents. 
TITLE III 
su.rrs BY AND AGAINST LABOR ORG.A'N:rZATIONS 
SEc. 301. (a) Suits for violfltion of contracts between an. employer 
and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affect-
ing commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organi-
zations, may be .. brought in any district court of the United Sta.tea 
having jurisdict~on of the parties, wit~out r':Spect to the ~ount in 
controversy or without regard to th& e1tizensh1p of the parties. 
(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in a.n 
industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act and any employer 
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whose act.ivities affect commerce as defined in this Act shall be bound 
by the acts of its agents. Any such labor organization may sue or 
be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees wh<Jm it represents 
in the courts of tlie United States. Any money judgl]lent against .a 
Jabor organization in a district court of the Uiuted States shall be 
enforceaole only against the organizatioli; as an en!ity_ n;1d again~t its 
assets, and shall not be enforceable against any mdividual member 
or his assets. 
(c) For the purposes of actions and proceedings by or a~ainst 
labor organizations in the district courts of the United States, district 
courts shall be deemed to have jurisdiction of a labor organizati9n 
(l) in the district in which such organization maintains its principal 
office, or (2) in any district fo which its duly authorized officers or 
a.gents are engaged in representing or acting for employee members~ 
( d) The service of summons, subpena, or other legal process of any 
court of the United States upon nn officer or agent of a labor org:in1:. 
zation, in his capacity as such, shall constitute service upon the labor 
organization. 
( e) For the .purposes. of this section, in determining whether any 
person is acting as. a~ ~'agent)' ~f another person. so as to make such 
other person responsible for his acts, the question 0£ whether the 
specific acts perform~d were actually authorized or subsequently rati~ 
fied shall not be controlling. 
JlESTRIOI'IONS ON PAYME.'lli[TS TO EMPLOY.EE BEPRESENTA'ITVES 
SEO. 302.. ( a) It shall be unlawful for any employer to pay or 
deli:ver, or to agree to :eay or deliver, any money or other thing of 
value. to any repre~ntat1ve of any of his employees who are employed 
in an mdustry affectmg commerce. 
(b) It shall be unlawful for any representative of any employees 
who are' employed jn an industry affecting cominerce to receive or 
accept, or to agree to ~ceive or acce:p~ from the employer of such 
employees any money or other thing of value. 
(c) The provisions o.f this section shall not be a-eplicable (1) with 
respect to any mo~ey or ot~er thing of value paynole by an employer 
to any representat1Ye who 1s an employee or former employee of such 
employer, as compensation for, or by reason of; his services as an 
employee of such employer; (2) with respect to the payment or delivery 
of any money or other thing of value in satisfaction of a judgment of 
any court or a deGision or award of an arbitrator or impartial chair-
man or in comproniise, adjustment, Settlement or release of any claim, 
complaint, grievance, or dispute in the absence of fraud or duress; 
(3) with r~pect to the S.'l.le or purchase of an art-icle or commodity 
at the prevailing market price in the regular course of business; ( 4) 
with respect to money deducted from the wages of- employees in pay-
ment o:f membership dues in a labor orga11ization: Provided, That the 
employer has received £roni each employee, on whose account such 
deductions are made, a written assignment which shall not be irrevo-
cable for a period of more than one year, or beyond the termination 
date of the applicable collective agreement, whichever occurs sooner; 
or ( 5) with respect to money or other thing of valne paid to a trust 
fund established by such representative, for the sole: and exclusive 
benefit of the employees of such employer, and their families and 
dependents ( or of such employees, families, and dependents jointly 
with the employees of other employers making similar payments, and 
thek families and dependents): Pro~ti.ded, That (A) such pa~ents 
are held in trust for the purpose of paying, either from prmcipal 
or income or both, for t.he benefit pf en1ploy~, their. families and 
dependents, £or medical or hospital care, pensions on retirem~t or 
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death of employees, compensation for injuries or illness resulting from 
occupationul activity or insurance to provide any of the :foregoing, 
or unemployment benefits or life insurnnce, disability and sickness 
insurance, or accident insurance; (B) the detailed basis on· which suc-.h 
payments are to. be mad~ is specified in a written agreement with t~e 
employer, and employees .and employers are equally represented m 
the administration of such fund, together with sucli neutral persons 
as the representatives or the employers and the reP-resentn.tives oftl,ie 
employees may agree upon aJ.?-d _in th~ eventthe employer and employee 
groups deadlock on the administration o:f su.c~ ftgld and ~here ar~ no 
neutral persons empowered to break such deadlock, such agreemen~ 
provides that the two group~. shaU agree on an impartial ilmP,ire to 
decide su.c11 dispute, or in event . of their failure to ag1-ee mthin a 
-reasonable length of time, an impartial umpire to decide such dispute 
shall, on petition of either grou~, be appom~d by the clistrict court 
of the United States fo:rthe district where the trust fund has.its prin-
cipal office, and shall n.1$0 contain provisions for an a.i:uuia.1 audit of 
the trust fund: a statement of the results of :which shall be available 
for inspection o:y interested persons at the principal office of the tl"Ust 
ft.md and at such other places as may be designated in such written 
agreement; and (C) such paJ1ll!ents as are intended to be used for 
tlie purpose of providing pensions or annuitie.$ for employees a.re 
made to a separate trust wliich provides that the fundsheld therein 
cannot be used for ·any purpose other than paying $1lch pensions or 
annuities. 
( d) · Any person who willfully violates any of the pro'1isions of this 
seclio1! shall, upon convi~tion thereof, be guilty ~f a n:i~demeanor and 
be subJect to a. fine of l)ot more than $10,000 or to llllpnsonment for not 
more than one year, or both. 
(e) The district.co~rts of the Unit~d Stat-es and t~~ "f!ni~q.Sfates 
courts of the Terr1tones and possessions sht:t11 haveJunsdiet1on, for 
cause shown, a.nd subject to the prov:islons Q:t section 17 (reJatmg to 
notice t<i opposite party) of the A.ct entitled "An Act to supplement 
existing laws .against. unlawful res_trainis and mc;mopolies, and for 
other purposes''; approved October 15, 1914, as amended (U. S. O. 
title 28, see. 381), to restrt1in violations of this sect. io~ without regri.;d 
to the provisions of sections 6 anq 20 of such Act ofuct;olJer 15~ 1914, 
as amended (U.S. C., title·.15, sec. 171 and title 29, sec. 5.2),.and the 
provisions of the Act· entitled. "An .A.ct to amend the judicial Code 
and to define and limit the jurisdiction of courts sittino- in equity, and 
for other purposes", approved March 23, 1932 (U. S. 6., title 29, secs. 
101~110). 
( f) This section shall not ~ pply t.o any contract in force on the date 
of ei;iactment 0£ ·this Act, µntirthe expiration of such contract, or until 
July 1, 1948, whichever :.first occurs. 
(g) Compliance with the restrictions contained in subsection (c) 
(5) (B) u_pon contributions wtrust fund~, otp.erwise lawful, shall not 
be applicable to contributions to such trust funds established by eollec-
ti ve agreement prior to Janl.la.ry 1, 1946, nor shall subsection (c) (5) 
(.A.) be construed as prohibiting contributions to such trust funds if 
prior ·to January 1, 1947, such funds contained provisions for pooled 
vacation benefits. 
BOYCOTTS AND OTHER U.NtA. WFut. CQMBIN.A.TIONS 
SEC: 3()3. {a) I~ shall be 1!11!awfub f~rthe purposes of this section 
only, m an industry or activity a.ffectmg commerce, £or any labor 
organization 'to engage in, or to induce .or encourage the employees of 
any erilployei: to engage in, a strike or a co:ncert~d refus~l in the 
course .of theu· employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, 
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or otherwise handle or work on any goods~ articles, materials, or com-
modities or to perfonn ~ny services, where an object thereof is-
(1) forcing or rcquirmg any employer or self-employed person 
to join any labor or employer organization or any employer or 
other person to cease usin~; seHing, . handling, transporting, . or 
otherwise dealing in the proa.ucts of any other producer, processor, 
01· manufacturer, or t9 cease doing 9usiness with any other pers9n; 
(2) forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or 
bargain with a In.bot organization as the representative of his 
emp1oyecs unless such labor organization has been certified as the 
:repre.sentn.ti ve of such employees under the provisions of section 9 
of the N ationnl Labor Relations Act; 
(3) £arcing or requiring ariv employer to recognize or bargain 
with a .particular labor organfaatio1i as the representative of his 
employees if anotherlabor orgunizntion has been certified as the 
representative of such employees under the provisions of section 9 
of the N utional Labor 'Relations A.ct ; 
( 4) forcin~ or requiring nuy employer~ a~sign p:irticular. ·work 
to emplo~esm a part1cµhu· la.bor orgnmzntion or ma particular 
trade·, craft, or clnss mtl1e:r thn.n to employees in another labor 
organization . or in another trade, craft, or class unless such 
employer is failing to conform to an order or certification of the 
N ationn.l Labor Relations Board determining the bar~ining rep-
resentative for employees performing such work. Nothing con-
tained in this subsection shall be construed tc; muke unlawful a 
re£us3.l by any person to e~1ter upo11 the premises of any employer 
{ other than his own employer), if tl1e employees of such employer 
are engaged in a strike ratified or approved by a representative 
of such empl~yecs ,rhom such ~mployer is required to recognize 
under the N at1onal Ln.bor Relnt10.ns Act. 
(b) Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason 
or any violation of subsection ( a) may sue therefor in any district oomt 
of the-Unite.d States subject to the limitations and provisions of section 
301 hereo:£ without respect to the amo~t in controversy, or in a11y other 
court h1tvi11g jurisdiction· 0£ the parties, and shall recover the damages 
by him sustained and the cost of the suit. 
RESTRIGrlON ON POLITlOAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
8Ec. 304 .. Sectjon 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 1925 
(U. S. C., 1940. c~ition, title 2, sec. 251; Supp. V, title 50; App.~ sec. 
1509), as amended, is amended to read as follows: · 
"SEC. 313. It is unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation 
organized by authority of any law of Congress: to make n contribution 
9.r expenditure in connection with auy electio1i to nriy political office, 
or in connection with any primary election or politicnI convention or 
caucus held t.o select cnndidates for any political office, or for any cor-
poration whatever, or any lnbor organizntion to make n contribution 
or expenditure in coimection with auy election nt which Presidential 
nnd Vice Presidential electors or a Se1u1tor or R~presentative in, or a 
Delegate or Resident Commissioner to Congress are to be voted for, 
or in. connection with any primary election or political convention or 
caucus held to select caudidates for any of tlie foregoing offices, or 
for any .candidate, political committee, or other person to accept or 
receive any contribution prohibited by this section. Every corpo1-a-
tion or ls,ibor organization which makes any contribution or expendi-
ture in violation of this section shnU be fined not more th11n $5,000; 
and every officer or dh-cctor of a.ny corporation, or officer of any labo1; 
organizntion, who consents to any contribution or expenditure by the 
corporation or labor orgnnizat.ion, as the case mny be, in violation of 
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this section shall be_ fined 11ot m.ore than $1,000 or im~risoned for not 
more than one year, or both. For the. purposes of th1s section 'labor 
organization' means any organization of ani kind, or any agency 01· 
employee representation committee or plan, in which employees par-
tie1pate and which exists for the. :eurpose, in whole or in part, of deal-
ing with employers concepiing grievances, lal:i_or disputes, wages, rates 
of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." 
STlUXES BY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 
SEc. 305. It shaJl be unlawful for any individual employed by the 
United States or any agency thereof including wholly owned Govem-
nient corporations to participate in. any strike. Any individual 
employed by the United States or by any sueh agency who strikes shall 
be discharged immediately from his employment; and shall forreit his 
civil service status, if an,, and shall not be .eligible for reemployment 
.for three years by the United Sta.tes or any such agency. · 
TITLE IV 
CREATION OF JOINT COM!tfi'ITEE TO· STUD'!'.' AND l?EPORT ON BASIC PROBLEMS 
.AF.FEOI'ING FRIENDLY MBOK RELATIONS AND PRODUCTIVITY 
SEo. 401. There is hereby established a joint congressional commit-
tee to be known as the Joint Committee on Labor<Man~gement Rela• 
tions (herea.fte1· referred to as the committee) and to be composed oi 
seven Members of the Senate Committee on Labor and ·Public Welfare, 
to be appointed by the President pro temppre of the Senate, and 
seven l\tiembers of the House of Representatives Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor, to be :ipp<>inted by the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives. .A vacancy in membership of the committee shill 
not affect the powers o:f the 1·emaining members to execute the func~ 
tions of the committee, and shall be fill~d in the same· manner as the 
oriipna.l selection. The coriim.ittee shall select a chairman and a vice 
chairman from among its IQemb~rs .. 
S.oo. 402. The committee, acting as a whole or by subcommittee, 
shall conduct a thoroug~ study and !nvestigation ?f }'he ®tire field of 
labor-management relations, mcluding but not !united~ 
(1) f.he means by which permanent friendly cooperation 
betwee_ n employerl:i and em_. pl.oy_~ a!ld ~ability of labor relations 
ma7- be secured throughout th~ Uruted States; 
( 2) the means by which the Jndividu~ employee may achieve a 
greater productivity and hi~her· wages, including plansfor guar- . 
ant.eed annual wages; incentive profit-sharing and bonus systems; 
(3) the internal organization and administration of labor 
umons, with special attention t-0 the impact on individuals of 
collootive agreements requiring membership in unions as a condi-
tion of employment; 
(4). the labor relations policies and practices of employers and 
associatiom~ of employers; 
· ( 5) the desirability o:f we1£are funds for the benefit 0£ employees 
and their relation to the social-security system; 
(6) the methods and procedures for best. carrying out the 
collective-ba.r~g processes, with special attention to the eifects 
of industry-wide or regional bargaining upon the national 
economy; 
(7) the administration and operation of existing Federal la.ws 
relat~ to labor relations; and 
(8) such other problems and subjects in the field of labor-
management relations as the committee deems appropriate. 
8Eo. 403. The committ.ee shall report to the Senate and the House 
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of R~presentatives not later than March 15, 1948, the results of its 
study and in.vest!gation, together with such rec~mmend_ations as. to 
.necessary legislation an:d such other recommendations as it may deem 
advisable, and shall make its final report not later than January 2, 
1949. 
SEC. 404. The committee shall have the power, without regard to 
the civil-service laws and the Classi.6.cation Act of 1923, as amended, 
to employ and fix t-he compensation of such officers, experts, and 
employees as it deems necessary for t.he performance of its duties, 
includin~ consultant_s "·ho. shall rcceh·e compe. nsation at a rate not 
to exceea. $35 for each dn,y actually spent by them in the work o.f the 
committee, together with their necessary travel and subsistence 
ex-penses. The committee is further authorized, with the consent of 
the head of the depa.rtment or agency concerned, to utili~e the services, 
information, :facilities, and personnel of all agencies in the executive 
branch of the Government and may request the governments of the 
sev~ral States, representatives of business, indu.stry, finance, and labor, 
and such other persons, agencies, organizntions, and inst-rumentalities 
as it deems approprinte to nttend its hearings and to give nnd present 
information, ad vice, and recommendo.tions. 
SEc. 405. The committee, or any subcominittee thereof, is authorized 
to hold sm:h hearings; to sit and act ntsuch times and plac:es during the 
sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Eightieth Congress; 
to require by subpena. or· otherwise the attendance of such witnesses 
and the _production of such books, pa!)ers, and documents: to admin~ 
istcr oaths; t-0 take such testimony; to hnve such printing and binding 
done; and to make such expenciitures within the amount appropriated 
therefor; RS it deems tidvisable. The cost of stenor'~nphfo services in 
report.ing such hearings shall not be in excess o 25 cents IX?r one 
hundred words. Subpenas shall be issued under the signature of the 
chairman or vice chairman of the committee and shall be served by any 
person designated bv them. . . 
SEc. 406 •. The members of the commit.f.ee shall be reimbursed for 
truel,. subsistence, and other necessary expenses incurred by them in 
t~e performance of th~ duties vested in the committee, ·other than 
~xpenses in connection with meetings of the committee I1eld in the 
District of Colt1,mbia during such times as the Congress is in session. 
SEO. 407. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated the sum 
of $150,000, or so much thereof as mav be necessary, to carry out the 
provisions of _this tit.I~, to be ~isbursecf by the Secretary of the Senate 
<>n vouchers s1gned hy the ch1t.rrnrnn. 
TITLE V 
D.EF.INITIONS 
SEO. 501. When used in this Act-
(I) The term "industry affecting commerce'' means any industry 
or activity in commerce or in which a labor dispute would burden or 
obstruct commerce or t-end to burden or obstruct commerce or the free 
fiow oi commerce. 
(2) The term "st.rike" includes any strike or other concerted stop-
page of work by employees (including a stoppage by reason 0£ the 
expiration of a collec-tive~bnrgaining agreement) and any concerted 
slow-down or other _conc-erted interruption.of oper:utions by employees. 
161 
Powers. 
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(3) Tl!e terms •'c?mll?er~e'', "fabor d1sputes'·, "emoloyer'\ "em ... 
ployee", '•lnbor or"amzatmn'', "representative", "person\ and "super-
visor:" shall have.the $~une meaning as when used in the Nationa1 Labor 
Relnt.ions Act as amended by this .A.ct. Ants. p. 136. 
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[CHAPT:ER. 121] 
AN ACT 
To provide for emergency flood-coi:itrol work made necessary PY recent floods, 
· and for other purposes. 
Be it ert,O,Cted by the Senate d:nd House of Representati'lJeB of th6 
United State.~ of· America in Oo·11grcss a.ssemblca, Thn.t the sum 0£ 
$15>000,000 is hereby authorized to be appropriated as an emergency 
fund to be expended under the direction of the Secretary orW ar 
and the $Upervision of the Chief of Engineers for the repair restora-
tion, and strengthening of levees n.nd other flood-control worb which 
have· been tbrentened or destroyed by recent floods, or which may be 
threatened or destroyed .by lnter floods: Pro .. l:i<l,ed, That pending the 
appropdation of said sum, the Secretary of ,va.r may allot, from 
ex1&'ting .flood-c!>ntrol appropriations, such sums ~s mny be.necessn.ry 
:for the immediate prosecut10n of the· work herem authorized, such 
appropriations to be reirnbursed from the appropriation herein 
authorized when mnde: Provided furtl1,.et, Thnt funds nllottecl under 
this nuthQrit.Y shall nqt be diverted from the unobligat~d f-µnds _from 
ihe appropriation ''Flood control, genera.I", made availabJe in War 
Department Civil Functions Appropriation Acts for specific _Hurposes. 
S:m 2. The provisfons of section 1 shall be deemed to. be ailditiona.l 
and sup:plem~ntal ~' n.nd not in lieu of, eristing ge11era.l legishition 
author1zmg nllocnt1on of flood-control funds for restoration of ftood-
C<mfrol works threatened or dostroyed. by flood. 
Approved June 23, 1947. · 
[CHAPTER 124] 
AN ACT 
To ii.mend the Act entitled "An Act to pro\•ide for a .permanent Census Office", 
sppr·oved. Ma:rcb 6, l 902t.,tis .a.mc.nded (the <=9llection .and pliblfoa.tion or sui.tis• 
tics.I information·by the J.1lireau of the Census). 
Be it ~1lacted by tl1,e Senate and Hott.se of Representatives of tlte 
United,~ta.te8. of Am.erica:in 007:grc.ys assembled, That section 7 of the 
Act ent1tlecl "An Act to provide for a permnnent Census Office,,, 
approved March 6, 1902, ns amended (U. S. C., title 13, sec. 111), is 
amended by ndding•lLt the end of.the first sentence thereof the words~ 
·"P·1·ovided, That where the doctrine, tenchi;ng, o:r discipline of any 
religious denomination or church prohibits the disclosure of informa-
tion reltit.ive to membership, such information shall not be .required." 
Approved June 25, 1947. 
[CHAPTE~ 125] 
AN ACT 
To regulate the marketing of economic poiaons and devices, and for o.ther 
purposes. 
Be it enacte.d by th~ Senate and Hause of Re.presimtati1Jes of the 
llnited States of America i:n Congress ¢8scm1Jled, 
TITLE 
8Ec1.·10N 1. This Act mn.y be cited as the "Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act1'. 
163 
J'lltlO 23, 11147 {II. :R.:J70!l) 
(Public Law 102) 
Approprla.tit!ll au-
Uiorlzed. 
PD~1P,187. 
A. llotments from 
exbUng appropr.la• 
tions. 
Juna2S.J947 [8.t114} 
[Publio Lew 103} 
3iS~t.m .. 
June~ 1947 (ll. R.. 1237} 
{.Publio Law JO¼) 
DEFINITIONS 
SEO. 2. For the purposes of this .Act-
a. The term '~eoonomic poison 1' means any substance or mixture "EQ:)11t)Jlt)C po~" 
of s,ubstanoe~ intended for preven~ing, destroying, :repelling, or initi-
gatmg any insects, rodents, fungi, weeds, and other forms of plant 
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292 HOUSE REPORT NO. 245 ON H. R. 3020 
80TH CoN __ oREss l HOUSE OF REPRESEN'f ATIVES J 
1st Session f l 
[1] 
Ru.o.e.-r 
No. 245 
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 
APRn. 11. 1047.-Committed to t~e Committee of the Whole House on the State 
of the Union nnd ordered to be printed 
Mr. H,.nTLEY, from the l ,ommittee on Educa.tion aud Labor, st1bmitted 
the £ollowh1g 
REPORT 
I ro aC(:1J1opnns H. R ao201 
The Commit tee on Education n.11d Labor, to whom wus referred the 
bill (H. R. 3020} to prescribe fair and equitable rules of conduct to be 
observed by lnbor anti management in tl1eir relations with one nnother 
which nfi'ect commerce, to protect the rights of individual wprkers in 
their relations ,vith labor organizations whose activities Mf ect com-
merce, to .recognize tbe paramount public iuterest in lnb01· disputes 
affecting commerce thnt end,mger the public health, sdety, 01· welfare, 
and for othel" purposes: having considered the snme? reports .favoru.bly 
thereon with nmendments nn(l recommends thnt tl1e bill as so nmendeci 
do pass. 
'l'he amendments ~1re ns follows: 
Page 4, }jne 20., before "labor dispute" insert "current". 
Page 5, in pnr.igraph ( 5) before '1den.ling", strike ont "or" and 
insert "of". 
Pnge 9, line 20, st.rike out "1>rocednres nnd practices relating to". 
Pnge 11, line 7, after "who", insert "by the nnture of his duties':. 
Pnfte 15, line 15,sti•ike out ''$15,000" and insert''$12,ooo:l. 
Pngc 16, line 24, strike out "$15:000" and insert ''$12,000,,. 
Pag~ 19, before t.he period at the eud of section 7 (a), insert the 
followmg: 
:ind shall nlso huve th~ right to refritin from nny m· all c,f such acth·ities: Pro-
vided. Thnt nothing Ju~r~in sh:lll preclude nu employe1· from 1u:1k.ing and currying 
out nn ngree~nent with n labor org:miz3tion ns mithorizecl in section 8 (d) (4). 
P.,ge 21, in subsection (b), strike out "the1:cof" where it first appears 
n.nd inset·t "of n representntive~'. 
Pnge 2:l,sti·ike out "2 (ii),,nnd insert in lieu .thereof "2 ( 11) ". 
Pnge 24: after ,:the overthrow of the Umted Stntes Government 
by force", insert "or by a11y illegal or unconstitntionnl methods" .. 
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Page 25, oJter "to direct. pr call o stri~e'\ insert '~or make any 
request to the Administrator under section 2 ( 11) for a strike 
ballot."; and in the same p.1irag1:ap~ strike 01:1t ''~ri:ke'1 where it 
appe~rs. the second time and msert m h~u th~r~of u_a.ct,on''· 
Page 25, nt ~he beginning of subsection {d), strike out ''The'' and 
insert. in lieu thereof ''NotwithstandinJ? any other provision of thia 
section .. the''. . 
Page 29, strike out''(~)" at the beginni_n~ of the subsection desig-
nated n(c)" andinsert in lieu the1·eof "(e)'' .. 
Pa.3e 33,_in the. p~tase ''thatbeli~ve i~ or ten.clies'~ strike orit "be-
heve,· trn·d msert m heu thereof "behev~a" .. 
Page .33, ~fter -"Unite~ '.S~ates (.fovernm~11t by forc;e''- •. insert ''or 
by any 1lle~a.l or unconstitutional methods''. 
Puge 42, in the phrase .ecertificntio_n cpmplained of was entered 
nnd the. 6ndi'ngs and order on certification of the Board,,. strike out 
'~on,. and fosert ~'or". 
Pnge 44. in the-· phrase '*at nny designated place o~ hearing" strike 
out l•or:' and insert in lieu thereof "of'~. · • 
Page 46, strike9~t: the paragraph design?ted as paragraph (6). 
Pnge 49, o.fter subsection (e), insert a. new section readmg as 
follows: · 
.. SEC, · 13. Nothing In this Act sbnll be construed to lnva.lidnte a11y Stute Jnw or. 
c,i.nstitntional prQ\~isfon whtch rfl.sfrlcts tbE." rlgbt of :in employer to ninke agree-
ments with Jnl)nr organizations requiring as n condition or emtJl~yment membe.r-. 
si.ip ln sucb lub~r orJ?flnizntion. and DU such ~greement~. in~far ns they purport 
tu lmPose such. reqi1fre10ersts confrary to_Jhe p,:ovir.lous .of tlie law or consti'tuUon 
vf any ~tate. are herl,!by dlvP.st~. gf their ch111-nct~t as n subJec_t ,of regu_lntion b.Y 
Corigr~ss under ·tts p11.w¢r tc::, regulate commea·ce n1:11ong the several -~Jute$ nnd 
\\:1th foreign rjnUoos, t(,I the extent that such agreements .shall,. In odditfon to• 
beJng subject to-any applicable preventi"e prov.istons'of this A.ct. be subject to tbe 
operation and effec:t of such Stare laws nnd consntutloMJ pro,·lslons us well 
,,: Pige· 50, renumber sectior1s 13 and 14 as sections 14 o.nd 15, respoo-
tivr/;ectfon 201 (c) strike out ''t and utilize the facilities and per~ 
son.:nel of such agencies whth1 ndeqt1ate nnd when imiHnble without 
cost". 
· :rn section 204 (u) strike <>ut ''Uilitcd States Conrilhltion Service 
of the Department of Labor,' u11d inst?1-t in lien thereof ''Director of 
Cond)intion'~. 
In . section 204 { b) strike. out' ''Nu tionn) Lnboi• Relations Board" 
wherev_er appearing thel'ei_n ~ncl ih$ert in ljeu thereof "A.dininistrator 
of the NationnJ Labor Relations Act". In sect'ion 204 (c) sti-ike out '"Se.cretai·y of Labol',,_nrnl insert in 
lieu tl1ereof "Director of Crmciliation1'. 
After the finii ·sentence in sel'ticin 204 .(c) insert n new se1itence 
re,;iding as follow~: 
lt tor nny r~nsan lhe Chlr.f Justjct:? fs .unuble to serve hn sbull appoint nnother 
judge of the, United _State~ C:nurt rJf Ap~ls for the Di~trict of Columbln to 
nc( In his place.and s:tr.nd. · · · 
In ~section 204 ( cl) strike out '~N atfonn.) Labor RehLtions Bonrd" 
and insert .in lieu thereof '~Administrator Qf the Nutiona) L11.bor Rela; .. 
tions Act'-'. 
Aftei· sectiou 205 insert ll new sectim\ 1·en.ding a.r; fol1ows_: 
~~c. 206. OntU the• transfer · ..of functions under sedlnri 20l (eJ be:<,"t,mes eitee• 
U~e. _the functions· of the Director of ConciHntlori under .s.ectJon 204 shall be 
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perforwed by the Sectetory of Lnbot\ UurlJ tbe Aduihiistrutor of the ~ationnl 
Labor Relntlons Act first appointed qunlifies nnd t~kes office, his functl()ns under 
seetlon 204 shall he performe<l by the Nntional Lnbo1· Ut!latious llonrd. 
In section 803 (a) strike out ''thirty" where,,.er appearing therein 
and insert in lieu thereof "sixty", n.nd before "every fobor orgnnizn-
tion" insert "the principal officers of". 
In section 303. (n) (2), bdore"the name nnd address of the organiza-
tion~' insert "a detailed financia] report including a balance· sheet and 
ar, operating stntein~rtt and showin,:". 
At the end of section 303 (a.) msert a new sentence 1·eading as 
fol1QWS.: 
In the case of n tepo.rt.requlred. and~1· this s~t't_lon P.rlo.t• to the f;!~t>frntio~ of orw 
year tr.orn tbe dat~ of the ennctment ot this Acr. if nny of the 1•equh·ed lnforma-
tfon Is not il,1,•nilnble·nn iinswer ''no·lnformritipn" shnll be suftkieil.t. 
In section.304 strike out "19:}5'' and insert in lieu "thereof "1925'\ 
The committee's recommendation stems from an exhaustive investi-
gation mnde by the committee of the cnnses and effects of industrial 
!-=t.rife~ In the hen1fogs before the conuuittee,_exteudiu_g over a periO(l 
of more than 0: we~Jcs, .i.37 wittwsses appenred. They l·ame fr,,m uH 
parts of tht". <·ountry!' from many w:1 lks of life, nnd represented 11ll 
points of view. . . 
The c·1muuittC!e m·lrnowllltlgw, tla• rnst amount of wm·k done on tht? 
~nbject b_y the miu1y Afoubers of Cougt·e:lS. who prepared ttnd intro~ 
tlm:eu bi lJs fol' coiisitforat ion by the committee. They. us well llS 
countless ptfrHte ci_t izens bv correspondenc{' with mem_b:.!1'$ of the 
committ~e, ha.w mntle contributions of iuesthnuble value to the form-
ulntion of the lJillherewith repprt~d. " 
The committee nlso hnu the benefit of the stii<lies of ronuuittees·of 
previous Congresses-anti purticuhir1y thnt of tJ1e Spe~iaJ Committee 
T.o Investignte the National Lnbor Ut'httions Bo11t·d, (!reated iu the 
Seventy-sixth Co1igressJ mitny of whose i-ccommcndations ii.re included 
in the bill"here\vith t-eported. 
NEcESSl'n' .E·oa LEGISLATION 
Dm·iug the Inst few yen1·s, the effects of iudustrin1 strife Im.vent.times 
brought · our country to the brink_ of generul. economic parnly!:lis. 
E1111~1hyt•cs hnn~ sufl'l•red, t•mployut·s have su:ffcred-1m<l above all. the 
pubhc. hn~ snfft\1-ed. 
The cH!\t•ttuc•ut :·of C(lmp1·rheusive legh,Iation to c.ll•fine clearly the 
1egitimnl«.• rights of_ Plllf>loyt•.rs umlempJoye~s in_ their inc.Ju_ st_rinl rela-
tions. u1 ket•phig with t 1e protet•tion of the paramount public inteJ'est, 
is imper11t iw. 
Tht:' bill herewith reporwl doesjt'1st thnt. It presct·ibcs the.rip:hts ot 
all ptt:rties linving, :t stnke in h;1rmo11ious industrial telutfons, aml 
requirt•s Urnt each pui-ty rL'spect the l'ights of tl1e others. . 
The conunittee bl•liews th:_tt the t~IrnetnH?nt of the bill ,yill h:n-e the 
f.'fl'et·.t of hringiu,u widt•i-;t>l't•ad imlustl-inl istrife to au emL uml thi~t em-
ployers tlll<l e111ploy~t'li frill onC"c again l!O forward together ns u ten·1n 
m1it~d to nchi<.•ve for their mutunl benefit nutl for the wulfnte of tll<~ 
Nation_ the hi~la-~t sl:1mlal'd of li\'illg yet known in the hh,tory of 
thl~ wodd. . 
_During the··Oyrm·:; l)l'Ct'C<iing the.enactment uf tJ1e Natimutl Indus;.. 
trml Rel'overy Act of 1033, the Urnted Stnte.s hml an u\.·t•rn~c of 75;3 
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strikes a year, hivolving llll average of 297,000 \Vorkets; during t-he 
next 6 years 2,5•0 strikes per y~'l.r involving- an average of 1,181,000 
wo~kers; a~d. du.ring the next 5 years-that. is, through 1944-3,514 
strikes· n year m'V'o lvmg nn _a v~:rSlge of .1,508,000 workers • 
. In 1945 aP.proxirriately 3._~1000,q_~0--11;1,m-da.y~ of labc,r. were lost as a 
result. of strikes. Aud that totnl wns trebled m 1946. when there ·were 
UG;000,000 innn-dnys lost and the number of strikes hit n. new ~high of 
4,985. The .r~sulting loss in national wealth is staggering. 
The above 6g:i.n·es do not take into a~count t-he mnil-qays lost a$ o. 
result of the indirect effects of these-stdites~ 
In the .face of this record there nre. fe"' wlw would have the 
temerity to &$serf thnt· l.nbor relations in the· United St;a~es are today 
satisfnctory. Th.e American people; · and their representatives ()f 
both parties in Congr.ess., nr~ insistent that some means be found by 
lt:~isl{!.tkm tC? r.~Yerse this ulnrrning trend and to bring about indns-
trinl pence. .. . 
In approachfog the problem of general fa~r legi_sla.ti?n., . the com-
~ittee was impressed by the ab~olute neC!essity of steenng a course· 
whi'ch would recognize the~ rights of all interested pnrties in labor 
relations and which "9ould be scrupulously fnir .to each-the em-
ployerj the emplo.yees, a_nd the public. While -the ri~ht of the pul;>_lic: 
must, m the last analrs1s,. be treated ns pnrnm.ount, . 1t was the belief 
of the commj~t~e1 th~t, except in extraor«iinary._ circumstances,= the 
r1gl~t of the pubhc will be adequately pt·otected tf m turn -adequate 
protection is afforded to employers and employees in the exer.cise ·.of 
their legitimate rights~ 
Aecordingly the. bill herewith reported has been 1orinulated as a 
bill of rights·po~h for A:meriqan workingmen ~n~ for_t~e!r employe~~ 
.For the last 14 years, ~s a result. of laoor laws 1ll-conce1ved ana dis:,. 
astrously executetti the American ·workingman h0$ been deprived of 
his dignity as an mclividuo.l. H~ has been cajoled, coei-ced, intimi-
dated~ and. <>n tn_any Q~?asions beaten up,._in the name of th~ splend~d 
aims set forth m sechcm 1 of the N at1onal Labor Relations. Act. 
~is whole economic life has been sub,ject to the complete domin~tioi:. 
and ~o.ntr<?l o,t unrE:gulated monop(!hsts. He has on many_ occasions 
had to pay them tr1&ute to ~et & 30b. He has been forced into labor 
organizations against his w1IL At oth~r times whet) h~ has desire¢! 
to Join a particular lab?r. organization he has beeri prevented from 
doln~ so and forced to JOm a!1other one. H.e hns b~en co~pelled to 
contribute to causes and candxdates for pubhc office to which he was 
oppo_sed~ He h.t!,S been prohibited· from expressing his. own mind on 
public issues. He hns oeen denied any voice in a.rrn.ngini? tl1e ternis 
of hi$ own cn1ployment. . H~ has- frequently agninst. his wi]l been 
called._ou_t o __ n .st.rikes_ whi_c_ h. ha.ve.res.ul.ted in•·. )v~g. e _ los __ ses re. presenti. n.g· 
years of his savings. In many cases bis economi9 life has been ruled 
by Communists and other subversive influence~. In short, his mind, 
his soul,:and his very life ha.v~ been subject to a tyranny more despoti'c 
than one ~ouldJhink J?OSSibl~ in. a free cou:r1try. 
The employer's plight hu.s likewise not been., happy •. He has w.it-
pessed the prptluctive ·e.fficiency in his plants .sink to n.lam1in~ly lbw 
levels. · He l1as: been 1·equired lo employ ·or· reinstate indiridtfals· ,i~ho 
have destroyed his propeity and n.c;sanlted other employees. When he 
has tried to discharge Communi'sts he has been prevented from: doing 
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so by a bonrd which c~1led tliis ya1ic1 reason for the cli~charge a.n1ere 
pretext •. He hns seen the loyalty of his superviso,·s undermined by the 
compulsory unionistn imposed upon them by the National Labo·r Rela~ 
tit.ms Board. He has bee~ requirect by law to l:l.1.1·guin over matter$ ro 
which it was economicaliy impossible f~r. him foacce~e,. nnd _when. ]1e 
refused to accede has been accused of fmlmg to bal'gam m good faith. 
H~ has·b~n compell~d to bargain with the same union that bargains 
with his conipetitors ai1d thus to reveal to his competitors the secrets of 
his business. He.has ha.cl to stand helplessly by while employees desir• 
ii~g_to_enterhis plant to work_h~ve been obstructed by violenc~) m~,ss 
p1cketmg, and general rowdyism.. He has had to stand mute wlule 
irreRponsib1e detractorsslnndered,:ahused, and vilified him. 
His business oii occnsioris has been virtually brought to n standstm 
by disputes to which he himself was not n pttrty: and in whlch he.him-
self had no inte1·est. And finn11y; he has been compe1Ied by. the faws 
of. tl1e ~reatest democratic coui1try in the world-or ·nt lenst by their 
n<lministrat01·s-t~ treat his employees as if they belonged to a differ-
ent class or caste of society. 
This'sordid story wns 1111fo]ded before the committee in its hearings. 
Th•se heaJ-iugs demonstrate- the· need for nction by Congress~and 
itction now.. 
The. bO] attacks the problem in n comprehensive-not in a piece-
meul-fashion. It is neither drastic, oppressive, nor punitive. It 
rloes not 1·esfrict or in any mannei· interfere with employees' rights 
to organize and to bargain coBectively when they w:fah' to do so.· It 
Joes Ul)t restrict in anj· way employees' rights to engage in lnwful 
strikes. It do~s not take awuy ;my rights guaranteed by the existing 
Nutional Labor Relations Art. 
It. :c1oes, however, go to the root of the evils :rnd provides a fail', 
wofkable~ nnd Jong-overdue sohtti.on of the problem. In: brief out-
line, the bill accomplishes the followina: 
(1) It abolishes the existing discre<lited Nntionnl Labor Relntions 
8oarc.1, nnd creates in lieu the1~eof u uew board of fair-minded mem-
bers. to exercise qtmsi-judicinl fnnctious only. 
(2) It establishes .1 new official to exercise the \1arious prosecuting 
und m\·estiguth·e functio11s under the Natioi1nl Labor ReJat-ions Act_, 
to be entfrely independent of the Board. 
(3) I~ requires tl!e B,onl'cl to aet only upon the weight of credible 
legal e,·1dence, nnrl 1t gffes t-0 the courts of the United St;ites a real, 
1·athe1~ -than n fictitious, power to review decisions of the Board. 
{4) l.t outlaws th(> clo~ed shop and monopolistic indust-ry..:wide 
bargaining. 
(fl} It exempts sn_pe1·visol's from the compulsory features of the 
Nntionn_l Lnbor Refations Act. · 
(6) It imposes· on both pnrties to lnbor disputes the duty of bar-
gaining and requires thnt. the employees themselves be given n ,•oice 
in the bnrg11inin~ urran~entents_ through the <leYice of ptovicliug for a 
secret ballot of tne em1>loyees on their employer1s· Inst offer of $ettle-
ment of the cli~putE'. 
·( 1) It prote<:ts the existem·e of labor oi•gilllizations whid1 ui-e not 
affilfoted with one of the nntion.rl ·federations. · 
(8) It prohibits ('Cl'ti.fication by the Board of lnLor organiz.nions 
ha.\·in~ Cofrimunist or sub,~ersh·e offkers. 
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(9) It prescribes the rights whid1 nn .individual member of a labor 
?r~r1mizat101.1 cnn justly ~lalm of his union, uid gives him protection 
m th~ exe.rc.ise of those r1gllts.. . 
(10) It outlnws sympathy strikes, jurisdictional strikes, illegal 
boycotts, collusive strikes bf ernployees of competing employers; as· 
. well as sit.;;down ·strikes ·and other concerted work interferences. con-
ducted by remaining on the employer's pt~mises. 
q1) It Qutln.~s ~r!kes tq reruecly pr~ctices for wl1ich .an a~minis-
~rat!ve. remedy I$ ava1JabT~ und.er the ~1U or to compel a11 employer 
to vmlate the Jaw. 
(12) It outla\VS mn$S picketing arid other· forms o.f violence de~ 
sig1,eq to prevent, individual~- from entering or leaving. a place of 
employm.ent. . . . . . . · 
(13) It outlaws "picketing of n place of business where the pro-
prietor is: not irivolv~d in a Jnbor disput.e with.his _e~ployees. 
(14) For unhrn-ful concerted activities it giyes fhe person injurecl. 
the.rebv a right .to sue civilly any perscni responsible, therefor. 
(15) _It pi-escribes :unfair labor practices on the part of employees 
~nd their represent;1,t1ves ns weU ns·by em_ployers. 
( 16) It creates n. ne,v and independent conciliation agency. 
(17) It remo~•.es the exemption of labqr organiza.~ions from the 
antitrust Jaws when such organizations. acting· either alone or in col-
lusion with employers, eng:ige in unlawfu:l restraints· offrad~. 
. ( 18) It µinkes, l~b.~r ,S1:g~nizntions ~qu_n11y res_pon.sib_le w.ith ~m-
ployers for contract v1ohl.hons ~nd provides ·for .suit by either agamst 
the other in the United States district courts. . · (i~) It prc>vides a menns for ~topping strikes which imperi1 or 
threaten to irilperil the p·ublic health, safety, or interest. • 
(29) It guara1.,te!!s t.o .employees, t!' empl9ye1:5. nnd to the~r re-
spect1 ve. repre~ntat1 ves, ~he Ju] I exerc~~e of ~the r1~h~· o~. free .spe.ec~. 
All of the abo,r.e prov1s1ons at'.e explnmed m detni1 m the uAna]ys1s 
of Pr<wisions'' portion of this report. Some of them mny well be 
elaborated upon here with the reasons which the committee had for 
including tbem. 
OLD BO.\.JU> AnousHf'J> 
The committee found that, \\·bi1e there ·n.re n numbe1· of iu~portant 
defects in the National Labor Relations Act itself, there ni"e e,~en more 
in the way the Nutional Ls.bor Relations Board has ndministered it,. 
The bill therefore nbolishes ·the.existing Nntionai' Labor Relations 
Board. and creates- in its plnc~ ·a new .b~pnrtisu·1) Bourd of three fnir 
nnd impartial p~rsons. Unlike the old 801ml. rt will not uct as 
prosecutor. j1~dge. and ju1·y •. Its sole !m1ct_io~1 will be to decide cases. 
A ·new and mcl~pendimt officer, tile Adm1111stmtor of the new uct 
Will •invest!~nte cu~s an~ present tl1~ e~frlence to~ tr.e nc;\,. ~on?·cl, and 
the new Honr<l mu.<;t <lec~de the cases~ not ·accorcltng to preJu<.hce and 
caprice. ns the o.ld. Bonr<l so often has·clone .. but acc:01:tliug to th" facts~ 
Be$ide~ rtb_olishing the old Bonrdtthe bill 13re,·ents the new Bo~r.d 
froin rej)el!ttn~ th~ ol<l Bonrd's m1Etal£e:;. The new Board, unb,k~ 
tl1e 01,,. will. be. unable to condone strike!;l . to compel employers to 
dcrrive .employt'ef; of their :rights un<lcf the net~ i.llegnl boycotts, 
vic>JeJJ~e~ ioass picketing, in<lustry-~id.e ~a.rgairiing, .stnkes ag~inst 
public health and !m·fety, ancl dictatorial control of workel's 15y uu-
sc1;npulomf union leaders~ · 
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The bil1 does not undeJtake to punish anyone-employers, em-
ployees; or union~for evils thnt h,ive nrisen ·under the old act .. 
Rather .,it un<1ert:1~es ~o q~fi.ne the rights of those, who ;tr~ ccmc~ned 
in the broad and. important field of labor relations, and to protect 
the rights of ench from interference by· nny ·other. · The bill thus 
seeks to reduce strife and ill will by getting rid of many of their . 
cause5; but without impairing just rights. 
RtGHTS OF WORKERS 
Important among the provisions of the bill nre those that really 
assure to wQrkers freeiiom in their org:mizit1g and bargaining activi~ 
ties. The old act purported to do this, but in the Board's hands it 
often had the oppo$ite ·effect. • 
The bill prescribes mles for the new Bon.rd to follow in setting up 
units for collective bargaining nnd in holding elections to d,eterriliM 
\\"'hether- or not employees wi$h labor unions tQ bargain for them. 
These rules do away with practires of the old Board by which it has 
subjected literally ·1hi1Jions of workers to control by ]abor unions not-
withsta.~din~ thnt the•employees did.not wish the unions to rt1prescnt 
thern and voted agninst the unions in the Ilonrd's elections. Similar1y 
the l;,ill prevents the new Board from continuing. the p~st prnctice.of 
dt?p1fring workers of the right fo designnte rn·dependent u·nions ns 
their barguining agents merely been.use .they happened to be inde-
pendent. 
Whcil wOl·kers ,,•ish n union to. i•epresent them. tl1e bill enal,)Jes the 
worlmrs t.o keet> greater control of the union's nfi'nirs ·than, in many 
<.·as<'.S, ~they hnye .e1)joyc.d in !he pnr;t. They will bP. prot~cted. :i~ainst 
exccss1,•e n<linis.'?1on fees, fines. dut•s, nnd m::sessments. Tlwy mil have 
a voice in deciJinµ. .npon importnut questions, and .will be ·nssured of 
the right to spenK freely ~n . maHers that conc·ern them. to vote in 
eJecti<>ns of umon officers, and to Yote on 'the matter of striking. The 
.<·ommittc() hM do11e tl1is iu response to ple:,s of 1nauy sitwere union 
people who 1·~gn17-<1 dum~r.ic·y in unious us.indispe_rtsnhle t.o t~e het1!thy 
growth of uniomsm. On the other hand, the bill recognizes tl1e right 
of the union to m:iintnin tliscipline in the rnnlcs, and to"expel members 
who nrc disloyal to the union or who net in \\'ays that bring il into 
diH1·c1>11te. 
The hill further ndd~ t() the frcccfom of workers by perlllittinf! them 
not ,only to present g1·i~v1mct•S to their employers, a~ the old Doard 
hcr~tofc>rc. lrns per1nitt<'cl th<-m to (lo, but :1)~0 to sr.Ulc the gt~ievaiices 
'K'hcn .dnin~ so does not violate t11c t~rms of a co11ective-Largnining 
acrrccment. which the lfo:ii·tl h;,!=. m>t ;1lJcjwcd. . 
rThe bill nlso requires tlmt nnkms that undertnkt' to. bargain col-
]~ctivcly for work,ws nmst :l<'.tmtll.v perform this_ itupm·tunt duly~ a~1d 
m:1kcs it :in unfoir· lnbi>i· pr:trf in• fui· unicm~. ns wt>Jl-i1s foi• c-niploYe.r:S. 
to refm;c to lmrgnin t•flll<'cl h;t,Jy. At th~? R:tlll(' time. th~ bill tle.fin~S 
the prorednrc of collet·tiv<'. bargniniug. and by st,tting forth the 
mutters on whic·h <>IIP ~idt• m;iy n'quil·<:t the otltN· t-0 b;1rgnin, limits 
bnrg:tinint! lo ni;rtlel-s of i11(t-t~PHt to thC! t:'mployer n1id_to th{? imlh-ichtnl 
ma11 nt work. 
lly ,1~.11ing w·ith imhtstry-widf' b:trgaining, th.e bill enui>lcs the 
wcwlit•1-s t<> ln•~•p clos-.•1: ~·0!1trol r;f ~the b:tr~tiinin~ in th~ir b~hnlf. Al• 
(hougli the bill permits mternahonitl oflil·e1-s, executive bc>:trds, and 
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other ,Qffi.ci~Is far removed from the shops to advise. a11d guide th_e 
workers, it does not subject the workers to control by die union's 
central office, as the evidence before the ·tommittee h~s shown so 
frequently to hue ~n the ca~ 
F'HEE SPEE.CH 
·_Although the oJd Labor . ~oard pr~tests it does not · limit f~ 
speech, it is _apparent from decisions of the Board -itself that what 
~rsoris ~ay in the e~,er~ise of .!heir right. o.f fret, s~~h has~ ~n 
used agamst them Th~ bill prov1desthnUhe.new _Board 1s proh1b1ted 
from using asetidenc;e against an employer, nn emplQyee.; or a union 
any statement · that by its own terms does not threaten force or 
ecqnomic reprisal. · 
RtoHTS_ OF EM1•to-rtn:-
~sin the Case bill, whi~h pa~d the House by a vote of 1nore than 
2 to 1 last ,·ear •. the bill forbids the Boai•d to · regard as employees: 
foremen aud other representath•es· of management who act for em-
ployers in their dealings with employees and their unions, The evF 
fience· before tpe committe_e showed conclusively thq.t ~-c::a11ed 
inqependent unions of for_emen 'a1·e not in fact independent: but th~t 
the unions of men the foretilen su1>ervist(actually control thern. _The 
eV'ident~e further shqws·'that management must. have ·in the plants 
agent$ who are entirely Joya,, just. a~ reprtisentutiv..s of the workers 
must be undivided in their loyalty to the :wQtkers.. 
EQuAt R•:."-POS!-iimuTY BEFoRt. THE ·L.,w 
When employe·rs violate :i·ights that ·the Lubor Att-giv~s to em,. 
ploy~es.or to union~, the Board can issue orden; against them. When 
emplc,yers vfoJn.te rights of employees or of unions m,<l~r other l~ws; 
they 1iiust answer in court for what they do. Uiuler the bill, ,vhen 
unfons and their members violate rights gh·en to, employers and to 
employees', the new Board ~nn issl!e orders.protecting ;the empt!>_ yers 
and the employees~ Thus, 1 f a umon. refuses to bargam roUect1vely, 
if it intimidates worke~, if it extorts unJa wfuJ payments from its 
members, or refuses to conduct its aff'ni'rs · fairly and according to 
democratic practices,. it commits nn un·fah- labor practice and the 
Board can issue an order against it. The bill nlso lists acts for which, 
under existing laws, union$;· nnd their leaders and members often 
escape liability·but for which all o.ther citizens must m1sw~r in court. 
These act.c-; include violating collective-bargaining contracts, violen~ 
in _strikes., mass picketing, strikes to fo~e empl(!yers to violate 
the Lah9r· Act or tJther Jaws~ They also include 1llegaJ boycotts; 
sympa.tby strikes, jurisdictional strikes .. feather~d~iilg, and agree-
ment&. by winch umons nnd employers .Sef'k to restram trn.de contrary 
~othe antitn.-st laws. For all tl1ese. acts,and others Jil<e them, unio.ns 
nnd their members will be equa1ly respo11sible with othei· persons 
under'la'w. · 
bnt:HTRY--W nic B.\ HO.\IN n;o 
The bili is tbe first ·serious attempt to 4eal with one c>f our ~:mintry's 
greate$t, ai;id more pre.ssing pro9Jems, indust~y-wide bargaining ancl 
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industry-wide sti-ikes tha,t paralyze our economy nnd that imperil 
the health ·rind safety of our people. 
The oon1mittee ha~ dealt with this problem in t,vo ways: 
First, by ;unending the Nationn1 Labor Relations Act, the .l:>ill 
forbids the Board to certify one union as the bargaining agent for 
employees of tw(1 oi· more competing employers, and also forbids 
employees of two or more competing employers to conspire: together 
to. ~trike nt the same time. The1;e are two ·exceptions to these r:tiles. 
One union cnn r~preseiit less than 190 empl()yees of eac}:i of several 
competing employers if the employers' plants are not more than 50 
miles apart· This pennits .smnll groups of employees to bargain. 
together atid permits small employers to bargain together, but limits 
the kind of bitrgairiing that so· often leads t() price fixing and other 
mon_opolistic practices; The seconq. exception permits unions that 
represent employees of competi1ig employers to aflilmte or associate 
, together if their bargaining, striki!lft and other concerted activities are 
not subject to common control. · under this exception, national and 
international unions would be nble to perform for local unions fu11c'.'.". 
~ions like those thnt trJ\de associations perform for member companies 
now, but _would not be able to dictate to them~. 
Second, the bill arms th~ President with the authority to seek 
injunctions against strikes that irn~ril the public health and ~afety, 
and authorizes courts to issue injunctions in such cases without regard 
to the N Ol'ris-LaGuardia Act. · 
CoMPULSORY UNIONISM 
The bill bans the closed shop. Under carefully drawn regulations 
it permits an employer and a union volunt.ariJy to enter into an 
agreement requiring employees to become and remain members of 
tl,e union n month _or more after the employer hires them or after 
the agreement .is si.gned. Such agreements are lawful, however, 
only if the employees by secret ballot have selecte_d the union as their 
bargaining agent, and if the m,ljority of all the employees, by a 
scp11.rate secret . .ballot; authorize the union to enter into the agree-
ment, and if the agreement b not prohibited by State Jaw. .A.n em-
ployee may be expelled from the union and thus forced to leave his 
job only i£ the expulsion is by reason of his failing to pay fees and 
dues impose~ upon_ el!1ployees generally. Under 'this clause, em-
ployers may select their own employees. Employees have 80 days 
to decide whether or not to joil1 the union. Unions may not cail?e. 
the discharge of employees by .discrimiuatin~ against them. The 
agreement must be voluntary. Unions may· not st.rike. to compel 
employers to enter into such agreements. They are subject to loss 
of bargaining rights if they do so. 
CoNCILIA noN 
The bill takes the United 'states Conciliation Service out of the 
Depa~tment of L1.bor. which Department is how cliarged hI statute 
with the conflicting duties of -r~presenting lnbo.r and, at the same 
time, trying to serve. as a mediator. This bill transfers such con-
ciliatiqn and mediation functions to an impartial agency under a 
Director of Conciliation_, and defines his duties! · 
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lftscEil..ANEOUS 
Besides these major reforms, the hill permits employees, employers, 
and.unions·that lose in,the Bonrd'selections to ap.peal from the Board}s 
n:lings. Utlder the present ··act. a$ the Board administers it .. only.em-
ployei-s can appeal. and then .onlv in cumb,ersome prqc~dings ~nd at 
the risk of being branded. ''unfair" by the. Board.. The hill. hQ''"~'·er, 
permits employers to nsk for elections when they are in doubt as to the 
l~l?nJity of n union's claim to repr~ntation ... · 
Finally the bHl pro\·ides that t'he new Board shall n·ot certify as 
bi.1rgnining ag~nts foJ:' work,ei'.S uniot}s whose officers ar~ Con1munists 
m· fo1fow the "partv line."· nnd thnr union:-: mny expel from membe.r-
ship Communlsts nntl fellO\~· trn,·elers. . 
A ::s-A,~ .. ~sis PY Pn,w1s 1oss 
The bill is dh•icled into thl'e~ title$. T-itle .I ~meml$ the Nntiomtl 
Labor J?elations Act to achie,·e the purposes;-beretnfoi·e t~ferred to. 
Title:n creates n ne,r independent Offire of C011dlintitin to wbich nre 
trnnsferrecl .th~ existing condlintiou funttfons.of the Depo.rtm.ent of 
Lnbor. Title II also contains J~ro\·i~i~ns ntm~nF. ~he Pr.esiclent witp 
the ppwer necessnrv to deal with .st1·1kt-s wh1Cm ni1per1J the pubhc: 
hen1th. safetv. or interest •. Title Ill nmencls the Clayton Ac:t to limit 
the exemptions of .labot organizations to lnwful activities thereof. It 
also cot:)tains pro,·isions mnki:ng lnhor or:z,'\11izations sun\)Je like a.11 
other person·s for -contpct_ violation~. pfo,·i.sions requirinG _fhmncial 
reports by labor orgamznt19ns to tl1e1r members~ irnd pronsmns con-
t1nuing the existing p1·ohihitions on political contributions,. etc.1 by 
laboi· org:1nizatio·ns~ 
TITLE I-AuE~1>S1£:xT 0FX.\1·m-x.\1. L.\B(tB. RELATiu.Ns Ac-r 
Section 1 • ...;_;.The present preamble of the L~bor A<'t. b~c;ides refle~t-
ing. n highly prejµdiced approach tn the problems with wh,ich the act 
littempted to deul. contains· rertnin as.-;ertion~. that ~eem no.t to have 
beei1 foi-rect when the bill \\"ns passed ancl thnt. .experience und(.'r the 
net certainly shows not. t.o be-true now~ The net did not reduce indus-
t riaJ strife. Under th.e act str_ikes incre.ased and, up to the ,1ery time 
this Congress met, they c-ontnmecl to increase. The effect was .to 
impede comme1;ce. 1,ot to promote it~ flow as the net uiulertook to do. 
'Section l ofthe net as p1·oposed to be nmended doe~ not nbuse anyone. 
I.t does not contain asse1·tio11s of fa(:t~ not proved. It ·dt'le.tes iuatters 
of this, kind that a_ppear .in the first tliref-pnr11graph~ of section. 1 of 
t11e old, act. ·tt the11 declares.,as does·the ]astp:1ragraph Qf that .sec-
t_iou. that ir_is the policy of Cqngress, in .the exerl'i:;e of its con..c;titu-
t1onnl funct1on~ 
to elhninntE' the causes of certnli1 substnnrinl o~truc1ions to tlie tree flow of 
et.•m1m.•~ a~tl to mitigute .and tHilnin,1re th~ .obsrructi.ons '\\·hen tbey have 
·t,ccurred. 
Accordin1? to its terms. the old nd u.ndertook to acc-omplish tts pur-
pose .(1) .by ue~cotira~ju~ the prnctice ;and procedure rif c-oUective 
ba1·~nh1ing~·nrid (21 b~•·'•prote('tin~ the exerche by 'l'orkers"" of their 
et1·1[nnh:ing and bargainin#i· rip:hts. Cong·ress ·denrl_\· intended thi$ to 
m.enn t11at w.orkers should be p,rotected ~n e:-te1·cising the$e rights1 but. 
00830 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
302 HOUSii: REPORT NO. 24 !i ON H. R. 3020 
only when they wislu~d to do so. The Lab9r Board, however~ appears 
to have tnken this ltin:ruage ns a mandate to it to forre employt'es to 
bli.r~nin cull~ctively, ~ven a:rainst their will. It also rippc:irs to buve 
assumed thnt wheri Con~ress snid jt wished to protect the rights. of 
'-,\"orkers" it rrieant to prote"t hlbor or:rnniz:itions ( at l~'ist those 
o:-ganhmd into nntionnl nnd in.ternntionnl federations), ~,·en when 
the labor organiza.tions cxpk,ited the. worker~ or en~a$!ccl in other 
attivitie~ that were inconsistent with the int(?rests of workers. To the 
Hoard. the interests of the, unions .. not those of the \vorkers. seem to 
have beei1 of pn1·nmoui1t importunce. The Board has had little J!~nrd 
.ior tlie ri~hts of ~mployees. and its misconception of its duties do~bt-
les.~.lms increased indllstrfal strife. 
Consistently with _later clauses .. section 1 of the net, as pr,pposed to 
be am~nded. statt?s i~s .. purpose to promote the flow of commerce by 
protecth1g the rights· not only of emplo·yees, but also of those of em-
plovers :uid those of labor orgnnizntions. nnd to prevent any of these 
pctr-~ies fron~ ncti~g ·upfe.ir)ytownrd the othe~. It protects·ernployees 
agarnst abuses by their unions~- 11s well as ~gnmst abuses. by-employers. 
H pr·otec~s unimis_ ngn.inst ::ibuses by employers, by employe~t and. by 
other unions. It protects employers agn.mst abuses by umons :i.nd 
their members. 
_DEFINiTIO:N'S 
Serti~n £.-This section in the old act defines 11 terms. In the bill 
it defines 16 terms. 8 of which appeared in section 2 of the old .act 
and 8 of which are 11ew. The h~rms defined, and cbn.nges in the defini-
tions, nre as follows: 
( l) ·''Person!': A~though in . most cases fobor or~amzations are 
'Las.~ccintions:, or "corporations'\ both. of which are mduded in the 
de.fin.ition of "person':, it ~ms deemed desirnble, in the interest of 
clarity.to in~lude them in the definition specifically. 
(2) "Employer'': There ·are three ch~mp;es in the definition of this 
term:: . . 
(A) The old net illdude.d in the defi1,ition of "employer'' ''any 
person acting in the interest of an employer1'. Under this la11gu~1ge 
the Board frequently "imputed'' to empfoyers nnything that· anyon~ 
connec(ed with nn employer, no matter how remotely. said or did_! 
notwithstnndirig that the employer had not auth~rized what "\Vtis said 
or done~ and in many ~ascs even had prohibi~ed it. By such ruling!$~ 
the Board often was able to punish emp1oyers for things they did ·not 
do, did .not uutl1orize, and had trie_d to prevent. . (See .. ~atter of 
American Steel .$c1•aper Co.! 29· N. L. }:l. n. 9.:19: '!ii atter of .Shult 
• Trailers, Inc .. 28 N. L. R. B .. 975~ 993.: Matter of Jolm cf: Ollie1•£1~-
graving Co., 24 N. L. R. B. 896: 1.1/atter of B_phwrrr~t Kler:fric Co~, 16 
N. L. R. B.-246; Jllatte.r of Swift & ·oo., 15 N. L. _R. B. 992; A[<!.tter of 
American Oil Oo.Jnc.,. 11.N. L. R. B. 990; Matter of Fro.r;t RubbeT 
Work$, 2:-\ N. L. R B. 1071; :llatter of (',tli/rmtia 1Valm1t G1·m.vers 
AsRn .• 18 N. L. R. B. 49il.) . 
The bill, by defining ?,S .an. <'employer" "any person acting .as a~ 
agent of an emp1oyer" niakes emplovers responsible for what people 
say or.do on]y when it is within the qr.tual or apparent scope of their 
~utl:lorjty ~ a 9.d thereby· make~ the ordinary rules of ~he law. of agency 
equally applicable to employers and to umons. 
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(B) Under the old act, the term "employer" does not include the 
United States. The same exemption that appJies to the Govemment 
should o.pply :eqilally to instrumentnlities of the Go\:erl'.lm~nt. The 
bill therefore excJudes.!'the Unit~d SU.ltes 9r any instrun_1entality there~ 
of" from the definition of l'employer". Up to 1iow, the. Doa1·d, ap-
parently ~as ~ot applied .the ·a..ct to any o_f ~he many· inst_rumentn.Iities 
of the United States, ~ut whether or not 1t should do so, Congress, not 
the Board, should .decide.,_ · · 
( C} C~urche~, h9spitals, -s~h~ls. college~, and societies !or t~e ~a~e 
of the needy are not engaged m "commerce'' and certainly not m 
interstate commei-ce·. These institutions. freque.ntly assist :local gov.-
ermnents in carryillg out ~ieir essential funct1o~s, and for this reasori 
sh-Ould be snbj-ect to e~c]usive local jurisdiction. The bill the1·efore 
excludes from thedefinitioll_Qf "employer,, institutip~sthat qua_lify as 
charities under our ta·x laws~ fo this respect, the bill is co11sistent 
with similar laws in a number. of Stat~, notably New York, Perinsy)-
nnia, and Wisconsin. The bill does not exclurle from tl1e definition 
institutions organized for :P.ro.fit or those a substantial part of whose 
activities is carrying on ·propaganda or attempting to influence 
legislation. . · . . . . 
(S) "Employee": The changes in the definition of this term are ns 
folJows: 
(A) The old act provides that uh einploy~ _shall not lose his 
status·as n.n employee under the net, even though his ~ork has ceased 
''as a.co11sequence. of, or in com1ection with any ~u1Tent labor dispute" 
if the emplovee "11as not obtained substantially equivalent employ-
ment''. The ·n~'"" net w~lf like.wise provid~ th3t an employee remai~s 
an emplQyee under the act 1fotwithstnnding that his•."work has ceased 
as a ~onsequ~nce of a eurl'ent h1.bor dispute') •. The phrase-in the 
present nct-"or in connection with'' is vague and indefinite. The pur-
pose of the whole clause is t<> pre,·ent a ma.n's losing his job when he 
ei1gaaes in n Jnwfot·strike. The clause accomplishes its purpose with-
QUt-t&i$ vague and inQeij~1ite phrnse. No case in wlljch the Boa1·d has 
had to use the· plu·nse to j)rotect the rights of employees h.'ls come .to 
the attention .·of the committee. The bill therefore deletes .the phrase. 
The Bonrd llOW sµ.ys that an employer ir-ay repln.ce an "economic" 
Striker~ one who $trikes for higher l)BY or other changes in working 
-conditions. The biU wr~tes this ruleinto the act, sayi11g tbnt a striker 
~mains an· "en1ployee" :'unless such indiv.idµ:l) has been replaced by··a 
regular rep1acei11ent='; arid, at: the end of the subsection, it defines a 
"replacement" as being an m.d.ividual -who-replaces a :striker "if the 
duration of his employment is -not to be determjned with reference- to 
the existerice or- duratton of such labor disp.ut_e!'.. Thus, "strikebreak-
ers" may not be regarded ns "replacements". 
As ttrider the pi·esent act, a striker. ·under the bill, ·would lose his 
status as n11 "employeen if he·obtnined "other regular a:nd substantinlly 
equin1lent employmeuf' trhile.the strike·wns in progress. 
A few Sh1tes pay.strikers:nfter the fiftb~.sixth, or seventh week of a 
Strike. '):'his Clear.Iv is :i perYersion of the purpo_ses of the Stlcinl-
security la~Ys!· which Congi-e~s inte~d~d tQ _pr~,~ide for unemployment 
compensation for those out of .work m,ohmtarrly nnd throueb no f~~tlt 
ofth~fr ,Q\,·n. We therefore haX"e ·pr,frided tlu1t a: striker~ status ns 
au~ "~mp_loJee'' stops. when.I~~ ~tnrts rec.ei,~itl$? unemploymen~ compen,-;.. 
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sation from any State. He may receive relief from his union, from 
focal welfare funds, or from charity withC\Ut losing that status. 
{B) The next significant chan"'e in section 2. (3) concerns "super-
visors',. The bill, by exclurling foremen and other supervisoryder-
sonnel from the definition of "employee", deprives the Boar .. of 
jurisdiction over them. 
The eYicle11cc before the committee showed this to be one .of the 
most importnnt and most criticnl problems. 'When Congress pnssed 
the Labor Act, we wE>re concerned, ns we snid in its preamble, with 
the welfar~ of "workers,, and "wngc earners'\ not of the boss. It 
was to proteC't workers and their unions against foremen, not to 
unionizt• fol'l'men, that CongrPSS paS$ed the act. In few trades, ·and 
iu uoue of the grent mnss-proclucrn~ in<lustries~ were foremen 
unionized. It was n<>t until about 7 years aftel' Congress pnssed the 
Labor Act th8t nnyone · asked the Labor Board to estabhsh n unit 
~umposed of snpe1·,·1sors. Notwithstam.ling thut in the act Congress 
had clefined ns an "employer" "nny person acting in the interest of 
an employer'\ the Bonr<l Jwld, in t.he first ~11ch case, that supervisors 
in coal mines are ''Pmployees", ancl it certified as the bilrgainin~ ngcnt 
of supervisors of Umon Collieries Coal Co. a union tho.t claimed to 
be '"indepernlent" bnt that turne<l ont t.o be a stnlldng horse for the 
United ~line Workers of Ame1·icn. and that now is pnrt of the catch-
all District 50 of that.union {1J/atte1· of Union Collieries Ooal Oom-
71t1:J1J/. 4 I ~. L. R. B. 06 ( l!J42)). A Jitt le Inter the Bon.rd certified. ns 
the bnrgaming agent of foremen of Godchaux Sugars, Inc., the union 
of r:111k a11<l file workt1rs wlmm tJ,~ for<'IHC!n were suppose<I to super-
vise ( 44 N. L. R. B. 874 ( 1942)). . 
As n r(>sult of the Board's certifying unions of foremen in the 
Union Collieries nncl Godchaux Sugnrs case~ there was introduced 
in Congress u hill tnkh1g foremen out of the Labor Act {H. R. 2239, 
78th Cong.). While the bill was /)ending in the Military Affairs 
Committee of the House, the Boar<, on May 10, 1943, in Matter of 
Ma1•11la·nd Drydock Oompany (.49 N. L. ~- B. 733), reversed itseli, 
hokling thnt, except in trn<les ·where ioremen organized in 1935, it 
would not find uuits of supervisors appropriate for the purposes of 
collective bargaining under the Wngner Act. The Military Affairs 
Committee then dropped H. R. 2239. 
1)1 deciding the Mnrylnnd Drydock case; the Board pointed out 
that unionizing for~m~n un<lerthe Labor Act would be bad for output, 
which the act wus intended to promotei bad for the rnnk and file, 
und bn<l for the foremen themselves. n several cases, the Board 
coufomed its decision in the Maryland Drydock case (M attcr of Boe-
i-ny Aircraft Oompany, .51 N. L. R. B. 66; Matter of M·urray Oor-
poralion of A?Tu:rica (Ecorse Plant), 51 N. L. R. B: 94; Matter of 
General 1.lfotrnw Oor7101·aUon (Detroit Diesel Engine Division), 51 
N~ L. R. B. 457). Then, in Matter of Packard Motor Oar 00111.pany 
(61 N. L. R. B. 4 (1945)), the Board chann-ed its mind nrrnin, certi-
fyinir ns the bargaiuin~ agent of five ranfcs of Packard9s foremen 
the Foremen's Association of Americ:i., which it had held it ol!ght 
not' t6 certify ns the bU;rgnining agent for foremen of BeneraJ Mo-
tors) :Murray Corp., nn'd ot11er companies. Later the Board certi-
fie<l a division of District 50 of the United Mine Workers of America 
u~ tlw bargaining agent of supcrYisors in the mines. an<l subj~ted 
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· ~hem to the discipline'and control of the United Mine Workers and 
its leaders. . 
A.s a. result of the Board's ruling in the Packard case, both Houses 
of Congress, by overwhelming majorities, passeJ the so-¢nlled Case 
bill, e~empting s.upervisors from the ope1~ti~n of the Labor Act. The 
President \'etoed the bill, nnd the Boui-d continued· to unio11ize fore-
men at an accelerated pnce~ 
The evidem;:e before _the committee ·shows dearly ·that unionizing 
&upervism~ under the Lnbor. Act is inco11sistenJ ,,~ith the purpose: of 
the net to m·cr¢~1.$e output of g<>0ds. that move 1u ,th~ str~nm of corn~ 
r.uer~e, and thus to inc1~'1S7 itsfi<>w~ It is inconsiste_~f,t}th the poliqy 
of Congress to assure to workers freedom from donunat1on or control 
~Y. their ~upervi~ors in. the-it orgamzing nnd ~nrgnining acthiities; It 
1s. mco. 11.s_ 1ste_ n_t w1_. tl_1 our_ pol!CY to.prote __ ct the_ r. 1ghts o1_ e.m~.lo~_'ers ;: they_ , 
as well ilS workers, nre ent~~le~ to Joyal. repre,se!1tat1ves m t!1e·_p1ants, 
but \\"hen th~ for~men umomze1 even m ·a un.1011 that danns to be 
:lindependent1" of the union of the ran~ nnd_ file, t:heY.. nr~subject. ~o 
mfluence .. and con~rol by th~ 1·a•tk nnd file umon, and~ msteacl of their 
bossing the ruilk ,and file. the. rimk and file bosses them~ The evidence 
~bo,ts that_ rnnk and fiJe unions ha_ve .do11e ~.1;1ch of the nctual Ol"J!}lt:iiz-
,ng of fore~~!1 even when ·th~ foreJ?e!1 ·s umon · pro.fesses to. be "mde-· 
p~ndent". W·1tbout any question~ this 1s why the imJ.ons seek tQ organ-
ize the foremen. 
One of the ~11ost impo1;tant. iternsof evidehl•efo this question cnme to 
Jightifter the committee concluded the heai-in~ In N<:>,·embet 1942,. 
Ford Motor·()~~ recognized the Foremnn~s Associatio1~ of Amel'ic-n u.s 
the rep.resentative of several l'anks of supe1•~1isor~. In 19441 the Ford Co. mad~ a full collective-bargnining agreement with the a~ociatio11. 
In testifying before our comn1ittee, the preside:1it of ·t11e associntion 
urged. ~.he i·elntfon between F(!rd and the associatiori ns grqund for 
umom~mij foremen .. qther endenee showed~ h~we,·er: that after Foi-d 
rec<:>gmzect the nssocrntlon, there were: 111ore, strikes nnd stoppages by 
foremen ut fot~d•s tha,p in uny othercompt~ny. Alt!1ou~h the pre~ident 
of_ t1_1e. nssociat_mn ~ln_ nned tba·t-productrn1ty ,_ ~~.n_ s 111,rh 1.11 °})_b·t•11Js i_tbnd Qr~uized, w~ had quoted to us statements by Mr. Henry Ford II-that. 
productivity declined after· the fore111en o·rgai1ized. nnd th is e,·idence 
was supp·orted by eYid~nc.~ frQm othe_r comp~mies. 
On April 8, 1947 .. Mr ... John.-S~--Bugos, vke Pl'.esident aud dirertor <>f 
industrial relations .nt Fo1·d's, ·teii'ninnted ~ .. ord's ~0~1t_1~h~t with the 
ForeJnan's Assodation. His letter to the_ n~socindon constitutes the 
clearest evidence that sti"pervisors nre not:properly subject to the Lnbor 
Act: 
This. ls to ad,·ise you of .. the d('cislonof.'the F0.rd Moto1· Co. to t~riuii1nte th~ 
present ·ngreemenr betwPen th~ Fo1·erunri·s .\ssodatlun nutl the Femi lfotor Co~ 
As-you k1iow. under t11e terms of the ngt'.l:'<?JUe~t it mi1y b_,, termimttt·d i,n llnj, 
9, 19-17. PtOYided .either you1· uss~·llulon M the coillpnny gh·Qs 30 d:i~·$· nntke. 
It .ls the purpose of this letter t<> gin• !!im·h uotke-
Our µresenrngre,i>ment with. yon wns ent~1-ed into ,·otnnrnrHy tlU ll:1;\· fl. UY-l. 
At .tlUH tlme we touk _the llOSitlou thnr. Whethe.r o.r' not. Wl• b(')h•\"t.>1.IJh:t f r,wemt-~1·s 
u11!oi1~:or .n~odution$ wl!re Stlnnd. :we w.1,til~ unclertnke a p1~m;th•nl t,•st. l'his 
,~ in· line. wi.th o,~r policy elf nhvnys seeking worknl.>lt) ~o!ut1~••1s·h1 uttt· Imm:m 
l'ehttJous p1·oblelll:S· -h~t~ nt .Ford .. · . At' you ffl'e (l W:tTl', H1h1_ l'\llllllHll;\', iu 1-e:.d,iug 
the 1944 u~reeroent wi.th yon, took n 11.osi(i~lll not $Ullllfll't~1l hy tlil' i;r:-m~1·,i1 
opiuiou of i ndtisn·y. 
763795-48-VOt... I-23 
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At lhnt time, repr~e11tntfres of .your associntJon argued that recogil[tlon of 
a fol'.emnu's union would result in mnking foremen more effectively a part of 
mnnngement than before. . . . . . .. . . . 
After. 3 ye.nrs· esper•en~a, period' .\Vtiich .seems· to us ample 101· a. .test-It 
ls our conclusion thnt. the results hnve b~ the. opposite of what we bnve hoped 
for. Rather thn·n exerting its efforts to drow foremen into closer reJatlonsbip 
With the rest ot m.anniement, your nssocin1inu bn.s worked ln the 01,posite din-c-
tion. We feel that your a.s,so<.-iution under the ngreemenc bas fniled to me~r the 
test ot practice. · 
As. re~~ntly ns Jnst Sntilrd~y-AprU 5, 1947~ foremen. all except .8' ·frt:im 
the RQuge. rolling mm. wnlked off the job wlthout v.ermisslon, and contrary to 
spedill" lastrucrious to rerna_In. They stnyed off the job about !!1h hours, utrend• 
lng n ni~eting-of. the nssorfatioo; . This unuurbodz~d nbseuce ln,•ol'!ed grave 
risks to out- emJtloyees. In the rolling mUl. The fact that no damage c11me to 
· men or property was -fortunate, but lt ls something which tbe nbseut iuembe11; of 
your _nssociadori could not guarantee. . 
Efforts were mnde-we are ~l3d to sny unsuccessfully---:-to tnduce foremen ln 
the open hearth depo.1·rment to leave their jobs at the snmetlme. Thel'_e Is no need 
t<.(point out the risk to men and property Jo Iea•.ing opeo benrtb furnaces un;. 
attended. 
Your association i·ecentty instructed its members not to comply wtth company 
requirements thrit ·1bey · check employee~ 11ntler th~i.r supervislo11 ttt. •;'a1ions 
lucati.ons am.1y from the job where thi>y ·were felt to be. loitering. Spokesmen for 
yoar association did not agree wltb the· company ns to the· proper ra·hulque for 
lu1odling nn odmittedly bnd situntioll. lt is deudy the t·esponsibiUty of the t.-om-
l)flny. nnd not -of your nssoeintion, ro <.letermine tbe p1·ocedure in such situurtons. 
Severnl months a~o we proposed :i nnmber nf consrrncth·e amendments dP.signed 
ft; Jmpro?'e our rehtti,onsbips, ro dt-fiile n:iore cle.:rdy our s~purnte nrl!ns of 1·es11on• 
sibillty, nnd to close the ~ulf between f~remen.~~d othf?r u1embers ut our mn11age-
nient t~am wblcb we feel has been <'rented by the present _ugret-meur. lo s-ev_eral 
l!lOntfis of nf'gotiatiou. your. negotiating committee hns 11ot agreed to n sfngl_e 
n1njor proposal. Yuur c,ommittee has ntso failed to produce nny cuimterproposal 
wblch would l~nd to these goals. 
The Ford ~Iotor Co. hns the pre.sent' and Jong-term nbjecth·e of buil_ding nn 
ext>eptlonnl organiznlfoo of the nblest pl:!Opl_e. We cannot rcnch thi~ objt>rtive 
unles.s we develop whbio the orgnnizotion the finest nnd best-trnlned foremen In 
the eountry~ The nt-sociatlon is not helpin~ t1s to ndn1nee-· towurd this objerti\·e. 
Tbe.essentlnl cho.rlieteristic of mnnngement is r{l_sponsibillty. It foUo'lo\'~ ,th.at 
the chn_racterlstie wblch dlsringuishes· n foreman fs n sense- of .responsibility. 
It is our ot,servntlon tb:i~ the ncrivitJes of your asspcintion under onr n~reement 
bas tended to fend our foretnen away frorn mnru1gi.•ment responsibility, and bns 
lu fnet oppnS<!d eftot·ts.of the eompnny 'in this dirt~tion. 
W~ :tre glY!ng you th.ls notice of t~rmiriation of our ng1·eement fo1· tbc prAeticnt 
reaso1J th:H It bo.s not worked under test. 
If mnnagement is to be ·free to mann~e American industry ns in the 
past nnd tci produce the goods on which depends our strength in war 
n.nd our standard of livin~ i\lwnys, then CongrctiS must exclude fure-
nicnff0111. the operation of the Labtir Act1 not only when. tl1.ey-orga11izc 
into v:ni{)n$ of tl,.e 1•ank ar,.d -P,te and ,into union.1 affiliated with t/1.ose 
of tne rank anrl fi,le; but also when they organi.ze into unions that claim 
fo lJP. independent of t l,c union.I( of th.e rcrn/1: 11"f!.d file. 
The committee received in ev:dence about 200 letters thnt tlte Fore-
mnn 's A.ssocin.tion hnd exchrmged'.' w.ith ti..nions ·of the rank nncl file. 
Thc.•y showfd n closer :md mqre intimate rcla:tion between the assoda-
tion :rnd the unio_ns of me_n the forenum ~npcrvise than one ?I~din:u:ily 
6nds·hetween unions affilrnted top;ether m the ~·ame fe<lernt1on, nncl n. 
!-iUbservience of the ni=:sncintion to unions of the runk a.nd file tbnt is 
rare nmong unions. 
The evklence ~hows that fornmen's nnio11~aret an<l 11111st be. whCllly 
dependent upon rnnk-'und-file unions and under const:int oblig:Ltion to 
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them. l'he for~meu .cnnnot strike without fhe support oi Uie rimk 
arid file and its agreement not to do the work of striking foremen .. 
The ns!iocia.tion admits thnt it has such trn agreement with the. CIO. 
The association ha~ adopted a rormal "policyn f 01·bidding its meinbers~ 
when the rank-and-file unions strike, to erite1; the strt1ck plants 11.nd 
protect ·and maintain them without the consent of the rank-and-file 
unions. . 
The evidence further shows that rauk-nnd-file unions teil the fore::-
rn.~n's union when· ~lie t~r¢men may strike. and when they may not,. 
what duties the foremen may do and what ones tJiey may not, whafl 
plants the foremnn>s· union may organiie tl.lld what ones it may not .• 
I~ shows thnt rank-and~file unions hnve helped· foren1en's u1iions, not 
for th~ ben~fit of the ~oreJnep1 bllt for the bene(it of the rank rtnd file, 
~t ~he e:,:pense· of the fore~an's fid_e1ity in doing his duties. The 
.chnnman of n rank-and-file pit comm1ttee summed the matter up when 
he said: · · 
Well, we nre trying to J?et tllelll (tbe ~upe1~vi:,;01-s) to jotn tl::i~ unJon, the bosses 
to Jotn the union. aod then we'll' be their bosst'S. We'll lie tbeir bosses. 
·Tbnt roost foremen themselves see the· impropriety .of. theh· u1iioo-
iziug, and its danger for their .o:w,n status, is clear from the fa.ct that, 
11Ithough tl1e Foreman's .Assodation of America is the. largest union 
of foremen, only about 1 pei•cent of the foremen have joined it. 
1tl a11ageme11.t,· Ulce l,a.1:,or, must have Jaith.ful agents_-:.;.I:f we are to 
· produce goods competitively nnd in such large. quantities that. manz 
ca1\ buy them. ·at low cost, then, just as there nre pe()ple o.n labors 
s.ide to say what workers w:a11; and have a1•ightto e:xpect,there must 
be in mnnagement and loyal to 'it persons ·not subject to influence or. 
co.utrql of unions, not only to assign people to their w.ork, to see that 
they l_teep a_ t their work_ .. an_. d d? it w~ll, _t_o co_ ~~~t the_m when they are 
at fault, and tQ settle fheir complnmts and gr1evanc.es·, but to 9-eter':' 
mine how· much work employ~es should doi what p11y tl1ey should 
re.ceive for it, and to carry oil the whole of nl;ior relatipns. 
Labor relations people )'.legotfaf:e labor agreements and handle dis;.. 
putes not settled in the shops. Employment and personnel people hire 
workers, and sometime~ assign then1 to their departments~ Plant 
policemen and gual'ds prevent disorders and t·eport m.isco'riduct of 
e'mployees and of unions and their rnem~rs. Time-:study men help 
to fix the pace at which employ~. work and to determine- the number 
of men the work. cnlls for •. ·Doctors, nnrses, sai~ty engineers, nnd 
adjusters handle claims for disability ·benefits 'nnd investigute alleged 
haz~t1·ds 'to safety n.ntt health. 
Ot,1er eµip!oy~~ lumdle_ i_ntiroate details of th~ business that _fre.• 
q~entlv .nre Iughly confidenti_~l. So~e affect. the.employer's. relat10,ns 
with labor. Others. affect 1ts· re]ntions mth 1ts coii1pet1tors. In 
· neither case should the employee!s loyalty be divided. Thnt which 
afects the company's relations with its competitors certninly ought nQt 
to be open to members .of a union that. dei:tls: also with. the firm's 
cqmpetitors. . 
·supervisors are management people. Thev hnve distinguished 
r.hemselv~. in t11eir work. They hnYe demonst1·~ted t~1eir apility to 
tnke care ~f the:mselves without dependfog upon the pi·e:35ure of col-
l~tive 11.ct10µ. lfo 9ne forced them to become $t1perv1.~01~ . They 
abandoned the "collective security'' of the rank nnd file voluntarily, 
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hec~rnse-they belieyed the opportu1iities tl1us opened to r.bem to 'be 
more. vn1ua.ble to. t.hem tha.n such "security" It seems wrong, ,and .it 
is wrong, to subject people of this kincl, 'Y'ho bav~ demonstratecl their 
initfative, their 3:m~ition n?td th~ir ability to get a.!1ea~~ to thelev~lling 
processei:- of semor1ty, uiufonmty and stanoard1zation that the Su-
preme Court recognizes as: being. fund~m~tnl principles of unionism. ( J. J. Oase Oo. v. National Labo1• Relations Board. 321 U. S. 332 
(1944).) It is wrong for the foremen, for it discou1·ages the things 
in them that made tI1em foremen . in .the first P.lnce. For th~ sam~ 
reason, that it discoura&'85 those best qualified to get ahead, it is wrong. 
for industry, andpart1cularly for the future ~trength and produc• 
tivity _of our country. 
So, by this bill, Congress makes clea1: once 1i1ore whnt.:it tried to 
make clear when, in passing the act, it defined as an "employer," not 
an "e.rripfoyee,,, any· person nacting in the interest of an employer,,; 
what it again made clear-in taking up H. R. 2-239 in 1943 and in drop-
ping it when the Board decided the Mnryland Drydock case,.and what, 
for a third time, it.~a.de clear last year in passing the Case:--bill by a 
majority of about .2 to 1 aud in barely .falling short of enough votes Jo 
override the President's veto of that bill. 
The bill does not forbid anyone to organize. .· It does not forbid any 
employer to rec_ogrifae n uni~n of foremen. Employers who, in the 
pnst, hn·ve bnrgained collectively with supervisors mny continue to do 
so. Wh~t the bill ~:loes is to say w1int the law always has said untiJ. 
the Labor Board~_in the exercise of what it modestly calls its "expert-
ness," changed the law: That 119 one,. whether ~mployer or.emploree, 
need. h~ve as his agent <;>n~ who 1s 9bhgated to those on the other side, 
or .one \V horn, for any :reason, he does not trust. 
( C) "Agri_cultural labor~rs": The pre.sent act excludes from the defi-
nition of "employee" ''any individual employed as an agricultural 
laborer," but it does not say w.h? are n~ricultural !~bo~ers nnd wl:o 
n-r.e not •. Congress has defined this term m other legislation.. The bill 
adopts the definition of agricultural laborer set forth in the Internal 
Revenue Code, section 1426 {h). namely: 
The term "agrkulturn.l labor'' inclutles all sel'vict!S performed-
ll) On R fa.rm, in the emplo.r of nn:r 11erson, in· conn~tfon with f!.ulU.,·nting 
the· ~oil, or in connecti<:m _wtth. rnlsing. ()r lu~n·estin~ nnr ngL·tcultural 01· horti-
cultural corumodlty, lncltulin~ the l'll.isin,;, shettriu~. feeilin~. curing tnr. tr.iln-
lng, nnd mnnngeinent of livestock. bees, poultry, .nnd fur-bearing animals and 
wildlife. . · 
(2) In the ~mploy of the owner, or ten:lflt or other opera.tor of a ftum, in 
connection ,viUt the opei-ntlon. mnnugement, · conservntion., improwment. oi-
runlntennnce of such farm nnd its tools and equipment. or .in snlvaging timl.Jer 
or clearing lnnd <lf b.rn::th nnd other debi•is left by n hurrlenne, if tl1e mnjor Jlart 
of such. se.rvke ls pe1·tormed on n farm. 
(3) In connel•tlon with the 11roduction or harvesting of mnple slrn1l or mnple 
sngnr or any commQdlty. <lefine<l ns mi agrlcnltural commodity _in section 1141j 
(g) of title 12, ns nmen.cled, or in connectfon with the raising or hnr,·e:;tfn;t of 
mushrooms, or In connection with the hatching ot poultry, or in <>onnection with 
th~ ginning of cotto11, 01· in com1ection· with th~ operntlon 01'. nmlut.eu.:m~ or 
ditches,. cnnnl~, rese1·,·olrs, or wnterwnys used exclusively for su11plyin;.! au,1 
storing \"\'a ter for fnrming purposes~ · 
H) rn handliT1g, planting, clrying, pttckjng. pnclcnsing, :proce.rssing, f1•eE>7.ing. 
grading. storing. or de1h·ering to stor11.i:e or to m~rket 9r to :t (':lrrier fm• rr.m~ 
portatlon to mnrket, nn1~. ngrtculturnl or hol'ticulturnl commotlity; but only it such 
s~r,·ice Js performetl ~s nn incident t() ordinary fn.l'IJling opernti~ns. ~r, ·in tht' 
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cwsc nf fruits nn<l Ye~etJlbl~s, ~s nn lncilleut to ·th~ preput'lit1~1n ot tiueh fniit.t1 
or vegetables .fo1• rnui•ket, T.he provisions of I his-1l:11•ngrn11b ij~l.alr 11ot hi! cl~unH~ll 
to be 11p1>lfo11ble with respt.-ct t() ser,·ice perfo1:me.d iu L·o!,f1ec.1ici11 w~ll• c1>m• 
tnercial cmmlng or. cvmmercin,l treeziug or ln colmectfou with nnr 11,;1·1culhu·nl 
<•r hortlcultu_~l commodity nf~~r Jts delh•eJ·y to a terminnl mtu·kct for distribu-
tion for <.·mus,mlplion~ · . · . · ·· 
·Ai{ i1sed ln. HliS subsection,. the term "fRrlll" ln<!lud()S st<l('k, .d1tlry, poultry, 
fruit, fnr-btmrlng nnlmnl, un_d. irµck ful'ms, plnututi{)n!5, r1111chcs~ uu1-stn·i~s, 
r:i11~cs. gn-eu_hu;1~~ or other siruih1r ~ti·uctu~~ Ul:i~tl 1•rinuti-lly for the rui:Jihg 
or ngrlculturnl o·r hortkulttu-a.l com_mQdltie~. nn4 prclmrds. 
(D) An nemployee'', n.ccordmg to: ull srai1dard dictionttries, nc• 
cord 11ig tQ th~. law ;aa · t be courts hn ve stat~d i_t, ~~net . ncc01·<l i 11g to the 
understanding o:f almost e\·~rycme; with the exception. of memQ~rs 
of ·the ·Nntional Labor Relations Doard .. rifo:rns sonicone who "'orks 
ior another for hire. :But in _ the case oi National. Labor Relati(Jn8 
Board v._Hearst Publications:; Inc. (822 U. $. 111 (1944) )~ the Boa.rd 
~pan:ded the definition- of th~ te1·rn "employef·, beycmd q.nything 
that it ever ·had in~luded _ before, and the S.u-preme Court, relying 
upon 'the tlieoretic _'lexpe·rt~ess" of th~ l?oarct·, upheld the Ilonrd. · In 
tnis ca!5e the Board held rndepe1~dent merchants who bought _news• 
pnpers from the publisher nnd hfred people.: to sell the1·n to be. •·em-
ployees',. The. people tile· me1·chantH hirfd . .t.o ·sell the papct·s were 
"~mploy~es'' of the_ merchant$;. but holdin:.r the ~w:11·chnnts_ to _b.e· ''cm-
pJoyees" of the publisher or t11e pnp4:i·s was must far read1iug. lt 
nJrist be presumeq thnt •when Congress enssed the Lnb9r Act .. it 
intended word~ it used to have ·the .me!uiiligs th11t they had wiw1i 
Co11gi'ess pnssed the ·,1t:t1 not tiew 11u~n1i"rn~s that. ll yenrs lnfor, th!' 
Labor Board .might think tt_p. fo th~ hnv_; ,twn~ ·11lwi,ys· hn~ be<!tl :1. 
<hiTerence, and n ~ig d!fferencet between· ~'employees". nu~l "indc-:-
pen<lent contmctor$·'. '~EmP.loyees" work for wages or snlnr1es under 
rlh·~ct. super,•isfon. "'Independent co1it1;act01:s" unde1'ti1kc tQ do· n 
job for a price _dec.·.ide how; the \vork ~vil! be doiie,usunliy hire othet~ 
to .do the wm•iq caud. de.pend for their mcome not opo11 wngrs, but 
upon the di1f~1·cnce. betw~·eu whnt they pny for goo1ls, mntt'1·iiils, :and 
f:Jbor nnd whnt th~y rec~ive fot· the end 1-esolt. thnt is, upon profits. 
It is.incQnceiynbJe thut Congi·vss, ,vhen it pass(\() the act, uuthprizcd 
the Bmu·d fo give tn e,very v.·ord in_ th~ ;\rt whatever menning it 
wished. On· th~ ;controry, Congress h-i"t~ndcd then, a_nd it intei1ds 
now, that the Dc,nrd give to wo.rds not far-fetehetl. n1eanin::rs but 
ot'tliil.m·y m~anings. To l~OlTect whnt the· 13oard hns done, nnd whnt 
rhe Suprem¢ Court, putting misplnct--cl rcifance upon tht:~ Hoard's 
<'Xpc1ifues.", !ms;nppron~d. :tl1~ bill exclud~s uhult1~_ude11t contractors" 
from the <Miriitiotl of ''ernplo)~ee~'. 
The definitions app('.'na·in~ in S('c-tion 2 -of th~ p1't'~.Emt net of thc-
t~rms '4:t't"pl'.CSeutn.tiye" (4)~ ''lnb~>r 01"1,!Jllihmtion,, (i>). --''c-<JllUUN'('l',, 
( G) ,. "''affecting commt'l'('l''~ ( 7) :- :mtl ''unfa h· lnbnl' 1n·m·ti<"c'' ( 8) 1·r-
mni11 m1ch2'n:,red .. :t,1thou~h, il~ i-:~~tion ij~ the ''unfair lnb01 priH'tict'::i,: 
thl!mselves nre dmnged ~tthl:itnntit,lly. 
~<,ction e ("0) of the prr..st~1it nrt. ,\·hi<-11 cl"fhm:.."lnhor ,li~put<•", is 
ouutt.ed. The te11n docs. not .app(mr onywl•es-c m the pre~c.•nt nd 
1•xr.t.~pt in the ,fofiriitions~ It do(•~ nppt•nr ·j11 the bjl), but it:-: UlPaninc, 
is denr from the context nml from th<' hil I ns n whole mal ,lc.w.i- 11(~ 
lll'~cl drfiniug .. In nny. ~v~11t.: the oM t}pfi111tion woul<i bl' "in:11>pi·o- ., 
p1·1ate m thr .nm(lndrd ri<•t hPC'_nn~~ H:-' t hl' Lnh<li' Dt1a ~·d hu~-N>m-:tr,it~d 
ih:1: uct. n "Jnbor clisput(~•,_ r~ist~--wht~m•,·t'1· .IJ union di_!,:n:rr<1l•:: ·with m1 
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Calendar No. 104 
80rH CoNGBESS } 
JatSesaion 
SENATE { 
FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1947 
REJ.101lr 
No. 105 
APB.IL 17 Oegislative day .. MABCH 24), 1947.-0rdered to be printed 
Mr. TA.Fl', from the Committee on Labor and Public W elfa.re, 
submitted the following 
·REPORT 
[To accompany S. 1126] 
together with the 
INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF MR. THOMAS OF UT.AH, AND THE 
SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF MR. TAFT, MR. BALL, MR. 
DONNELL; AND MR. JENNER, AND THE CONCURRING 
VIEWS, WITH RESERVATIONS~ OF MR.·SMITH, THEREIN 
The Committee on Labor and Public W elf a.re report an original 
bill (S. 1126) to amend the National Labor Relations Act, to provirle 
addit.ionn.l facilities for the ml;'diation of labor disputes nff ecting com-
merr.r, to t•qualizr lrgal respons_ibilitil'S of labor organizations and 
employt•rs, and for other purpost•s, and recommends that the bill do 
PThe problem of the inadequacy of existing laws on industrial rela-
tions is om,. of gro.vC' national concern. The bu.sic Federal law on this · 
subject is conto.inrd in two stat.ut-l's-the N orris-Ln.Guardia Act of 1932 
and the National Labor RC'lations. Act of 1935. Enacted at the time 
when millions of p~l'SOUS l\"C'rC' miemployc-d and labor organizations 
were 1·~lat.iv<'ly WC'nk a.ncl inC'fiectrvC', thvsc statutr.s, despite their 
C'Xprrim(\ntn.l cluirnet(lr,• lmv(' not ,brNl chnngC'd in o.ny res·pect since 
their original rno.ctment. 
While the committc.e does not belic,re that social gains which indus-
trial employ<.'<'S hM•c received bv n,ason of these statutes should be 
impaired in any drgree, we do feel that to the extent that such statutes, 
toget-h~r.witb. t.he 1·~.gula.tions issut'd under them, o..nd decisions rega.rd-
in~ ~hc.m, hayc produrcd specific types of injustice, or clear inequities 
bctwc.~cu employers and employees, Congress should remedy the situa-
tion by precise and C'a.rP.fully drawn legislation. 
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The need for congressional action has become partipularly acute as 
a result of increased industrial· strife. In 1945 this occasioned the 
loss of approximately 38,000,000 man-days of labor through strikce. 
This total was trebled in 1946 when there wero 116,000,000 man-days 
lost and the number of strikes reached the unprecedented figure of 
41985. 
This bill, formulated by the committee, in an· attempt to ·solve 
some of the more pressing difficulties with which the Nation is con-
fronted'-- represents the results of numerous hearings before the com-· 
mittee extending over a period of more than 5 weeks. The committee 
heard 83 witnesses representing not only management, labol' organi-
. zations, and the Government but also the general public. The actual 
drafting of the bill was done in executive sessions of the conimittee 
during the la.st 4 weeks, in which almost daily meeti~s were held. M 
aq indication of the interest in the subject matter, the entire member-
ship or the committee was present a.t the meetings in which tho 
draft we.s perfected. VirtuaJly every Senator. on the committee madt' 
an important contribution to its provisions. . 
The committee bill is predicated upon our belief that a .fair and 
equitable labor policy can best be achieved by equalizing existing 
laws in a manner which will encourage free collective bargaining. 
Government, decisions should not be substituted for free agreement, 
but both siaes-management and orga.n.ize.d labor-must recognize 
that the rights of the general public are paramount. 
The need for such leg!sla.tion is ur1;ent. Supreme Court interpreta-
tions of the Norris-LaGua.rdia. Anti-injunction Act and the Clayton 
Act seem to have placed union activities, no matter how destructive 
to the rights of the individual workers and employers who a.re coµ-
forming to the National Lo.bor Relations Act, beyond the pal~ of 
Federal law. ·Moreover, the a.dministra.tion of the National Labor 
Relations Act itself has tended to destroy the equality of bargaining 
power necessary to mainta.in industri9il peace. This is due in pa.rt to 
the one-sided character of the act itself, which, while affording relief 
to employees and labor organizations for certain undesirable practices 
on the part of management, denies. to management an;y redress for 
equally undesirable actions on the pa.rt of labor organizat1Qns. More ... 
over, as a result of certain administrative pra.etices which developed 
in the early period of the o.ct, the Boa.rd he.a acquired a reputation for 
partisanship, which the committee bill seeks to over.come·, by insisting 
upon certain procedural reforms. 
In the course of its deliberp,tions, the committee· considered many 
other proposals, such as restricting alleged moudpolistic practices by 
unions, the formulation of a code o( rights for individual members .of 
trade unions, and a clarification of the problem of union-welfare funds. 
In excluding these matters from the purview of the bill, the majority · 
of the committee should not be understood as regarding sueh proposals 
e.s unsound or unworkable, bu.t rather that the problems involved 
should receive more extended study by a special Joint congressional 
committee for which the committee bill specifically provides. In other 
words, the committee in this bill attempted to embody reforms which 
are lo~ overdue o.nd with respect to which the record of the hearin~ 
revealea widespread agreement on the part of informed and impartial 
persons. 
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'fhe bill is divided into foul' titles: Title I amends the National 
Labor Relations Act . to· achieve the purposes to whi'ch reference has 
been ma.de. TiCle· II creates a new Feder~! Mediation Service, which. 
tra.nsf ers the funrt-ions .of the_ Department of u,bor in the field of 
corieiliatfon, nlong with the property and personnel of the present· 
Service. It also provides special procedur.es•for the Attorney General 
and the President to utilize in national emergencies. Title III give.s 
labor unions the right to sue and be sued as legal entities for breach 
of con~ract in the Federal cour~. Title IY estab~shes e. joint Com-
mittee of the Congress to make a long-range study of certain aspects 
of labor relations, concerning which _further information was thought 
desirable by ·the committee. ·Title V con.ta.ins definitions. 
The major chru1ges which the bill would make in the Nat-ions.I Labor 
Relations Act may be'.s~nunarized as follows: 
· 1. It. eliminates the genuine supervisor from the coverage of the act 
asan employee and makes.it clear that he.should be dP,emed a pa.rt of 
management. · . . 
·2. It abolishes the closed shop but permits -voluntary ·agreements· 
for requiring such f o~~ of CO?Jpulsory membership f!S ~he union shop 
or mamtenance· of membership; proy1ded that a ma.Jority of the em-
ployees authorize their rep1·es~ntatives to make such contracts. It 
al~o prot:ects empfoyees ag~inst discharg_e, if unions deny or t~ate 
the_ir membership. for caprici<:>us reasons .. 
3. It gives t!-mployers and individual employees rights to .. invoke the 
processes of the Board against w1ion$· which engaged in certain 
enumerate~ unfair labor practices, including secondary boycot-ts and 
jmisdictional strikes, which may result in the Board itself applying 
for restraining .Qrders in certain c~es. . · 
4. _ It i-eorga.ni_zes the central structu.re of the. National Labor Rela .. 
tions Boo.rd not only by providing for tho o.ddition off our new members 
to thQ pre£e.n~ Board pf three1 but by placing' upon the. members indi;.. 
vi<lual responsibility in performing their judicial functions. This 
would be a.ccQm_plished by .eliminating the review section 0£ the legal 
·st.mi and the reviewing personnel of the '!'rial Examining Division. 
·5: In the interests of nssurintr complete freedom of choice to em- , 
ployces who do not wish to be represented collectively as well as those. 
who do, it requires :the :Uoard. to enlarge the ri~hts of petition in 
repres·eritation cases and to give {?ieater attention to the special 
problems ·of- cra.f tsmen and professional employees in the determina-
tion of bargaining units. 
6. It prevents the Board from continuing to accord e.ffiliated unions 
special advantages at the expense of independent le.'bor organizations,. 
by requiring ihat1 under identical circumstances, the Board fa com~ 
plaint cases refrain from any disparity of treatment. 
SUPERVISORY- PERSONNEL 
A. recent development. which probably more than any other singl.e 
fac•tor has upset any real balance of power in the collectiv:e-ba.rgaining 
process ha$ been the successful efforts of labor organizations to invoke 
the Wagner Act for covering supervisor, personnel, traditionally 
regru·dcd as. p~t. of management; i~to . orga.ruzatiQn5 composed of or 
subservient·to the unions of the very men they we-re hired to super-
,~ise. It ,vas riot until 1945, after several changes in position, that the 
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Nati()nal Labor.Relations Bo~rd its~lf by divided vote finally decided 
that supervisory emplQyees were covered by the N a.tional Lo.QOr 
Relati(!DS Act. Tb.hi constructi()n was rec~tly: upheld in the Supreme 
Court m- the Packard Molor Car cas~ (decided March 10, 1947). 'It 
should be noted that the majority of the Court .in. this case did not 
approve. the policy. of the. Board ~s. doctrine but, in ·the absence of any 
specific. limitation 11;poil the ~ord "employe_e'' in the Wagner Act, 
merely _held tb.&t ihe Board had power to reach such a conclusion. 
This . means, &9 Mr . .. Justice Douglas pointed o.ut in ~- dissenting 
opinion-and as Board COUllSel conceded in argument.-that ·unless 
Congress amends the act in this resper.t its processes can be used .to 
unionize even vice presidents since they are not specifically exempted 
from the category of "etiploye~." . · · 
'l'he .Board has. pla.ced the issu~ squ.arely up to the Congress by 
stating in one of its recent decislons:· , · · 
. So long all the Coogress ot the United ~~tes imposes no limitation on their 
•choiet?, it is not tor us to do so (J onu d: Laughlin Sled Corp., 71 N. L. R. B. 1261) • 
. The f<>lly of permitting a continuation of·this :policy is dramatically 
illustrated by what-has happened in· the capijve mines of the Jones· & 
Lauf?hlin Steel Corp. since supervisory employees w~e organized by 
the t.Tnited Mine W 9rkers under the protection of the act. . Discipli-
nary slips issued by the und.erp-ound _s11pervisors .in these mines. have 
iallen off by two-thirds and the.accid,ent rate in each mirie has doubled. 
(See testimony-_ of H. Parker Sh~rp,. hearings on S. 55 and S. J. Res. 22; 
vol. l, p·. 3E39, Ile J<>iies and Laughlin &e_el (!orp.1 71 N. L, Jl~ ~- J,26_l.) In diawmg an amendment to meet this s1tuati:on, the comnuttee has 
not been unmindful of the fact ~i cer~a.in employees: with minor 
~uperviso:ry_ duties have proble~.-~hi~ may justify their inclusio;n 
m tba~ act._ It has· therefore <listmguished .between straw bosses, 
leadlnen, set-up nien,· and other minor supervisory employees, ~n the 
one hand, a.nd the supervisor vested with sucb.·:genuine .management 
preroga.ti.v~ ~ the'J.ight to hlre or.fire, <Ji~cipline, ·or m~ke_.effective 
recommendations with respect to such aot1on. In other words the 
committee. has adopted the test which the Board itself has m~de Jn 
numerous ~es w.lien it has permitted certain categories of super-
visory employees to be• included· in the same bargainini unit with the 
rank a.nd file.. (Bethlehem Steel, Oompa,ny, SpaN40W8 Poi~ Division, 65 
N; L._'R. B. 2&4 (~xpediters); Pitu!ru,rgh Egji,U4bl.e Meur O-Ompany, 61 
N. L. R. B. 880 (group l~ders.with a~~nority to give.instructions an_d 
to lay ~ut the work); Ruhards Olumical Works, 65 N. L. R. B. H 
(supel'Vi.sors who are m~e conduits for transmittiilg orders); Endicottc. 
Jolfrtson1 67 N. L. R. B.1342, 1347- (persons having the title.rif foreman 
and assistant (oreman but wit4 .no authority other than .to keep 
production mo!ll18') .) . • . . . . • . . 
Before formule.tmg· this defirut1on, the committee considered e. pro-
J>O$al1 occasionally. advanced, which would have limited the prote~tihn 
. of foremen to joining or organizing unions. whose membership was 
confined to supervisory personne.l and not affiliated with eithe1 of the 
maf or labo:r federations. After c<?~siderable discussion, the-coIIllll!,t~ 
decided that any suro. co:inproin.Jse. would be CQmple.tely unrealistic. 
There is· iioihi,!lg · in· 'tlie record developed. before this co~ttee. to 
justify the oonclusic>n that there is such a. thing as a really independent 
foremen's .. otganization. 
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It is true the.t the Foremen's Association of America. is nominally 
independent, but its president admitted in testifying before us that it 
was the practice of his union to. confer with reptesento.tives of various 
CIO and AFL unions to work out a. common policy in the event of a. 
strike. (See testimony of Robert H. Keys,. ict., vol. 3, pp. 232""'."233.) 
A number of Boa.rd cases a.re studded with evidmce showing collabo-
ration both in the or~e.nizingsta.ge and in concert0d activity between 
the Foremen>s Association and affiliated unions. . (See Re Chrysler 
Oorp_ .. 69 N. L.R. B. 182; Re B. F. Goodrich, 65 N. L. R. B. 294; and 
Re L.A. Young Spring Wire, 65 N. L. R. B. 298.) It also appeared 
that i.he only major company in mass-production industry which has 
had n. coll~ctive agreement with the Foremen's Association is the 
Ford Motor Co. :Although this wa.s cited by the Foremen's Asso-
ciation as refuting industry's fears that productivity would suffer if 
it entered into collective relations with supervisors, it is si~nifi.ee.nt 
that within the past week this very company he.s s~rved notice of its 
termination of its agreement with the a.ssocia.tion. The termination 
wo.s accompanied with a statement of the company that-
After 3 years• experience * • * the results have been the opposite of what 
•we have hoped for~ Rs.ther than exerting its efforts to bring foremen into closer 
relationship with management, your association has worked in the opposite direc-
tion. 
It is natural to expect that unless this Congress takes action, man-
agement will be deprived of the undivided loyalty of its foremen.: 
There is an inherent tendency to subordinate their interests wherever 
· they conflict with those of the rank and file:. As one witness put it, 
"Two groups of people working on parallel lines eventually find a 
parallel interest." (See testimony of ,James D. Francis, id., vol. 1, 
p. 23~.) 
In recommending the adoption of this amendment, the committee is 
trying to make clear what Congress attempted to demonstrate last 
yes.r when it adopted the Case. l>ill. By drawing a mor~- definite line 
between management, o.nd labor we believe the proposed lo.ngu~e has 
fully met some of the technical criticisms to the corresponding section 
referred to in the President's veto of that bill. It should be noted 
the.tall that the bill does is to leave foremen in the same position in 
which they were until the Labor Board reversed the position it had 
originally taken in 1943 in the Maryf,a,nd Drydock case (49 N. L. R. B. 
733). In other words, the bill does not prevent anyone from organizing 
nor does it prohibit any employer from recognizing a union of foremen. 
It merely relieves employers who are subject to the na.tiono.1 act free 
from any compulsion by this N ationo.l Board or any loco.I agency to 
accord to the front line of ·management the anomalous status of 
employees. · 
COMPULSORY UNION MEMBERSHIP 
A controversial issue to which the committee has devoted the most 
mature deliberation has been the problem posed by compulsory union 
membership. It should be noted that when the railway workers were 
given the protection of the Railway Labor Act, Congress thought tho.t 
the provisions which prevented discrimination against union member-
ship and provided for the certification of bo.rge.ining representatives 
obviated the justification for closed-shop or union-shop arrangements. 
That statute specifically forbids n.ny kind. of compulsory unionism. 
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